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An Argument Against Treating Non-Human Animal Bodies as Commodities

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Abstract

Some animal defenders are committed to complete abstinence from animal products. However the strongest arguments for adopting veganism only seem to require that one avoid using animal products, where use or procurement of these products will harm sentient animals. As such, there is seemingly a gap between our intuition and our argument. In this article I attempt to defend the more comprehensive claim that we have a moral reason to avoid using animal products, regardless of the method of procurement. I argue that animal bodies give rise to properties which grant sentient animals' moral status and in light of this, animal bodies possess final value in themselves. This final value gives us a moral reason not to commodify animal bodies, which means we have a defeasible reason to abstain from using animal products in almost all circumstances.

Keywords: Commodification; Meat Eating; Posthumous Harm; Respecting the Dead; Using Animal Products; Vegetarianism and Veganism

1. Introduction

Imagine you and a friend are driving along a country lane and see the dead body of a pheasant lying at the side of the road. You stop and inspect it to find it has very recently been hit by a car and killed. You have the strong belief that sentient non-human animals (henceforth simply animals) possess moral status and that it is (*pro tanto*) wrong to harm or kill them. Since you formed this belief, you have considered yourself a committed vegan, believing this to be morally required. Your friend suggests you cook and eat the pheasant. At first you outrightly reject your friend's idea; it feels intuitively wrong to you. However, when your friend asks you why, you start to consider the reasons that support your intuition and can't seem to find any substantial argument. Your friend suggests you're merely being squeamish.[1]

Many animal defenders will have, I expect, at least briefly struggled with their response to a similar hypothetical situation. The reasons for which many of us reject the consumption of meat or the use of other animal products are grounded in the impact the procurement of these objects has on living animals. When we eat meat we normally have to kill and inflict suffering on an animal or, more likely, pay a third party to kill and inflict suffering on an animal. Where this negative consequence is removed, and meat can be sourced from an animal that has not suffered because of the intentional actions of a moral agent, what's wrong with making the most of the situation and eating meat?

It is my intuition that there are genuine moral reasons against eating meat, and using other animal products, even in a situation where there is no (intentional or unintentional) harm and so the refusal to use animal products in these circumstances is more than mere squeamishness. In this paper I attempt to provide justification for this intuition. I argue that assuming animals possess moral status, animal bodies in themselves possess final value in virtue of their external relations to moral status holders. This value obligates us not to treat animal bodies as mere commodities to be utilized for whatever purposes we see fit.

Thus, I argue that we have a moral reason not to commodify animals and this obligates us not to eat animals or use animal products, even in the complete absence of harm in the procurement of these products. This being said, I take it that this is a defeasible moral reason and I will not consider whether using animal products may be permissible in any particular circumstances. As such, whether and when the reason we have to not use animal products is outweighed by countervailing reasons, and the relative weight of the reason not to use animal products, are questions I do not discuss here.

2. Understanding the Problem

The question of whether it is morally permissible to utilize animal bodies in the absence of harm is not as niche or theoretical as it may appear at first. In fact, it is a problem that impinges regularly on the lives of many animal defenders. Consider wearing your grandmother's fur stole, displaying a piece of carved ivory in your

home or using a leather armchair. None of these actions cause harm to any moral status bearing animals and these actions will not directly result in an increase in demand for animal products, or financially contribute to industries that will inflict harm on animals. If one is concerned that the harm inflicted on the animals used to create these goods has tainted them, I could further specify that these objects were created from animal body parts scavenged from carcasses of animals found dead in the wild. Even with such a caveat however, I suggest that for many, the intuition will remain that there is something morally questionable about using these objects in the ways described.

One might suggest that using animal products (however they were procured) may cause indirect harm to animals. For example, wearing fur may influence others to do the same, increasing demand for new fur products, and in so doing, cause harm to animals from which furs are taken. However, this isn't sufficient to support the intuition that using animal products is wrong *per se*, since this isn't a necessary consequence of eating roadkill, wearing my grandmother's fur or displaying ivory in a domestic setting. I could engage in any of these actions privately, without causing any indirect harm to animals and yet there still seems to be something intuitively wrong about such actions.

It is worth noting that though some may not possess this intuition against utilizing animal bodies, and objects made from animal bodies, it is highly likely that one will possess this intuition regarding the treatment of human bodies. Despite many different religious and cultural practices, there is general accord across the globe that human bodies should not be treated as mere objects. For instance, it is

widely considered impermissible to make clothing and furniture from human bodies and where such items already exist, it is considered impermissible to use them. For example, using a lampshade made from human skin, eating with a cutlery set carved from human bone, or using a human embryo encased in plastic as a paperweight would certainly attract criticism in most circles.[2]

Where human bodies and body parts are utilized, this is typically only considered acceptable where the individual to whom the body/body part belongs or belonged, gives consent, or where a one is already dead and no consent has been obtained, the consent of one's next of kin may be accepted. The typical examples of such cases are organ, blood, sperm and egg donation. If humans and animals are moral status holders then it seems to me that we should expect our obligations regarding animal bodies to be similar to our obligations regarding human bodies. As such our treatment of human bodies should motivate us to reconsider our treatment of animal bodies.

It is also worth mentioning that in the case of humans, one prominent explanation for why we shouldn't utilize others' bodies is that through doing so we would harm or wrong the individual to whom the body once belonged.[3] This is sometimes referred to as inflicting 'posthumous harm'.[4] According to such a view, one might argue I have a moral reason not to dismember Ghengis Khan's body and craft clothing from his skin because doing so harms the living Ghengis Khan. I find views of this kind unconvincing due to the claim that the well-being of moral status holders can be affected by events that occur after their death. However, I will not provide any arguments against such accounts here, as it would take me too far of

course. Instead I will attempt to provide an alternative explanation for the wrongness of using animal bodies, that does not involve the notion of posthumous harm. Nonetheless, if one *is* convinced of the possibility of posthumous harm, then one might take my argument here to reinforce and compound the obligations we have towards dead bodies.

3. Dignity and Respect

Two concepts that appear to be particularly relevant to questions surrounding the appropriate treatment of bodies, are dignity and respect. Both concepts are highly likely to feature in any conversation about our cultural norms surrounding the treatment of human bodies in or outside academia. Further, it seems very natural to suggest that animal defenders might take eating roadkill to be disrespectful to the dead animal or fail to accord them the dignity they deserve. So, perhaps these concepts can explain why certain treatment is inappropriate in the case of animal bodies. Importantly however, dignity and respect are used in a variety of ways both in everyday speech and in philosophical argument and as such, if we are to make use of these concepts, we must clearly define them.

Perhaps the most prevalent conceptions of dignity and respect, are given by Kant. Dignity for Kant is the value or status persons have in light of being autonomous agents. This value obligates moral agents to treat persons with respect, by which Kant meant that we should not interfere with, or undermine, other persons' autonomous choices. Kant's notion of human dignity is tied to the capacity

for autonomy, as such, since animals are incapable of autonomy in the relevant sense, dignity and respect in Kant's sense are not applicable to animals. However modern supporters of Kant have attempted to address this issue and have argued for Kantian, or at least Kantian-inspired, views which ground dignity and respect in the capacity to pursue goods or the possession of a subjective life.[5] On such accounts dignity can be understood as the moral status one has as a good-purser or a subjective life-possessor and respecting moral status holders would amount to not interfering with their pursuit of goods or actions.

Assuming that these notions of dignity and respect can apply to animals, they don't seem to be applicable to the treatment of dead animal bodies. Humans can have goals and desires about how their body is to be treated once they are dead. So, if someone makes clear that they wish their body to be cremated after their death, it would clearly be disrespectful in Kant's sense, and a failure to recognize their dignity, for one to harvest their skin to reupholster a chair. However animals do not seem to be capable of forming preferences about the treatment of their bodies after their deaths. And even if they were, it is not at all clear how they would wish their bodies to be treated or how we could determine the content of these wishes. Thus, our treatment of animal bodies seems to be outside of the scope of these notions of dignity and respect. So it seems Kantian notions of dignity and respect do not provide us with much insight into whether using animals' bodies in given ways is wrong.

Of course these Kantian derived notions of dignity and respect are modified versions of concepts that have been developed with humans in mind. Other

contemporary philosophers have developed non-Kantian conceptions of dignity and respect that are more animal inclusive in design.[6] The most popular of these notions of dignity and respect are tied to animals' species-specific capacities or traits.[7] Blazer, Rippe and Schaber discuss such notions of animal dignity. They suggest for a non-human animal to possess dignity may be for them to be able to possess the traits specific to their species.[8] They also describe another conception of animal dignity, rooted in the Capabilities Account, according to which animals possess dignity where they are able to engage in the functions and operations in which a member of their species can normally engage.[9] Similarly, Taylor suggests that animals (and living things generally) are teleological centers, by which he means, roughly, that they are entities with goals to pursue for their own good. And, in light of being teleological centers, living things are owed respect which amounts to considering their interests.[10]

According to these accounts, we violate animals' dignity and/or fail to show them respect when we deprive them of their species-specific traits or ability to engage in particular functions. So we wrong animals when we restrict them in ways that stop them from engaging in certain behaviors, such as when we clip a bird's wings or declaw a cat. However, whether one possesses the traits or capacities that are typical to one's species only appears to be a relevant concern whilst one is alive. Like the Kantian-derived notions of dignity and respect, it doesn't seem that these animal-centric notions are any more helpful in determining if there are any moral reasons against treating dead animal bodies in particular ways.

It seems to me that none of the considered notions of dignity and respect are relevant to questions of the treatment of animal bodies because these concepts apply to animals *as beings.* We owe animals dignity and respect on these accounts because they are moral status holders. However upon an animal's death, the moral status holder ceases to exist and as such there is no longer a subject to be owed dignity or respect. The animal's body that remains behind after their death is not the individual that possessed moral status. The being that possessed moral status was a physical-psychological being, composed of psychological capacities, beliefs, desires, habits, tastes, a subjective history and much more. Of course my body gives rise to many psychological features that are key parts of what makes me, me, however upon my death, when my body ceases to facilitate the existence of these features, I no longer exist. A body is at best, only a part of a moral status holder and hence it is not owed dignity and respect in its own right. Thus dead bodies are not something to which we owe particular treatment it seems, because they don't have value in themselves (unlike moral status holders).

This problem can't be easily circumvented by according moral status to bodies in themselves. There is good reason to think that our bodies do not, and cannot, possess moral status. This is principally because of the nature of moral status. Moral status is a unique kind of intrinsic value, typically considered to be the highest kind of value. Moral status holders not only matter in their own right, but they matter *to themselves*. They have subjective points of view and thus things can be better or worse for them. They are not merely things but individuals. To this end a body itself cannot plausibly be a moral status holder. It has no subjective point of

view, and it has no interests which it aims to fulfil. There is nothing to take into account when considering how a body would want to be treated, since a body has no interests to consider. Harré makes the point that we could perhaps have obligations towards living bodies purely as living organisms (presumably like the kind of obligations we might have towards plants) however even obligations as minimal as these would disappear once the body ceases to function.[11]

Even if we were to weaken our conception of moral status and understand moral status in a looser sense, as a type of value that individuals *and* bodies can possess, this would still not provide an adequate solution. We would still be left with the problem of how we are to understand the relative weight of our obligations towards bodies and other moral status holders. The obligations we have towards living moral status holders, animal or human, do not seem of comparable weight to any of the obligations we might have towards a body itself. Further, if one was to attempt to avoid this concern by suggesting that we treat living moral status holders and bodies in significantly different ways, this would call into question the reason for ascribing moral status to bodies in the first place. Thus it seems that bodies are not something that can plausibly possess moral status.

The analysis in this section shows us that any account which attempts to justify the rejection of the use of animal products must ensure it does not entail that animals are identical to their bodies or that animal bodies themselves possess moral status. Importantly, this does not rule out any account which accords value to bodies themselves but only those that confer moral status or value on bodies because they are identical to moral status holders. The discussion in this section also does not rule

out the relevance of notions of dignity and respect, however if these terms are to be used they would have to be defined in such a way that they do not exclusively apply to moral status holders.

In the next section, I will put forward a view that suggests that animal bodies have value in themselves but this is not any form of moral status. As such animal bodies are objects which we have obligations regarding. I will not defend this account in terms of dignity or respect, though nothing I say here will prevent one from reframing this view in these terms, if one prefers.

4. The Value of Animal Bodies

In this section, I will sketch an argument for the claim that dead animal bodies are valuable objects in virtue of their relational properties. According to this view, bodies are objects that are valuable *in themselves* however they possess this value, not because of their own internal features but because of relation between them and moral status holders.

Typically philosophers speak of two main types of value. The first is intrinsic value, usually understood to mean the value a thing has in itself, in virtue of its internal, or sometimes necessary, properties. As discussed, moral status is a kind of intrinsic value. Intrinsic value is normally contrasted with instrumental value; the kind of value a thing has that is conditional upon it performing some function or allowing access to something else that is valuable in itself. Where something is

merely instrumentally valuable it is valuable only because it allows one to secure this further good. Where it fails to provide this good it does not have value.

Some theorists have argued that an object could be valuable in itself for reasons other than its internal properties. They suggest that we should make room for objects being valuable in themselves in virtue of their relational properties.[12] So an object might be valuable in itself, not merely because of the nature of the thing itself but because it stands in a certain relation with something else that is intrinsically valuable. If this is the case, an object could be valuable in itself because of its causal powers, history or rarity.[13] Following Rabinowicz and Rønnow-Rasmussen I will refer to this kind of value as 'final value'.[14] This type of value is best understood through considering an example.

Kagan gives an example of an elegantly designed race car.[15] This race car, with the capability to reach high speeds and handle with ease, is something that appears to be valuable in itself. It is seemingly valuable because of its causal power to deliver high speeds and still allow the driver to maintain control. However this feature is not an internal property of the race car but a relational property. Thus, whilst the race car is valuable in itself, it is valuable because of its relational properties, specifically its causal relation to high speeds and ease of handling. One might argue that such a car is merely instrumentally valuable; that it has value only where it produces high speeds. However it seems that we would value this car even if it was never driven and would never be driven e.g. if it was housed in a motor museum from its time of manufacture. Plausibly, Kagan argues, we don't just value the great

handling at high speeds that this car can produce, but we value the car itself because of its ability to produce this effect, even if this ability is never utilized.

As Kagan notes, causal properties are not the only plausible relational properties that can ground final value. An object's historical relations may also make it valuable in itself. To demonstrate this Kagan asks us to consider the pen Abraham Lincoln used to sign the Emancipation Proclamation.[16] Through being used by Lincoln to sign this highly significant document, one might argue that this pen has become valuable in itself. In Kagan's words: 'The world is the richer for the existence of the pen; its destruction would diminish the value of the world as such.'[17] It seems reasonably clear that had this pen not been used by Lincoln to sign the Emancipation Proclamation, it would certainly not possess the value we take it to have. Further, had another pen been used in its place that was completely different in its shape, size, etc, this pen would be considered valuable in itself. Seemingly then, Lincoln's pen is valuable in itself in virtue of its historical relations.

I think this concept of final value grounded on an object's relational properties can help support the view that there is something wrong about using dead animals' bodies in particular ways. I submit that, like the elegant race car and Lincoln's pen, animal bodies possess value in themselves, in virtue of their relational properties. Specifically I suggest that animal bodies are valuable in virtue of the historical causal properties that held between them and the moral status holders to whom they belonged.

Animal bodies have the causal power to give rise to minds capable of subjective experience, forming beliefs, desires, memories and many other properties that make animals conscious and distinct individuals. Without this power, animals would not exist in anything like the same way. They would be no different, in their form of life, to plants. Most importantly, without these psychological properties, animals would not possess moral status. Hence, animals bodies grant animals the kind of lives that make them worthy of moral status. Much like the elegant race car, animal bodies have a strong causal ability to produce a highly valuable property, plausibly the most valuable property: a psychological life that entitles one to moral status.

However most animal bodies also bear a historical relation to moral status holders. Like Lincoln's pen, animal bodies have a history in which their power to give rise to subjective life has been exercised. They not only have the ability to give rise to something valuable but have actually realized this power. Each body has manifested an individual subjective life for the animal that possessed it and in so doing granted moral status to that animal. So a body is not merely instrumentally valuable when an animal is alive through sustaining their subjective life. It is valuable in itself after the animal dies because of the role it played whilst they were alive. The body is valuable because of the historical causal relation it continues to bear to the now deceased moral status holder; it gave rise to the kind of life which we consider to be highly valuable in itself.

Through having the ability to give rise to minded beings and through having exercised this ability, creating beings that are intrinsically valuable in themselves,

animal bodies are plausibly valuable in themselves. Though they are not valuable in virtue of their internal properties, their relational properties plausibly grant them significant final value. However, my claim is not that animal bodies are the kind of thing that have final value in virtue of the role they play in creating moral status holders generally, but rather that each individual body has final value in virtue of the role it plays in giving rise to the mind of a specific moral status holder. So where this external relation to a specific moral status holder is not present, a body will not possess final value itself. Or more accurately, it will not possess final value in the way I am discussing here. It may possess final value of a different kind, for different reasons.

5. How Should We Treat Bodies?

If bodies are objects that possess value in themselves, then moral agents are obligated to recognize this value and treat them in particular ways. As previously noted however bodies have no behalf upon which to act, so how do we determine what is appropriate treatment of a body? In response to this question it is first important to understand that the final value that animal bodies have is like the intrinsic value that a great piece of art might be thought to possess. As such, though we have obligations *regarding* a body in light of its value, we do not have obligations *toward* a body. So while the value of the body obligates us to act in specific ways, it does not imply that things can be better or worse for the body *itself*. One might understand the obligations that bodies generate for us to be obligations that we have

towards other moral status holders to appropriately recognize the value of a body by treating it in particular ways.

I will not attempt to define exactly what treatment qualifies as 'appropriate recognition of a body's value'. However, it seems almost tautologically true that the value of an animal body requires at least that one not treat it in ways, and for purposes, which we would usually use mere everyday objects. To put this more succinctly, we should not *commodify* animal bodies. Whilst this still does not provide us with a precise understanding of what exactly qualifies as appropriate treatment, it does allow us to draw some guidance. To return to my earlier example, it would clearly be an instance of commodifying an animal body if one were to cook and eat some found roadkill. Eating roadkill is an obvious case of treating an animal body as a mere resource to be utilized to meet one's nutritional needs or gustatory desires. In fact, we can generalize this case to eating animals in most, although not all, situations (I'll discuss some exceptions below). If animal bodies have final value, we have a moral reason not to treat them as a mere culinary resource. We can also draw the same conclusion about utilizing an animal's body to make taxidermy or harvesting them for pelts. Typically in these situations the animal body is treated as a mere commodity to be used to create something, traded or directly utilized for some other end.

Plausibly, commodification of an animal body is not only directly eating or using the body to produce objects but also the further act of using objects already made from animal bodies. Thus, the final value of animal bodies not only gives us reason to avoid making products out of them but also to avoid making use of objects

that have already been made from animal bodies. To do so is to treat animal bodies as mere everyday objects which can be used to fulfill some purpose. In wearing a fur stole, one treats an animal body as a mere fashion accessory to glamourize one's outfit, in displaying a piece of carved ivory, one treats an animal body as a mere objet d'art to liven up the interior design scheme of one's room and in using a leather armchair one treats an animal body as a mere object upon which to rest and to provide comfort. Such actions do not plausibly seem compatible with a recognition or appreciation of the value of animal bodies.

Importantly one should note that I am not arguing that recognising the final value of an animal's body obligates one to refuse to commodify an animal body *under any circumstances*. My suggestion is that the final value of animal bodies gives moral agents a moral reason not to commodify them. This reason may be outweighed by other moral reasons, for instance where one is lost in the wilderness, having had nothing to eat for days and comes across an animal carcass, it seems highly intuitive that preserving one's own life would outweigh the obligation of non-commodification. As such, I suggest merely that we *pro tanto* ought not to commodify animal bodies. That being said I will not discuss the relative weight of the obligation not to commodify animal bodies any further.

One should also note that treating a body as a commodity is less about the purpose for which a body is used and more about the way in which it is used. For instance, in a culture where the dead are ritually cooked and their meat is eaten by their friends and relatives in commemoration, animal bodies could seemingly be consumed in the same way without them being treated as commodities. In this case,

the animal body would be used as part of a ceremony that honors the deceased animal and as such the body would not plausibly be treated as a mere commodity. I take it that the same can be said for other uses of animal bodies too. However, I think it is important to bear in mind that how commonplace the use of a product is within a society or culture plays an important role in whether something is considered commodification. Commemorating deceased animals by eating their bodies would plausibly not be an instance of commodification only in a culture or society where animal bodies are not commonly eaten outside of this ceremony. If animals are slaughtered on an industrial scale to produce meat and leather furniture within a given society, it is difficult to see how eating an animal body or making a leather armchair from their skin could be a form of ceremony to honor the deceased animal within the same society. More plausibly, this appears to be just another instance of commodification .

6. Further Applications

In addition to providing the basis of an argument against using animal products in many circumstances, the Commodification Account has some other interesting applications. It seems that our general attitudes towards dead human bodies are consistent with recognising them as possessing final value in virtue of their historical causal relations to human moral status holders. Like animal bodies, we take human bodies to possess final value and this value gives us moral reason not to commodify them. A key difference between our treatment of human bodies and the treatment

the Commodification Account suggests for animals, is that it seems we sometimes do treat human bodies as commodities. As noted in Section 2, we use organs, blood, egg and sperm cells. However, this behavior can be easily accommodated within my view by noting that humans, unlike animals, possess autonomy and can provide consent. So although all moral status holders' bodies have final value in themselves, a human moral status holder can absolve other moral agents of the obligation not to commodify their own body, if they so choose.

Human moral status holders can plausibly donate organs, cells or their whole body for any given purpose. However, since animals lack the capacity to provide consent, they cannot relieve us of the obligation not to commodify their bodies. Further this also provides an argument for why we have a (defeasible) moral reason not to use human organs and tissue where consent of the moral status holder to whom they belong cannot be secured. Further, the Commodification Account can accommodate the fact that our treatment of human bodies is culturally relative through incorporating a culturally relative understanding of commodification. Thus, it is a virtue of this account that it not only offers a progressive view of the treatment of animal bodies but that it can support our existing rituals surrounding the treatment of human bodies. As such, it is generalisable to all moral status holders, providing a single unified explanation of the value of dead bodies and our obligations regarding them.

The Commodification Account can also provide ethical support for the production and consumption of lab grown meat (under certain conditions). If animal bodies have final value because of their historical causal relations to moral status

holders, then where a body or body parts are grown in a lab without the use of any moral status holders and the body/body part does not give rise to a being which could possess moral status, it would lack final value on this account. Since the body has no relevant relation to a minded being, the body would lack the relational properties that grant naturally born animals' bodies final value. A lab grown body might be considered to be no more valuable than any other piece of organic matter.

If this is the case then the Commodification Account would give us no reason not to treat lab grown bodies as commodities. As such, it does not provide us with any reason against producing or consuming lab grown meat (where it is produced without using the bodies of moral status holding beings). This highlights the importance of the relation the body has to a specific moral status holder. As stated in Section 4 the causal power to give rise to a mind may be a valuable feature of bodies generally, but it is this historical relation of having given rise to a mind and thus the bringing about of a moral status holder, that imbues a body with final value. Where a body does not have this historical causal relation, I suggest that there is no obligation of non-commodification present, or at least this obligation is not nearly as strong. It seems to me that having the causal power to give rise to a mind *and* actualising this power is a much more secure ground for the final value of a body than the mere power to give rise to a mind alone.

7. Conclusion

In this article I have argued that animal bodies possess final value, that is to say, value in themselves because they have given rise to minds with properties that ground moral status. Further, in virtue of possessing this value we have a defeasible moral reason not to commodify animal bodies. Specifically this means we have a reason not to use animal bodies to make everyday items to furnish our houses, stock our wardrobes or fill our plates. It also gives us reason not to use objects made from animal bodies. Further, I suggest that this Commodification Account can provide a defense of the value of human bodies and our obligations towards them. That being said, I do not take this account to provide a silver bullet. There are still considerably thorny issues to deal with around the treatment of bodies, in particular: As bodies rot and decay does their value (and our related obligations) diminish commensurately? And how strong is the reason not to commodify bodies? Nonetheless, it seems the Commodification Account plausibly lays the groundwork for a progressive view on the use of animal bodies whilst supporting the current norms surrounding the treatment of human bodies.

Notes

1. See Cora Diamond, "Eating Meat and Eating People," *Philosophy* 53, no. 206 (1978): p. 468. for a version of this challenge.
2. See Rom Harré, "Bodily Obligations," *Cogito* 1, no. 3 (1987): p. 16 for this paperweight example.
3. See Geoffrey Scarre, "Archaeology and Respect for the Dead," *Journal of Applied Philosophy* 20, no. 3 (2003): p. 15. for an account of posthumous harm relevant to using bodies.
4. See Dorothy Grover, "Posthumous Harm," *The Philosophical Quarterly* 39, no. 156 (1989): p. 334; Ernest Partridge, "Posthumous Interests and Posthumous Respect," *Ethics*, 1981, pp. 243–64; James Stacey Taylor, "The Myth of

Posthumous Harm," *American Philosophical Quarterly* 42, no. 4 (2005): pp. 311–22.

5. See Christine M. Korsgaard, *Fellow Creatures: Our Obligations to the Other Animals* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2018); and Elizabeth Foreman, "The Object of Respect," *Environmental Ethics* 37, no. 1 (2015): pp. 57–73, https://doi.org/10.5840/enviroethics20153715 respectively.
6. See Philipp Balzer, Klaus Peter Rippe, and Peter Schaber, "Two Concepts of Dignity for Humans and Non-Human Organisms in the Context of Genetic Engineering," *Journal of Agricultural and Environmental Ethics* 13, no. 1–2 (2000): pp. 7–27, https://doi.org/10.1007/BF02694132; Suzanne Laba Cataldi, "Animals and the Concept of Dignity: Critical Reflections on a Circus Performance," *Ethics and the Environment* 7, no. 2 (2002): pp. 104–26; David J. Chauvet, "Should Cultured Meat Be Refused in the Name of Animal Dignity?," *Ethical Theory and Moral Practice* 21, no. 2 (2018): pp. 387–411, https://doi.org/10.1007/s10677-018-9888-4; Martha C. Nussbaum, *Frontiers of Justice Disability, Nationality, Species Membership* (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 2007); Sara Elizabeth Gavrell Ortiz, "Beyond Welfare: Animal Integrity, Animal Dignity, and Genetic Engineering," *Ethics & the Environment* 9, no. 1 (2004): pp. 94–120; Bernard E. Rollin, *Animal Rights and Human Morality* (New York: Prometheus Books, 1981); Federico Zuolo, "Dignity and Animals. Does It Make Sense to Apply the Concept of Dignity to All Sentient Beings?," *Ethical Theory and Moral Practice* 19, no. 5 (November 1, 2016): pp. 1117–30, https://doi.org/10.1007/s10677-016-9695-8.
7. See Ortiz, op. cit., p. 114.
8. See Balzer, Rippe, and Schaber, op. cit., p. 20.
9. See Balzer, Rippe, and Schaber, op. cit. p. 23; Zuolo, op. cit., p. 1121; Nussbaum, *Frontiers of Justice Disability, Nationality, Species Membership*; Rollin, *Animal Rights and Human Morality*, p. 35.
10. See Paul W. Taylor, *Respect for Nature: A Theory of Environmental Ethics* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2011).
11. See Harré, op. cit., p. 16.
12. See Shelly Kagan, "Rethinking Intrinsic Value," *The Journal of Ethics* 2, no. 4 (December 1, 1998): pp. 77–97; Wlodek Rabinowicz and Toni Rønnow-Rasmussen, "A Distinction in Value: Intrinsic and for Its Own Sake," *Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society.*, 2000, pp. 33–51, https://doi.org/10.1007/1-4020-3846-1_10.
13. See Kagan, op. cit.
14. Rabinowicz and Rønnow-Rasmussen, op. cit. For an alternative view see Kagan, op. cit.
15. See Kagan, op. cit., p. 284.
16. See Kagan, ibid., p. 286.
17. Kagan, ibid.

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