

CHARACTER (ALONE) DOESN'T COUNT: PHENOMENAL CHARACTER AND NARROW INTENTIONAL CONTENT

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ABSTRACT

Proponents of phenomenal intentionality share a commitment that, for at least some paradigmatically intentional states, phenomenal character constitutively determines narrow intentional content. If this is correct, then any two states with the same phenomenal character will have the same narrow intentional content. Using a twin-earth style case, I argue that two different people can be in intrinsically identical phenomenological states without sharing narrow intentional contents. After describing and defending the case, I conclude by considering a few objections that help to further illustrate the problem.

In recent years, a growing research program in the metaphysics of intentionality and content has centered around the purported existence of *Phenomenal Intentionality*. This literature exploded shortly after the publication of Terry Horgan and John Tienson's (2002) "The Intentionality of Phenomenology and the Phenomenology of Intentionality." Proponents of phenomenal intentionality are a diverse bunch that all share some core commitment to a set of theses (albeit to varying degrees of strength). In what follows, I will be arguing against one of these core theses, which I will call (PI). Briefly, I will argue that a mental state *M*'s having a particular phenomenal character does not alone determine the narrow intentional content of *M*. I will begin with a concise discussion of the thesis I will be arguing against via its relation to the so-called *Phenomenal Intentionality Research Program* (PIRP).¹ Then I will present my argument against (PI). Finally, I will draw

some conclusions about the PIRP and the phenomenology of thought more generally.

I. PHENOMENAL CONSTITUTION AND THE PHENOMENOLOGY OF INTENTIONALITY

The most central claim of the PIRP is what I will call *Phenomenal Constitution*:

Phenomenal Constitution (PC): There is a kind of intentionality, pervasive in paradigmatically intentional states, that is fully constituted by phenomenal character.²

Phenomenal Constitution says that for at least some important categories of intentional states, their narrow content is constitutively determined by their phenomenology. Briefly, narrow content is content that doesn't depend on anything external to the individual. How far (PC) extends is a matter of dispute between different proponents of the PIRP. However, it is standard to take at least beliefs and desires as two kinds of intentional states

whose narrow content is fully constituted by their phenomenal character. My argument will involve belief states and their associated phenomenology, but I think analogous arguments could be given for many other intentional states as well.

The thesis I will be arguing against is:

(PI) Necessarily, for any paradigmatically intentional state s with narrow content i , s has some phenomenal character q such that any paradigmatically intentional state with phenomenal character q also has i .³

Any kind of intentional state whose content is fully constituted by its phenomenal character will fall under the scope of (PI). Phenomenal Constitution says that, with respect to paradigmatically intentional states, phenomenal character fully constitutes intentional content. This entails that any two paradigmatically intentional states with identical phenomenal character should have the same intentional content. Because (PC) entails (PI), if (PI) is false, then (PC) must be as well. I should be explicit that (PC) and (PI) are intended to be claims only about *narrow* intentional content.

II. DOES PHENOMENAL CHARACTER ALONE DETERMINE NARROW INTENTIONAL CONTENT? AGAINST (PI)

It would be difficult to find direct empirical data that would provide evidence against (PI). It may be relatively straightforward to infer differences in phenomenal character between two subjects in the same occurrent intentional state based on their reports about that very phenomenal character.⁴ However, in order to show (PI) to be mistaken, we would need a case in which we have type-identical phenomenal character with distinct intentional content. This does not seem empirically discoverable—at least, not given current neuroscience. As a result, my argument against (PI) must delve into the realm of metaphysical possibility.⁵ Begin by considering our good

friend Oscar. Oscar is sitting in his armchair thinking about the flag of Nepal. In particular, he is thinking about the background color of the flag of Nepal. Oscar has the occurrent belief that *the background color of the flag of Nepal is red*. This occurrent belief has a particular phenomenology. The phenomenal character of Oscar's belief is his visual imagery of the flag of Nepal, with particular attention to the background color of the visual imagery. Along with this, Oscar has the auditory imagery of his inner voice saying: "The background color of the flag of Nepal is red." There is also some phenomenal character to his assenting to the content that his occurrent thought is true—this phenomenology is associated with his believing that the background color of the flag of Nepal is red, rather than desiring it, wondering it, and so forth. Now consider Oscar's next occurrent belief, that *the background color of the flag of Nepal is crimson*. The phenomenal character of Oscar's belief that *the background color of the flag of Nepal is crimson* is extremely similar to the phenomenal character of Oscar's belief that *the background color of the flag of Nepal is red*. Oscar again has visual imagery of the flag of Nepal as he remembers it, with particular attention to the background color of the image in his "mind's eye." This will presumably be the same visual imagery, since crimson is a determinate of the determinable red. Oscar, we can suppose, while in this occurrent belief state has auditory imagery of his inner voice saying: "The background color of the flag of Nepal is crimson." He also has the phenomenology characteristic of belief, as opposed to desire, hope, and so on. It appears that the only intrinsic difference in phenomenal character between the two different occurrent beliefs that Oscar could have is in the words he says to himself in his inner voice. His visual imagery is the same—of the flag of Nepal as best as he can remember it. And his attentive focus on his visual imagery is the same—he is focused particularly on the

background color of his visual imagery. The phenomenology characteristic of belief (as opposed to desire, hope, etc.) is the same as well.

None of what's been said so far is a problem for (PI). The phenomenal character of two different intentional states can be similar without casting doubt on (PI). Furthermore, we might even *expect* the phenomenal character of Oscar's two occurrent belief states to be extremely similar, given that the content of two belief states is so similar. So Oscar's two occurrent belief states either support (PI) or are neutral with respect to it.

But now consider Twin-Oscar. Twin-Oscar is Oscar's Twin-Earth counterpart. Twin-Oscar has all of the same (non-occurrent, *de dicto*) beliefs, desires, hopes, imaginings, and so forth as Oscar. As is to be expected, Twin-English contains a miniscule but relevant alteration from the English that Oscar speaks. In Twin-English, the word that is phonetically and lexically identical to the English word "crimson" means *red*, and the word that is phonetically and lexically identical to the English word "red" means *crimson*.

Twin-Oscar, like Oscar, has the occurrent belief that has the content, as we would represent it in English, that *the background color of the flag of Nepal is red*. What will the phenomenal character of Twin-Oscar's belief that *the background color of the flag of Nepal is red* be? Since Twin-Oscar is much like Oscar, the phenomenal character of this occurrent belief will be much like Oscar's: He will have the visual imagery of the flag of Nepal, as best as he can remember it (which, *ex hypothesi*, will be the same imagery as possessed by Oscar), with a particular attentive focus on the background color of the flag. The phenomenology of his believing (rather than desiring, hoping, etc.) is also the same as Oscar's. So far, so good—Twin-Oscar's belief that *the background color of the flag of Nepal is red* has the same phenomenal visual imagery, phenomenal character of attentive

focus (on the color of the flag), and phenomenology of belief, as Oscar's occurrent belief. But Twin-Oscar's occurrent belief, just as Oscar's did, also involves some auditory imagery—that is, Twin-Oscar will "hear" his inner voice asserting the claim and will assent to it. Since Twin-English differs from English in the way mentioned above, Twin-Oscar's inner voice will have the phenomenal character of him saying to himself: "The background color of the flag of Nepal is crimson." If the way I've described the phenomenal character of Twin-Oscar's belief is correct, (PI) is false.

Let's recapitulate what I've said so far. First, I argued that the only *intrinsic* difference in phenomenal character between Oscar's first and second occurrent beliefs is his auditory imagery, the auditory imagery of "hearing" his inner voice assert the two English sentences that express the two distinct propositions in question. So this difference in auditory imagery must be the difference that maps onto the difference in the content of Oscar's intentional state, if (PI) is true. Let's call the full phenomenal character-type of Oscar's occurrent belief that *the background color of the flag of Nepal is crimson* phenomenal character-type *P*. Returning to Twin-Oscar, let's call the full phenomenal character-type of his belief that *the background color of the flag of Nepal is red* phenomenal character-type *C*. The intentional content associated with Oscar's *P* and Twin-Oscar's *C* differs. *Phenomenal Intentionality* entails, then, that *P* and *C* will be distinct phenomenal character-types. But $P = C$. So (PI) is false. *P* and *C* contain identical visual imagery, identical attentive focus on a particular aspect of the visual imagery (the background color of the image in the "mind's eye"), identical phenomenology of belief (as opposed to desire, hope, etc.). The only potential difference is in their auditory imagery. But since Twin-Oscar speaks Twin-English, his inner voice will be saying what is phonetically and lexically identical to "The background color

of the flag of Nepal is crimson” in English. Oscar speaks English, so his inner voice will be saying what is phonetically and lexically identical to “The background of the flag of Nepal is crimson.” *P* and *C* contain the same auditory imagery, along with the rest of their full phenomenal character. Therefore, $P = C$.

III. SOME COMPLICATIONS

The details of describing phenomenal character are notoriously tricky. I’ve done the best I can to describe the occurrent phenomenology that I have when I reflect on my beliefs that *the background color of the flag of Nepal is red* and *the background color of the flag of Nepal is crimson*, respectively. Others may reflectively seem to be in states with a different phenomenal character when they concentrate on these contents. For example, some might believe that they can introspectively phenomenally discriminate between the applications of any two concepts, such as *crimson* and *red*. Or perhaps, for some, focusing on the determinable *red* of the flag is phenomenally different from focusing on the determinate *crimson*.⁶ Horgan and Tienson (2002), for example, claim that

the intentionality that we are talking about—even when it is specifically tied to certain words in English or some other natural language—does not attach to those words simply as sequences or patterns of sounds, or even as syntactic structures. It attaches to awareness of those words qua contentful . . . even if thinking did always involve auditory imagery, the auditory imagery would be intentionally loaded in the experience, not intentionally empty.⁷

This passage has a weaker reading and a stronger reading. On the weaker reading, Horgan and Tienson are pointing out that having the auditory imagery of “the background of the flag of Nepal is crimson” will always be coupled with some other phenomenology in order to imbue the phenomenal character of the state its intentional content. On this weak reading, the phenomenally felt

connection between the auditory imagery and the visual imagery in Oscar and Twin-Oscar’s phenomenal states is enough to generate intentional content, and the counter-example goes through (setting aside other potential objections).

On the stronger reading, Horgan and Tienson are claiming that there must be some further non-auditory, non-visual *conceptual* phenomenology that imbues Oscar and Twin-Oscar’s auditory and visual imagery with meaning and thus intentional content. And the further phenomenal character is enough to render *P* and *C* distinct, contrary to what I’ve claimed above. In response, I want to be clear that I am not denying that there may be people who have the relevant conceptual phenomenology, over and above auditory and visual imagery, to *intrinsically* distinguish states such as *P* and *C*, even when all auditory and visual imagery is held fixed. But this possibility is compatible with the argument of the paper. Since (PI) is a necessity claim, even if the case as described is only successful in people with phenomenal profiles similar to mine, that would be counter-example enough to show that (PI) is false.⁸ The proponent of (PI) could also conceivably argue that I and others are just mistaken about the phenomenal character we are experiencing when we reflect on the contents of our beliefs about the flag of Nepal. This is certainly possible—neither the proponent nor the opponent of (PI) need be committed to the infallibility of introspection. But if the proponent of (PI) is to defend this approach, she must provide some reason independent of (PI) to think that our introspection is failing in this case. And it is hard to see what reason could be given. Furthermore, the proponent of (PI) faces some pressure to hold on to the general reliability of introspection since defenses of (PI) characteristically rely on introspecting on the phenomenology of thought.⁹ As Kriegel says, “central in motivating sympathizers [to PIRP] is the idea

that phenomenal intentionality is simply *introspectively manifest*.”¹⁰

A second concern about the argument given above is that its success relies on illicitly smuggling in a difference in *externalistically determined* content and then treating this difference as one of *narrow* content. Since (PI) is only a claim about *narrow* content, showing that Oscar and Twin-Oscar can have states with identical phenomenal character with a different externalistically determined content can be happily welcomed by its defenders.

In order to see if this objection works, we have to get clear about both Oscar and Twin-Oscar’s respective narrow belief contents. The contents of their beliefs about the flag of Nepal are partially externalistically determined, since at the very least, what object counts as *the flag of Nepal* will depend on a believer’s local environment. More controversially, what properties are picked out by color concepts such as *red* and *crimson* may also be partially determined by a believer’s local environment. If both the object and the property that make up the proposition believed are partially externalistically determined, what content remains to be identified as *narrow*? One helpful in-depth discussion of the proponent of (PI)’s conception of narrow content can be found in Horgan, Tienson, and Graham (2004). According to Horgan, Tienson, and Graham (2004), narrow

contents (determined by phenomenal character alone) are “thoughts that are expressible linguistically using only (i) logical vocabulary, (ii) predicates expressing properties and relations to which the experiencer can mentally refer in a phenomenally constituted way, and (iii) certain first-person indexical expressions.”¹¹

One important question that immediately arises is how extensive of a category (ii) is—that is, how many predicates express properties that can be referred to by a subject in a completely “phenomenally constituted,” and thus narrow, way? Horgan, Tienson, and Graham say:

[W]e take it that the range of such properties and relations is very extensive. It appears to include, inter alia, temporal relations, causal relations, properties like *being a temporally persisting object*, *being an animal*, *being an agent*, and *being a person*, numerous artifactual kinds like *being a container* and *being a table*, and numerous social relations and properties like *being friend of*, *being a boss of*, and *being a politician*.¹²

If Horgan, Tienson, and Graham (2004) are right, color concepts are almost certainly narrowly constituted. So this gives us some idea of Oscar and Twin-Oscar’s narrow contents and how they contribute to determining the wide contents of their respective beliefs (see Table 1).

Table 1.

	Phenomenal Character	Narrow Content (Phenomenally Constituted)	Wide Content (Determined by Narrow Content + External Environment)
Oscar	Visual imagery of the flag of Nepal, attentive focus on the background color, auditory imagery that sounds like “The background color of the flag of Nepal is crimson.”	There is an x and there is a y such that x is a <i>flag</i> , y is a <i>country</i> , y is <i>named</i> “Nepal”, x is the <i>flag</i> of y, and <i>crimson</i> is the background color of x.	The background color of the flag of Nepal is crimson.
Twin-Oscar	Visual imagery of the flag of Nepal, attentive focus on the background color, auditory imagery that sounds like “The background color of the flag of Nepal is crimson.”	There is an x and there is a y such that x is a <i>flag</i> , y is a <i>country</i> , y is <i>named</i> “Nepal”, x is the <i>flag</i> of y, and <i>red</i> is the background color of x.	The background color of the flag of Nepal is red.

I've modeled Oscar and Twin-Oscar's narrow contents on Horgan, Tienson, and Graham's analysis of the narrow content of the belief that "[a] picture is hanging crooked on a wall directly in front of me."¹³ Notice again that Oscar and Twin-Oscar's beliefs have the same phenomenal character, as I've argued above. Why, then, do their narrow contents come apart in Table 1? What I've been supposing is that phenomenology discriminates Oscar and Twin-Oscar's color concepts in (at most) two ways. First, their phenomenology focuses in on a particular color in their visual imagery—as they do when focusing on the background color of the flag of Nepal. Second, their phenomenology discriminates concepts via what we might call a "phenomenal name." And as it turns out, Oscar's phenomenal name for *crimson* is (an auditory imaging of) "crimson," whereas Twin-Oscar's phenomenal name for *red* is also (an auditory imaging of) "crimson." So the phenomenal names Oscar and Twin-Oscar have are phenomenologically identical, despite their referring to different concepts. Normally, this would not be a problem since some other aspect of their respective phenomenal characters will be different—the attentive focus, the object of the focus, or the phenomenology of proposition attitude (belief, desire, wish, etc.). But in the case above, Oscar and Twin-Oscar are focused on the same visual image, attending to the same aspect of that image, and in fact also attending to the *very same token property* of that image. Since *crimson* is the determinate of the determinable *red*, the color of the visual images of Oscar and Twin-Oscar will also be identical. In short, if everything I've said is correct, Oscar and Twin-Oscar are in states with identical phenomenal character. But since the (narrowly conceived) concept Oscar picks out with the phenomenal name "crimson" is different from the (narrowly conceived) concept Twin-Oscar picks out with the phenomenal name "crimson," their

narrow contents will differ in what properties they are ascribing to the (narrowly conceived) flag.

Perhaps the Horgan, Tienson, and Graham (2004) conception of phenomenally determined narrow content is too broad. It's certainly consistent with (PI) to have a thinner set of phenomenally determined predicates. However, there is some pressure on the proponent of (PI) to have a sufficiently thick conception of narrow content in order to render (PI) an interesting claim. But let's set that aside and consider what I take to be the thinnest possible way to construe the narrow contents of two beliefs that Oscar and Twin-Oscar might have while looking at a crimson (and therefore also red) wall of paint directly in front of them. (I use a simplified example to avoid unnecessary complications with how to construe thinly the narrow content of "the flag of Nepal" and "background color")

Oscar's belief that
that thing is crimson.
There is an x and
there is a y such that
x is a *thing* and y is
a *color-property* and
y is *called* "crimson"
and x *has* y.

Twin-Oscar's belief
that *that thing is red.*
There is an x and
there is a y such that
x is a *thing* and y is a
color-property and y
is *called* "crimson"
and x *has* y.

If we construe narrow content this thinly, Oscar and Twin-Oscar do share the same narrow content with their respective beliefs. Their beliefs differ in wide content only because of facts about their respective linguistic communities. So construing narrow content so that color concepts are externalistically determined will resolve the problem for the proponent of (PI) in this case.

There is a serious concern about this fix, however. If proponents of (PI) are to fully avoid the problem that the red/crimson case brings out, this thinning of the narrow content fix must adequately generalize. But it is hard to see how they can claim that the fix generalizes without giving up any non-trivial

conception of narrow content. To see why this is, notice that the red/crimson case does not rely on any special facts about color concepts or color properties. Instead, the case works, if it works at all, only as a result of the determinable/determinate relation between *red* and *crimson*. So if proponents of (PI) are to generalize this fix to all cases of this sort, they are committed to the view that *no* concepts that bear the determinable/determinate relation to each other are phenomenally constituted. This would rule out paradigmatically phenomenally constituted concepts such as triangle/isosceles-triangle, painful/achy, and even being-a-logical-operator/being-a-disjunction-operator. I think it is unlikely that most proponents of (PI) would want to bite this bullet.

It's worth emphasizing one other reason why defenders of (PI) ought to focus on finding a difference in phenomenal character, rather than one in externalistically determined content. One important motivation behind the PIRP is to provide a defense of the thought that narrow content plays a crucial role in determining wide content. Almost all proponents of the PIRP agree that the world has a role to play in determining wide content, but this is only when combined with phenomenally constituted narrow content.¹⁴ As a result, assuming Oscar and Twin-Oscar are in the same otherwise (non-linguistically) identical environment, the only thing left to explain how Oscar and Twin-Oscar's belief states have different wide content is by an appeal to a difference in narrow content. Given that proponents of the PIRP are looking for a non-trivial conception of phenomenally constituted narrow content, there is strong theoretical pressure for them to agree with the middle column of the first table above. The challenge for them would then be to explain why I am mistaken about the first column, that Oscar and Twin-Oscar are in states with the same intrinsic phenomenal character.

Finally, it might be thought that there is some kind of sleight of hand in the argument given above. For one thing, I could be accused of misrepresenting Oscar and Twin-Oscar as twins. Horgan and Tienson make use, in their arguments for (PC), of the idea of *phenomenal duplicates*. Two people are phenomenal duplicates "just in case each creature's total experience, throughout its existence, is phenomenally exactly similar to the other's."¹⁵ If Oscar and Twin-Oscar are both competent users of the concepts of *red* and *crimson*, then they can't be phenomenal duplicates in this sense. Oscar and Twin-Oscar must have different phenomenological histories, if they were to have properly learned the concepts and their English/Twin-English words for expressing those concepts. When Oscar was a child, he was shown a wide variety of shades of red and was told; "These are red." This allowed him to connect his concept of *red* to the English word "red." Twin-Oscar had a similar experience, except when he was shown the wide variety of shades of red, he was told: "These are crimson." This allowed him to connect his concept of *red* to the Twin-English word "crimson."

This conclusively shows that Oscar and Twin-Oscar are not phenomenological duplicates, since part of what makes someone a person's phenomenological duplicate is sharing a complete phenomenological history. Furthermore, they differ with respect to what things they label "red" and "crimson" (though not in what they believe are *red* and *crimson*—they have all the same beliefs about the colors of objects; they just speak different languages). So Oscar and Twin-Oscar not only fail to share their phenomenological histories, but they are also disposed to have differences in phenomenal character. Say we showed them both the flag of Canada and asked them to form an occurrent belief about the color of the Maple Leaf on the flag. The phenomenal character of Oscar and Twin-Oscar's beliefs would be different.

Twin-Oscar's inner voice would say: "The color of the Maple Leaf is crimson," and Oscar's inner voice would say: "The color of the Maple Leaf is red." So Oscar and Twin-Oscar not only fail to be phenomenal duplicates in virtue of their histories, but they also fail to be phenomenal duplicates in virtue of their dispositions for having future phenomenal states.

I concede everything just said. Oscar and Twin-Oscar are not phenomenal duplicates. They don't share the same phenomenological history, and their phenomenology is likely to come apart again in the future. The difficulty is in leveraging this into an objection to the argument given above. This is because (PC) and (PI) are usually taken to be claims about intrinsic phenomenal character, not about a relation between phenomenal states over some extended period of time. In Kriegel's expository article concerning the PIRP, he notes that one widely held thesis amongst defenders of the PIRP is;

(IN) *Intrinsic Subjectivity*: Necessarily, for any intentional state *M*, if *M* is non-derivatively subjective [where non-derivatively subjective means that it is a state that represents completely intrinsically], then *M* is phenomenally intentional.¹⁶

Intrinsic Subjectivity says that, at least with respect to the narrow intentional content constitutively determined by phenomenal character (in their phrase, phenomenal intentionality), the intentional state is fully determined by its intrinsic phenomenal character alone. The motivation for accepting (IN) is one that should appeal to all proponents of the PIRP. This is because an important task of the PIRP is in explaining how non-phenomenal states can have intentional content only derivatively from phenomenal states.¹⁷ Appealing to differences in phenomenal histories or dispositions for phenomenal differences in the future is beside the point, and cannot show that two different agents have distinct

phenomenal characters at a particular time. Either phenomenal histories are relevant to assessing the intentional content determined by a phenomenal state, or they are not. Regardless, (PI) is in trouble. If phenomenal histories are relevant, then both (IN) and (PI) are false, since they are claims about present phenomenal character. If phenomenal histories are not relevant, then my argument against (PI) goes through.

It's worth emphasizing that this appeal to phenomenal histories and/or dispositions for phenomenal differences in the future is in tension with (IN), (PI), and (PC) because it seems to be a mistake that advocates such as Horgan and Tienson make. We saw above their definition of what counts as someone's *phenomenal duplicate*—they must share an entire phenomenological history. But then they claim that, using the notion of a phenomenal duplicate, (PC) can be restated as the *Phenomenal Duplicate Thesis*:

Phenomenal Duplicate Thesis (PD): There is a kind of intentional content, pervasive in human life, such that any two possible phenomenal duplicates have exactly similar intentional states vis-à-vis such content.¹⁸

In fact, some of Horgan and Tienson's arguments in favor of (PC) presuppose that (PD) is nothing more than a restatement of (PC). We can now see that this is mistaken. Phenomenal Constitution claims that a particular phenomenal character alone constitutively determines some particular intentional state. Phenomenal Duplicate Thesis only claims that agents with entirely identical phenomenological histories will be in the same intentional state insofar as they are in states with identical phenomenal character. So (PD) is consistent with, while (PC) is not, historical factors affecting the intentional content of a particular mental state. Furthermore, (PI), the thesis that proponents use to leverage arguments for their research program, if true, would support (PC) but not (PD). And only a full-fledged commitment

to (PC) will save (IN), one of the PIRP's fundamental tenets. So, although (PD) is an interesting claim that is related to (PC), (PC) is the thesis that must be true if the PIRP is to be salvageable. And (PC) entails (PI), which I have argued is false.

CONCLUSION

In sum, I think my argument against (PI) is successful: two agents can be in states with identical phenomenal characters, while having distinct intentional contents. Since (PC) entails (PI), if my argument is successful, then (PC) must also be false. This threatens to shake the foundations of the PIRP, since (PC) is arguably the single most central

claim of the program. Proponents of (PC) have, rightfully I think, pointed out that paradigmatically intentional states have their own associated phenomenology. This fact had been widely overlooked by analytic philosophers of mind, and so it is an important point in itself. The mistake that proponents of (PC) make is in assuming that this associated phenomenology provides powerful evidence that there is some constitutive or necessary connection between the two kinds of mental states. Phenomenal character alone does not constitutively determine intentional content.

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NOTES

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1. This is Kriegel's (2013) phrase.
2. See Kriegel (2013, p. 5); Horgan and Tienson (2002, p. 520); and Graham, Horgan, and Tienson (2007, p. 471).
3. I thank an anonymous referee for suggesting this formulation of (PI).
4. For example, empirical research has shown that people's capacities for forming visual imagery vary greatly. Some lack visual imagery completely. Others, especially those with severe cases of dyslexia, are lacking an "inner voice." See, for example, Brewer and Schommer-Aikins (2006); Marks (1973, 1995); Cui et al. (2007); Baddeley et al. (1982); Swam and Goswami (1997); and Bruck (1992).
5. If the reader has any lingering methodological worries, I can only briefly note that my arguments are of the same structure and form that proponents of the PIRP generally give to defend both (PI) and (PC). (See, e.g., Horgan and Tienson 2002, sections 2–4).
6. I thank Esa Diaz-Leon and two anonymous referees for pressing me on these points.
7. Horgan and Tienson (2002, p. 523).
8. I've asked several people to reflect on their phenomenological states when considering beliefs with these contents. It's been about evenly divided between people who describe it similar to the way I do above and people who describe it differently in some important way (e.g., no inner voice).
9. See, for example, Horgan and Tienson (2002, pp. 521–524); Kriegel (2013, section II); Siewert (1998, chap. 1, and throughout).
10. Kriegel (2013, p. 7); emphasis in original.
11. Horgan, Tienson, and Graham (2004, p. 306).

12. Ibid, p. 305.
13. Ibid., p. 306.
14. Farkas (2008) is an exception to this general rule. Nothing in my argument relies on the widely accepted claim noted in the text, so I take it that the argument applies equally well to Farkas's view.
15. Horgan and Tienson (2002, p. 524). Horgan, Graham, and Tienson (2004) also make extensive use of the idea of phenomenal duplicates.
16. Kriegel (2013, p. 11).
17. See Kriegel (2013), especially the discussion of the *Basicness* thesis.
18. Horgan and Tienson (2002, p. 524).

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