Realism, Science, and Pragmatism

Edited by Kenneth R. Westphal
Realism, Science, and Pragmatism

“This is a first-rate collection of essays on the general issue of realism, on the relation of realism to contemporary philosophy of science and epistemology, and on the challenge that has been made to traditional realism by classical pragmatism and neo-pragmatism. The contributors are among the leading scholars in the field, and their essays advance the debates in ways that will provoke response and further inquiry. Anyone interested in the topic of realism, its history and current controversies, will benefit from paying the close attention that these essays deserve.”

—John Ryder, American University of Ras al Khaimah, United Arab Emirates

This collection of original essays aims to reinvigorate the debate surrounding philosophical realism in relation to philosophy of science, pragmatism, epistemology, and theory of perception. Questions concerning realism are as current and as ancient as philosophy itself; this volume explores relations between different positions designated as ‘realism’ by examining specific cases in point, drawn from a broad range of systematic problems and historical views, from ancient Greek philosophy through the present. The first section examines the context of the project; contributions systematically engage the historical background of philosophical realism, re-examining key works of Aristotle, Descartes, Quine, and others. The following two sections epitomize the central tension within current debates: scientific realism and pragmatism. These contributions address contemporary questions of scientific realism and the reality of the objects of science, and consider whether, how or the extent to which realism and pragmatism are compatible. With an editorial introduction by Kenneth R. Westphal, these fourteen original essays provide wide-ranging, salient insights into the status of realism today.

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From advance reviews of

Realism, Science, and Pragmatism

The project is an important one – the reconciliation of realism and pragmatism. The book is attractive for the intellectual strength of the contributions and its organization, which does justice to the wide range of related issues. The idea of considering the topic of realism from various points of view is original. It is not easy to find a volume which combines the various discussions.

This is a strong set of original essays on a number of significant aspects of the ongoing debate concerning philosophical realism. Most contributors are prominent figures who bring considerable experience and knowledge to bear in these essays to good effect. The editor has done a first-rate job of selecting and organizing the essays. Most of the authors are from Scandinavian universities, and build on the strong philosophical tradition that has built up around Helsinki.

The first section provides a general and high altitude overview of the topic, and then several essays that review highlights of the historical background. The rest of the volume is cleverly divided into two themes that more than any other capture the tension in the current debates: scientific realism and pragmatism, thus assuring a comprehensive study of the question in its current incarnations.

The book has the strength of being pluralist in the breadth of its essays. These are interesting and provocative essays, and they should generate further discussion and debate. Any reader who goes through these essays carefully will have a good command of the topic generally and of the cutting edge discussions and debates. One cannot ask for more from a single volume.

I anticipate the book being discussed in any Ph.D. program in which contemporary analytic and/or pragmatist philosophy is being studied. The book would be a valuable source in many kinds of courses in philosophy. Across Europe, especially in Scandinavia and countries in Central Europe, in Turkey, to some extent in Russia, and well beyond, there is growing interest in philosophy in these styles and dealing with these issues. It will be wise to market the book as much as possible around the world.
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Issues about realism are as current and as ancient as philosophy itself. Plato in the *Theatetus* comments on the long-standing battle between philosophical giants and gods about whether, in addition to the physical objects and events we perceive, there are also non-physical, and hence non-perceptible forms or ideas of kinds or characteristics, variously instantiated in physical particulars, but which exist independently both of their instances and of what we may happen to say, think, believe, or know about them. In philosophical usage, the term ‘realism’ is both basic and polysemic. For example, one can hold realism—in contrast to idealism, irrealism, or agnosticism—if one holds that material objects exist and have various characteristics regardless of what we may say, think, believe, or know about them. One can be a direct realist in the theory of perception by holding that perception is direct awareness of external objects, a moral realist if one believes that there are objective moral values, a scientific realist if one holds that scientific knowledge is about theory-independent phenomena and that such knowledge is possible even about unobservable entities, or a modal realist if one believes that possible worlds are as real as the actual world. In ontology, realism indicates that one grants—in ways which vary from case to case—extra-mental existence to certain kinds of entities, processes, or structures and at least some of their features, such as physical objects, universals, relations, structures, or propositions. Realism about particular objects and about their features or relations became problematic in Twentieth Century philosophy when it became generally recognized that we cannot, as it were, set aside our concepts, theories, beliefs, or, in general, our language to inspect the facts themselves and on that basis assess our beliefs, statements, or theories about them. Realism has remained fraught since.

The fourteen original essays presented here explore the relations that different positions designated as ‘realism’ may have to each other by examining specific cases in point, drawn from a broad range of systematic problems and historical views from Ancient Greek philosophy up to the present day. Individually and taken together, these essays show how much can be gained by examining issues about realism both systematically and historically. The essays form three groups, Part I: Realism Contextualized, Part II: Scientific Realism, and Part III: Pragmatism and Realism.
Part I contextualizes issues about realism regarding both physical particulars and universals by critically re-examining several major historical and systematic positions on these topics. A hallmark of pragmatism is that both the understanding and the assessment of current views, and the development of improved views, benefit, often centrally, by re-assessing prior views on the same or related issues, whether these prior views be familiar, neglected, under appreciated, or misunderstood. Accordingly Part I attempts neither a historical nor a systematic review of issues about realism; excellent surveys are available elsewhere. Instead, its six chapters re-investigate key historical and systematic issues where new and unexpected insights can be discovered—and discoveries there are in these chapters, which plumb philosophical depths in Ancient, Mediaeval, Modern, and Contemporary philosophy.

The issues are launched, officially yet non-technically, by Jaakko Hintikka in “What Is Real(ism)?” (Chapter 1). Hintikka articulates what is involved in claiming realism about any domain or issue or particular(s), in part by arguing that the use of possible world semantics requires a richer domain of discourse than is provided by any such semantics tailored to any one domain and its attendant possible-worlds model. To use such a logic we must be able to identify individuals across such domains and models, in order to identify any actual individuals within possible worlds, and to identify their merely possible, non-actual existence in some possible worlds, including that possible world which is our actual world. Accordingly, “actuality and existence do not go together,” and epistemic logic requires a richer domain of discourse than that of Frege-Russell first-order quantification logic and the possible-worlds semantics built upon it. We need not only the ‘is’ of identity, the ‘is’ of predication, and the ‘is’ of instantiation, but also the ‘is’ of identifiability, as was implicitly recognized in Aristotle’s logic and metaphysics. Epistemic logic requires possible objects as well as actual ones, and epistemic logic is required to use first-order quantification theory and possible-worlds semantics in any actual domain of inquiry.

In “Aristotle’s Direct Realism and Some Later Developments” (Chapter 2), Mika Perälä elucidates Aristotle’s direct theory of perception within Aristotle’s general explanatory project. Aristotle’s formal cause is specified in terms of the relevant efficient cause, the activity of which occurs in the activity of the patient. This model implies that, in perception, seeing, e.g., a white object is the type of perception it is because it is caused by a white object, where the object’s white color exercises its power of being perceived in the sense of vision as someone’s seeing that white of that object. That object’s white color is the term to which the activity of the perceiver’s sense, as the patient of the object’s color’s activity, is relative. This analysis enables Aristotle to solve problems in the Megarean and Protagorean anti-realist accounts of perception. Aristotle’s view thus contrasts in important regards to those of, e.g., Aquinas and Scotus. Perälä examines two important contrasts. First, he argues that Aristotle, unlike Aquinas—and many of his successors even today—did not resort to the concepts of intentional being and
likeness (and their cognates such as representation) to explain why a perception is about its proper object. Second, he points out that Aristotle, unlike Scotus, did not allow that a mental act could be directed at its object even when the object is not the efficient cause of that act (for example, when God or Devil induces such an act in us). Accordingly, Aristotle provides a cogent direct realist theory of perception.

Laurent Cesalli begins his examination of “Key Arguments Supporting Non-semantic Universality” in “Late Mediaeval Realisms” (to invert the sub-title and title of Chapter 3) by noting the highly favorable reception of Scotus’s realism about universals by both C. S. Peirce and David Armstrong. Cesalli then critically examines key arguments for the real existence of universals developed by Aquinas, Scotus, Burley, Ockham, Buridan, Richard Brinkley, Nicolas of Autrécourt, Francesc da Prato, John Wyclif, and Dietrich of Freiberg, who argue that (i) semantic universality depends upon the existence of metaphysical universals, or that (ii) scientific knowledge requires metaphysical universals if it is not to be reduced to psychology or linguistics, or that (iii) essences of things exist objectively, no less than do their matter and forms. They analyze relations between universals and particulars in several ways: in terms of a merely formal distinction, mereology, concomitance, partial identity, real identity, or platonic-atomism. Cesalli further elucidates their views by critical comparison with modern forms of realism developed by Bergmann, Armstrong, and Cocchiarella.

In “Descartes on the Formal Reality, Objective Reality, and Material Falsity of Ideas: Realism through Constructivism?” (Chapter 4), Dermot Moran revisits Descartes’ account of the formal and objective reality of ideas in order to ascertain more exactly Descartes’ commitment to realism. For Descartes, as for the Scotist tradition in general, ‘real’ means something that can be a ‘res’: to be real is to be possible. The reality of some possible thing is expressed by its essence which is reflected in its ‘objective reality’. Objective reality comes in degrees. Some ‘real’ entities also have actuality as a result of being caused. This is their ‘formal reality’. For Descartes certain ideas (e.g., of God) have an objective reality so great that it can be accounted for only by those ideas also having formal reality. Other ideas have objective reality but fail to have a formal cause and may even mislead in presenting the kind of objective reality they possess. These are ‘materially false’ ideas. The received view is that Descartes’ employment of these Scholastic notions is confused and that Antoine Arnauld in his Objections makes a number of valid criticisms of Descartes’ account. Moran contends that Descartes’ distinctions offer powerful insights into the intentionality of the mind and the manner in which the phenomenological character of our experiences can (or cannot) reliably lead us to grasp the nature of reality in itself. Descartes has a complex conception of intentional content that deserves more attention and credit than it has hitherto received.

In “Quine’s Conception of Objects: Beyond Realism and Anti-realism” (Chapter 5), Antti Keskinen argues that the apparent tension between
Quine’s scientific realism and his epistemological conception of objects as theoretical posits is not resolved by appeal to Quine’s naturalism, but instead by the genuinely reciprocal containment between science and epistemology. Quine’s scientific realism and his epistemological conception of objects as posits are consistent because the notion of reality is itself always part of a theory; otherwise it is meaningless. The appearance of a tension between those two aspects of Quine’s view arises only if it is assumed that objects can be real in some sense other than as posits of a theory included within our best current science. Quine disallows any metaphysical realism that has primacy over epistemology; hence his scientific realism is consistent with his epistemological view of objects as theory-dependent posits. Yet this conception of objects does not entail that the objects talked about in our best current science are less than real, in any admissible, theory-external sense of “real.” However, Quine’s view further implies that, although de re attitude ascriptions have sense, they are rarely true because the conditions necessary for their truthful ascription are rarely satisfied. Though no reductio, this implication of Quine’s view is highly counter-intuitive.

The answer to Peter Swirski’s titular question is no mystery: “Did Sherlock Holmes Inhale Pipe Smoke through a Hole in His Forehead?” (Chapter 6). The question is how we know that Holmes did no such thing, despite his being fictional, and why such knowledge matters. Swirski argues that such knowledge is not based simply upon the text, nor upon possible worlds implicated by the text or the author, not even when guided by a Reality Principle, a Mutual (Shared) Belief Principle, or by the fictional persona of the narrator. None of these proposals properly specify the relevant background beliefs or information required to understand literary texts. Recognizing what is relevant, Swirski argues, requires the reader’s reflexive recognition of the real author’s successfully executed reflexive intentions relevant to a given fiction, facilitated in part by our recognition of an author’s use (or abuse) of genre conventions, and by our quintessentially human, natural capacities to understand one another’s intentions and acts of directing joint attention. Our understanding of real intentions is required for comprehending one another, and for comprehending fictional truths.

Our reflections on realism began with quantification logic, according to which to be is to be the value of a bound variable, to argue that our understanding of possibility and of possible existence is required to use possible world models of any domain to understand actual features of actual objects or events, thus renewing our appreciation of Aristotle’s insights into the ‘is’ of identification. The systematic and historical trajectory thus launched carries through the essays of Part I to conclude that our understanding of fictional truths requires our understanding of actual intentions and acts of joint attention, without which we could not communicate, and indeed could not be human. Part I thus provides the systematic and historical context of issues about the reality of objects, events, their characteristics, and their relations, within which Parts II and III examine these issues in greater detail.
Part II considers a specific domain of these issues: scientific realism; Part III considers a distinctive approach to these issues: pragmatism.

Part II opens with Panu Raatikainen’s “Realism: Metaphysical, Scientific, and Semantic” (Chapter 7). Raatikainen distinguishes and interrelates three influential forms of realism: realism about the external world, construed as a metaphysical doctrine; scientific realism about non-observable entities postulated in science; and semantic realism as defined by Dummett. He first contrasts metaphysical realism about everyday physical objects with idealism and phenomenalism, reviews several potent arguments against these latter views, and argues briefly by induction in support of realism about physical objects. Scientific realism—the idea that natural sciences discover and explain genuine features of natural phenomena—may be commonsense, and may be regarded as the paragon of empirical knowledge, though it has been widely out of philosophical favor, not only since Kuhn’s *Structure of Scientific Revolutions* (1962), but throughout the history of empiricism, from Hume to the Logical Positivists, Logical Empiricists and today’s Constructive Empiricists. Raatikainen distinguishes three forms of scientific realism: (i) scientific theories and their existence postulates should be taken literally; (ii) the existence of unobservable entities posited by our most successful scientific theories is justified scientifically; and (iii) our best current scientific theories are at least approximately true. Raatikainen argues that only some form of scientific realism can make proper sense of certain episodes in the history of science. He then considers Dummett’s influential formulation of semantic issues about realism. Dummett argued that in some cases, the fundamental issue is not about the existence of entities, but rather about whether statements of some specified class (such as mathematics) have an objective truth value, independently of our means of knowing it. Dummett famously argued against such semantic realism and in favor of anti-realism. Raatikainen examines the relation of semantic realism to the metaphysical construal of realism, presents Dummett’s main argument against semantic realism, and focuses on Dummett’s key premise, that understanding the meaning of a declarative sentence involves knowing the conditions which would make that sentence true. Raatikainen argues against that key premise by appeal to semantic externalism.

Ilkka Niiniluoto’s “Scientific Realism: Independence, Causation, and Abduction” (Chapter 8), examines three related criteria of realism within the sciences: mind-independence, causal power, and knowledge by abductive reasoning, by considering what a scientific realist should say about the reality of the past. He argues that realism about the past effectively rules out many anti-realist philosophical positions, such as subjective idealism, phenomenalism, solipsism, positivism, internal realism, social constructivism, and non- or anti-realist varieties of pragmatism. His analysis takes up the theme, announced by Hintikka’s opening chapter, of object identification, in connection with Peirce’s, Putnam’s and with Pihlström’s versions of pragmatism. In “Cognitive Semantics and Newton’s Rule 4 of Experimental Philosophy: Scientific Realism without Empiricism” (Chapter 9), Kenneth
Westphal argues that Evans’ analysis in “Identity and Predication” (1975) provides the basis for a powerful semantics of singular, specifically cognitive reference which directly and strongly supports Newton’s Rule 4 of (experimental) Philosophy in ways which support Newton’s realism about gravitational force. He first examines Newton’s Rule 4 and its role in Newton’s justification of realism about gravitational force and then summarizes Evans’ account of predication and examines its implications for the semantics of singular cognitive reference. Westphal argues that this semantics of singular cognitive reference is embedded in and strongly supports Newton’s Rule 4, and that it rules out Cartesian, infallibilist presumptions about empirical justification generally. He then argues that this semantics of singular cognitive reference reveals a key defect in Bas van Fraassen’s main argument for his anti-realist “Constructive Empiricism,” and also in many common objections to realism, both commonsense and scientific. More generally, Westphal argues, “realism” has appeared problematic to the extent that, in their focus upon the semantics of conceptual content or linguistic meaning, philosophers have neglected the further requirements for specifically cognitive reference.

In “Naturalism without Metaphysics” (Chapter 10), Jonathan Knowles argues—against wide-spread consensus to the contrary—that scientific naturalism, the thesis that natural science is our unique source of fundamental knowledge and explanation, does not require metaphysical realism, so that a scientific naturalist can reject metaphysics. Drawing on the work of Huw Price, Knowles argues against a naturalistic form of metaphysical realism that builds on a substantive notion of reference, and also argues (contra Devitt and Searle) that one cannot have a substantive realistic position without such a notion. Further, science itself does not militate for a naturalistic metaphysical realism. The correct alternative to realism, Knowles argues, is not Huw Price’s “subject naturalism,” which purports to explain scientifically the pluralism exhibited by language, including scientific language, by a global “expressivist” theory of content. Knowles argues that Price’s approach leads to another, equally problematic kind of metaphysics, and its semantics lacks the scientific credentials claimed for it. The proper middle ground, Knowles contends, recognizes that semantic minimalism need not reduce truth to justification nor to warranted assertability, and that the systematic search for truth, which grapples with what is yet unknown, remains the prerogative of the sciences. These are the keys to a scientific naturalism without metaphysics.

Pragmatist and neo-pragmatist themes are sounded repeatedly in Parts II and III; they are examined in detail in Part III: Pragmatism and Realism. In “Majesty of Truth and the Moral Sentiment: Emerson’s and Peirce’s Ethico-Ontological Realism” (Chapter 11), Heikki Kovalainen and Douglas Anderson argue that, although they are often logically independent doctrines, realism about physical objects and realism about universals intersect in the religiously influenced interpretation and reception of Plato from the
early church Fathers up to Romantics such as Samuel Taylor Coleridge, according to whom Christianity embodies universal truths, nonhuman in origin yet knowable to human reason by intellectual intuition—a faculty Kant famously denied. This Platonic, religiously inclined ontological realism enters American philosophy via Ralph Waldo Emerson. Emerson’s notion of the moral sentiment is an intellectual faculty of intuiting universal truths—à la Coleridge—and a non-human real force operating in reality—anticipating Peirce. Kovalainen and Anderson argue that both Emerson and Peirce advocate ethico-ontological realism. Understanding Peirce’s theory of inquiry and his ontology requires recognizing their moral and theological aspects. More generally, they contend, understanding the issues of realism about particular objects, their features, and their relations requires grappling with the moral and theological dimensions of these issues.

In “Concepts and the Real in C. I. Lewis’ Epistemology” (Chapter 12), Lauri Järvilehto argues that Lewis developed an aspectual realism that avoids relativism. According to Lewis, concepts guide our attention in what we experience. Concepts combine to form conceptual principles, which function as categorial laws by which we classify whatever we experience. If an experience does not conform to our conceptual expectations, we classify that experience as non-veridical. Consequently, our attributions of reality depend in part on the conceptual principles we employ. This seems to result in a very strong relativism: what is real depends upon the concepts and classifications we devise. This apparent relativism arises from a terminological ambiguity: Lewis uses the term ‘real’ both to designate that to which we attribute reality within our conceptual scheme, and to designate what there actually is, which we encounter, experience, and classify. The fact that a classification works for our purposes, and thus serves to attribute reality to some kinds of particulars, shows that what we so classify is, albeit aspectually, metaphysically real. Thus Lewis advocates perspectivalist or aspectualist realism rather than relativism. Indeed, the very logic of relativity, Lewis argues, undercuts relativism.

In “Pragmatic Realism” (Chapter 13), Sami Pihlström—himself a major exponent of this view—reassesses and further develops his pragmatic realism by re-examining the Kantian roots and character of pragmatic realism and the debates about realism in the classical pragmatism of Peirce, James, and Dewey, and by differentiating and defending his view by critically examining the views of three other contemporary pragmatic realists: Margolis, Westphal, and Vihaemm. Pihlström argues that sustained controversy about and tensions between realism and pragmatism are not a plague, but instead a strength of pragmatism and an important source of its continuing vitality. Pihlström argues that, in both its classical and in its contemporary forms, pragmatic realism is distinct, e.g., from both social constructivist and metaphysical realist accounts of the world and of our knowledge of it, both commonsense and scientific. Recognizing the distinctive virtues of pragmatic realism requires recognizing that whatever we justifiably regard
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as real must result from inquiry, and those results and the form(s) they take can be neither pre-determined nor presupposed. That is the cardinal mistake of many commonsense, scientific, and metaphysical forms of realism. Pihlström develops a pragmatic realism which combines a (naturalized) transcendental idealism with pragmatic realism and naturalism in a circular (though not viciously circular) structure: We transcendently constitute the world through engaging in worldly (and entirely natural) practices, including practices of inquiry, which themselves are constituted through this same continuing process; there is no Archimedean fundamentum of our transcendental world-constitution.

In “McDowell’s Pragmatist Anti-anti-realism” (Chapter 14), Eirik Julius Risberg re-examines the debate between Rorty, Davidson, McDowell, and now joining them, the ‘New Pragmatists’, about the character and status of objectivity in a philosophy cleansed of the dualism of conceptual scheme and empirical content. Rorty has long argued that any supposed answerability of our words to a world beyond the linguistic community is fundamentally misguided. The New Pragmatists contend instead that the notion of objectivity is not inimical to pragmatism. In particular, Ramberg argues, against Rorty, that Davidson’s insistence upon the irreducibility of the intentional marks a post-ontological distinction between the intentional and the non-intentional, which provides for our intentional thought to be answerable to the non-intentional, in a way compatible with pragmatism. Rorty has accepted Ramberg’s criticism, but still maintains that McDowell’s view of the answerability of thought to the world is metaphysical and beyond the pale of pragmatism. Against Rorty, Risberg argues that Davidson’s post-ontological distinction between the intentional and the non-intentional, and Rorty’s accepting that distinction, suffice to show that McDowell’s “anti-anti-realism” belongs within the pragmatist fold. Although McDowell and Davidson disagree about the boundary between the intentional “space of reasons” and the non-intentional “space of nature,” McDowell’s distinction is as post-ontological as Davidson’s. Consequently, McDowell’s view is tantamount to pragmatist anti-anti-realism.

Many of these essays originated from the conference, “Realism in Its Multiple Forms: A Case of Mere Homonymy or Identifiable Common Commitments?” (6–9 June, 2011), hosted by the Helsinki Collegium for Advanced Studies. It was sponsored jointly by the Helsinki Collegium for Advanced Studies; by the research project, “The Ethical Grounds of Metaphysics” (Universities of Helsinki and Jyväskylä), funded by the Academy of Finland; by the Nordic Pragmatism Network, funded by NordForsk; and by the Swiss National Science Foundation. All of the contributors, and I in particular, express our gratitude to these sponsors for their manifest confidence in, and concrete support of, our research.

Papers presented there have been substantially revised for the present volume, and several contributions have been specially written for it.
Originally I had proposed to Sami Pihlström that we co-edit this volume. I have consulted him at every step, yet by happy coincidence I handled the editing; I had the time, whereas Sami was busy directing the Helsinki Collegium for Advanced Studies. More significantly, the contributors have all been wonderful collaborators; hence no problems arose which required extra brain-storming. I wish to thank each contributor for his fine contribution and exemplary cooperation; my special thanks are to Sami for his thoughts, advice, and assistance. I believe all the contributors join me in thanking Sami very warmly for having organized the very successful conference which launched this project, and in thanking the sponsors who made that conference possible, and hence this volume too. Last though not at all least, I wish to thank the Helsinki Collegium for Advanced Studies for its warm hospitality and ideal working conditions, where as a (former) member of its Academic Advisory Board I was allowed to spend the final quarter of 2011, when most of the editorial work on this volume was undertaken. The editorial and production staff at Routledge have been thoroughly professional, the very model of integrity in academic publishing, for which we are all very grateful indeed.
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(Note: close cognate terms are all listed under one main form, without mentioning the latter variants; e.g., ‘actualism’ also includes ‘actualist’.)

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