SYNONYMITY WITHOUT ANALYTICITY
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If it's true by definition that a judgment is analytic if it's true by definition, there would seem scant space for skepticism that there are analytic judgments. Despite this, such skepticism is now common and commonly the cause is epistemic. One main complaint is that all evidence of analyticity is entrapped in assumptional circles. What beliefs are expressed and evidenced by a speaker's utterances depends on the speaker's linguistic rules; and vice-versa: whatever a speaker's verbal and nonverbal behavior, it could evidence and be explained by any of many sets of linguistic rules, depending on the speaker's substantive, synthetic, extralinguistic beliefs. So no identification of a speaker's semantic rules and analytic truths is better evidenced than countless competing interpretations of the linguistic data. Hence, allegedly, all hope of detecting analyticity is naive delusion.

However, for various more or less familiar reasons, this is the wrong way to get at what's wrong with the concept of analyticity. For starters, congenital evidentiary underdetermination is a dubious cause for skepticism. Evidence of anything is essentially underdetermined. Appearances of anything can be deceiving -- and must be: they wouldn't be appearances if they couldn't deceive, be explained by and justify competing interpretations. (What is properly called "evidence" for a judgment never entails the judgment, except via a premise that is not itself a bit of evidence.) All evidence lies in one assumptional loop or another. The circles surrounding linguistic data are distinctive in content, but not in epistemic structure.

Besides, whatever the evidentiary deficiency, it may sanction only doubts about justifications of ascriptions of analyticity -- without questioning the reality of analyticity. Epistemic skepticism about our evidence of analyticity entails no semantic or ontic skepticism about the intelligibility of the concept of analyticity or the reality of the property and instances. A doubt whether we can know some fact (or justify a belief or predication) isn't itself a (ground for) doubt whether a determinate fact is there to be known -- not unless some verifiability principle is assumed. Such principles are infamously suspect, especially if analyticity is a suspect concept.

Epistemic worries won't imperil the coherence of the concept of analyticity. But neither is coherence vouchsafed by the consensus on instances: which judgments are hot prospects for analyticity, which are not serious candidates, and which are problematic examples. This point -- and much else about analyticity -- may be obscured by the endemic delusion that, at least for the speaker herself, synonymy and analyticity are inseparable from knowledge of them. The naturalness of this
picture is evident in the confidence with which a Michael Dummett can say: "It is an undeniable feature of the notion of meaning -- obscure as that notion is -- that meaning is transparent in the sense that, if someone attaches a meaning to each of two words, he must know whether these meanings are the same."\(^i\)

But in light of recent research, what should now be undeniable is that people commonly and confidently think they sense synonomy or ambiguity when their intuitions are far better described and explained by factors other than word meaning affecting our reading of an utterance.\(^ii\) For example, despite the naturalness of intuiting that "right" and "true" are synonyms in contexts like "What she said is true/right", in fact those predicates operate on syntactically (logically/metaphysically) contrasting subjects.\(^iii\) The competence to speak a language properly and even sensitively neither requires nor provides anything more than fallible intuitions of synonymy.

The seeming "transparency" of synonymy is sheer illusion. Linguistic meanings and sameness of meaning are not simple mental perceptibles; a correct definition is essentially a theoretical claim, the best explanation of complex patterns of linguistic behavior. This is so even for words of no special philosophical interest. With the terms at the center of philosophical topics, the whole history of the subject since Socrates teaches us (if it teaches anything at all) that if there is anything that we don't really know, it's the analysis and definition of our conceptually central terms.\(^iv\)

The native speakers' sense of the linguistic propriety of an utterance is authoritative since that sense is first-order and constitutive of the language. But our claims of semantic and syntactic rules are second-order, metalinguistic, and not definitive of the language; they aren't authoritative except as approximations, rough guides to facilitate ordinary communication. (For daily purposes, it does no harm and sometimes does help to tell someone that "right" and "true" are contextual synonyms.) Neither the (alleged) necessity of analytic truths nor their (alleged) knowability a priori suggests that we apprehend them infallibly or with anything close to the automatic, absolute, precise certainty we have with a sharp pain or a bright color, or even a simple personal intention.\(^v\)

Another trouble with the epistemic critique of analyticity is that the attack on the concept of analyticity -- an artifice of modern philosophy -- is essentially equally an attack on the elemental idea of synonymy (sameness of meaning) and thus of our pretheoretical idea of meaning. This adds to the interest and excitement of the critique, but this spicier skepticism offends commonsense, rendering the critique a reductio.\(^vi\)

The concept of analyticity is a creation of philosophical theory. Even our name for it goes back but 200 years to Kant, and while the concept is explicitly operative a century or so prior in
Hume and Leibniz, traces of any earlier appearances are hard to find. However natural the notion may now seem and however readily it may be acquired, philosophical innocents need to be introduced to the idea. If the notion proves of little use, that might surprise and sadden us, yet its loss is felt only by philosophers; the rest of the world can well whirl on without it.

In contrast, while laymen's understanding of sameness of meaning may be inchoate, with paradoxes infecting the folklore of synonymy, we can't even begin to theorize about language without some conception of interpretation, translation, sameness of meaning (synonymy) and difference of meaning (e.g., ambiguity.) We can't formulate the axioms of logic ("p v -p", "-(p.-p)") without the idea that the negated "p" has the same meaning as the affirmed "p." We can't formulate self-identity statements as:

\[ \text{IU: } U=U \] (or "u=u" read indifferently as: Uncles are uncles, An uncle is an uncle, [The property of] Unclehood is [the property of] unclehood, The class of uncles is the class of uncles.)

without the idea that the left flanking term has the same meaning as the right one. Natural language synonymies might be as rare and fleeting as summer snow, but denials of the possibility of synonymy, like Eleatic denials of the possibility of motion, seem less intelligible than the object of the denial.

Skepticism about the concept of analyticity has more direct and compelling motivations, free of verificationist and other suspect epistemic assumptions, and free of general doubts about linguistic meaning and synonymy. Consider:

\[ \text{Au: } \text{An uncle is a parent's brother.} \]
\[ \text{Nu: } \text{The symbol "uncle" has the same meaning as the symbol "parent's brother."} \]

Take Au to be a statement of a paradigm analytic truth (if there be anything of the kind), and take Nu to be a statement of a paradigm correlate semantic norm (if there be anything of the kind.)

The concept of analyticity now in question is specifiable by its implicit claim, the Analyticity Thesis (A-Thesis): If an N-statement like Nu is true, then a correlate A-statement like Au is true, necessarily and just because the N-statement is true.

The A-Thesis is an explanatory claim with the form of a conditional: If Nu is true, then, just in consequence, Au is true necessarily. That conditional doesn't assume the fulfillment of the antecedent or its detectability, so the thesis may bed with worries about justifying claims of analyticity. The A-Thesis is a claim about the explanatory import of synonymy, not about the existence of synonymy or the evidence of it.

This may be obscured by the diversity of definitions of analyticity in the literature. Some characterize analytic
judgments in explicitly explanatory terms: e.g., "true by
definition," "true in virtue of the meanings of the terms." But
many characterizations seem simply descriptive, not explicitly
explanatory: e.g., "the denial is a self-contradiction," "the
predicate concept is contained in the subject concept". With a
descriptive characterization like "the result of substituting
synonyms in a logical truth", the mere existence of synonyms
entails the existence of analytic propositions (albeit perhaps
unuttered.) No matter, for then a variant of the A-thesis must be
waiting in the wings, for the one fixed point about analyticity is
that philosophers have cared about the concept only because of its
promise of providing an explanation of necessary truth and a
priori knowledge.\textsuperscript{vii}

Whether, characterized one way, the analyticity of some
judgments is unarguable or whether, characterized another way,
what is intuitive is only the necessity of certain truths, in any
case the essential question is whether the truth of some judgments
is explainable solely by certain internal properties of the
judgments that render their truth autonomous. Friends of
analyticity may differ on which truths are necessary or on which
necessities are explained by analyticity, but the friends would
abandon analyticity if it explained no necessities.

And it better explain truths of some importance: analyticity
can hold no more philosophical interest than what it explains.
Yet, necessarily, no controversial claim is consensually judged
analytic. Apart from the preposterous -- albeit seemingly
attractive -- example of mathematics, where are the statements
that are both of serious philosophical interest and
uncontroversial examples of analyticity?

The residual truth of Quinean skepticism is that the
epistemological problems besetting analyticity claims deprive the
concept of epistemological utility: no science is furthered by the
idea. Once freed of the illusion that synonymy is phenomenological
or precisely sensed infallibly, analyticity finds no epistemic
function in \textit{justifying} any statement. Even if all mathematics is
analytic and we knew it, we'd need the same old techniques for
determining which mathematical claims and conjectures are true,
false, undecidable or ill-formed. And so too for any alleged
philosophical or nonphilosophical analytic judgments rooted in
common speech. Indeed, even a properly modest epistemic skepticism
about claims of analyticity suffices to undermine the utility of
the concept: if there were a genuine, sharp analytic-synthetic
distinction, verifying its application would require substantial
synthetic, extralinguistic assumptions.

The epistemic skepticism exposes the poverty of the concept.
But its incoherence isn't understood unless we see why the A-
Thesis explanation is bogus -- even for a triviality like Au.\textsuperscript{viii}
An N-statement states an identity of meaning between two expressions. It may be read as predicking a semantic property of an expression; "Uncle" is a symbol having the same meaning as the symbol "parent's brother". Sentence Nu can be said and read as a sheer stipulation or as some quasi-imperative, neither true nor false. But taking it to be (expressing) a true report of an operative linguistic rule facilitates mapping Nu's truth functional relations with Au. So read, Nu states a contingent fact about the expression "uncle." Nu predicates of that symbol the property of having the same meaning as the other expression, "parent's brother."

That is also a legitimate reading of Au. A-sentences can be and commonly enough are said and read as an alternative way of expressing an N-statement. But that's not the only interpretation of an A-utterance, nor the most natural. In its standard, default reading, Au is predicking a property (being a parent's brother) of a subject, an uncle or uncles, perhaps actual normal uncles or every possible uncle, or it may predicate the identity of the property with the attribute of unclehood or the essence of uncles. Whatever, Au has the grammatical form of a substantive, synthetic predication about extrasymbolic reality, just like:

Suₐ: An uncle is a boy's best friend.
Suₜ: An uncle is a bore.

Any sentence with Au's grammatical form can be said and read either "predicationally" as a substantive predication about extralinguistic reality or "notationally" as declaring (stipulating or reporting) a correlate N-statement about the meaning of the subject term (and/or the predicate term.) If a notational reading is more unnatural with Suₐ and Suₜ than with Au, that's only because, given our understanding of standard English, we find Nu intuitively plausible while the correlative Nuₐ and Nuₜ are just incredible. Still, Suₐ and Suₜ could be said as Nuₐ and Nuₜ, as meaningful, albeit blatantly false claims about prevailing linguistic norms or as stipulations for or reports of an alternative notation. This predicational/notational ambiguity is syntactic, not morphemic or dependent on peculiarities of English. The ambiguity in Suₐ and Suₜ is for us a dead option, but with Au the ambiguity is all too alive. The A-Thesis owes much of its plausibility and semblance of coherence to the ease with which we bounce blindly back and forth between the two readings. The irony of analyticity is that the idea has invited dismissal of diverse claims as being either substantive but false or true but trivial, yet that dilemma is the plight of the A-thesis itself, except that the second option is truisms mixed with mistakes.

The now standard interpretation of the A-Thesis is that the transition from Nu to Au is mediated by the merest truth of logic, the Law of Identity. That law is instantiated by Iu and Ip:
**Iu:** An uncle is an uncle.

**Ip:** A parent's brother is a parent's brother.

*Nu* licenses substitutions in both *Iu* and *Ip*, yielding both *Au* and *Ap*:

**Ap:** A parent's brother is an uncle.

This looks like simplicity itself and it plainly precludes a notational reading of *Au*. If *Au* is a necessary truth it can't be equivalent to the thoroughly contingent *Nu*. The semantics differs since the syntax differs. Consider:

**NDj:**

*Nu*: "Uncle" and "parent's brother" are synonyms.

**Ju:** Joe is an uncle.

**Jp:** Joe is a parent's brother.

**SDj:**

*Su_b:* An uncle is a bore.

**Ju:** Joe is an uncle.

**Jb:** Joe is a bore.

**ADj:**

**Au:** An uncle is a parent's brother

**Ju:** Joe is an uncle.

**Jp:** Joe is a parent's brother.

*SD* is a formal deduction licensed a principle of inference, a rule of logic. Formally, *ND* is not a deduction or inference but simply a substitution licensed by a notational convention. What of *ADj*? The syntax and truth conditions of predicational and notational readings differ as those of using and mentioning a word differ. Reading *Au* notationally makes *ADj* structurally like *NDj*. *ADj* is formally akin to *SDj* if and only if *Au* is predicational.

Analyticity is a vacuous concept and the A-Thesis a degenerate explanatory claim if the explanans (the truth of *Nu*) is the explanandum (the truth of *Au*). If analytic truths are vacuous (void of extrasymbolic information) then analyticity is a vacuous concept and the A-Thesis a vacuous explanation. For the A-Thesis to have real substance, the truth of *Au* must categorically differ from the truth of *Nu* yet somehow be a consequence of it.

Put it this way. If the A-Thesis is to be a genuine explanatory claim about language, truth or meaning, it can't itself be an analytic truth. Otherwise, by its own lights it would tell us only about symbols like "language," "truth," "meaning," and nothing extranotational about their referents. Unless *Au* is only a notational variant of *Nu*, no notational convention connecting "uncle" and "parent's brother" will secure the truth of "*Nu* explains why *Au* is true" -- not without a further rule relating the sentence *Nu* with the predicate "explains why *Au* is true." The A-Thesis can't be both interesting and true by definition, if it's true by definition that analytic judgments are true by definition.

If you mean to assert *Au* predicationally and explain its truth via the A-Thesis, you may be suffering any of various confusions. For one thing, an N-statement may serve to identify
the proposition expressed by an A-sentence, so the N-statement may partly explain what statement is made by substitution of a synonym. But that’s not the same as explaining why the statement is true, or whether it is true. It is not incorrect to say that Nu partly explains why "Joe is an uncle" (Ju) is true, but it is likely to mislead. Nu helps explain why (in virtue of what) Ju states that Joe is an uncle, and thus -- if in fact Joe is an uncle -- why Ju states a truth (= is true.) However, Nu does nothing to explain why (it's true/a fact that) Joe is an uncle (if fact it be.) The fact of Joe's being an uncle is independent of and unexplained by linguistic truths like Nu. So too, while Nu may explain the truth of Au in the way it explains the truth of Ju, the A-Thesis is of interest only if Nu explains why (it's a fact that) an uncle is a parent's brother, and not just why Au states that fact.

According to the A-Thesis, that fact is explained by Nu's licensing substitution into a logical truth. The assumption here is that substitution of synonyms perforce preserves a sentence's syntactic and semantic properties: more specifically, that substitution of a synonym into the expression of a logical truth transfers the necessity of that truth to the resultant expression. That compositional principle might have an initial intuitive obviousness, it might seem axiomatic, hardly worth a second thought, yet it is false.

Ju ("Joe is an uncle") may say the same as Jp ("Joe is a parent's brother"). Iu ("An uncle is an uncle") may say the same as IuG ("Ein Oheim ist ein Oheim"). But Iu plainly does not say the same as Au ("An uncle is a parent's brother"), read either predicationally or notationally. For starters, Iu may be read as "An uncle is self-identical/itself"; Au cannot. Au may be read as a definition, Nu; Iu cannot. If Iu has a megalinguistic reading, it is not a defintion like Nu. "U=U" (Iu) can't be synonymous with "U=P" (Au). They don't share the same logical form.xiv Iu is a truth of logic; Au is not. Just what is asserted with Iu and whether it's some substantive extrasymbolic fact may be controversial, but it's certainly not the same as the standard reading of Au. Just what is logical form and how any proposition could be true in virtue of logical form may be problematic, but certainly Au (predicational or notational) is not true just in virtue of its logical form.

Analytic A-sentences like Au have the very same syntax as synthetic S-sentences like Su. Their only difference is purely semantic: there are N-sentence licensed substitutions into A-sentences that yield the expression of a logical truth. But, note, any and every S-sentence yields the expression of a logical truth via some set of N-statements. It's not some peculiar syntactical/formal feature of A-sentences that enables them to be transformed into formal, logical truths. A-sentences are simply S-
sentences, whose requisite N-statements happen to be true (of a particular language at a particular time and place.)

But expressions of self-identity like Iu are peculiar. The Law of Identity is thought to be a basic law of logic, axiomatic, conceptually elemental, an atomic thought, simple and unanalyzable. So Fregean puzzles about identity statements commonly are presented as problems about alter-identity statements, as though the semantics, epistemics, and metaphysics of self-identity statements were (sufficiently) clear and unproblematic. (Just as the mind-body problem gets discussed as though the concept of mind is problematic, the concept of body is not.) Yet, however primitive "U=U" may be in some axiomatic system, it's not cognitively or conceptually primitive. As children (and as a species) we don't and presumably could not) first understand the concept of self-identity and statements of self-identity, and then master "U=P" on the model of "U=U". We do -- and must -- first understand statements of the form "U is (identical with/the same thing as) P", before we can make sense of "U is U". xv

This may suggest that "U=U" is a degenerate or limiting case of "U=P", but that description of the relation dangerously deemphasizes crucial differences.

Statements of the form "u=u" have no pretheoretical use in our lives. "u=p" can be understood as an answer to "What (which/who) is u?" (or "What is p?"). If "u=u" can at all be regarded as a genuine answer to such a question -- as identifying u -- such usage is hardly automatic or unproblematic, since it doesn't epistemically identify the u.

When we say things like "War is war" or "Charley is Charley" we don't standardly mean "War is identical with war" or "Charley is one and the same thing as Charley" or "Charley is self-identical". Roughly, we may be referring de re with the subject term and de dicto with the predicate term. We are saying of the object referred to with the subject term that it has its stereotypical properties: i.e., properties which, in this world, are inevitable features of the thing, but which need not be metaphysically essential features of the thing.

"U=U" is standardly read as "U is identical with U". While this says the same as "U is self-identical", the latter is less misleading. The former looks like a special case of "U = [1]"/"U is identical with [1]

xvi, as though the property possessed by U is the very same as the property predicated of P in "P=U" (or "U=P"),
namely the property of being identical with $U$. Yet this suggests
that, as regards $U$, the property of being identical with $U$ is
(identical with) the property of being self-identical, whereas, as
regards $P$, the property of being identical with $U$ is not the
property of being self-identical.

The A-Thesis' explanation of $Au$'s (alleged) necessity
presumes that synonym switches preserve logical form. That
(alleged) necessary truth of $Au$ can't derive from the contingent
synonymy presented by $Nu$; at best $Au$'s necessity might be
transferred, by means of the substitution rule, from the necessity
of a logical truth. But the truth of "$U=U" is necessitated by its
form. (Logic as the structure of truth.) Aside from its form there
is no necessity in $Iu$, indeed no reason at all to attribute truth
to it. Unlike "$U=P"$, there is no fact (other than the fact of the
symbolic form) that could make "$U=U" be true. (What is the fact of
your being you? Is being identical with yourself one of your
properties; is that different from your being self-identical?
Everyone is self-identical, but only you are identical with you;
no one else has the property of being you.

To deny the A-Thesis is not to deny that, for example,
sometimes it's proper and useful to avow one's allegiance, for the
nonce, to a synonymy and to settle a dispute by declaring it
purely verbal. You can, and sometimes have good reason make $Au$ be
true by meaning and reading $Au$ notationally, and making $Nu$ be true
(of your idiolect, for the nonce) by committing yourself to $Nu$ as
a rule. When your speech is guided by the rule, $Nu$ ($= notational
$Au$) is true of your idiolect, but you can't make $Nu$ or
predicational $Au$ be a necessary truth.

At best, synonymies necessarily transmit truth. The synonymies
themselves are contingent. At best it's contingent that a sentence
expresses an A-statement: it needn't have been that "Unlces are
parent's bothers) states a necessary truth.

Intuitively, if synonymy can transmit the logical necessity it
does, and must do so. If it could do it at all, how could it ever fail to? But it can't, because there isn't any necessity, any
truth to transmit other than the form, and it's precisely the
formal symmetry that the symbol switch destroys. It presupposes
and preserves syntactic form. (Synonyms needn't share the same
syntactic categories, but unless they do they can't form A-
sentences; they can't transform truth's of logic. Truth's of logic
aren't true simply in virtue of their syntactic form. $a=b$ and $a=a$
have the same syntactic. But they don't have the same symbolic
form.

It's the symbolic content, not just it's syntactic structure. I
don't mean the semantic content of the symbol, but the physical
content: the fact that the same physical symbolic element appears here and there in this syntactic form
What of: Tomorrow today will be yesterday.

The surface syntactic form does not look like any logical form

\[(x) (if \ x \ is \ Tomorrow, \ and \ y \ is \ Yesterday, \ and \ z \ is \ Today \ (Fx.Yy.Tz) > x \ is \ the \ day \ after \ z, \ and \ z \ is \ the \ after \ y> x \ is \ the \ day \ after \ y\]

The person known as Cicero is the person known as Tully.

It's not the meaning of "or" and "and" but the nature of propositional disjunction and conjunction

It may help here to consider the contrast identities of sense with identities of reference.
1. Uncles are uncles (Tu)
2. Uncles are parental brothers (Au)
3. Abe Lincoln is Abe Lincoln
4. Abe Linclon is Abraham Lincoln
5. The author of the GA is the author of the GA
6. Abe Linclon is the author of the Gettysburg Address

1, 3 & 5 are statements of self-identity, instantiations of the logical truth: (x)(x=x). true necessarily, due to logical form. Their truth is logically necessary since it is due to their logical form.
2, 4, 6, are statements of alter-identity, they are not truths of logic; their logical form is: a=b

1, 3, 5 are logically necessary; 2, 4, 6 are not

2 is an analytic identity, an identity of sense; it represents the relation of defining property: b (parent's brother) is the defining property of a (uncle). 4 & 6 are synthetic identities, referential identities.

4 & 6 might be thought to be necessary truths due to much the same confusion that might make 2 seem to be a necessary truth. As with 2, we may confuse predicational and notational readings. Grant that proper names are "rigid designators" and that definite descriptions can be. Still, "abe" and "abraham" are arbitrary symbols; what they name needn't have been named by either term or by any name at all. Whether an object is so named is contingent. So the referential truth here is

NRa: The object named "Abe" is also named "Abraham".

4 "Abe is Abraham" will be a contingent truth when 4 is read
notationally, as a way of saying NRa. Given the contingent truth NRa, then

Saying that it's true due to its logical form may mislead. The explanatory "due to" ("because of", "in virtue of") can't here signify quite the same relation as with contingent truths. A necessary truth is, after all, a proposition whose truth is not contingent upon, dependent on some independent truth. Logical form can't explain a proposition's truth in the way that a fact may be the material, efficient cause of another fact, another truth. Generally the fact that S explains the truth of "S"; it seems right to say that the propositional, symbolic entity is true because of the reality of the fact. But with the logical truth it's unclear whether there is any fact expressed that is somehow prior to or in any way distinct from the truth expressed, the essential character of the proposition.

The way that logical form might illuminate truth may be misconceived. As a matter of psychological fact, though we may sometimes insist that logical form is something more abstract than a physical shape, we're bound to be influenced by the power of our mode of visualizing a truth. We tend to blithely dismiss the physical, sense-perceptible features of our symbols as "arbitrary", of no logical, semantic or syntactic importance. Here we're thinking of the equivalence of the phonetically different terms and words of different languages. But, peculiarly in the realm of logic, concerns about the physical forms and configuration of symbols. Like a poet whose concerns with sound of her words is of a piece with her concerns with their sense, a logician's interest in the layout of symbols in visual space is driven by his interest in the content of the expression. There is more than one interest here. Some notations provide or facilitate processes of computation. Here our concern is with perspicuous representation: what is the best picture of what is portrayed, expressed. There is indeed a great naturalness in our symbol of equality and identity: "=". Somehow our symbol "a=a" seems to capture and convey the essence of identity. It's a picture consisting of the same label appearing and then repeated, each time symbolizing the same thing. Contrast "a=a" with "a is self identical". Presumably the latter says the very same thing as the former, but it's visual meaning is nil. It's natural to think that "a=a" shows something of what it says or that it says something about what it shows, that it says or shows something about flanking the symbol "=" with the same symbol. Symbols like "Iuu", "a is a" "a is the same as a" or "a is identical with a" may be comparable but are far less effective, compelling visualizations. "=" portrays what it means, while "is identical with" and "I" do not. In any case, the iteration of the referring expression presents a picture of the identity relation as here a relation between an expression and its iteration. The visual display is
sequential yet synchronic: it reads from left to right, yet permits reading back right to left, for the ordering around the sign is essentially irrelevant, and unlike a audial signal, the whole symbol is present all at once, like what it symbolizes.

All this is lost, nothing like it is suggested by "a is self identical" or "a is identical with itself." We don't so readily sense the sense of saying: The proposition, "a is self identical" is true due to its form. That sentence provides no picture of a form. But for that reason, the reflexive expressions block the picture of the predicate here being the same independent of the subject. With "=a" or "is a" or "is the same as/identical with a", it looks like the predicate is to be read as portraying the same property or relation independent of the subject term. But, my being identical with RW is not a matter of logical form, whereas my being self identical is.

One might here wonder why Au is not synonymous with Iu, and why Iu is any more a logical truth and/or any less true by definition than Au, for it seems that, just as Au requires Nu, the sentence Iu expresses a logical truth only because of the contingently true NI_u:

**NI_u**: The word "uncle" in subject position has the same meaning as the word "uncle" in predicate position.

Consider also Nt^a:

**Nt^a**: The word "tomato^a" (pronounced with a long "a") has the same meaning as the word "tomato_a" (with a short "a"). If "A tomato^a is a tomato_a" is to be read as It ("t=t") and not as At^a ("t^a=t_a"), then why can't Au be read as Iu? After all, just as Au may be read predicationally or notationally (= Nu), Iu, It and At^a can (in principle) be read predicationally or notationally, as ways of stating, respectively, NI_u and Nt^a.

However, while the latter have the appearance of N-statements, their resemblance with Nu is mere masquerade. Nu is a semantic rule. NI_u is best considered a syntactic rule. While Nu is an arbitrary independent convention governing a specific pair of expressions, the NI_u is actually an instance of a general rule, NI, regarding the symbolic constancy of tokens of a symbol type. NI is more a rule about "=" or "is" and only incidentally about any specific word flanking those symbols; it is not a definition of any flanking symbol.

On the other hand Nt^a is best considered a phonetic rule that the alternate pronunciations are only phonetic variants of a single word. Such rules regarding phonetic variants are indispensible, for without them we could not (e.g.) represent self identity with "u=u" since no two physical tokens of the same type are qualitatively absolutely identical. But "parent's brother" can't be a phonetic variant of "uncle" if its meaning is
constructed from the meanings of independent morphemes: "parent," "brother," "'s".

Perhaps it is possible in principle for (e.g.) "lawyer" to be a mere phonetic variant of "attorney" in some English-like language. Then Aa ("An attorney is a lawyer") would be strictly synonymous with Ia ("An attorney is an attorney."). But then Aa would itself be a logical truth, merely a phonetic variant of Ia. And then Aa couldn't be analytic, since Ia can't be. If analyticity is truth by definition, truths of logic aren't analytic, for their truth is due solely to their syntactic form and not to the semantics of their terms. To suppose that the propositions of logic owe their truth to arbitrary notational conventions is to confuse the proposition represented by a notational structure with the notational rules for representing the proposition. If "synthetic" means "nonanalytic" (= "not true by definition"), logical truths are synthetic. This may depart from traditional usage of "analytic," but that predicate becomes superfluous if it's coextensive with "logical." Syntax threatens the A-Thesis in another way. The A-Thesis assumes that N-statements plus logic suffice to yield truths. But consider:

NF: The symbol "farnchoap" has the same meaning as the symbol "nurple."

AF: A farnchoap is a nurple.

I might say Nf while explaining a code I've been creating. Nf may be true, yet it can't entail or explain the truth of Af if only because it doesn't even entail that Af is grammatical and meaningful. If NF states the only existing rule governing "farnchoap" and "nurple," then these symbols may be intersubstitutable but their grammar is indeterminate. Are they nouns? particles? prepositions? Is Af grammatically ill-formed like (*Ap) "A precedes is an is before"? Such questions don't yet have answers, known or unknown. Nonetheless, while Af needn't be true or meaningful, it's true that "farnchoap" and "nurple" mean the same in my Nf code, just as it's true (enough) that "precedes" and "is before" mean the same.

No truth could be explained solely by definitions, since what statement, if any, a sentence expresses depends essentially on its syntax and logical form, not on word meaning alone. The A-Thesis can at best be only that if an N-statement is true, then some correlative A-statement is true, and true solely due to the meaning of the A-sentence.

As an aside, let's note that the A-Thesis doesn't require the expressions mentioned in N-statements to be terms representing concepts. The expressions can belong to any grammatical category. Consider pairs like "precedes"-"is before", "also"-"too", "if"-"when", and A-sentence forms like "X precedes Y just in case X is before Y," "Either X saw Y too or X did not see Y also," "If
p then q, if it's true that when p then q." Such A-sentences aren't standardly cited to illustrate analyticity, and perhaps are not recognized as candidates. Yet, like every A-statement, these are generated by same rule: Take a sentence expressing (an instantiation of) a logical truth in which a symbol occurs twice, and replace one occurrence of the symbol with a surrogate licensed by an N-statement. A-statements are formed by and only by notational substitution into expressions of logical truths.

Our friends "farnchoap" and "nurple" shed light on another aspect of the A-Thesis. N-statements state semantic rules, definitions. They regulate the range of sounds and scripts within which we're saying the same thing, but they do so without identifying or referring to what we and our words say and mean. In this respect N-statements resemble phonetic rules. (Recall the comparison of Nu with phonetic rules for "tomato".) The flip side of this is that the rule generating A-sentences is subject to qualification or nullification by arbitrary phonetic conventions: e.g., no A-sentence is formed by the N-statement of "a" and "an"'s synonymy since phonetic rules preclude substitution.

The generation of A-sentences may be constrained by diverse symbol specific rules, like those restricting replacement of "parent's brother" in "Dutch uncle." More generally, unlike phonetic variants, each natural language synonym has a body of its own and so it can and normally does take on a life of its own as it acquires its own associations, connotations, metaphors and ironies. (Try "spouse's female progenitor" in the typical mother-in-law joke and listen for the lack of laughs.) Vagueness, indeterminacies, and matters of degree surround the boundaries between (one of) a word's strict literal sense and its other distinct senses, and its possible metaphors and connotations. One clear lesson of Wittgestein's reminders on rule following is that when synonyms start to diverge (a place where one word fits while the other feels inapt), the question of which -- if either word -- has changed its sense need not have any answer, known or unknown. (That such questions never have a knowable answer is a radical, resistable inference.)

An N-statement can't itself tell us how to take specific tokens of a sentence type. It can't itself determine which utterances are A-sentences (derivable by substitution of a synonym in a logical truth) since (1) the rule is inevitably riddled with licensed exceptions, (2) the rule and its exemption rules are inescapably subject to indeterminacies, (3) on any given occasion the speaker may be deviating from the rules.

Again, the problem here is not that we can never know which tokens are A-sentences, for generally we need only ask the speaker how she means her words. Of course, she may well be unreliable regarding a past intention, since we don't generally think about or have firm and definite linguistic commitments while speaking. And even with our immediate present intentions, we aren't
absolutely omniscient and infallible, for we don't and couldn't really have much idea what we would say if faced with every hitherto unimaginied circumstance. Still, these epistemic limitations are endemic to all intentions and aren't peculiar to linguistic intentions. The varying degrees of uncertainty afflicting the data pose no more threat to the A-thesis than the inevitable presence of comparable uncertainties imperils other explanatory hypotheses.

Instead the trouble is that the speaker can't make her utterance conform to an N-statement except by her present intention, but she can't maintain the A-statement predicationally while constraining herself by a commitment to the N-statement. Her commitment to the synonymy commits her to speaking notationally when insisting on the necessity of the A-statement's truth. She can speak predicationally only if (as is normal) her speech conforms to the rule but without a commitment that overrides all motivations for deviations and revisions in response to information.

Look at all this anew in the light of "farnchoap" and "nurple." My Nf code reminds us that an N-statement doesn't itself identify the meaning of either mentioned symbol, for it doesn't identify the meaning that both symbols have, what both of them mean. Nu might be said to state (present, identify) that meaning, but only because its definiens happens to have a meaning we're familiar with, while Nf does not. Yet formally Nu and Nf are on a par (as are Au and Af): assertions of this form don't assert the meaningfulness of the definiens or the definiendum.

Nf doesn't identify the meaning that both have expressions have, for it doesn't imply that there is any such meaning. We might balk at Nf for that very reason, for our N-statement formula -- ""X" has the same meaning as "Y"" -- may seem to imply that the mentioned symbols do have a meaning, just as "X has the same size (shape, color, etc.) as Y" implies that X and Y have a size (shape, color, etc.) But, first, however natural and proper that inference may normally be, it remains sensible and true to say things like "Monday has the same size (shape, color) as Tuesday, namely none at all." In this sense, prior my Nf code "nurple" and "farnchoap" had the same sense: viz, no sense. What's unclear is what it comes to for me to stipulate that these expressions have the same sense, whatever the sense they acquire.

Whatever oddness infects Nf, it falls away as "nurple" and "farnchoap" gain enough sense for Af to be as meaningful and true as Au. By seeing what must be added to attain this, we

Moreover, even if "X has the same M as Y" did imply that both X and Y have an M, surely no such implication attaches to "X has neither more nor less M than Y" or "X has no different M than Y".
We can formulate an A-Thesis using the latter formula.

We can formulate various A-Theses with various conceptions of definition represented by various formulae for definitions. We can, explicitly or implicitly, build into the A-Thesis a requirement that the symbols mentioned in the N-statement and used in the A-statement have meaning. We may insist that, as used in the expression "true by definition," a definition must have a definiens that has meaning, that is meaningful and not merely interchangeable with the definiendum without an alteration of sense. We may enforce this by reformulating N-statements disquotationally as, e.g.:

Nu₄: The word "uncle" means parent's brother.
And then we may regard

Nf₄: The symbol "farnchoap" means nurple.
as ill-formed or ungrammatical or not (fully) meaningful or not truly a sentence. We may say that it expresses no statement, no propositional truth or falsehood.

But after saying all this, has any progress been made? Presumably, Nu₄ is equivalent to Nu: the term "parent's brother" is truly predicated of a thing if and only the thing is a parent's brother. Nu₄ brings us no closer to an explanation of the truth of Au.

question remains whether this new A-Thesis makes good sense or whether it only covers over the difficulties in the A-Thesis we've been looking at.

Or we may say that Nf₄ is an instance of or has the same general function as:

Nfₓ: The symbol "farnchoap" means whatchimacallit.
or: The symbol "farnchoap" means X.
or: The symbol "farnchoap" means ... . (pronounced as "dot -dot-dot."
Such formulae do in fact function as English sentences in ordinary talk about talk. Like other N-sentences they may be used to enact a notational rule, stipulating a definition. Here Nₓᵛ:

Nₓᵛ: The symbol "Y" means X.
may be used as a way of saying !Nₓᵛ:

!Nₓᵛ: Let the symbol "Y" mean X.
But unlike !Nₓᵛ, expressions with the form of Nₓᵛ are indicative declarative English sentences that can express true statements reporting the operation of a notational rule. For example, occasionally we don't know or don't care to use the standard word for something, so we employ a symbol that serves as a phonetic variable but not necessarily a semantic variable. The rule in this case is that the capital of "x" represents but doesn't specify what is meant.

Logicians may, for their own purposes, restrict the use of their
symbols for (so-called) open sentences and stipulate that such symbols can't themselves be asserted or express true statements. But it's a bit of narrow-minded linguistic legislation, not a plausible piece of descriptive linguistics, to say that natural languages like English don't have standard readings of such formulae as expressions of true statements.

It's not linguistically deviant for Nf_d to be used equivalently with Nf, a fully grammatical means of stating a semantic form, without attributing a semantic content. Nf_d differs from N_f because the latter presents only a phonetic form, whereas Nfd is more naturally used to present a specific phonetic content. So Af may be used as way of saying Nf or Nf_d, just as Au may be used to express Nu or Nu_d. But like Af, Nf_d cannot (yet) say anything more than Nf, whereas Au and Nu_d can say more than Nu. In this regard, the point of defining "analytic," "A-Thesis," "N-statement"

This won't salvage the A-Thesis since it will emerge that Nu_q says nothing apart from our fallible synthetic beliefs about brothers of parents. What "parent's brother" there refers to and what it means can't be fixed by any stipulation or convention without substantive synthetic beliefs about what the term is predicable of and what is predicable of its referent(s).

This point will emerge more clearly by starting with a bare notion of definition as stating only notational intersubstitutability, and then exposing step by step what is needed to get Af to be as meaningful and true as Au.

A definition can't teach us the meaning of the definiendum unless we already know the meaning of the definiens. That epistemic platitude is a corollary of the semantic axiom that unless the definiens already has a meaning it can't endow the definiendum with any. A notational convention can't capture or create the semantic content of its symbols, since it presupposes and does not explain the significance of the definiens.

This is obvious with verbal definitions such a N-statement. It's not so obvious, but no less true (as Wittgenstein taught us) of explanations of meaning by ostension, exemplification, etc. Such definitions cannot communicate the meaning of the definiendum unless the audience shares the speakers intended focus of attention, and manner of perceiving and conceiving the object of attention. The definer's verbal and nonverbal behavior can't constitute a meaningful definiens apart from her extrasymbolic beliefs about the object, and about the speech context of defining as well.

Thus, given only Nf, if Af is grammatical enough to say anything it can say no more than Nf, a thoroughly contingent truth. By contrast, Au can say more than Nu, due, not to Nu's truth, but to
further truths about Nu's mentioned symbols. (So too, as things are, if (Nun) "Nurple" means the same as "uncle" is true, then (Aun) "A nurple is an uncle" can say more than Nun.)

Let's supplement my Nf code by selecting a grammatical category for the mentioned symbols: e.g., count noun. This specifies the semantic form of the symbols, but does not provide a determinate content; it secures the grammaticality of Af ("A farnchoap is a nurple") but not its meaning. Neither symbol has a semantic content fitting it for use - other than display - in substantive speech. Af still says hardly more than Nf. In uttering Af, we aren't predicating some property, nurpleness, for no property is specified by this symbol; nor do we refer to some subject, a farnchoap, for no subject is specified by that symbol. We don't yet get a true instance of the Law Identity in "A farnchoap is a farnchoap" (If), for If isn't truly meaningful - except when read as: "Whatever if anything "farnchoap" may signify, if it's a term, a farnchoap is a farnchoap." So If may be either an equivalent of Nf or some metalinguistic equivalent of the Law of Identity, but it's not yet a substantive instance of the Law of Identity like Iu.

Even given the laws of logic and the grammaticality of Af, Nf doesn't yield an Af asserting some substantive predication.

The semantic vacuity of the Nf symbols isn't much altered by assigning them a general semantic category: e.g., name of an (unspecified) biological species. Af can still say little more than Nf, for the symbols lack determinate reference. Substantive predications with either symbol lack determinate truth conditions. Do farnchoaps fly? Or photosynthesize? Are some nurples purple? Is one in my soup or under your bed? Or are they extinct? To such questions the answer remains: that part of the code has yet to be decided. The symbols haven't been endowed with semantic substance, but only a form for it.

Af becomes like Au only when it says something determinate, true or false, about extrasymbolic reality, and thus only when Sf sentences have determinate truth conditions like Su sentences. What we're talking about, what we're saying about it, the truth conditions and whether they are fulfilled must have a determinate reality.

They needn't be "perfectly determinate," whatever that might mean. Even the best entrenched terms suffer sorts of vagueness and other indeterminacies of application. But with genuine terms like "uncle," uncertainties of application exist only when and because there are reasons favoring the application (e.g., similarity to a paradigm) and reasons against it. "Nurple" still hasn't sense enough to be genuinely vague. As the name of a still unspecified species, the indeterminacy is near total: there are no reasons for or against any predication of the term. None except that it doesn't apply to inanimate things. But that's no reason to apply the term to one species rather than another, for there is no truth
or even approximate truth to one application or another. This indeterminacy occasions no uncertainty. Epistemic problems of predication can't arise before reference becomes determinate (enough.)

"Nurple"'s reference must be fixed, but can't be without substantive, synthetic assumptions about extrasymbolic reality. No definiens can fix reference until its own relation to the real is fixed by extrasymbolic beliefs. Symbols and symbol systems can't mean or refer to anything without their speakers regulating their usage with extrasymbolic judgments. A notational system may be mechanically operated without beliefs, but its output represents truth-valued statements only via an interpretation embedded in a system of extrasymbolic beliefs. Apart from substantive beliefs, a system of rules (conventional or otherwise) is not a language, and a sequence of symbols says nothing true or false.

This demand for determinate application is semantic, not epistemic. Our beliefs can fix reference without being knowledge or even true. Taken singly they may be false and revisable without altering a term's meaning. We may disagree over some of them while sharing the same lexicon; we must be able to since a notation isn't a propositional language if speakers can't disagree over the expressible propositions. Big differences in reference fixing beliefs may permit or enforce different readings of a term, but that's not because those beliefs (or their denials) entail some statement of the term's meaning or the truth conditions of its predication. The reference fixing beliefs aren't entailments of a term's predication.

Determinate application is not secured by conventions and an isolated reference fixing belief alone, but rather by their linking the symbol to a whole propositional language and thus placing it within the ambit of a whole system of beliefs and the norms of rational thought the system is subject to. A belief - and thus a concept and term - exists and operates only within a network of beliefs; its content is defined by its functioning in an inferential system. An believer can't have just one belief, with no other beliefs conditioning it or consequent upon it, for the belief is nothing apart from its mutual conditioning and conditioning by other beliefs, and the system's mutual conditioning and conditioning by extrascredal reality.

A credal system and its concepts are normatively structured. A complex of attitudes and dispositions can't constitute genuine beliefs, and a notational system can't be a language without (sufficiently) conforming to norms of rational thought. The more scrambled the "speech," the more arational the "thinking," the less content to the "beliefs" and "terms," and the more the agent's behavior is explained by impulses, drives, and nonintentionalistic events.

A symbol is a significant term only when its application is subject to - regulated, evaluable, and revisable by - principles
of rational coherence with the rest of a speaker's beliefs. Ultimately a term's meaning is a matter of what is a (satisfactorily or optimally) reasonable way of contouring and organizing a speaker's speech as a whole.\textsuperscript{xxv} Shaping our speech (inner and outer) means shaping the expression of thought, both the thoughts expressed and the expressive symbols.

What our words do mean (what our concepts do contain) is an essentially normative question; its answer depends on what our words should mean (what our concepts should contain) given our present predicational proclivities and the realities of the world we speak in and of.\textsuperscript{xxvi} As with a legal system and other norms we create, de facto definitional rules can be invalid. The interpretation enforced in current practice may be erroneous, illegitimate and subsequent reasoning may justify declaring that what we'd "known" to be law has all along been void \textit{ab initio}, not a law \textit{de jure}. That possibility is permanently open, though it may often be effectively unimaginable.

When Kant introduced the term "analytic judgment," baptizing a conception he found in Hume and others, it wasn't true by definition that an analytic judgment is true by definition. Hume and Kant believed that certain judgments were true just in virtue of the conceptual content of the judgment. Post-Kantians translated this talk into a linguistic mode precisely because they thought their reformulation wasn't strictly equivalent to the original but instead provided a more adequate explanation of the truth of those judgments. Which definition of analyticity is correct or the best is a substantive issue of logical theory that isn't settled by citing a stipulation and a tradition of adherence to it. However hoary the tradition, the acceptance of a definition doesn't certify its correctness, for it may fail to capture the intended intuitive idea or the idea may be irredeemably inchoate.

While the modern semantic conception of analyticity may be unfaithful to the original conception(s) of Leibniz, Hume, and Kant, the older ideas may be woolier but no wiser. Suppose (ala Frege) concepts are objective, with properties (e.g. containment of another concept) independent of our cognition. Then the puzzles about necessity and a prioricity get reframed as puzzles about concepts rather than first-order objects, but how does that help toward a solution: Must this concept contain that concept? Why? How do we know? How do we know our ideas of the concept are correct? If instead concepts are subjective, with properties dependent on our cognition, then how do they differ from linguistic meanings in any way that advances the answers to the metaphysical and epistemological questions?

Ultimately the craziness in the concept of analyticity is the idea that some judgments are \textit{autonomous}, that their truth is somehow internal to an isolated thought and independent of all
other truths and thoughts, so that nothing could be a reason for revising the judgment. But the content of a judgment can't be autonomous and neither can its truth. The positivist project of securing such autonomy by stipulating arbitrary notational conventions for logically perfect languages is to no avail. Purely arbitrary rules don't persist in natural languages; their interpretation, retention and revision are subject to evaluation and regulation by the rest of our rules, beliefs and interests -- which is why instances of "perfectly" synonymous symbol pairs are rare in real languages.xxvii

The alethic autonomy of analytic judgments is a mirage, a myth, and much like the alleged autonomy of moral judgments from "factual" judgments and metaethical judgments. But that's another story.xxviii
This is a persistent theme of Dummett's: e.g., "... if someone understands two expressions that have the same meaning, he must know that their meaning is the same" ("What Does the Appeal to Use Do to the Theory of Meaning?," in A. Margalit, ed, Meaning and Use (Dordrecht: Reidel, 1979) 130.) Dummett is hardly idiosyncratic here: e.g., "Any proposition I can apprehend is a proposition that is fully known to me, in the relevant sense, for the only relevant sense in which one may be "acquainted with" a proposition is that one may fully apprehend it" (Nathan Salmon, Frege's Puzzle (Cambridge, MA, 1986) p. 107.)


As explained in my forthcoming "Truth, Fact, and Rightness Reconceived", our alethic "true" is a predicate of "that S" complements, not of "for NP to VP" complements, whereas "right" is a predicate of "for-to" complements, not of "that S". That syntactical contrast pulls the plug on the preference for rightness over truth expressed by Goodman, Elgin and Putnam.

Semantic "insight" into word and sentence synonymies and ambiguities must be comparable to mathematical insight -- otherwise the analyticity of mathematics could never have been a remotely plausible thesis. For computational prodigies, a massive multiplication may be as transparent as two digit addition is for most adults; other prodigies of discovery see deep theorems and elegant skeletal proofs with a sense of immediacy and self-evidence. Yet, we're all liable to make even simple mathematical mistakes. The purest light of human reason is still the product of a causal cognitive mechanism of a finite, fallible creature, subject to the world's contingencies, prone to mistakes and great pockets of ignorance. The sheer necessity of a truth doesn't necessitate our detecting it or accepting it upon detection or rejecting all imposters. We might stipulate that perfect rationality requires necessarily believing a priori necessary truths, but that's likely not the most useful conception of perfect rationality. (Compare: must an ideal perceptual mechanism be immune to all illusions and hallucinations? Or aren't they sometimes precisely what we should see if our perceptual mechanism is operating as it should?) The logical properties of a cognitive object needn't correspond with its cognitional properties. Synonymy is a transitive relation; the obviousness of it is not: each link in a chain may be obvious while the relation of the first to the last link is not.

It also seems fishy to question the intelligibility or reality of synonymy with arguments relying on the circle of intentionality and the evidentiary interdependence between substantive beliefs and semantic rules. The familiar critiques don't look like reductios, yet they argue from this interdependence to deny its presupposition: viz., the intelligibility and reality of semantic rules.
It's been argued that some necessary truths are knowable a posteriori and not (or not only) a priori, or that some contingent truths are knowable a priori. However, to my knowledge, it is universally accepted that an analytic truth must be both necessary and knowable a priori. Here the focus will be mainly on the metaphysical issue of necessity rather than the epistemological issue of a priori knowledge, because the latter is, I believe, derivative and ill-defined. Consider: suppose some facts are knowable simply by knowing what a statement of them says; still, what's the point of calling knowledge of the fact a priori when the knowledge/understanding of what a statement of them says requires substantial a posteriori knowledge?

Contrast this with the analysis in Hilary Putnam's classic "The Analytic and the Synthetic," in ....................... wherein Putnam grants the existence of only trivial "single-criterion" analytic truths.

Nu may instead be read as being about the phrase "parent's brother" and Au may be reading being about a parent's brother. Alternatively, Nu could be read as being about the particular phrases. Nothing here turns on whether the topic of discourse is given by the subject term or the predicate term. (Cf. Atlas, Philosophy Without Ambiguity.)

Also, as pertains to analyticity, we can regard "An uncle is a parent's brother" having the same grammatical form as "Uncles are parent's brothers."

If the N-statement's mentioned symbols name a linguistic type, its correlate A-statement will, in one sense, be stating facts only about a language, not something extralinguistic matter. Even with, e.g., (Ad) "A dictionary is a compendium of definitions" regarding predicationally the reference of the terms of Ad is not to its own symbols, as it is in the correlate Nd. In that respect any A-statement is about extrasymbolic reality.

Also, this predicational/notational contrast cuts across that between the so called "is" of predication and the "is" of identity. Au might be read as "u=p" where u is the class of uncles or the attribute, unclehood and p is the class of parents' brothers or the attribute, parents' brother. Any such reading differs from both "(x)(x is the meaning of "uncle" = x is the meaning of "parent's brother")" and "the meaning of "uncle" = the meaning of "parent's brother"."

In this and other respects, the predicational/notational ambiguity is comparable her "factual"/"normative" ambiguities: e.g., "The initial letter of a written English sentence is capitalized" may (be used to) state a rule or report an observable regularity.

The syntactic category of an enquiring, mentioning symbol is that of a count noun, whatever be the syntax of the symbol enquoted. The symbol enquoted may also be a count noun; it could well be itself an enquiring symbol; but that has no bearing on the structure of the use-mention relation.

I've discovered that Hilary Putnam long ago noted this point of logical form in "Synonymity and the Analysis of Belief Sentences," in Analysis 14 (1954), 114–22. However, Putnam does not press it as a threat to the concept of analyticity.
Here too, we could just as well focus on "[1] = U"/[1] is identical with U".

The confusions surrounding the A-Thesis surround the idea that "-(p and -p)", "(p and -p) > p", etc. are true in virtue of the meaning "and", and "p or -p)", "p > (p or q)" etc. are true in virtue of the meaning of "or". Sentences expressing logical truths can be read substantively, as expressing linguistic truths about the particles, operators, etc. But the substantive logical truth require a predicational reading of the sentence.

Logical truths can't be explained by notational conventions, because they are presupposed by and regulate notational conventions: e.g., the Law of Identity requires that predicational notation permit interpredication of coreferential symbols.

The same confusion between explaining (identifying) what proposition is expressed by a sentence and explaining why the proposition is true idea that (e.g.) "p and q" implies "p" and "p" implies "p or q") is true in virtue of the meaning of, respectively, "and" and "or".

These points are reinforced by the need for refinements of the general rule generating A-statements. Notational substitution of one occurrence of a symbol occurring twice or more in a logical truth needn't yield what we'd call an analytic truth, unless each occurrence is nonredundant, essential to the truth of the whole statement. Consider:

I: Ju (Joe is an uncle) or not-Ju or Ju.
II: Ju or not-Ju or Jp (Joe is a parent's brother.)

If I, II is a truth of logic, and not analytic, for its truth is independent of the truth of Nu or other N-statements.

Note also that only substitution of equivalent symbols is licensed by N-statements alone. To get from Nu to "An uncle is a brother" we need an inferential principle: (x)(x is T1's T2 > x is a T2). Additional instructive refinements on generating A-statements are discussed in fn. 14 below.

A comparable problem haunts the move from (NuG) "The (English) word "uncle" has the same meaning as the (German) word "Oheim"" to (AuG) "An uncle is an Oheim." We might charitably let AuG pass as a legitimate, fully intelligible English sentence. More problematic is AuC, the inscription formed from Iu by replacing the predicate "uncle" with the semantically equivalent Chinese ideograph. Yet the correlative NuC is quite unproblematic.

The Kantian image of analyticity as the "containment" of the predicate concept in the subject concept may be apt. Its translation into later linguistic conceptions of analyticity in terms of terms, definitions, semantic rules, etc. is problematic. The problem of that translation is at the heart of the whole problem of radical translation. Let it be that for Kant terms are not names of abstract individuals (a property or separable to the proper name of a concrete individual). A Kantian term represents concepts and is controlled by - a concept, and Kantian concepts are not semantic rules, but of predicates, or, better, of predication judgments, thoughts expressed by whole sentence or net of sentences. However, Kant seems to suffer the Cartesian illusion at our concepts are transparent to us, that we can directly, infallibly intuit the contents.

Kant is regularly criticized for (sometimes) arbitrarily limiting analyticity to simple subject-predicate judgments. One might better complain that he, like his descendants, limits analyticity to a relation between terms, symbols representing concepts. But we might instead worry whether either complaint is a fair criticism and whether Kant's conception...
analyticity as concept containment is captured by the modern linguistic versions.

We have no evidence of someone's accepting a synonymy claim like Nu apart from evidence in her extrasymbolic beliefs. To make sense of her verbal behavior we must make sense of it within some shared conception of extrasymbolic reality. She can't express her synonymy beliefs unless she has some, and she can't have synonymy beliefs about genuine terms without substantive conceptions of the referents.

Once more, the point is not epistemic, but logico-semantic. We can't identify what someone's words mean without our using a normative interpretational grid, because their meanings have no identity, no existence apart from the compliance of her speech with rational norms.

Here we may lump together with the "meaning" of a term its intension, the entailments of its predication, the essential contents of its concept, etc.

Again the epistemic relations are derivative. We can identify someone's beliefs and semantic rules only by making sense of those beliefs and norms, and we do that only by seeing their fit with our own norms of sensible speech. We need to do that because the identity of these objects (beliefs, meanings, rules) is normatively structured.

In an artificial language wherein Nf is fixed by fiat, Af may say more than Nf, but not more than If ("A farchoap is a farchoap.") But in living languages terms take on lives of their own, for fiats can't hold them fast, so Au says more than Iu ("An uncle is a uncle.") In natural languages the purest cases of synonymy are marginal examples, like the derivative symbol pairs generated by contraction rules: e.g., "brother of parent"-"parent's brother"; "it is raining"-"it's raining"; "is not"-"isn't".

My thanks for needed help from Bredo Johnsen and Al Spangler.