**Mary Shepherd on Space and Minds**

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**INTRODUCTION**

Our aim in this paper is to make sense of Mary Shepherd’s remarks on space, extension and minds and, more particularly, to elaborate on the way that both finite, human minds and the mind of God are related to space. In her last known work “Lady Mary Shepherd’s Metaphysics” (1832), Shepherd writes that “mind, may inhere in definite portions of matter […] or of infinite space” (LMSM 699).[[1]](#endnote-1) Shepherd thus suggests that a mind – a “capacity for sensation in general” (e.g., EPEU 16) – may have a spatial location. This is *prima facie* surprising given that, in various places, she maintains that the mind is unextended (e.g., LMSM 698).[[2]](#endnote-2) Indeed, in the growing body of literature on Shepherd’s metaphysics and philosophy of mind, there is no consensus on how best to understand the relation between minds (and their sensations), extension, and space. In recent literature, commentators have hypothesized that, on Shepherd’s view, minds are extended – but in a way that is different to the extension of a body. Antonia LoLordo has suggested that, given the intimate connection that a mind and a body share, on Shepherd’s view, minds should be thought of as extended – although precisely what it means to say that minds are extended, on this reading, is unclear.[[3]](#endnote-3) Similarly, Deborah Boyle speculates that Shepherd must hold that minds are extended in some sense, but is careful to note that this seems to conflict with passages such as LMSM 697–99 in which Shepherd is firmly committed to the unextendedness of mind.[[4]](#endnote-4)

What is common to these readings is the idea that minds have a special kind of status; they are ‘extended’ in some way, but not in the way bodies are. Minds do not offer *resistance*; they are not *penetrable* or *divisible*. As Shepherd herself notes, you need not worry about bumping into any *minds* as you walk down a road, no matter how many people (and their bodies) also occupy that road (LMSM, 699). LoLordo and Boyle’s speculations about in-some-way-extended minds, then, can be seen as a reaction to an underlying tension in the way Shepherd talks about the relation between minds, extension, and space.[[5]](#endnote-5)

Unlike LoLordo and Boyle, we argue that Shepherd does not hold (or needs to hold) that minds are extended in some special sense that is different from bodies. In fact, we provide textual evidence that, for Shepherd, minds are not extended at all. We then argue that even though finite minds, due to their unextendedness cannot, to use Shepherd’s term, ‘occupy’ space as material bodies do, such minds can nonetheless be said to have a spatial location in virtue of what we call their *presence*, or what Shepherd calls ‘inherence’, in a material body.[[6]](#endnote-6) Second, we argue that, in a similar way, the divine mind is present throughout the whole of space and is thus *omni*present. We then argue that, in contrast to finite minds, the divine mind does not require a body to be present in space. Rather, we contend, God’s omnipresence is best understood in a ‘holenmerist’ sense, where the divine mind is *wholly* present in every part of creation.[[7]](#endnote-7) This is not a position to which Shepherd explicitly commits herself but one that can be plausibly attributed to her based on the textual evidence.

We make the case for this reading in three steps. In section one, we provide an outline of Shepherd’s remarks on space. We argue that, for Shepherd, space is extended, meaning that (in accordance with her understanding of what extension involves) it has the capacity to allow for motion. Further, we argue, Shepherd maintains that space can exist without being occupied by matter; in other words, space can be empty. In section two, we make two interpretative claims. First, we argue that, for Shepherd, finite (human) minds are unextended. Second, we clarify the relation between finite minds and space by demonstrating that, despite their lack of extension, they have a spatial location in virtue of the bodies in which they ‘inhere’ (LMSM 699). To establish this claim, we demonstrate that in Shepherd’s writing there is an implicit distinction between something’s having a spatial location in the way that a mind does and something’s ‘*occupying’* space in the way human bodies and other material objects do. Furthermore, we spell out the relation of ‘inherence’ that Shepherd introduces in terms of *presence*. This not only helps us to better understand what Shepherd means by ‘inherence’ (a term she never explicitly clarifies), but also allows us to demonstrate the parallels between the relation of finite minds and material bodies and the divine mind and space. In the latter case, Shepherd repeatedly uses the language of presence along with the language of ‘inherence’ (LMSM 699), which suggests that the two terms are intended to pick out the same relation.[[8]](#endnote-8) In section three, we then use this notion of ‘presence’ to argue that a similar story applies to the divine mind’s relation with space – with the notable exception that God’s mind does not require a body to inhere in space but does so directly. Furthermore, we argue that Shepherd’s understanding of the relation between God and space is distinct from that of both Descartes and Newton and suggest that it is best understood in the tradition of holenmerism.

**1. SPACE, EXTENSION, AND (UNPERCEIVED) MOTION**

Although Shepherd denies that we can gain knowledge of the essence of space (EPEU 176), her writings nonetheless offer several insights into how she thinks we ought to characterise space *for all we know*.[[9]](#endnote-9) Specifically, Shepherd maintains (i) that the senses inform us that space is a mind-independent, external entity (and not a mode of the mind), (ii) that space is extended, and (iii) that space is an “unresisting medium” (EPEU 58) which can be empty. However, before spelling out Shepherd’s account of what space is *like*, we begin by outlining Shepherd’s view that, in everyday experience, we have a *sensation* of space. In turn, this informs our attribution of points (i), (ii), and (iii) to Shepherd.

Shepherd’s view that we have a sensation of space is closely connected to her account of the role that *motion* plays in our experience of the world around us. Shepherd claims that motion is “a sort of sense; for motion will ever appear from infancy upwards to be an action in relation to that space which is outward” (EPEU 105). Her point is that just as, so long as all five sense organs are functioning properly, we are aware from birth of sights, sounds, tastes, touches, and smells, we are likewise constantly aware of sensations of being in (or not being in) motion. We know that we can move our limbs into the space around us, or our whole body into space near to us. From infancy, we are aware of space and our capacity to move within it just as clearly and immediately as we know what we are seeing, hearing, and so on. For this reason, Shepherd maintains, when we talk of the “evidence of sense” we are talking about information provided by the “five organs of sense, and motion” (EPEU 104). Simply put, Shepherd maintains that the sense of motion is quite literally a sixth sense (EPEU 230); what she calls a “capacity or quality of being”, i.e., something that makes it possible for us to have certain sensations.

Shepherd goes on to argue that it is via this sixth sense, our sense of motion, that we receive a sensation of space itself. She writes:

[T]he very impression of motion consists in the impression of passing through extended space, and as a corollary with it suggests to the mind, *here,* and *there* […] This space or unresisting medium appears continually to exist, and to respond regularly to *motion,* as other objects do to other senses. It is hence the immediate consequence of motion also to suggest the corollary that must be included in its essence, that is, the *reality* of distance or outwardness. (EPEU 58–59)

Shepherd’s point is that the experience of passing through space – say, from one side of a room to another – is not just an *absence* of a sensation of resistance, but a distinct sensation unto itself, referred to as ‘motion’. This experience of passing through an “unresisting medium” is what provides us with our notions of ‘here’ and ‘there’ in a similar way to how our sense of vision provides us with notions of light or dark or how our sense of hearing provides us with notions of loud or quiet. On this basis, then, Shepherd concludes that our “power of motion” (EPEU 230), i.e., our capacity to move our body, provides us with a sensation of space.[[10]](#endnote-10) What’s more, it is in virtue of these sensations, Shepherd maintains, that we can come to know that space is an actually existing “outward being” (EPEU 48).

This justifies attributing point (i) to Shepherd: the view that space is a mind-independent, external entity. Shepherd’s commitment to this view is made particularly evident in a footnote where she rejects what she takes to be Kant’s account of space.[[11]](#endnote-11) There, Shepherd argues that we ought to reject Kant’s view that space (as well as time) is only a “mode of the mind” (EPEU 59, note). To hold that, Shepherd maintains, is to mistake the “*causes* which determine a mode of the mind with the effect” (ibid., emphasis in original). In other words, Kant, on her reading, fails to appreciate that the only explanation of the outwardness we perceive in objects is that there is a genuinely ‘outward’ object that causes that sensation (EPEU 1). The way Shepherd contrasts her interpretation of Kant with her own view shows that, for her, space is something genuinely out there in the world and not merely a ‘mode of the mind’ – i.e., not something that we project onto the world in our perception of it.

The sensations of space, gained by our “power of motion” (EPEU 230), are also important in establishing that (ii) space is extended. As Shepherd puts it, the “sensation of passing through different points in space […] inspires the immediate feeling of the *extension of space*” (EPEU 58, emphasis in original). At first glance, this is reminiscent of the Cartesian view where for something to be extended is for it to have length, breadth, and depth (e.g., Descartes, *Principles*, II.10; AT VIII, 45). Descartes himself maintains that empty space, such as the distance between two lamp posts, is as extended – since it has length, breadth, and depth – as the lamp posts, two material bodies, themselves. As he puts it, “the extension in length, breadth and depth [is what] constitutes a space” (*Principles,* II.10; AT VIII, 45). To some degree, Shepherd’s views are in line with Descartes’s here, in that, for her, space, like the objects that fill it, is known to us as an extended thing. However, there are also differences.

Importantly, unlike Descartes (e.g., *Principles* II.16; AT VIII 49), Shepherd does not believe that space requires matter to exist. She maintains that (iii) space is an “unresisting medium” (EPEU 58) which can be empty. This is something the “power of motion” (EPEU 230) plays a crucial role in helping us to identify. From infancy onwards, we learn that there must be some medium to “respond to [our] motions, and to enable [us] to use [our] members *without resistance*” (EPEU 105, our emphasis). Sometimes, Shepherd refers to this ‘unresisting medium’ (i.e., space) as “nothing” (EPEU 387). But that should not be taken to entail that the term ‘space’ does not pick out a really existing entity. Rather, her point is simply that it can be empty (EPEU 48) and so may have nothing *in it*. Our sensations of space, gained by our ‘power of motion’ through an “unresisting medium” are sensations of *something*. They inform us, that is, of the existence of an extended, “outward being” (EPEU 48). This becomes clearer when considering what Shepherd says about the relation between the extension of space and (unperceived) motion.

Shepherd characterises extension – or, strictly speaking, the unperceived cause of our idea of extension (LMSM 697) – as a “capacity for receiving unperceived motion, i.e., for admitting any object to change its place with respect to it; along it, or across it, or through it” (LMSM 702). When Shepherd writes of “unperceived motion” in this quote, she is implicitly drawing a distinction between ‘unperceived’ and ‘perceived’ motion. The former is what she refers to as, the “physical” or “material part” of any motion of which we cannot become conscious (EPEU 406), while the latter is the conscious sensation of motion which we receive through the exercise of our power of motion (EPEU 16–7, 103–5). It is important for Shepherd to distinguish this sensation which is only a “perception” (EPEU 60) or an “impression” (EPEU 58) of motion, from what motion *really is* (EPEU 60): a “successive change of place” (LMSM 702).[[12]](#endnote-12) While we can become aware of this change of place, this is not to be confused with the “change itself” (LMSM 702).[[13]](#endnote-13) Thus, when Shepherd suggests the extension of space is a condition for ‘unperceived motion’ to take place, she is saying that this extension is required for what she calls elsewhere “*real motion*” (LMSM 702)– which is consistent with her description of space as an ‘unresisting medium’ – and not merely for us to have a sensation of motion. That is, Shepherd is again making a point about what space is actually like, irrespective of our sensations of it.

To put it differently, like Newton, who holds that that “space may be empty of body”.[[14]](#endnote-14) Shepherd believes that we have a sensation of an “unresisting medium” because there actually is extended and empty space.[[15]](#endnote-15) By ‘medium’ Shepherd means “an acting cause of nature, independent of the senses” (EPEU xiv) – and space remains a medium, capable of receiving (unperceived) motion in this sense whether it is empty or not. Furthermore, while Descartes reduces matter or material bodies to their extension (e.g., AT VIII, 45), Shepherd defines matter in terms of its “unperceived extended impenetrability” (LMSM 697) which offers resistance (LMSM 698) and whose “solid extension” (EPEU 48) can “occupy space” (EPEU 386).[[16]](#endnote-16) In other words, in contrast to Descartes – and closer to, e.g., Newton[[17]](#endnote-17) – Shepherd distinguishes between space and the bodies that can occupy it; or, more accurately, between extended empty space which offers no resistance, and which can be occupied by matter or material objects, and material objects which are also extended but *do* offer resistance.

In sum, when Shepherd talks about space, she is talking about something that is, as far as we know, an extended ‘unresisting medium’ that may be empty and thus allows for successive changes of place “along it, or across it, or through it” (LMSM 702). According to Shepherd, there is thus a distinction between (extended) empty space and the extended material bodies which may occupy it. With this outline of Shepherd’s notion of space as something that (i) exists external to and independent of (finite) minds, (ii) is extended, and (iii) is an unresisting medium, we can now proceed to look more closely at how finite minds relate to space. In turn, this will put us in a better position to understand the relation between God’s mind and space in section three.

**2. SPACE AND THE (FINITE) MIND**

The aim of this section is to clarify Shepherd’s account of the relation between finite minds and space. More specifically, we establish two points. First, finite minds are, unlike bodies, unextended. Second, there is an implicit distinction in Shepherd’s writings between ‘occupying space’, as bodies do, and having a spatial location in the way that minds do (EPEU 386). The outcome of our reading is the following: while minds cannot be said to occupy space (because unlike bodies they are unextended), they can nonetheless be said to have a spatial location in virtue of the bodies they are present in – or ‘inhere’ in, as Shepherd puts it (LMSM 699).[[18]](#endnote-18)

In *Lady Mary Shepherd’s Metaphysics,* Shepherd argues at length against John Fearn’s (1768–1838) view that the mind, as well as its thoughts and sensations, is extended (Fearn 1820, 52).[[19]](#endnote-19) Already, this suggests that Shepherd is likely to construe the mind as *unextended.* In what is effectively a *reductio ad absurdum* of Fearn’s view, she argues that the extension of minds would entail that “each mind one met with, might oppose one’s progress with its extension” (LMSM 698). As she puts it, “not one particle more will be added or diminished” from “any definite extension” such as a “mile of road”, whether “twenty minds enjoy a morning’s ride thereon, or the contrary” (LMSM 699). In other words, no matter how many (finite) minds are ‘situated’ along a stretch of road, you could never ‘fill’ this space with minds in a way that would, for instance, not allow you to walk on the road because minds are blocking your way.

Aside from her opposition to Fearn, the question of whether minds are extended or not, for Shepherd, is left somewhat ambiguous by the textual evidence available to us.[[20]](#endnote-20) On the one hand, as we have seen, her response to Fearn (e.g., at LMSM 698) implies that the mind is not extended. Yet, elsewhere, she suggests that the mind is “as extended as empty space” (EPEU 387–88) – and as we have seen, empty space *is* extended. However, it is worth noting that this claim is made in the context of what can be thought of as a thought experiment intended to demonstrate that sensations cannot exist on their own (EPEU 386–89). There is also further evidence that minds are not extended in EPEU. There, she talks of “the intimate sentiment of our existence, *separated* from that of our bodies [our emphasis]” and explains that this ‘sentiment’ that we have of ourselves (as distinct from our bodies) does *not* include the sensation of extension. Importantly, for our purposes, Shepherd draws an explicit distinction here between space, which is extended, and ourselves or our minds (which are not) – thus suggesting that minds are *not* “as extended as empty space”, despite her speculation in EPEU 387–88. She writes:

[T]he sensation of passing through different points of space, suggests the notion, or rather inspires the immediate feeling of the *extension of space*, (or of an unresisting medium,) but never that of the *extension of the sentient principle, the self.* (EPEU 58, emphasis in original).[[21]](#endnote-21)

This passage is interesting, first, because Shepherd seems to acknowledge that space and the mind *appear* to have something in common; neither space nor the mind offer *resistance*, unlike material objects (including bodies). However, Shepherd argues that reflecting on the sensations we have of both space and the mind will reveal that this similarity is merely apparent. In fact, our sensation of space (or rather, of “passing through different points” in space) *is* accompanied by the “immediate feeling” of its extension. Our sensation of ourselves, as minds, however, even under close inspection, does not include extension and thus cannot afford us with such a sensation. This point is corroborated by her characterization of “*external* extension [our emphasis]” as something “fitted to create an idea of extension on the mind” (LMSM 697). Read in this context, this remark suggests that *external* extension is needed to have an idea or sensation of extension in the first place – given that a consideration of our own minds will not afford us with such a sensation.

Having thus established that, for Shepherd, (finite) minds are unextended, we may consider what relation they bear to space. Our contention will be that the mind can be said to have a spatial location in virtue of the body it is united with (and ‘inheres’ in).[[22]](#endnote-22) In order to make the case for that reading, we begin with a discussion of Shepherd’s views on the relation between *sensations* and space. Since, for Shepherd, the mind is a “capacity for sensation in general” (EPEU 113) (where ‘sensation’ denotes ‘any consciousness whatever”, EPEU 8–9)[[23]](#endnote-23) this is *prima facie* a promising place to start.

Shepherd claims that “though it [i.e., a sensation] does not occupy space as solid extension, yet it has a necessary relation to space, by requiring space in which to exist” (EPEU 386). Shepherd here introduces a distinction between ‘occupying’ space and ‘existing in’ space: a sensation does not *occupy* space “as solid extension”, i.e., in the way that a material object like a human body does, but it nonetheless has a necessary relation to space because sensation *requires* the latter, in some sense, to exist in. This does not entail for Shepherd that the sensation itself is extended – or if it is extended, its extension is different from the one of material bodies. She notes, as far as we know, sensation either is the “*unextended* quality of some kind of extension” or it is “some form of extended being not detectable by any organ of sense” (EPEU 386); in either case “the occupation of space [is never suggested] as essential to its existence” (EPEU 58).[[24]](#endnote-24)

Furthermore, it is worth noting that Shepherd does not claim that sensations *directly* “exist in” space. Rather, sensations require space for their existence because they are tied to a body for their existence. As Shepherd puts it, “ideas, sensations […] may inhere in definite portions of matter” (LMSM 699). The ‘ideas’ that Shepherd here refers to are a “distinct class of sensations” (EPEU 133) that arise whenever the ‘things’ we are conscious of “have existed, may exist, will exist, must needs exist, but whose qualities are not presently determined upon the mind” (EPEU 136). In other words, ‘ideas’ are a subcategory of sensations (i.e., things we are conscious of) covering things remembered, imagined, and conceived. The ‘definite portion of matter’ referred to, on the other hand, is Shepherd’s way of describing a particular body which she elsewhere calls “the arrangement of that which [is] material” (EPEU 400). Thus, Shepherd is claiming in LMSM 699 that all sensations ‘inhere’ in a particular material body. To understand this relation of inherence better, we need to look at the causal role the body plays in the formation of sensations.

When it comes to human beings, Shepherd’s view is that the brain is necessary for sensations (i.e., consciousness) to arise. For instance, she writes, it is only “under the form and the action of a brain” that sensations “seem capable of being elicited” (EPEU 156). One of the first things to note about this claim is Shepherd’s cautious language, e.g., the word “seem”. Yet, the reason for this is *not* that Shepherd is unsure about the importance of the brain in the case of humans. Rather, it is explained by the fact that Shepherd deems it possible that creatures without a brain could have sensations (EPEU 156) and that the brain may not be required for humans to have sensations in the afterlife (EPEU 156–58, 376–81). In other words, she seems to think that sensation or consciousness is multiply realizable.[[25]](#endnote-25) As far as living human beings are concerned, however, she repeatedly maintains that the existence of the brain, and the body more generally, is necessary for the production of sensations (see e.g., EPEU 160, 234, 348–49, 401). Thus, her claim at EPEU 156 amounts to her saying that – as far as we know– there is no consciousness without the brain in *living* human beings. This, however, should not be taken as Shepherd claiming that the brain alone causes sensations. Nor should this be taken to imply that sensations exist *in* the brain (as we discuss below).

Shepherd is committed to the view that nothing can cause something else on its own.[[26]](#endnote-26) She argues at length in *Essays on the Relation of Cause and Effect* that causation is *at least* a tripartite relation. In other words, there always need to be at least two partial causes that unite, mix, or cojoin to “to form a new nature, capable of exhibiting qualities varying from those of either of the objects cojoined” (ERCE 63). As she puts it, “Cause and Effect, might be presented by A x B = C, therefore C is included in the mixture of the objects called cause” (ERCE 141). While there is much to be said about Shepherd’s idiosyncratic notion of causation, the most important aspect for our purpose is the following: in addition to the brain, there must be some other cause for sensations to arise.[[27]](#endnote-27)

This second cause is the mind which is but “the CAPACITY OR CAUSE, for *sensation in general*” (EPEU 155) and which is required “for *every sensation*, however popularly called *bodily*” (ERCE 172). In the case of human beings, the mind is united to the body by divine decree (EPEU 399–401), which is why Shepherd also says in LMSM 699 that the mind “inheres” “in definite portions of matter [i.e., a body]” (LMSM 699). Note that, unlike a sensation, a mind does not causally depend on the brain or body. Even though Shepherd uses the term ‘inhere’, this should not be taken to imply that minds require material bodies to exist – even if they do require bodies to interact with for sensations to arise. Nor can the mind be reduced to a body. As Shepherd puts it:

It is here that the materialists err, – they can make no distinction between the nature and use of those organs [such as the brain] which are necessary towards the eliciting each sensation in particular, from the continuous power [i.e., the mind] which must exist as a totally different being, as a complete variety of essence from that of the solidity, the extension, and the action of such interfering organs (EPEU 376)[[28]](#endnote-28)

In other words, for Shepherd, sensations in a living human being cannot occur without the body (and the brain in particular), yet the mind itself may (continue to) exist independently of the body. In Shepherd’s words, “We consider *that as our own body*, which is within a bound, or certain limit, and is the source of *conscious* pleasure and pain, and this *limit*, we call the skin, within which, is contained, *all we call ourselves*” (EPEU 62). Thus, Shepherd says that even a child will “consider its arms and legs as part” of themselves (EPEU 105). From a very early age, humans are aware of their mind as present in their bodies and denoting the limits of their conscious experience. While sensation or conscious experience can be said to depend on the body (as long as we are alive), the mind does not.

In short, Shepherd believes that in living human beings the mind and the body are united to a degree that makes it hard to even conceptually separate them: “[T]o address the mind is to address the body, which *instantly* acts along and with it, not *after* it. And to address the body is to address the mind” (ERCE 172). Thus, when Shepherd says that a mind “may inhere” in a body (i.e., a “definite portion of matter”) or that the mind (i.e., a “capacity to feel”) exists within the “compass” of a body (EPEU 388), this is best understood as her saying that the mind is *present* in the (whole) body inasmuch as it is located within its bounds – i.e., within the skin – and causally interacts with the body, or certain bodily organs such as the brain, to give rise to sensations or (conscious) experience.[[29]](#endnote-29)

Crucially for our purposes, this presence of the mind *within* the bounds of a particular material body is what relates the mind and the sensations it co-produces to space. After all, the human body belongs to the realm of extended things (e.g., EPEU 155) that occupy space (or at least have the capacity to do so). Thus, what Shepherd says about the relation between sensations and space (EPEU 386) can be adapted to cover the mind as well. The mind can be said to have a spatial location inasmuch as it is present within the boundaries of a material body that occupies a specific portion of space. However, in contrast to sensations, the mind does not “require” space to exist in the same sense as sensations, because the body, and specifically the brain, is not necessary for the mind to exist. Thus, rather than requiring space to exist in, the mind happens to have a spatial location because God chose to unite it with a material body (EPEU 399–401).

In short, even though Shepherd says that “ideas, sensations, or mind, may inhere in definite portions of matter” (LMSM 699) this does not mean that there are no differences between the way minds and sensations relate to the body and ultimately to space. While both can be said to exist within space, and thus to have a spatial location, we are certain that the mind is unextended and know that only sensations are dependent on the body for their *existence*.

In this section, we have established that finite minds – despite being unextended – can be said to have a spatial location. This is the case in virtue of the body, which ‘occupies’ space as Shepherd suggests, in which a mind is present and which it causally interacts with to (co-)produce sensations.[[30]](#endnote-30)

**3. SPACE AND GOD**

In the previous section, we established that the body is central to the way (finite) minds relate to space. For Shepherd, it is in virtue of the bodies they are united with and present in that minds can be said to have a spatial location. Those bodies, in turn, occupy space. In this section, we put these insights to use in order to understand Shepherd’s account of the relation between the *divine mind* and space.[[31]](#endnote-31) We argue that Shepherd’s claim that the divine mind ‘inheres’ in infinite space (LMSM 699) is best understood as the view that God is omnipresent.[[32]](#endnote-32) We then make the case for thinking that this omnipresence can plausibly be interpreted in a holenmerist sense of the divine mind being wholly present throughout space.

We begin with a discussion of the unextendedess of the divine mind. We established in section two that Shepherd holds that (finite) minds are unextended.[[33]](#endnote-33) While Shepherd does not explicitly say that this unextendedness also applies to the divine mind, there is no reason to assume the contrary. Consider, for example, the fact that she argues for the “inextension of mind” (LMSM 698). The language here seems to encompass *any* mind – whether finite or not. This is consistent with her commitment to the to the “immateriality” of the “Deity” (EPEU Essay 11). Similarly, her point about the absurd consequence that an extended mind could block the way of a (moving) body, or fill a road, seems equally applicable to the deity (LMSM 698). When Shepherd speaks of the “absurdity” of Fearn’s “notions” and the “errors” of his “doctrine”, this seems to include all aspects of Fearn’s assertion that the human and the divine mind are extended, and that the universe is nothing but a “manifestation” of what Fearn calls the “energies” of the Deity (e.g., John Fearn, *First Lines of the Human Mind* [‘Lines’] (printed by A. J. Valpy, 1820),106 or 181; for Shepherd’s criticism, see LMSM 697). This becomes even more evident when Shepherd argues that the divine mind may be “near for immediate communion in every place” but rejects the idea that the divine mind must be extended or could (again, using Fearn’s terminology) be “manifested in his energies” which, Shepherd argues, would allow us to use God as if the latter were a horse that we discipline (LMSM 699).[[34]](#endnote-34) There are thus good reasons to believe that, for Shepherd, the mind of God is similar to finite (human) minds in being *un*extended.

However, the similarity between finite and divine minds runs even deeper. For Shepherd also seems to locate the divine mind *in* *space*. For instance, she says that the Deity not only “formed” the universe, but “presides *in* it” (LMSM 700, our emphasis), and she writes that “ideas, sensations, or mind, may inhere in definite portions of matter […] or of infinite space” (LMSM 699).[[35]](#endnote-35) As we established in section two, it is finite human minds that ‘inhere’ in, and are thus present in, ‘definite portions’ of matter. Meanwhile, it seems that the best candidate for the kind of mind that could inhere in “infinite space” is God’s. This interpretation is corroborated by Shepherd’s description of the divine “mind” and “essence” as “universal” (e.g., EPEU 390, 399, 401) and is all but confirmed when she explicitly says that the divine mind takes up “infinite space for his residence” (EPEU 390). But how ought this divine inherence to be understood? As we argue below, this relation of ‘inherence’ should be interpreted as God being present everywhere *in* space, i.e., as God being omnipresent.

What reason is there to accept this interpretative claim? For a start, it is evidenced by the fact that Shepherd repeatedly uses the language of *presence* when it comes to the divine mind. For instance, she speaks of the “immediate presence” of the divine mind (EPEU 147) that is “ever present” (LMSM 708) and thus “ever ready to appear” (EPEU 151, 191) as well as “near for immediate communion in every place” (LMSM 699). Crucially, Shepherd suggests that this divine presence is achieved by God being “*in* *all* times and *places*” (EPEU 191, our emphasis).[[36]](#endnote-36) That is, Shepherd all but explicitly says that the divine mind is omnipresent. But questions remain as to the precise way that the divine mind is omnipresent inspace. We tackle this issue in the remainder of this section by making the case that Shepherd is best understood as endorsing holenmerism; the position that the divine mind wholly exists in every part of space.

So far, we have established that Shepherd believes that the divine mind ‘inheres’ inspace (EPEU 390) and argued that this ‘inherence’ relation should be characterized in terms of divine omnipresence – similarly to how the ‘inherence’ of human minds in bodies should be understood in terms of presence. However, it is not totally clear what it means for God to be omnipresent in space. While this is a fairly standard theistic commitment, various early modern thinkers developed different accounts of precisely how divine omnipresence ought to be understood.[[37]](#endnote-37) According to one option, which Henry More calls ‘nullibism’ and attributes to Descartes (e.g., *Enchiridion metaphysicum*, 98),[[38]](#endnote-38) God, like any other ‘spiritual’ entity, is not – in the words of Jasper Reid – “present in the spatial world”.[[39]](#endnote-39) The discussion so far in this section ought to have made it clear that this is not Shepherd’s position. Although she shares with the Cartesians the position that minds are not extended, Shepherd clearly locates the divine mind *in* space in some way.

In contrast to ‘nullibism’ stands the view that God exists in space in the same (or a very similar) way as bodies do. Geoffrey Gorham labels this view the “*partes ex partes*” view, suggesting that God literally has parts which extend throughout space.[[40]](#endnote-40) As one prominent defender of this position, Newton puts it, God is “omnipresent not only virtually but substantially; for action requires substance”.[[41]](#endnote-41) Other thinkers sympathetic to this view, such as John Locke, maintained that it is preferable to nullibism because “it is better to be every where in the infinite extent of space than to be shut out from any part of it”.[[42]](#endnote-42) Yet, problematically from a standard Christian point of view, this position also seems to imply that God literally has spatial parts and is thus extended. Although Shepherd would certainly agree with Newton’s claim in *De gravitatione* that God is literally everywhere, we have already established that Shepherd also maintains that minds – including God’s – are unextended.[[43]](#endnote-43) What’s more, such a position would seem to run afoul of her commitment to the simplicity of mind or, as Shepherd puts it, the idea that the mind is a “*simple* capacity for general sensation” (EPEU 15, our emphasis).[[44]](#endnote-44) There is a clear tension, if not an outright inconsistency, between the claim that any mind is simple – another standard, orthodox commitment – and the idea that it has extended parts. For that reason, it is not plausible to attribute the ‘*partes ex partes’* position to Shepherd.

A third way of understanding divine omnipresence in space is in terms of what is known as ‘holenmerism’. Shepherd does not explicitly commit herself to this view. In general, Shepherd’s writings make it difficult (if not impossible, in principle) to spell out how exactly God and space are related because she maintains that the true essences of God and space are unknowable (EPEU 389-91 and EPEU 176, respectively). This is in line with her view that that there are a variety of metaphysical issues, particularly concerning the essence or ultimate nature of things such as mind or matter (EPEU 244), where she needs to resign herself “to whatever degree of ignorance my very nature renders inevitable” (LMSM 708).[[45]](#endnote-45) Nonetheless, our contention is that there is enough textual evidence to attribute this view to her.

For a holenmerist, to say that God is omnipresent in space is to say that God *as a whole* is literally everywhere; “whole in the whole and whole in all the parts”.[[46]](#endnote-46) As More puts it, this view holds that “God, insofar as the human mind comprehends God, is everywhere in his entirety. He is present in all places and all spaces as well as in each point of space in his whole essence”.[[47]](#endnote-47) This fits well with Shepherd’s remarks that the ‘universal’ ‘mind’ or ‘essence’ (e.g., EPEU 390, 399, 401) takes up “infinite space for his residence” (EPEU 390). Further, Shepherd claims that the divine mind, arguably as a whole, is present in “*in* *all* […] *places*” (EPEU 191, our emphasis). On Shepherd’s view, God does not occupy a body, but directly ‘inheres’ in infinite space (LMSM 699). Thus, a holenmerist account of omnipresence is *prima facie* compatible with the way Shepherd writes about God’s relation to space and has the further merit of being consistent with her commitment to the simplicity of the divine mind.

Holenmerism allows one to make sense of Shepherd’s position while also connecting it to an existing tradition and avoiding the problematic consequence of the ‘*partes ex partes*’ view that God is in space in the same way as bodies (i.e., extended). Yet, the holenmerist reading of Shepherd might give rise to the worry that God *depends on space* in some way. This is the kind of concern raised by Leibniz, in his correspondence with Samuel Clarke, when he suggests that if God could be said to exist in space, he “would depend on it [i.e., space], *if he has need of place*”.[[48]](#endnote-48) This looks like a legitimate concern for Shepherd and our reading of her as a holenmerist. Although Shepherd’s theism may be heterodox in certain ways,[[49]](#endnote-49) the idea that God depends on space does not fit with her understanding of God as the “great root of existence” (EPEU 396–97) or her claim that God is “THE GREAT FIRST CAUSE” (ERCE 119; see also ERCE 19). In the remainder of this section, we demonstrate that Shepherd has the resources to respond to this kind of worry. In doing so we also provide additional insight into what Shepherd’s version of holenmerism might look like.

Shepherd never explicitly defends an account of the origin of space, although she does put forward two speculative suggestions. On the one hand, she speculates that space could be ‘coeval’ with God (EPEU, 354).[[50]](#endnote-50) One the other hand, she speculates that space, like motion, may have “commenced in the eternal mind at the beginning of the universe” (ibid.). While Shepherd, in all likelihood, would say that “we have no possibility of preferable conjecture” (EPEU 354) in this instance, on neither conjecture would God be conceived as *dependent* on space. This is consistent with Shepherd’s view that the divine mind “exist[s] at large in the universe, *uncircumscribed* by space and duration” (EPEU 401, emphasis in original). If the second conjecture is true and space, like motion, is “commenced in the eternal mind at the beginning of the universe”, then it follows that space is the product of divine creation. This is consistent with thinking that God is omnipresent in space, i.e., wholly present throughout, *subsequent* to its creation. In other words, it is only *after* the creation of space that it becomes “the venue in which God exercises His divine will”, to borrow Connolly’s phrasing.[[51]](#endnote-51)

Alternatively, if space is equally as old as God (i.e., ‘coeval’), this would not render the Deity dependent upon it. The divine mind, like any mind, is not extended and its essence is as a cause for consciousness. As such, the ‘coeval’ reading of God’s relation to space would simply emphasize Shepherd’s description of space as a “medium” (EPEU 58). On such a reading, space might be considered as something like a *condition* to be satisfied in order for God to manifest his divine attributes in regard to his creation (ERCE 97; EPEU 152) – i.e., for divine action, such as e bringing about motion or the creation of creatures like human beings (EPEU 398–401). There is no obvious reason why such an account of the God-space relation should entail that the divine mind *requires* space to exist or that space is a *sine qua non* for divine action. After all, God can interact with his creation even if the Deity or the divine attributes are not located within it.[[52]](#endnote-52) In a nutshell, space may (as Shepherd seems to suggest) be as old as God, but the omnipresence of the divine mind in space may only have begun *simultaneously* with or *subsequently* to God’s creation of the universe.[[53]](#endnote-53)

While Shepherd’s epistemic humility limits the detail in which it is possible to spell out the relation between the divine mind and space, this section has provided reasons for thinking that, for Shepherd, the divine mind as a whole is present in every part of space, which is either created by God or as old as God. In response to the concern that such a view renders God *dependent* on space, we have also shown that Shepherd can either say that God created space (which renders space dependent on God) or, if space is as old as God, that the divine mind only becomes located in space when the latter is used as a medium to bring about creation.

**CONCLUSION**

The aim of this paper has been to clarify Shepherd’s account of the relation between space, extension and minds; in particular, finite human minds and the mind of God. Our starting point was Shepherd’s puzzling remark that *unextended* minds, whether human or finite, “may inhere in definite portions of matter […] or of infinite space” (LMSM 699). Our contention has been that, in a similar, but not perfectly analogous, way to how an unextended finite human mind ‘inheres’ in its body – and, in that sense, is present in that body – the unextended mind of God ‘inheres’ in space as a whole. Our interpretation, thus, was able to make sense of Shepherd’s remarks without the need to commit Shepherd to the view that minds are in some form extended – a position that Boyle and LoLordo, albeit speculatively, attribute to Shepherd.

We began by looking at what space *is,* for Shepherd. Our answer was that space, as far as we can know it, is extended: some of that extended space is occupied by material objects, while some of it is ‘empty’ or, as Shepherd puts it, ‘unresisting’. We then outlined her views on the relation between finite human minds and space, demonstrating that, for Shepherd, minds do not occupy space (as material objects, including human bodies, do) but are nonetheless present in the bodies they ‘inhere’ in. Finally, in section three, we argued that while human minds are present in “definite portions” (LMSM, 699) of matter, the divine mind is omnipresent throughout “infinite space” (ibid.) as a whole. Further, we argued that the best way to understand God’s omnipresence is in a holenmerist sense, where the divine mind is wholly present throughout infinite space. This allows Shepherd to avoid the concern that God’s mind is extended or divisible. Finally, we demonstrated that while Shepherd offers no decisive account of the origin of space, she does not believe that God is dependent on space.[[54]](#endnote-54)

**List of Abbreviations:**

AT = Descartes, René. *Oeuvres de Descartes*. C. Adam and P. Tannery (eds.). Vol. 8. Paris: Vrin: 1897–1910.

ECHU= Locke, John. *Essay Concerning Human Understanding*. Peter H. Nidditch (ed.). Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1979.

LMSM = Shepherd, Mary. ‘Lady Mary Shepherd’s Metaphysics’ in A. Lolordo (ed.), M*ary Shepherd's Essays on the Perception of an External Universe,* 2020. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 202–221.

EPEU = Shepherd, Mary. *Essays on the Perception of an External Universe, and other Subjects connected with the Doctrine of Cause and Effect*. London: John Hatchard and Son, 1827.

ERCE = Shepherd, Mary. *An Essay Upon the Relation of Cause and Effect: Controverting the Doctrine of Mr. Hume, Concerning the Nature of that Relation, with Observations Upon the Opinions of Dr. Brown and Mr. Lawrence Connected with the Same Subject*. Printed for: T. Hookham, Old Bond Street, 1824.

1. We use the following abbreviations in this paper: LMSM for “Lady Mary Shepherd’s Metaphysics”(1832); ERCE for Shepherd’s *Essay on the Relation of Cause and Effect* (1824), and EPEU for the *Essays on the Perception of an External Universe* (1827). All page numbers refer to the original pagination. [↑](#endnote-ref-1)
2. The importance of space for Shepherd’s metaphysics has recently been acknowledged in the secondary literature by Deborah Boyle, *Mary Shepherd: A Guide* [*Mary Shepherd*] (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2023), 253-54, and Antonia LoLordo, *Mary Shepherd* [*Mary Shepherd*] (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2022), 31. Shepherd’s philosophy of mind is addressed extensively in a forthcoming volume on Shepherd edited by Keota Fields. It is also discussed in Deborah Boyle, ‘Mary Shepherd and the meaning of “life”’ [‘Meaning’], *British Journal for the History of Philosophy*, 29.2 (2020a): 1–18; Louise Daoust, ‘Shepherd on Causal Necessity and Human Agency’ [‘Necessity and Agency’] *Journal of Modern Philosophy* 4.1 (2022); Manuel Fasko, ‘Mary Shepherd’s “Threefold Variety of Intellect” and its role in improving education’ [‘Threefold Variety’], *Journal for Scottish Philosophy* 19.3 (2021): 185–201; M. Folescu, ‘Mary Shepherd on the role of proofs in our knowledge of first principles’ [‘Proofs’], *Noûs* (2021): 1–21; David, Landy ‘Shepherd on reason’ [‘On reason’] *British Journal for the History of Philosophy* (2023): 1–21; Antonia LoLordo, ‘Powers in Britain, 1689–1827’ [‘Powers’] in Julia Jorati (ed.), *Powers: A History* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2021), 220–242; LoLordo, *Mary Shepherd*; Travis Tanner, ‘How good was Shepherd’s response to Hume’s epistemological challenge?’ [‘Shepherd’s response’] *British Journal for the History of Philosophy* 30.1 (2022): 71-89. [↑](#endnote-ref-2)
3. LoLordo, *Mary Shepherd,* 25. LoLordo, *Mary Shepherd,* 31, fn 44, also notes that there is reason to think that extension or space “is a power rather than a categorical property for Shepherd”, and so claiming that minds are extended in some sense or have a spatial location may be “less surprising than it initially seems”. While we remain neutral on the ultimate nature of space in this paper, we agree with LoLordo that minds can be said to have a spatial location because of the intimate connection between them and their associated bodies. [↑](#endnote-ref-3)
4. Boyle, *Mary Shepherd,* 254. Boyle, thus, suggests that ‘extension’ in EPEU 386 must mean something different when applied to the mind. As will become evident we interpret this passage differently and as not applying to the mind, see p. 10. [↑](#endnote-ref-4)
5. It seems as though Garrett is also, perhaps implicitly, responding to this tension when he suggests that is not entirely clear whether Shepherd believes that space is external to all minds (including God’s). See Don Garrett, ‘External Existence and the Rejection of Idealism in Hume and Shepherd’ [‘External Existence’] in Keota Fields (ed.), *The Philosophy of Lady Mary Shepherd* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, forthcoming)). We address this question in more detail in section 3 when discussing the relation between the divine mind and space. [↑](#endnote-ref-5)
6. Throughout this paper, references to finite human minds are to those of *living human beings*. We remain neutral on Shepherd’s views on the afterlife. For a sustained discussion of Shepherd’s view on the afterlife see EPEU Essay 10; Boyle, *Mary Shepherd*, 257–63. We also do not comment on what Shepherd’s views on non-human animal minds might look like and to what degree the relation between the human mind and space is applicable to them as well. For more on Shepherd’s views on animal cognition see Manuel Fasko, ‘The “Animal Power to Feel” – Mary Shepherd’s understanding of non-human animal cognition’ [‘Animal Power’] in Keota Fields (ed.), *The Philosophy of Lady Mary Shepherd* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, forthcoming); LoLordo, *Mary Shepherd,* §4.3; Antonia LoLordo, ‘Mary Shepherd’s Account of the Mind: Its Opponents and Implications’ [‘Mind’] in Keota Fields (ed.), *The Philosophy of Lady Mary Shepherd* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, forthcoming). [↑](#endnote-ref-6)
7. For an outline of holenmerism, see Marleen Rozemond, ‘Holenmerism (Holenmerianism)’, [‘Holenmerism’] in Lawrence Nolan (ed.), *The Cambridge Descartes Lexicon* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2015), 366–68; or Marleen Rozemond, ‘Descartes, mind-body union, and Holenmerism’ [‘Descartes’], *Philosophical Topics* 31.1/2 (2003), 343-367. [↑](#endnote-ref-7)
8. We thank Donald Rutherford for helpful suggestions in developing this point. [↑](#endnote-ref-8)
9. Crucially, it will become evident in this section that Shepherd never identifies space with extension in the way (e.g.,) Descartes or Hobbes do (see Thomas Hobbes, *The English Works of Thomas Hobbes,* William Molesworth (ed.) (London: John Bohn, 1839–1845); we discuss Descartes’ views in more detail below). She is more cautious and believes that space *as far as we know it* (which does not necessarily also pertain to its ultimate metaphysical nature) is extended. This allows for the possibility that, on her view, there could be unextended space - this will become important by the end of this paper. However, for the most part, we follow Shepherd’s focus on extended space because our aim is to show that there is an interesting parallel between finite minds and the divine mind as far as their respective existences in *extended* space is concerned. [↑](#endnote-ref-9)
10. It will become evident in this section that this ‘power of motion’ ultimately provides us with the notion of space as outward *and* extended. Also note that this process requires an extra step. As Boyle, *Mary Shepherd,* 124, argues, we “can characterize the movement of one’s own body as a capacity to feel a sensation of motion” and this allows us to “detect […] outwardness” or “extended space”. This is also why Shepherd refers to the “power of motion” as a “sixth sense” (EPEU 230). [↑](#endnote-ref-10)
11. It is questionable whether this reading of Kant is accurate but, as LoLordo notes, this kind of reading “was common in Shepherd’s context” (Antonia LoLordo, ‘Introduction’ in A. Lolordo (ed.), *Mary Shepherd’s Essays on the Perception of an External Universe* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2020), 1–24), 55, fn. 10 [editor’s note]). For discussions of Kant’s views on space (and time), see Andrew Janiak, ‘Kant’s Views on Space and Time’ in Edward N. Zalta (ed.), *The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy* (Summer 2022 Edition); Michael Friedmann, ‘Space in Kantian Idealism’ in Andrew Janiak (ed.), *Space: A History* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2022) 280–306. [↑](#endnote-ref-11)
12. This characterization by Shepherd is consistent with Descartes’ understanding of motion as change of ‘neighborhood’ of a body (*Principles* II.25; AT VIII 53–54). For more on Descartes on bodies and motion, see Lisa Downing, ‘Bodies in Descartes and Boyle’ in L. Nolan (ed.), *Primary and Secondary Qualities: The Historical and Ongoing Debate* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2011), 109–135; Edward Slowik, *Cartesian spacetime: Descartes’ physics and the relational theory of space and motion* (Doderecht: Springer, 2013) part III. [↑](#endnote-ref-12)
13. In fact, Shepherd believes that we do not have access to the “*essence* of what motion is in nature” (EPEU 60, emphasis in original). This is consistent with what we have called her ‘epistemic humility’. [↑](#endnote-ref-13)
14. Isaac Newton, *Philosophical Writings,* [‘Writings’] Andrew Janiak (ed.) (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2004), 26f. [↑](#endnote-ref-14)
15. As will become evident throughout the paper, this does not render Shepherd a clear-cut Newtonian, because there remain important ways in which her views differ from Newton’s. [↑](#endnote-ref-15)
16. Again, Shepherd does not say that this constitutes the essence of matter which we cannot know (see EPEU 244). Rather, this is matter as far as we know it. For more on this and Shepherd’s understanding of matter in terms of a power, see LoLordo, ‘Powers’, § 9.7. [↑](#endnote-ref-16)
17. Isaac Newton, *The Principia: mathematical principles of natural philosophy*, I. B. Cohen and A. Whitman (eds.) (Berkeley: Univ. of California Press, 1999), 409. [↑](#endnote-ref-17)
18. Establishing these points will lay the groundwork for section three, where we make the case for thinking that what is true of the relation between *finite* minds and space (or something very like it) is also true of the relation between space and the mind of God. The most important similarity is that, just as finite minds are present in their bodies, the mind of God is (omni-)presentin space. [↑](#endnote-ref-18)
19. Fearn was a former naval officer who started to publish philosophical tracts from 1810 onwards. Despite writing twelve books over two decades, he never found academic recognition. Shepherd wrote Fearn two letters containing “a few critical remarks” on his *Lines of the Human Mind* (first published in 1820) “really not intended for the public eye” (LMSM 697). Despite this, Fearn subsequently published them along with a “lengthy and rather condescending” reply. See Margaret Atherton, ‘Lady Mary Shepherd's Case against George Berkeley’, *British Journal for the History of Philosophy* 4.2 (1996): 347–366. This is turn is what elicited LMSM in the first place. See Jennifer McRobert, *Mary Shepherd's Two Senses of Necessary Connection*, 2002. [↑](#endnote-ref-19)
20. LoLordo, *Mary Shepherd,* 25, thus speculates that Shepherd could think that the mind is extended, though in a different sense to the body. As will become evident, we disagree that minds are extended but agree that there is an intimate connection with extension via the body in which a given mind is present. [↑](#endnote-ref-20)
21. For the purposes of this paper, we remain neutral on the question of whether or to what degree Shepherd identifies the mind and self. While Deborah Boyle argues that Shepherd does not distinguish between minds and selves (Deborah Boyle, ‘Mary Shepherd on Mind, Soul, and Self’ [‘Mind, Soul, and Self’] *Journal of the History of Philosophy* 58.1 (2020): 93–112, at §4) this claim has come under scrutiny from Antonia LoLordo, ‘Mind’, §§5–6 & 9, and David Landy (David Landy, ‘Shepherd’s First-Personal Causal-Functionalist Account of the Mind’ in Keota Fields (ed.), *The Philosophy of Lady Mary Shepherd* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, forthcoming). While these commentators argue against an identification of mind and self, both agree that the mind has some role to play for a self. This is all that we need for the purpose of our interpretation because in EPEU 58 Shepherd invites a consideration of ourselves as mind, separated from our bodies. [↑](#endnote-ref-21)
22. Note, again, that our focus is confined to the minds of *living* human beings (see Introduction and fn.4). So, while the case might be different in the afterlife, this is beyond the scope of this paper. [↑](#endnote-ref-22)
23. This characterization of the mind, as a capacity or cause, can be found throughout EPEU. See, for instance, EPEU 48, 84, 113, 157, 163, 216, 242. For a discussion of Shepherd’s notion of mind as a capacity, see Boyle ‘Mind Soul, and Self’, §3; LoLordo *Mary Shepherd*, chap. 4, and LoLordo, ‘Mind’. [↑](#endnote-ref-23)
24. This further highlights that Shepherd thinks that even if sensations were extended, it would be a special kind of extension, different from the one of material bodies. The reason that there are two options in the first place is that Shepherd, as we discuss next, believes that sensations are the product of the causal interaction of unextended minds and extended bodies – and so sensations could *prima facie* be either unextended or extended in some special way. Shepherd seemingly believes that we cannot certainly know which option it is because we can only experience our sensations and not observe them. Our reading of EPEU 386, thus, differs from Boyle’s (*Mary Shepherd,* 254) who interprets this passage as offering three options concerning the questions what sensations are qualities of. This forces Boyle to conclude that Shepherd seems to hold that minds are extended in some sense; even though, as Boyle notes, this would run counter to Shepherd’s commitment to the unextendedness of mind. [↑](#endnote-ref-24)
25. Shepherd thus anticipates more recent discussions of the multiple-realizability of mental states. For discussion, see John Bickle, ‘Multiple Realizability’ in Edward N. Zalta (ed.), *The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy* (Summer 2020 Edition) <https://plato.stanford.edu/archives/sum2020/entries/multiple-realizability/>. This also means that our interpretation, strictly speaking, only holds for the minds of *living human beings*. For Shepherd’s remarks on the difference between living and dead bodies, see for instance EPEU, 58-59 & 173. For more on Shepherd’s understanding of what ‘life’ involves, see Boyle, ‘Life’, esp. §4, and Boyle, *Mary Shepherd*, chap. 4. [↑](#endnote-ref-25)
26. This even holds for God. For more on this see Deborah Boyle, ‘Mary Shepherd’s Causal Principles and Divine Causation’ [‘Causal Principles’] in Keota Fields (ed.), *The Philosophy of Lady Mary Shepherd* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, forthcoming). [↑](#endnote-ref-26)
27. Shepherd’s notion of causation is discussed in depth in Boyle, *Mary Shepherd,* chap. 2; Martha Brandt Bolton, ‘Lady Mary Shepherd and David Hume on Cause and Effect’ in E. O'Neill, and M. P. Loscano (eds.), *Feminist History of Philosophy: The Recovery and Evaluation of Women's Philosophical Thought* (Cham: Springer, 2019), 129–152; Jeremy Fantl, ‘Mary Shepherd on Causal Necessity’, *Metaphysica* 17.1 (2016): 87–108; David Landy, ‘A Defense of Shepherd’s Account of Cause and Effect as Synchronous’ [‘Cause and Effect’] *Journal of Modern Philosophy* 2.1 (2020); LoLordo, *Mary Shepherd,* chap. 2; Cristina Paoletti, ‘Restoring necessary connections: Lady Mary Shepherd on Hume and the early nineteenth-century debate on causality’ *I Castelli die Yale* 11 (2011): 47–59. [↑](#endnote-ref-27)
28. Consider, further, that Shepherd believes that mind is “immortal” or “eternal” and can survive the body (EPEU Essay 10). This is further accentuated by her identification of ‘mind’ and ‘soul’. See Boyle, ‘Mind, Soul, and Self’, 104. [↑](#endnote-ref-28)
29. It is an interesting question whether Shepherd is an holenmerist concerning the relation between human minds and bodies. That is, does she believe that the mind *as a whole* is present in every part of the body, as opposed to a certain part of it like the brain or the pineal gland? While Shepherd clearly believes that the mind is *really* present within the body, it seems equally clear that the mind cannot have (spatial) parts because it is unextended, as we argued in section one, and simple (e.g., EPEU 15, 48, 239). While we address the issue of holenmerism in more detail when it comes to the relation between the divine mind and space, understanding the precise nature of Shepherd’s account of the mind-body relation is beyond the remit of this paper. For more on the relation between mind and body in Shepherd, see Boyle, *Mary Shepherd*, chap. 8 or LoLordo, *Mary Shepherd*, § 4.2. [↑](#endnote-ref-29)
30. This is reminiscent of Newton’s claim that “created minds are somewhere, and body is in the space that it occupies” (Newton, ‘Writings’, 25) in that, for Shepherd, minds are somewhere *due* to the bodies they are present in, and which occupy space. It will become evident in the next section that one should not go so far as to characterize Shepherd as a ‘Newtonian’ about space – and particularly about how the divine mind relates to space. This (implicit) critical attitude towards Newtonianism fits well with, e.g., her explicitly critical discussion of Newton’s view of final causation (EPEU, Essay 9). [↑](#endnote-ref-30)
31. We do not claim that the relation between finite minds and the divine mind to space is perfectly analogous. After all, Shepherd cautions against relying too heavily on analogies between our mind (and the way it works) and the divine mind. For instance, she argues it would a gross mistake to think that the divine mind needs a body for its existence or to produce consciousness just because this is the case for finite minds (EPEU 394). [↑](#endnote-ref-31)
32. As will become evident, Shepherd uses the language of ‘presence’ repeatedly when it comes to the divine mind, although she does not explicitly call God ‘omnipresent’. This fits with her general tendency to say little about God, the divine attributes, or the way the latter relates to creation, beyond the claim that God is (all-)good, wise, and powerful (ERCE 97; EPEU 152). [↑](#endnote-ref-32)
33. This puts Shepherd at odds with Newton, ‘Writings’, 31, who suggests that a commitment to unextended minds entails that one believes that they do not exist. [↑](#endnote-ref-33)
34. We leave aside the question of what ‘energies’ refers to for Fearn (or what Shepherd thought it referred to). Shepherd is simply paraphrasing him when she uses the term. [↑](#endnote-ref-34)
35. In the quoted passage Shepherd suggests a third option: a mind could also inhere in “the whole of matter”. Considering this claim in more detail is beyond the scope of the present investigation because it would require an in-depth analysis of Shepherd’s doctrine of cause and effect. In particular, her notion that cause(s) and effect are synchronous would need detailed attention because it entails that cause(s) are “included” (i.e., become part of) the “mixture” that is the effect (ERCE 141). See Landy, ‘Cause and Effect’; LoLordo, *Mary Shepherd,* §2.2. This is important because, in light of her understanding of causation, the statement in LMSM can be read as Shepherd’s roundabout way of saying that God, as the “beginner and director” of matter (EPEU 400), is in some sense also present in every part of creation. However, in God’s case this presence does not diminish “the plentitude of his infinity, or [subtract] from the splendor of his incommunicable majesty” (EPEU 402). For more on the (problems of the) application of Shepherd’s doctrine of cause and effect to divine creation, see Boyle, ‘Causal Principles’. [↑](#endnote-ref-35)
36. This claim is reminiscent of Locke’s approval of the “opinion that infinite space is possessed by God’s infinite omnipresence” (Essay 2.28.20). Geoffrey Gorham has argued that Locke’s position is closer to Newton’s than to the (young) More’s holenmerism (which Shepherd seems inclined towards, see §3.2). See Geoffrey Gorham, ‘Locke on space, time and God’ [‘Locke’], *Ergo* 7:7 (2020), 219-240. This would put Locke at odds with the reading of Shepherd we develop in the remainder of this section. For a different reading of Locke, see Jasper Reid, *The Metaphysics of Henry More* [*Metaphysics*] (Heidelberg, New York, London: Springer, 2012), 226–27. [↑](#endnote-ref-36)
37. For a sustained discussion of these options and their proponents see Reid 2012, chap. 5. [↑](#endnote-ref-37)
38. Henry More, *Enchiridion Metaphysicum*, 2 vols., Alexander Jacob (Ed.). Hildesheim: Olms, 1995. [↑](#endnote-ref-38)
39. See Reid, *Metaphysics,* 141. The worry this position gives rise to is that it is “dangerously close” to the claim that “they [a spiritual entity such as God] did not exist *tout court*” (Reid 2012, 147). As More puts it, nullibists maintain that “a *Spirit* is *Nullibi*, that is to say, *Nowhere*” (*Enchiridion metaphysicum,* 100). In light of such criticisms, some thinker, like Descartes, maintained that while God’s substance may not exist in space, the divine power does (AT V 343). There is an ongoing scholarly discussion about whether More was right to attribute this position to Descartes. See, e.g., Rozemond, ‘Descartes’; Edward Slowik, ‘Cartesian Holenmerism and Its Discontents: Or, on the" Dislocated" Relationship of Descartes’s God to the Material World’, Journal of the History of Philosophy 57.2 (2019): 235-254. [↑](#endnote-ref-39)
40. Gorham, ‘Locke’, 229. [↑](#endnote-ref-40)
41. Newton, ‘Writings’, 91. [↑](#endnote-ref-41)
42. John Locke, *The Correspondence of John Locke* [*Correspondence*], E. S. De Beer (ed.), 8 vols (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1976-1989), letter no. 2395;6*.*789. [↑](#endnote-ref-42)
43. Newton, ‘Writings’, 24. [↑](#endnote-ref-43)
44. See also Boyle, ‘Mind, Soul, and Self’, 101. [↑](#endnote-ref-44)
45. For more on the importance of what may be called Shepherd’s ‘epistemic humility’ see Sandra Lindblom ‘Lady Mary Shepherd’s Epistemic Humility, (draft), 2021; LoLordo, ‘Introduction’, 19; LoLordo, *Mary Shepherd,* 32. [↑](#endnote-ref-45)
46. Henry More, *A Collection of Severall Philosophical Writings of Dr Henry More* (London: Printed by James Flesher for William Morden London, 1662), xii. [↑](#endnote-ref-46)
47. This is Hengstermann’s translation from *The Cambridge Platonist Sourcebook* (<https://www.cambridge-platonism.divinity.cam.ac.uk/view/texts/diplomatic/Hengstermann1679C>). The original can be found in *Opera omnia* II. See Henry More, *Opera omnia*, 3 vols. (London: J. Maycock, for J. Martyn and W. Kettilby: 1675-1679) (Reprint Hildesheim: Olms, 1966), 245. [↑](#endnote-ref-47)
48. Gottfried Wilhelm Leibniz, *Die philosophischen Schriften*. 7 vols. C. I. Gerhardt (ed.) (Berlin, 1875–90. Reprint, Hildesheim: Georg Olms, 1965), 5th Letter, §79. See also, Gottfried Wilhelm Leibniz and Samuel Clarke, *Leibniz and Clarke: correspondence*, R. Ariew (ed.) (Indianapolis: Hackett Publishing, 2000), 55. This worry, of course, also arises on the ‘*partes ex partes*’ view that God exists in space similarly to a body. Hence, it is unsurprising that this worry also applies to the Newtonian position. For a Newtonian response to such a concern, see Patrick J. Connolly, ‘Space Before God? A Problem in Newton's Metaphysics’ [‘Space’], *Philosophy* 90.1 (2015): 83-106, especially §§5-6. A further worry, which can be found in Locke, *Correspondence,* letter no. 2395, 6.789–90, is the issue of co-location. See also Gorham, ‘Locke’, §4. While Locke (e.g., ECHU2.27.1) holds that no two things can occupy the same point in space, our discussion of the (finite) minds presence in the body already suggests that Shepherd does not seem to share such worries. This is arguably connected to the fact that Shepherd, in distinction to Locke, does not have a well worked out account of individuation. See William L. Uzgalis, ‘Relative identity and Locke's principle of individuation’ [‘Individuation’], *History of Philosophy Quarterly* 7.3 (1990): 283-297. In fact, the question has been raised whether Shepherd has an account of individuation at all. See LoLordo, *Mary Shepherd,* 32. For questions about Shepherd’s individuation of minds specifically, see Boyle *Mary Shepherd*, 230–33; LoLordo *Mary Shepherd*, § 4.5. Thanks to an anonymous referee for raising this concern. [↑](#endnote-ref-48)
49. Some commentators have suggested this with connection to her apparent Spinozistic tendencies. See, e.g., Boyle, ‘Causal Principles’, §. 5; LoLordo, ‘Mind’, § 8; LoLordo, *Mary Shepherd,* 9 & 30. [↑](#endnote-ref-49)
50. ‘Coeval’ here can be taken to mean as ‘equally as old as’ (see "coeval, adj. and n.". OED Online. June 2022. Oxford University Press. https://www.oed.com/view/Entry/35756?redirectedFrom=coeval (accessed August 29, 2022). Note that this fits with Shepherd’s suggestion that space may be eternal (EPEU 392) because God is eternal too (e.g., EPEU 399). That is, *neither* God nor space have a future endpoint or a beginning in the past. [↑](#endnote-ref-50)
51. Patrick J. Connolly, ‘Newton and God’s Sensorium’ [‘Newton’], *Intellectual History Review* 24.2 (2014): 185-201, at 186. Connolly is describing Newton’s account of the relation between God and space, but the point seems equally applicable to Shepherd (although Shepherd’s divergences from Newton should also be kept in mind). For a different discussion of Newton’s understanding of omnipresence see J. E. McGuire and Edward Slowik, ‘Newton’s Ontology of Omnipresence and Infinite Space’, *Oxford Studies in Early Modern Philosophy* 6 (2012): 279-308. [↑](#endnote-ref-51)
52. We thank the editor for the helpful suggestions for reframing this discussion. [↑](#endnote-ref-52)
53. Crucially, on either option the divine mind is external to space. Thus, Shepherd has resources to defend a robust account of the externality of space to mind, which helps her rejection of idealism see Garrett, ‘External Existence’. For a more detailed discussion of the workings of divine creation in Shepherd which, crucially, does not require space to work, see Boyle, ‘Causal Principles’. [↑](#endnote-ref-53)
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