Stellingwerff believes that some statements in Kuyper’s *Stone Lectures* are Gnostic and mystical, including Kuyper’s idea of the regenerated heart (64, 65, 90). But Stellingwerff omits mentioning that Dooyeweerd praises these very statements! Do we really need to label this as Gnostic? As for mysticism, Stellingwerff regards it as a striving to transcend (37). But for Dooyeweerd, we already transcend time in our heart! Dooyeweerd’s mysticism is the experience of our present supratemporal heart reality, out of which proceed or “issue” our temporal acts, including theoretical thought.

Or does ‘reformational’ merely mean a continued reform of philosophy, without concern for continuity with the past? But then there is no longer any common basis or foundation to reformational philosophy. There is no criterion to judge the adequacy of the criticism of the past. Dooyeweerd certainly refused to accept the criticisms leveled at his philosophy, and he provided a criterion — the importance and reality of the supratemporal heart and religious root. In his last article, Dooyeweerd insisted again on their necessity in order to understand the nature of theoretical thought, its difference from pre-theoretical experience, and even the basis for the irreducibility of the modal aspects. And in *Twilight of Western Thought*, Dooyeweerd said that the Christian ground-motive of creation, fall and redemption is misunderstood unless it is interpreted in relation to this supratemporal religious root. Stellingwerff is right that religious ground-motives are not theoretical presuppositions; they work in our supratemporal heart (94). But Stellingwerff, unlike Dooyeweerd, compares them to Vollenhoven’s philosophical types and time currents (57, 58, 67, 108).

Stellingwerff’s book is an interesting introduction to the history of reformational philosophy. But his conclusions are premature, and much more work needs to be done. We should not move too quickly to systematization and attempted harmonization. We need to look for the sources, both Calvinistic and non-Calvinistic, that have influenced reformational philosophers. And we need to acknowledge the real and radical differences between Vollenhoven and Dooyeweerd. In reformational philosophy, there was more than one sower, and they were not planting the same seed.

J. Glenn Friesen


Jan van der Stoep’s 2005 Doctoral dissertation from the Philosophy Faculty of the Vrije Universiteit Amsterdam is a complex work. Van der Stoep explores how Bourdieu’s critical, reflexive sociology confronts political philosophy and in so doing he makes connections between philosophical argument and the policies that prevail within multicultural polities. It provides a welcome and perceptive overview of the reflexive sociological theory of Pierre Bourdieu (1930-2002), but in fact the author has something more in mind than merely a critical commentary. Van der Stoep writes as one concerned for how justice is to be justly implemented in multicultural societies like his own, and he is also eager to make a constructive contribution to current political philosophy. Such is his respect for Bourdieu that he would also become an expert interpreter of this French socialist sociologist whose work has been widely read, translated from French into English and other languages. Van der Stoep’s discussion gains its critical bearings from this French socialist’s selection of Blaise Pascal (1623-1662) as his preferred intellectual predecessor and, because of this, the work takes on still another dimension — it is an indirect contribution to the widening scholarly discussion in many disciplines about the contemporary relevance of Pascal.
This work is framed to lay a foundation, not just for debate about multiculturalism, but to develop insight as to why the public ethos supporting multiculturalism seems to have evaporated. Previously "culture" was viewed as irrelevant; any lack of integration within the national community was viewed as the result of social and economic factors. Now an inability to engage in civil society is viewed as a symptom of a cultural resistance to civilised democratic values. The book promotes discussion of Bourdieu’s sociology when, in the Netherlands and elsewhere, multiculturalism is paraded as the reason for a lack of civic integration. It is also not too far-fetched to interpret this as a contribution across two 20th century "pillars" (the Christian and the socialist) of Dutch civil society. Indeed why shouldn’t the author have in mind a reformational provocation of Dutch socialist theoretical reflection on multiculturalism via this critical report on how a French socialist confronts neo-liberalism and its multicultural consequences?

As the title suggests, this dissertation has (at least) three distinct, but interrelated, foci. It examines the reflexive sociology of one who describes himself as “left of the left”, distils the basic tenets of Bourdieu’s critical orientation (Chapters 1 & 2) and then launches into the arena of political philosophy, pitting Bourdieu’s critical perspective against the arguments and insights of Habermas, Walzer, Rawls, Kymlicka and Taylor (Chapters 3, 4 & 5). This is done under various heads: the structure of the democratic state (Chapter 3); the question of governmental neutrality and group-specific rights (Chapter 4), and concluding with a discussion of how public morality relates to variously positioned persons and social groups (Chapter 5). It is these three chapters which develop the political philosophical discussion of multiculturalism, the third focus of the work. The aim, presumably, is to identify key political philosophical principles that should guide public policy and legislation. Political philosophical debate is explored in order to begin laying out principles for how a just political order will deal with the differences and day-to-day issues that emerge for people when several ethnic and cultural groups live side-by-side.

Van der Stoep frames his exposition in terms of Bourdieu’s late-in-career self-designation: "Bourdieu benadrukt echter dat hij meer een pascaliërs dan een marxistisch denker is" (19 (The reference is to Méditations pascalienes 1997, 91)). This is an important facet of recent (socialist) sociological reflexive understanding of the critical theorist’s place in history. The "pascaliërmoment" in Bourdieu’s work intrigues Van der Stoep and it is worth hearing further from Bourdieu to identify the subtle intellectual processes that are at work in his socialist reflections. But, above all, I had always been grateful to Pascal, as I understood him, for his concern, devoid of all populist naivety, for ‘ordinary people’ and the ‘sound opinions of the people’; ... (Pascalian Meditations (PM) 2000, 2). Van der Stoep captures this self-critical character of Bourdieu’s "gauche de gauche" sociology, taking his cue from Bourdieu’s account of the place from which he made his contribution to the (French) intellectual tradition. Bourdieu knew that Pascal and French moralism had made a significant contribution to his own (oft-times negatively designated “Marxist”) reflections. In this remarkable book, he outlines the “errors of scholastic reason”, those assumptions that preserve "the enchanted circle of collective denial" (PM 5), within academia but not only there.

Van der Stoep’s summarized exegesis of Bourdieu’s “The Three Forms of Scholastic Fallacy” is found in the initial chapter “De dwalingen van de scholastische rede” (19-57). The three fallacies are explained in the chapter’s three parts: the fallacy/error of originality (de dwaling van de oorspronkelijkheid) — an inherited tendency in the historically transmitted illusion of the scholarly “tribe” to believe that their academic/scientific/theoretical/philosophical contribution is, in the final analysis, a self-validating exercise based upon a point of reference (an archimedean point perhaps) from which a universal over-view may be obtained and can be proclaimed; the fallacy/error of disinterestedness (de dwaling van de belangeloosheid), the assumption of
communication without manipulation, which refers to the linguistic cloak of neutrality which is an integral (and ambiguous) part of the scholastic vision of academic self-interest — this is a power which exists by virtue of it being repressed, part of a struggle for recognition, for the power that comes from being seen to present an unbiased and hence universal viewpoint; the fallacy/error of transparency (de dwaling van de transparantie) which is an academic prejudice that forgets that it is embodied in a certain place in the social order, removed from the urgencies of working life, having become oblivious to the freedom, in economic and political terms, that is part of the “vocation” of those who study.

Seen in these terms this Proefschrift indicates that its author, Director of an Amersfoort Instituut voor CultuurEthiek, demands a lot from his theoretical reflections and research. To address these multi-dimensional and multi-layered problems in a society which is confessionally pluralistic, as well as institutionally complex and diverse, would have required that concerted attention be given to the “big picture”, even if that society had not begun to re-consider the limits of its tradition of multicultural tolerance. If valuable scientific advice is to be proffered, then the “big picture” cannot be set aside, and this is a dissertation seeking insight from within an intense and bewildering public debate. It has all the marks of the author’s experience of living within, and being shaped by, a multicultural society in which his own academic leisure (a term central to Bourdieu’s third fallacy: skholè) to write this thesis is in stark, inspiring contrast with the way his own Christian commitment has brought him (and his family) into intimate day-by-day contact with over-crowded, high-density living among working-class people of diverse ethnic and religious background. That experience stands behind this effort to develop a cultural ethics that makes its own contribution to justice in the public realm.

Van der Stoep shares Bourdieu’s commitment to a full-blooded social-political involvement on the side of those “lower” and “less autonomous”, particularly in situations and circumstances of intense human stress, hardship and bewilderment, where people do not have the day-to-day elbow room to freely form their own lives. He warms to Bourdieu’s “filosofie als negatie van de filosofie”, (“a kind of negative philosophy that was liable to appear self-destructive” PM, 7), which is formed not just to dispel illusions, but to reflexively expose the illusions and fallacies by which philosophy maintains its “scholastic denial”. In this sense, Bourdieu’s critique offers Van der Stoep a path to think about the weaknesses of political philosophy as it confronts a multicultural reality in the Netherlands, France, Europe, the western world and the globe. In this sense a Dutch language discussion of the modus operandi of a French sociological anthropologist is as good a place as any to begin — in a scholarly sense — to overcome any anamnesis (forgetting) within the North Atlantic political philosophy of multiculturalism about the multicultural social conditions that make such philosophical reflection possible.

The second chapter “Het oeuvre van Bourdieu” (58-110) is a detailed discussion of Bourdieu’s intellectual contribution from his days at the École Normale Superieure in the 1950s, his dissatisfaction with the “philosophy of the subject” in Sartre’s existentialism, and his subsequent “immigration” to social science. In 1981 he became the successor to Raymond Aron at the Collège de France and his numerous publications, beginning with his fieldwork studies in Algeria in the 1960s, have consistently defended a reflexive sociology that logically led him to involvement in various social movements, providing a “left of left” option for defending the rights of marginalized minorities, the jobless, the homeless, immigrants and other groups whose place is made precarious under neo-liberal ideology. It would be good to have Van der Stoep’s “pascalienne” interpretation of Bourdieu expanded and available in English, in an article, if not in a book. In English Bourdieu’s work has, in the main, been appropriated within the sociology of education, but Van der Stoep helps us understand how Bourdieu conceived his “sociology of education” as his base-line critique of
theory *per se*. Perhaps, just as much, it should also be available in French and at the very least a French summary of the thesis should be included alongside the English summary in any new printing.

In Chapters 3-5 Van der Stoep extends Bourdieu’s contribution to the political philosophy of multiculturalism. Here he appears to be highly restrained if not somewhat inconclusive. Van der Stoep claims Bourdieu as a collaborator in multicultural politics, emphasizing the importance of promoting social security and social recognition so that people can “develop an ethos of self actualization, public responsibility and tolerance” (263). One might also have expected that Bourdieu’s “Three Forms of Scholastic Fallacy” would be applied “critically” to unmask the arbitrary character of latter-day scholasticism in political philosophy, but such an application runs counter to Bourdieu’s explicit intention. Bourdieu reminds those who attend to his critique that his reflexive perspective aims to be a *reminder* of the social setting in which theorizing takes place. “The logic in which this reminder is situated is that of epistemological questioning, and not that of political denunciation (which has almost always made it possible to dispense with the former) ...” (PM 49). So Van der Stoep follows Bourdieu’s “epistemological” tenets as an apprentice “fieldworker” who seeks to gain insight from the well-seasoned ethnographer of the social landscape. This dimension of the thesis may be confusing to some readers who want the author to provide more definitive answers, but seen in this “Bourdieuian” way the dissertation does maintain a coherence as part of Van der Stoep’s search for principles to guide him in the “field” of cultural ethics. At the same time, he occasionally takes distance from Bourdieu, showing his critical determination to discern in what way, or indeed how far, he can follow down Bourdieu’s path in philosophical fieldwork.

This indicates to me that though difficult to evaluate in terms of one specific “research question”, this *Proefschrift* is yet an attempt to lay out an agenda for further post-doctoral inquiry inspired by a Christian vision. Van der Stoep has avoided complicating his dissertation further by appending his own philosophical conclusion. There are many hints and critical observations throughout which indicate his underlying Christian commitment. The author has done enough to justify ongoing consideration of Bourdieu’s writings by reformational sociologists, educationalists and political theorists working co-operatively in the “field”. Consider, for instance, Bourdieu’s *doxa* “that the most fundamental problems of political philosophy can only be posed and truly resolved by means of a return to the mundane observations of the sociology of learning and upbringing” (PM 168). Such co-operative “fieldwork” can learn from Bourdieu and will not close its eyes as if politics is somehow absent from the school, the class-room, the lecture theatre, the playground, or the cafeteria, let alone any Philosophy Faculty which brings forth *Proefschriften* for examination in order that qualifications be lawfully conferred. But if a reformational political theory is to confront Bourdieu’s political view it will need an exhaustive and systematic inquiry of Bourdieu’s view that political authority has no ultimate basis for its historically-derived legitimacy with a political theory that revives its normative and reformational theoretical account of the structures and structuring of the political community, as well as all other community associations and institutions including schooling. As insight is gained by historical and sociological research we remind ourselves of our part in human history, the God-given stewardship that is grounded in Christ’s redemptive rule over all of the creation. We look forward to further writings from Jan van der Stoep that arise from his full-bodied struggle from creative fieldwork in cultural ethics and his provocative contribution to Bourdieu studies.

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