

INTRODUCTION: A Great Awakening

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All it is is think

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USNA William C. Stutt Ethics Lecture, Fall 2003

Near 20 years ago a committee of the United States Senate directed its federal military academies to submit their students to a college credit course in ethics before commissioning them as officers. Hitherto, academy ethics course requirements had been imposed or lifted as each superintendent saw fit. Provoked by the antics of an Annapolis graduate and his prevarication in their chambers, our elected representatives saw fit to impose the requirement by Congressional mandate.

The mandate and courses are matters of public record, not state secrets, but public knowledge of them is nil. Their significance is not appreciated, not considered. No reckoning is made of what these matters tell us about the culture of this nation and the culture of its military. It takes a peculiar mindset, an historically novel house of assumptions and hopes, for a society to respond to the misbehavior of a military officer by compelling his successors to study the most intellectually cultivated thinking on ethics and the proper conduct of the managers of its means of killing masses of persons. This is, I believe, the sole Congressionally enjoined course at our service academies – or anywhere. That students may refer to it as "the Ollie North course" with some degree of cynicism is not surprising or dispiriting.

This book testifies to that mandate's significance. So the book owes much to the escapades of Lt. Col. Oliver North, USMC (ret.), and appreciates his most enduring contribution to the nation he served so daringly and thoughtlessly. The new requirement rejuvenated ethics education at his alma mater, the U.S. Naval Academy (USNA), where it had been rather moribund, unlike the U.S. Military Academy (USMA) and the U.S. Air Force Academy (USAFA). These institutions share a central mission of instilling character and central assumptions how to execute it. Character instillation has always been mostly by various modes of indoctrination, not education: training and exhortation, not intellectual challenges and critical thought. The fate of Philosophy and Ethical Theory had waxed and waned over the years, each school having its own history.¹ At USNA, with the mandated introduction of a mandated course and the institutional focus on this new intellectual component, other of the character development programs became more educational, less inculcational, more analytic, critical, thoughtful and thought provoking. The other academies have trended alike.

To advise and aid its efforts, USNA instituted a position, the Distinguished Chair in Ethics (DCE), which was, I believe, without precedent. It was an academic faculty position, a visiting professorship (effectively for two years) in the Ethics Section, yet its prime function was neither teaching nor scholarly research, but instead advising the

¹Throughout this volume, the term "philosophy" refers primarily to the process and product of dialectical thought in the Socratic tradition typified by this collection. The ruminations of a Marcus Aurelius and comparable thoughtful warriors are not disdained, just not discussed. So too for prophetic teachings, preachings and parables presented without reasoned argument.

Academy's Superintendent (College President), the Commandant (Dean of Students), and the Provost/Academic Dean regarding USNA's very various efforts at enhancing the moral character of midshipmen. The DCE was funded with a private, alumni donation. Taxpayer support of this mission was insufficient.

The advising extended to overseeing the academy's diverse Ethics Across the Curriculum (EAC) activities. Advisory competence was presumed to come from applying an expertise in moral reasoning and its instruction at civilian institutions to the knowledge acquired as participant-observer in USNA's ethics and character education programs, sitting on Academy executive boards and team-teaching the core ethics course with 3-5 civilian Ph.D.'s and some 30 senior military officers, from Marine Majors to retired Fleet Admirals. The DCE's understanding of his client's needs was regularly facilitated and encouraged with frank personal conversations and sponsored on-site inspections of the comparable programs at USMA and USAFA. I met less suspiciousness than when I advised a law enforcement agency decades prior. (Per usual, suspicions peak in middle management.) The absence of clearance for classified matters of national security did not thwart relevant inquiries.

The DCE was designed to be a position of influence, not window-dressing for outsiders. In USNA's military organizational flow chart the DCE was one of about eight persons reporting directly to the commanding officer, the Superintendent, a 3-star admiral. The only other faculty member with that access was the DCE's counterpart, with whom he shared a secretary, the Distinguished Chair in Leadership, a retired 3- or 4-star admiral.

I was honored to be the last holder of this visiting chair. The DCE was terminated when its mission was largely accomplished. USNA ethics education had been vitalized. The Ethics Section was staffed with (just barely) enough Philosophy Ph.D.'s. The core course had evolved and stabilized. Retaining a plushly paid and supported DCE became a luxury for an academy facing brutal budget cuts (some 25%) for an indefinite future due to America's "war on terror" (a term rolling some Admirals' eyes.)

As overseer of the Academy's EAC programs, the DCE directed a lecture series, inviting outside philosophy professors to give informal brown bag talks open to the USNA faculty and staff – and often attended by the Superintendent himself. (Faculty at civilian schools with 4000+ students can report how commonly they see their President at comparable events.) Midshipmen were welcome but their schedules allow scant options.

Many of these monthly talks were original contributions to scholarly philosophical thought as intellectually impressive as any presented at Harvard or Oxford. Many of our nation's most esteemed moral philosophers came happily, despite an honorarium well below the going rate at civilian schools. Many talks were on topics not distinctively military. Enough of the best had enough specific military focus to publish a collection with topical coherence. Another talk I helped arrange that called for inclusion was the Fall 2002 guest lecture in the military ethics course by Michael Walzer, the pre-eminent theorist in the field.

Serendipitously, the selections make a neat structure of six essays, each a substantial contribution to the literature of so-called *Just War Theory* (JWT), with three in Part I on *jus ad bellum* (the propriety of going to war, engaging in war at all) and three in Part II on *jus in bello* (the propriety of military conduct within a war). Part I presents

competing conceptions of the intellectual and political history of JWT, and competing conceptions of basic principles and their application to America's main recent military ventures. Collectively they shred their government's two favorite rationalizations for invading Iraq. The essays of Part II finely analyze and compellingly challenge three pillars of current *jus in bello* orthodoxy.

The lead essay, Michael Walzer's "The Triumph of the Just War Tradition, and the Dangers of Success", is a brief intellectual and political history of JWT focusing on *jus ad bellum*. His essay is something of a retrospective on his *Just and Unjust Wars* (1977), which took JWT from the cloisters of religious and legal theorists and made it a cottage industry in secular, civilian, academic political philosophy. Such thinking entered the academies with the intellectualization of moral education there. Cadets and midshipmen had long been taught the laws of war. Now they studied the best moral theorizing about those laws and debates questioning their onerous restrictions. Walzer's book became the only text on JWT the military academies (independently) required in all the required ethics courses. In his USNA talk, as usual, Walzer's historical analysis is at the service of his political analysis, in this case, on the principles regarding preemptive and preventive wars, and their import for the impending U.S. invasion of Iraq (at that time, some four months away) and the "Bush doctrine".

George Lucas' "Methodological Anarchy: Arguing about Preventive War" looks at JWT and its history afresh, also with an eye toward evaluating the Bush doctrine. He sees Walzer working in a distinctive, modern tributary, departing in important respects from older streams of thought, with a distinctive style of analysis and a more restricted, defensive attitude than the original, Catholic tradition supported. Walzer's historical

account describes an evolution with great continuities in the content of JWT and great shifts in its political influence. Lucas emphasizes the contrasts in the content and methods among distinct and often insular traditions of JWT. On this view, the term, *Just War Theory*, may now be a misnomer. The actual referent of that name is no longer (if it ever was) a relatively unified theory but a topic around which families of argument have contended, with various distinctive doctrines, concepts, methodologies and frameworks. For Lucas, this renders suspect any claims about what JWT says on controversial issues like preventive and preemptive war. This volume well illustrates Lucas' point. Its critiques of core principles of JWT orthodoxy are all in-house proposals for reform of JWT. Neither individually nor collectively do they present a repudiation of any doctrine with authoritative claim to the title, "Just War Theory". With this complex history as backdrop, Lucas analyzes our concept of *vigilante* and insightfully applies it to America's invasion of Iraq, and a remarkable recent trend of cases.

Richard Miller's "Crossing Borders to Fight Injustice" critically examines the most common rationale for U. S. military action in recent years and likely the foreseeable future: "humanitarian intervention". Combining a richly informed historical understanding with careful normative analysis, Miller advances leagues beyond the vague generalizations typical of *jus ad bellum* discussions, and identifies considerations of sufficient plausibility and specificity to frame deliberations about engaging in humanitarian intervention. This is JWT brought down to earth: "applied ethics" applying no ethical theory, but instead skills, best acquired by studying ethical theory, in locating and formulating the essential structure of a complex moral controversy. Miller operates without a net, without reference to any "theory", and lets his readers' good sense see the

good sense in some *jus ad bellum* principles with a specificity that limits self-serving interpretation.

These three essays about deciding to war are tied to past events, but are in no danger of being “dated” or out of date. Their depth ensures their enduring interest.

The other three talks were directed against three principles currently assumed crucial for *jus in bello*: (1) A differentiation of the class of legitimate military targets from a protected class of things not permissibly subject to military attacks; (2) A prohibition of *intentionally* harming members of the protected class that permits harming them unintentionally, even if knowingly, by otherwise permissible acts; (3) A restriction of the responsibility of combatants to compliance with the rules of *jus in bello*, and absolution of their responsibility for their contribution to a heinous activity, their nation’s violation of *jus ad bellum*, and its terrible consequences.

Much JWT thinking departs from St. Thomas Aquinas’ dicta, while his Doctrine of Double Effect (DDE) still skews *jus in bello* thinking, legal and moral, about military targeting. Applied to war, the DDE assumes a differentiation of legitimate military targets – enemy combatants and the materials essential to their activity (e.g., facilities for producing, transporting or storing munitions) -- from illegitimate military targets: noncombatants (most civilians, military clergy and medical personnel, POWs, etc.) and their means of survival. The DDE flatly condemns all intentional harming of noncombatants, and then licenses any military to incinerate, suffocate or dismember any number of noncombatant bodies, just so long as it was *unintentional*, and even when it was as foreseeable as sunrise, but only when the horrific wreckage is “proportionate”

according to some incomprehensible comparison with the target's morally mystifying "military value".

Thomas Scanlon's "The Proper Role of Intention in Military Decision Making" distinguishes our multiple conceptions of intentionality and explains why intentions have, at most, only an incidental relevance to the moral permissibility of military targeting. Military strategists and tacticians may come away from this highly abstract essay worrying whether it has any practical import. The question, if not the worry, is appropriate, for Scanlon is not out to reform, but to make systematic sense of, the case by case moral judgments most reasonable people already accept. The practical import here, as in much moral theorizing, is that a refined theoretical understanding lessens our liability to fall into errors, confusion, indecision, or self-deception or to fall for propaganda and self-serving rationalizations when confronting novel or complex controversies. Scanlon argues that the moral discriminations we already make are incompatible with the DDE. The pattern of our "gut" judgments is best explained by our operating, consciously or not, more reasonably, more sensitively to everyone's legitimate interests, and without confusing an action's moral quality with the moral qualities of the agent's motivation. Scanlon's analysis tells against a venerable dogma of *jus in bello*, and equally against the equally venerable dogma of *jus ad bellum* that however much our circumstances cry us to war, however many millions more suffer if we don't war, however compelling the moral reasons for going to war, we must not war unless these are the reasons that will us to war. (Nations need be wary of guidance from those more concerned with sin than international justice.)

Jeffrey Reiman's answer to his title question, "Ethics for Calamities: How Strict is the Moral Rule Against Targeting Noncombatants?" is a trenchant criticism of the traditional conception of military discrimination presupposed by the DDE. Reiman shares many of Scanlon's intuitive doubts about the moral significance of intentionality, but his own primary target is the moral significance of the combatant-noncombatant distinction sanctioned by the current laws of war. The conventions determining combatant and noncombatant status have notorious incongruities, and Reiman is hardly the first to notice various obvious paradoxical features of the orthodoxy here. Reiman goes deeper and proposes a novel restructuring of principles to register our untutored responses to warfare's scale of manmade suffering. He boldly yet cautiously defends some radical conclusions that many readers may recoil from, while many others greet gladly for their sensitivity to their own moral sensibilities.

Richard Schoonhoven's "Invincible Ignorance, Moral Equality, and Professional Obligation" critiques the modern assumption that has walled off issues of *jus in bello* from those of *jus ad bellum* and made war a moral singularity. Outside warfare, unless excused by extraordinary coercion, duress or the like, people are held accountable, morally and legally, for their contribution to a wrongful infliction of great suffering. Following Walzer's *Just and Unjust Wars* which would have us "collectivize" responsibility for warring, current JWT orthodoxy (excepting Catholicism's Augustinian tradition) regards all combatants as "moral equals" in the sense that, however just or unjust the cause a combatant serves, every combatant is, morally, equally entitled to harm (kill, injure, imprison) enemy combatants by any means *jus in bello* precepts permit. This amazing modern moral notion says, in essence, that no conscience can justifiably object

to military service in any of its nation's war, for combatants are exempt from all moral responsibility for such service. Nothing remotely like this alleged disappearance of accountability is needed to justify current war conventions prohibiting harsh treatment of all captive enemy combatants. Nor is there historical evidence of this notion explaining why nations all around this planet, whatever their cultural heritage, commit themselves to these conventions. Unalloyed considerations of national self-interest are plenty obvious and powerful enough to explain and justify every nation's signature. Schoonhoven step by step dismantles this principle's standard rationale, which exculpates all combatants by attributing to them an "invincible ignorance" of the justice of their nation's cause. He does not pretend to prove that combatants are morally complicit in the horrendous injustices abetted by their serving their nation. Suffice that Schoonhoven leaves us wondering how we could honestly justify denying this.

A collection of these six essays would merit publication on its own as a prime candidate for the central text in a college course on JWT. I know of no other single work that can compel such a thorough, fundamental, multifaceted rethinking of JWT. We might all profit if it were read by the world's opinion makers and decision makers.

That these were all invited talks at the Naval Academy of the world's mightiest military makes their publication all the more valuable. They are illuminating historical documents, evidence of a matter of great global interest. They exemplify the efforts of the American military to sharpen and strengthen the moral sense of its officers by confronting them with the most intellectually challenging moral and political thinking on military matters currently available. That two of the six authors are regular, full-time

academy professors is further evidence of the quality the academies' moral education programs sometimes attain.

Before my stint as DCE, I, like most civilians, assumed that military education is, as it generally had been, the installation of rigid habits of thought and action, solid skills and stolid character. Of course, unlike their enlisted subordinates, commanders need substantial skills of analysis and innovation, but any questioning of first principles is uncalled for – or so it had been thought and still is by most civilians, and many in the military.

This book documents, celebrates and anxiously reflects upon a Great Awakening, an untrumpeted intellectual and moral liberation within America's military. That military still wants its personnel to be imbued with common core values and principles. But now the organization, or at least enough of its leadership, recognizes that its forces cannot function well unless their officers have the capacities for independent, critical thought developed by a liberal arts education that explores and questions the central pillars of its culture, including its most fundamental moral assumptions. This realization has much the same roots as the recognition, expressed by the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, that conditions of the modern world "place a premium on our [military's] ability to foster innovation in our" military personnel.²

Publication of these essays is overdue. Actions of American military personnel at Abu Ghraib, Guantanamo, Haditha, Hamandiyah -- and rumors of many more -- have shocked the conscience of world opinion like never before, and set off a great surge of concern, sweeping across the United States and around the world, about the ethics

² "Joint Vision 2020", U.S. Printing Office, Washington, DC, 2000.

education of American military personnel. A global concern with the moral character of America's military personnel is understandable and justifiable. Regrettably, the anxious babbling has rumbled self-righteously along unchecked by any inkling of the transformation in American military moral education over the last two decades. This nation, its allies and its enemies, all ought to learn of the admirable efforts that have been made, starting long before the invasion of Iraq, to armor the conscience of America's military officers with the world's most advanced weapons of ethical reasoning. Every nation has reason to join this book in celebrating this military's strivings to make the quality of moral thought in its academies as good as it gets anywhere.

Publication of these essays is needed to provide interested parties everywhere, not the fleeting comfort of vague assurances, but a vivid, first-hand sense of the character and quality of ethics education at America's military academies. It matters mightily that what USNA wanted and got were talks of utmost critical acuity and intellectual rigor, not sermons or pep talks reciting official doctrine. My guess is that it would (rightly) mean little to most people to be told that our future officers read a few bits and pieces from the classics (Aristotle, Kant, etc.) It might mean lots to lots of people to read and wrestle with the kind of current, intellectually daunting, counter-establishment, moral and political critiques this military has its present and prospective leaders consider and come to terms with.

The academies must contend with the reality that most citizens suppose (with none but anecdotal evidence) that the old ways are wisest, that service personnel are best kept on paths straight and narrow just by firm discipline and ritual reaffirmations of moral platitudes. Many people, like the many entering these military academies, are

blissfully certain that they already know perfectly well what is right and what is wrong, and they see no value in – indeed no possibility of – further *education* in such matters. For that mindset it is unimaginable how officers could benefit from confronting arguments of the gauge, caliber, and penetrating power of these essays. In fact, as officers often come to appreciate (after the course or after the academy), they desperately need to learn that there really are moral arguments markedly more mature than anything they meet in the media, officer clubs, or church

The audience for these talks are persons of demonstrably superior intelligence who could recognize that what they were being exposed to is a lot of stuff the likes of which they had not seen before, with an unfamiliar density of abstraction, nuanced qualifications, novel distinctions, close argument and counter-argument. Whether any in the audience was persuaded by any of the reasoning is immaterial. While much of the character training at the academies has a definite doctrinal agenda, what drives much of the compulsory ethics course, and the whole EAC lecture series (and this volume deriving from it) is not any doctrinal agenda. (No guiding animus against JWT orthodoxy lurks here.) The audience is properly empowered even when struggling to grasp the subtleties of the more abstract essays. They can still see that their difficulties in following the argument lie with themselves. This is all fairly jargon-free reasoning, but the ratio of argument to assertion is high, and the language is taut, precise, without fluff. It is reasoning that *compels* respect, even if not concurrence. These essays show their audience what Socrates showed his: that another human being may very well have thought through some moral matter more skillfully, imaginatively and insightfully than they had or could have on their own, and come to other conclusions. Appreciating that

unnerving fact is the first step toward a proper humility about one's capacities as a leader, a decision maker, a moral judge and a human being.

These essays are one indicia of our military's enlightenment. Another indicia is the creation of the DCE position. America's citizenry would do well to reflect upon the fact that our military turned to academic ethical theorists, with no ties to the military or reliance on allegedly revealed truths, to guide its efforts to cultivate its officers' moral thought and character. Many professed patriots, who avow profound fealty to and fondness for their nation while forsaking its founding principles, would call for the academies to trust chaplains and Holy Scripture to give whatever moral guidance is needed.

Still another indicia of our military's intellectual liberation. Many a patriot would suffer a slacked jaw on learning of their defense force's hiring me, of all people, for DCE despite both the FBI dossier on the 1968 return of my draft card in protest of the Vietnam War, and the taste for acidic irony, alien to academese and militarese alike, indulged in my writings. More, USNA hired me despite my showing no signs of mellowing but instead, during my interview, bluntly voicing skepticism of the contents, structure and staffing of what I had seen of USNA's core ethics course. Still more startling (my marveling remains), the academy leadership I worked for evidently welcomed my ungenerous assessments, and sure seemed to take my advice seriously by acting on it with greater than random frequency, sometimes despite influential opposition. All this testifies to the intellectual and moral seriousness of my employers, not to any talents I may have.

Yet, predictably, the enlightenment of America's military remains a work in progress, and sometimes in regress. Though not in headlong retreat, the advances have sometimes given ground. There is a characteristic military mindset, distinctive habits of thought and feeling, favored by the organizational imperatives of the military. Those imperatives make uniformity a priority and motivate mechanisms encouraging and entrenching the mindset. Revising core cultural assumptions or encouraging the questioning of them is bound to engender resistance from many of the multi-million members of the Department of Defense (DoD) and its service branches -- and disconnects among its enormous complex of offices, policies and practices. The enlightenment exhibited and nurtured by the academies is partial even there. Outside their walls, the reigning mindset continues, knowingly or unthinkingly, to subvert it. However dismaying, it is hardly surprising to hear official organs broadcast “Stormin” Norman Schwarzkopf’s sorry simplification: “The truth of the matter is that you always know the right thing to do. The hard part is doing it.” That conviction, with its evident certainty, so natural for military minds, is a dagger at the heart of the ethics education programs this volume celebrates.

As DCE teaching in USNA’s core ethics course, I needed to acquire a deep understanding of JWT. As DCE advising USNA’s leaders on all aspects of its efforts at developing moral character, I needed to acquire a deep understanding of Professional Military Ethics Education (PMEE). Some results of my efforts comprise the two chapters of this volume’s Part III. My ambitions there are multiple. One main aim of Part III is to chart or create connections between JWT and PMEE that neither has much noticed. The first essay, “The Moral Singularity of Military Professionalism”(MSMP), aims (1) to

contribute to JWT as traditionally conceived by considering Schoonhoven's topic of combatant moral equality from the perspective of the ethos of military professionalism, rather than the Schoonhoven-Walzer academic ethicists perspective, and (2) to understand military professionalism as the Enlightenment's response to the peculiar "moral precariousness" inherent in warrior work that Walzer's conception of moral equality responds to improperly. The understanding of that ethos developed in MSMP is fitted for the needs of PMEE, which is the subject of the second essay, "The Morality of Military Ethics Education"(MMEE). The essays are joined by a continuing dominant focus on the interplay within military professionalism of distinct legitimate basic imperatives (principles, goals, values). MMME analyzes the PMEEE of the American military academies as a negotiation of a military's inherent demand for maximization of military proficiency and an Enlightenment demand for some kind of respect for persons. The topics are conflicts inherent in the transformed military moral education exemplified by the essays of Parts I and II. I wish for these essays to be understood, taken together, as reconceiving the reach of JWT.

Philosophical geniuses as far apart as Plato, Rousseau, Kant, and Dewey have appreciated that abstract moral theorizing is a feckless enterprise when detached from any mechanism for cultivating decision makers' capacities and dispositions to translate philosophy into conduct. This is especially pertinent to theorizing about the ethics of warfare. In this case the absence of an educational mechanism can be a grave injustice.

A nation has the responsibility for training and licensing its own military personnel, especially its leadership. The government is derelict if it doesn't do what it can to adequately equip them morally as well as materially, physically, intellectually, and

emotionally. As MMME explains in greater detail, to let loose upon the world commanders of military power ill-prepared to properly appreciate the moral aspects of their fateful decision is to put in peril their fellow citizens and military subordinates, other nations, and the commanders themselves.

MMME is an early foray into the field of *jus in disciplina bellica*. It ranges widely and often rapidly over assorted subjects, in part just to convey some sense of this field's scope and the diversity of its issues. Like the essays by my fellow contemporary academic ethical theorists, it is written with a style of thought unnatural to military minds, however much they may profitably appreciate it. A profession of radical action does not normally reward a mindset of perpetual questioning and open-ended disputation about starting assumptions and first principles. (That is one of this essay's topics.)

Unlike the other essays, much of this final essay's questioning of fond assumptions might be mistaken for belittlement of America's military or its academies. That would be a grievous misreading. The message is that conflicts within PMEE manifested in our academies (and much of our military) are not conflicts between good and evil, but clashes between competing legitimate aims and interests we are stuck with. They are elemental, not optional. Frequently I question or criticize current responses to these clashes. I have zero interest in assessing or laying blame, and a dominant interest in making plain why the conflicts resist neat resolution. One main conclusion is that, if there be any fault to find in the military regarding this matter, it is a failure to have properly considered the questions raised – a complaint uncomfortably made when the client pays you precisely for your presumed expertise in raising such questions.

This last point alludes a further peculiarity of the essay. It is written with the purposes and perspective of a hired applied ethicist, an advisory/consultant profession with its own peculiar, controversial rights and responsibilities, but without, perhaps forever, any officially recognized code of ethics.³ Still further peculiarities come with the peculiar nature of the client (a Navy and Marine Corps of hitherto unimaginable power) and the proclivities of the advisor, a poster child of the 60's, long suspicious of his nation's military might and moral sense, and convinced that no better use is to be made of whatever skills he has than assisting this military's PMEE mission.

This last essay's questioning cuts closer to home for some intended readers. Its edges are more liable to scrape some sensibilities. The essay's purpose, like that of the DCE's office, is not to congratulate or flatter, but to provide knowledgeable, candid, if sometimes unkind, assessment of assorted contentious matters. The intent is not to belittle this military's efforts – except as a means to prodding it to do better. Yet, human intentions are inherently open to multiple, equally accurate or reasonable descriptions. My intent risks seeming threatening for my report aims to put our military on alert that it is woefully unprepared for the battles of ideas it is destined to contend with in the years ahead. Our military risks making moral errors and, error or no, risks public embarrassment (and its command of respect in its ranks and in national and international

³ See my "Applying Ethical Theory: Caveats from a Case Study," in D. Rosenthal & F. Shehadi, eds., *Applied Ethics and Ethical Theory*, Utah, 1988, 229-55, and "Socratic Scepticism," *Metaphilosophy*, Oct, 1993 (24,4), 344-62, reprinted in E. Winkler & J. Kuhns, eds., *Applied Ethics*, Blackwell 1993.

opinion) by its incomprehension of its unresolved internal moral conflicts. The history of messengers bearing bad news is not cheering.

My harsh appraisals will likely evoke more outraged howls from flag-draped politicians and pundits than from the military leaders I came to respect and admire, who might understandably resent some remarks. I can only hope they all come to see that I can best serve this nation's military by speaking most credibly to those who share some of my anxieties about America's militaristic past and present unprecedented military predominance. Such readers (and some canny commanders) would rightly be more suspicious of a kinder, gentler, more respectful report.