AUGUSTINE, THOMAS AQUINAS, HENRY OF
GHENT, AND JOHN DUNS SCOTUS:
ON THE THEOLOGY OF THE FATHER’S
INTELLECTUAL GENERATION
OF THE WORD

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Abstract

There are two general routes that Augustine suggests in De Trinitate, XV, 14-16, 23-25, for a psychological account of the Father’s intellectual generation of the Word. Thomas Aquinas and Henry of Ghent, in their own ways, follow the first route; John Duns Scotus follows the second. Aquinas, Henry, and Scotus’s psychological accounts entail different theological opinions. For example, Aquinas (but neither Henry nor Scotus) thinks that the Father needs the Word to know the divine essence. If we compare the theological views entailed by their psychologies we find a trajectory from Aquinas, through Henry, and ending with Scotus. This theological trajectory falsifies a judgment that every Augustinian psychology of the divine persons amounts to a pre-Nicene functional Trinitarianism. This study makes clear how one’s awareness of the theological views entailed by these psychologies enables one to assess more thoroughly psychological accounts of the identity and distinction of the divine persons.

1. Introduction

In much of the contemporary anglophone Trinitarian theology associated with ‘analytic philosophy’, tremendous attention has been paid to the issue of the identity and distinction of the trinity of divine persons. These philosophical theologians have responded to the question «How can there be three persons and yet one divine substance?»

However, what has been missing in such discussions is the issue of the two *ad intra* divine productions. For example, what account might we give of the (eternal) generation of the Son, whom is called the «Word» in the prologue of John's gospel? Likewise, what account might we give of the (eternal) procession of the Holy Spirit? By paying more attention to the issue of the *ad intra* divine productions, theologians might have more resources for assessing theories that attempt to explain the identity and distinction of divine persons. To this end, in what follows I survey Thomas Aquinas, Henry of Ghent, and Duns Scotus’s accounts of the Father's intellectual generation of the Word. I trace what I take to be a significant trajectory in their philosophical psychologies that account for the Father’s (eternal) generation of the Word and the theological views that they entail. I conclude by saying how we might accept or reject a psychological account of divine persons on the basis of a theological position that it entails.

Thomas Aquinas, Henry of Ghent, and Duns Scotus all consider a proposed requirement for the Father's generation of the Son, who is the Word. Put in the form of a question the proposed requirement is this: «Is the Father’s act of understanding the divine essence necessary for the Father to generate the Word?» At first glance this question may seem relatively insignificant, but I aim to show that it manifests philosophical and theological differences between these theologians. To bring into focus their theological distinctives I will consider a closely related question: «Does the Father have an act of understanding the divine essence, which is an immanent perfection, intrinsically or by dependence on the generated Word?» This latter question helps us to see whether a theologian thinks the Father *in se* has the resources to have an act of understanding the divine essence, or if the Father requires the generated Word in order that the Father has an act of understanding the divine essence. Having shown how each theologian answers the first question I will be able to elicit from them an answer to this second question.

All of these scholastic theologians respected and appealed to Augustine’s authority when (in effect) giving their answers to the two questions above. What motivate their use of philosophical psychology to

2. I use the locution ‘act of understanding’ throughout to stand for any occurrent intellectual cognition.
answer these questions are Augustine’s reflections on the Father’s generation of the Son/Word in De Trinitate. And, what motivated Augustine was the prologue of John’s Gospel (John 1: 1-3) where we learn that «in the beginning was the Word, and the Word was with God, and the Word was God». With John’s prologue to hand Augustine wonders how to understand what a ‘word’ might be, and how the Father (eternally) generates his Word. It is Augustine’s use of philosophical psychology to attempt to understand these things that provokes Aquinas, Henry, and Duns Scotus (among other things) to use their philosophical psychologies to answer these two questions.

There are many key passages from Augustine’s De Trinitate that can be used to support these scholastics’ responses to the first question. As it turns out they use various passages to support contrary opinions. For example, in De Trinitate, XV, 14-16, 23-25, Augustine considers two ways to understand the Father’s intellectual generation of the Word. First, Augustine supposes that (1) the Father’s act of understanding the divine essence is necessary for the generation of the Word; second, Augustine supposes that (2) the Father’s act of understanding the divine essence is not necessary for the generation of the Word. As it happens, Thomas Aquinas and Henry of Ghent side with (1), and Duns Scotus sides with (2).

In §2 below I explain what Augustine says in some relevant passages from De Trinitate, XV, 14-16, 23-25, and elsewhere, that function as important background to understanding these scholastics’ own philosophical and theological positions with regard to our two questions. In §3 I survey Aquinas’s philosophical psychology that promotes the view that the Father’s act of understanding with regard to the divine essence is necessary for, and productive of, the Word. In §4 I show that Henry also thinks the Father’s act of understanding the divine essence is necessary for the generation of the Word, but that it is necessary for a different reason than Aquinas offers. Moreover, Henry denies that the Father’s act of understanding the divine essence is productive of the Word. Given that Henry’s philosophical psychology within the Trinitarian context is less well known3, I go into some detail about it since it is in

3. For discussion of Henry’s philosophical psychology outside the confines of his Trinitarian theology, see S. MARRONE, Truth and Scientific Knowledge in the Thought of Henry
stark contrast to Aquinas and Scotus’s better-known philosophical psychologies. I argue that Henry’s philosophical psychology, when used to explain the Father’s generation of the Word, improves on Aquinas’s in one respect but nevertheless has a certain problem of its own.

In §5 I show that, for Duns Scotus, the Father’s act of understanding the divine essence is neither necessary for, nor productive of, the Word. Moreover, I say how Duns Scotus critically develops the gains Henry made over Aquinas’s view, and how Duns Scotus avoids a problem that arises from Henry’s philosophical psychology.

Having seen how these three scholastics answer the first question, in §6 I say how each answers the second question. I show that Aquinas’s psychology entails a theologically weak view of the Father’s immanent intellectual perfection and may suggest a theologically illicit view of the Son and Holy Spirit’s intellectual perfection. However, I say how Henry and Duns Scotus’s views entail a theologically strong view of the Father’s immanent intellectual perfection. Furthermore, I explain how Henry’s philosophical psychology entails a theological position intermediate between the theological opinions entailed by Aquinas and Duns Scotus’s philosophical psychologies. In §7 I conclude with an assessment of how the views of Thomas Aquinas, Henry of Ghent, and Duns Scotus each follows one of two routes that Augustine suggests in *De Trinitate*, XV, 14-16, 23-25, that is, whether the Father’s act of understanding the divine essence is causally necessary for the Father’s intellectual generation of the Word. Having made clear the connection between a given philosophical psychology and a theological opinion that it entails, I say how this puts one in a better position not only to judge the charge that all Augustinian divine psychologies amount to a Trinitarian functionalism, but also to assess a given psychological account of the identity and distinction of the divine persons.
2. Receptions of Augustine’s De Trinitate, XV, 14-16, 23-25

In *De Trinitate*, XV, 14-16, 23-25, Augustine reflects on the Father’s generation of the Word. In these remarks Augustine discusses human cognition to attempt to understand how from eternity the Father intellectually generates his Word. I want to focus on these remarks because in them we can see the seeds of our scholastic theologians’ divergent answers to the proposed requirement (in the first question) for the generation of the Word4. But before I discuss what in effect are Augustine’s different responses to this question, it is helpful to take a step back to see what Augustine believes a ‘mental word’ is.

In his survey of diverse creaturely analogies that might help us to understand better the trinity of divine persons Augustine considers a psychological analogy in which the Father has the divine memory, the Son has the divine intelligence, and the Holy Spirit has the divine love5. On this view there is one substance with three distinct aspects or parts that is supposed to be analogous to the one divine substance and three distinct persons. However, Augustine declares that this psychological model fails if taken in a certain way. Consider the following.

But now I have already argued earlier on in this book that the trinity which is God cannot just be read off from those three things which we have pointed out in the trinity of our minds, in such a way that the Father is taken as the memory of all three, and the Son as the understanding of all three, and the Holy Spirit as the charity of all three; as though the Father did not do his


own understanding or loving, but the Son did his understanding for him and the Holy Spirit his loving6. 

According to this theologically undesirable view, which Augustine rejects, each divine person in se lacks what we ought to suppose to be attributes (e.g., the act of understanding, the act loving) equally shared by every divine person. On this theologically illicit view, for example, the Son has intelligence as an immanent perfection but no other divine person has intelligence as an immanent perfection; hence, the Father has intelligence only insofar as he is related to the Son. Likewise, if the Holy Spirit has divine love as an immanent perfection but no other divine person has divine love as an immanent perfection, then e.g., the Father has divine love only insofar as the Father is related to the Holy Spirit. But Augustine believes that this view is theologically undesirable because every divine person should be thought to have divine attributes like intelligence and love immanently. Memory, intelligence, and love are essential (shared) attributes of the divine persons and not unshared personal properties. Nevertheless, Augustine suggests that we can say the Father generates the Son/Word from memory if we bracket out this theologically illicit position7.

In his analysis of human memory, intelligence, and love, Augustine takes memory as dispositional belief or knowledge, intelligence as having acts of thinking, and love as having an act of will8. Since memory is like a storehouse of thoughts, we can say that it might be the storehouse of e.g., knowledge, and when we episodically think of what


8. See AUGUSTINE, De Trinitate, XII, 14, 23, pp. 376, 44 – 377, 80; also see note 7; also, see De Trinitate, IX, 12, 18, pp. 309, 26 – 310, 80; and De Trinitate, XV, 20-1, 38, 41, pp. 516, 25 – 39; 518, 22 – 24.
we dispositionally know, then the stored knowledge brings about occurrently cognized knowledge. In short, Augustine says that occurrently cognized knowledge is «knowledge [generated] from knowledge» \((\text{scientia de scientia})\). Augustine says that what gets produced from memory is a «mental word». Mental words are not features of a spoken or written natural language (e.g., French, Latin), but are a purely mental language\(^{10}\). What is important for my purposes here is Augustine’s claim that memory brings about cognized knowledge called a mental word. Memory is a productive power (analogous to a parent), and a mental word is its product (analogous to a child). In the case of God, Augustine wonders whether the Father brings about an act of understanding and the divine mental Word from memory.

By surveying Aquinas, Henry, and Duns Scotus we find two general interpretations of what a generated mental word is supposed to be. When a person thinks of something, she has the act of understanding, on the one hand, and the object or cognitive content that fixes the act of understanding, on the other hand. Consequently, there is an act-theory and an object-theory of what a mental word is; and as I say below, Henry of Ghent proposes a composite view of these.

To his scholastic descendents Augustine suggests two kinds of responses to the question: «Is the Father’s act of understanding the divine essence necessary for the generation of the Word?» In his initial response (in \(\text{De Trinitate}, XV, 25, 24\)) Augustine focuses on the claim that in the normal course of human understanding the act of understanding entails a generated mental word such that the act of understanding is a necessary condition for a generated mental word\(^{11}\).

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9. Cf. \textit{Augustine, De Trinitate}, XV, 15, 24, p. 498, 24-28: «Quid cum verum est verbum nostrum et idea recte verbum vocatur, numquid sicut dici potest vel visio de visione vel scientia de scientia, ita dici potest essentia de essentia sicut illud dei verbum maxime dicitur maximeque dicendum est?».


11. Cf. \textit{Augustine, De Trinitate}, XV, 15, 25, pp. 498, 34 – 499, 11: «Ilia etiam quae sua scintur ut numquam excidere possint quoniam praesentia sunt et ad ipsius animi naturam pertinent ut est illud quod nos uiuere scimus; maner enim hoc quamdiu animus manet, et quia semper manet animus et hoc semper manet; id ergo et si qua reperiuntur similia in quibus imago dei potius intuenda est, etiamsi semper scintur, tamen quia non semper etiam cognituntur, quomodo de his dicatur uerbum sempiternum, cum uerbum nostrum nostra cogitatione dicatur, inuenire difficile est. Sempiternum est enim animo
Once the act of understanding ceases to exist, so too does the mental word. But suppose that the Father’s act of understanding eternally exists. If this were so, then the generated divine Word would also eternally exist. Therefore, on this initial consideration the Father’s eternal act of understanding the divine essence is necessary for the eternal generation of the Word.

However, on Augustine’s second view, he worries that if we say an act of understanding is necessary for the generation of a mental word, then we might be tempted to suppose that the generated mental word can come and go since human acts of understanding are typically episodic. Augustine worries that if the divine Word «can be formed» (formabile), then it might not have been formed. To avoid the inference that the divine Word might not have been even if it is eternally generated, Augustine denies that the divine Word «can be formed». Instead, the generated divine Word is the same simple form (that is, the divine essence) as the Father, and the Father’s act of understanding (cogitatio) the divine essence is not in any way necessary for the generation of the Word. Since acts of understanding are typically

uiuere, sempiternum est scire quod uiuit, nec tamen sempiternum est cogitare uitam suam vel cogitare scientiam uitaes suae quoniam cum aliud atque aliud coeperit, hoc desinet cogitare quamuis non desinat scire. Ex quo fit ut si potest esse in animo aliqua scientia sempiterna, et sempiterna esse non potest eiusdem scientiae cogitatio, et uerbum uerum nostrum intimum nisi nostra cogitatione non dicitur, solus deus intellegatur habere uerbum sempiternum sibique coaeternum».


«Nisi forte dicendum est ipsam possibilitatem cogitationis quoniam id quod scitur etiam quando non cogitatur potest tamen ueraciter cogitari, uerbum esse tam perpetuum quam scientia ipsa perpetua est. Sed quomodo est uerbum quod nondum in cogitationis visione formatum est? Quomodo erit simile scientiae de qua nascitur si eius non habet formam et uerbum quia potest habere? Tale est enim ac si dicatur uerbum qui potest esse uerbum. [...] Ac per hoc etiam si concedamus, ne de controversia uocabuli laborare uideamur, iam uocandum esse uerbum quia potest esse uerbum. [...] Ac per hoc etiam si concedamus, ne de controversia uocabuli laborare uideamur, iam uocandum esse uerbum quidam illud men-
tis nostrae quod de nostra scientia formari potest etiam priusquam formatum sit quia iam ut ita dicam formabile est, quis non uideat quanta hac sit dissimilitudo ab illo dei uerbo quod in forma dei sic est ut non ante fuerit formabile postque formatum, nec aliquando esse possit informe, sed sit forma simplex et simpliciter aequalis ei de quo est et cui mirabiliter coaeternas est? Quapropter ita dicitur illud dei uerbum ut dei cogitatio non dicatur ne ali-

quid esse quasi uolubile creatur in deo, quod nunc accipiat, nunc recipiat formatum ut uer-

bum sit eamque possit amittere atque informiter quodam modo uolutari. [...] Non ergo ille dei filius cogitatio dei sed uerbum dei dicitur. Cogitatio quippe nostra pervenienti ad id quod scimus atque inde formata uerbum nostrum uerum est. Et ideo uerbum dei sine cogitazione dei debet intellegi ut forma ipsa simplex intellegatur, non aliquid habens forma-

ble quod esse etiam possit informe». 
episodic, and he denies that the Word depends on an act of understanding. Augustine supposes that he avoids suggesting that the Word might not have been generated. On this second consideration Augustine takes up his claim that the divine Word is «knowledge [generated] from knowledge» and suggests that the Father generates the Word directly from memory, as though divine memory were the productive power by which the Father eternally generates his Word. Consequently this second view proposes that the Father’s act of understanding the divine essence is not necessary for the generation of the Word. As we will see below, both Thomas Aquinas and Henry of Ghent affirm the first view that the Father’s act of understanding the divine essence is somehow necessary for generating the Word; but Duns Scotus affirms the second view that the Father’s act of understanding the divine essence is not necessary for the generation of the Word.

3. Thomas Aquinas: The Father’s Act of Understanding the Divine Essence is Necessary for, and Productive of, the Word

In what follows I focus on Aquinas’s mature account of human cognition and not on how he developed his own philosophical psychology. Aquinas accepts the Aristotelian teaching that what we normally intellectually cognize derives from the external world. As it were, information starts from an external object and ultimately arrives in the human intellect by a series of mediations. External objects send information to a person’s sense organs and powers, and then the information passes through the common sense to the imagination and ultimately stops in the intellect. Aquinas teaches that the information received in the imagination naturally stops there but can be transferred (abstracted) into the possible intellect (a power of the soul) by

13. On memory as a productive power, see Augustine, De Trinitate, XI, 7, 11, pp. 347, 1 – 348, 24; also, see note 7.
certain causal interactions between a person’s agent intellect (another power of the soul), and a phantasm (what is imagined). What is important here is the product from such causal interaction between the agent intellect and a phantasm, that is, what Aquinas calls an «intelligible species». An intelligible species is a disposition that is a likeness of its external object, and this likeness inheres in the possible intellect. An intelligible species must inhere in a person’s possible intellect before a person can will to generate an act of understanding whatever the intelligible species is a likeness of. An intelligible species is that through which (id quo est) a person understands something. However, a mental word, which Aquinas describes as an «understood intention» (intentio intellecta), is that in which (in quo) something is understood15. A mental word is a likeness of the intelligible species on which it (formal) causally depends; consequently the intelligible species and the mental word are likenesses of the same (external) object. The issue that I will pursue here is how an act of understanding is causally connected to the generation of a mental word.

In the case of humans, Aquinas believes that the possible intellect, informed with an intelligible species, produces an act of understanding, and this act of understanding, which is an operation, is somehow productive of a mental word («intellectus in concipiendo format; inquantum scilicet intuitu cogitationis divinae concipitur verbum Dei»)16. Now, this is peculiar, since it means that, on Aquinas’s view,


16. Cf. THOMAS AQUINAS, ST, Ia, 34, 1, ad 2, ed. Leonina, cura et studio fratrum praedicatorum, Opera Omnia IV, Rome 1888, p. 366 (emphasis mine): «Ad secundum dicendum quod nihil eorum quae ad intellectum pertinent, personaliter dicitur in divinis,
an intellectual operation (an act of understanding) is productive of something, that is, a mental word. Indeed, as Henry and Duns Scotus will point out, this is a category mistake. An operation does not have an end term distinct from itself, but a production does have an end term distinct from itself. How is it possible then that an act of understanding something — an intellectual operation — is also the production of a mental word? Aquinas does not seem to answer this question.

For humans there must be an intelligible species that is acquired and inheres in a person's possible intellect before a person can generate a mental word. But in the case of God, given divine simplicity, no intelligible species need inhere in the divine intellect for the Father to generate the Word. The divine essence (or rather, the divine intellect that is identical with the divine essence) plays the role of an intelligible species. The divine essence is the power by which the Father...
generates the Word; and, the Father’s act of understanding is necessary for the generation of Word because it is the act productive of the Word. This produced Word is identical with the divine essence such that by having an act intentionally directed at the Word, the Father understands the divine essence\(^{19}\). The Word is the object of the Father’s act of understanding in the sense that it is the term of the act. Hence, for Aquinas, the Father generates the Word in order that the Father’s act of understanding has an object; that is, the Father (as it were, occurrcently as opposed to dispositionally) understands the divine essence by means of the generated Word\(^ {20}\). (Below I compare Aquinas, intentio intellecta, sive Verbum, sint per essentiam unum, et per hoc necesse sit quod quodlibet horum sit Deus…».

19. See THOMAS AQUINAS, ST, I, 34, 1, ed. Leon., IV, Rome 1888, p. 366 (emphasis mine): «Nam intelligere importat solam habitudinem intelligentis ad rem intellectam; in qua nulla ratio originis importatur, sed solum informatio quaedam in intellectu nostro, prout intellectus noster fit in actu per formam rei intellectae. In Deo autem importat omnimodam identitatem, quia in Deo est omnino idem intellectus et intellectum, ut supra ostensum est. Sed dicere importat principaliter habitudinem ad verbum conceptum, nihil enim est alius dicere quam proferre verbum. Sed mediantem verbo importat habitudinem ad rem intellectam, quae in verbo prolato manifestatur intelligenti». Aquinas denies the mental Word is an act of understanding; cf. THOMAS AQUINAS, ST, I, 34, 1, ad 2, cited in note 16. For explanations of Aquinas’s view that the mental word is an internal object, see G. EMERY, The Trinitarian Theology of St. Thomas Aquinas, pp. 59, 183-184; also, see R. PASNAU, Theories of Cognition in the Later Middle Ages, New York 1997, pp. 256-262; also, see id., Thomas Aquinas on Human Nature, New York 2002, pp. 324-329; also, see C. PANACCIO, «From Mental Word to Mental Language», pp. 126-129; also, see R. CROSS, «The Mental Word in Duns Scotus and Some of His Contemporaries», forthcoming; E. STUMP «Word and Trinity», in: M.Y. STEWARD (ed.), The Trinity: East/West Dialogue, Dordrecht / Boston / London 2003, pp. 153-166. Henry of Ghent and Duns Scotus interpret Aquinas to posit that the word is an internal object. For Henry’s response to Aquinas’s theory, or a view like Aquinas’s, see HENRY OF GHENT, SQO, 58, 1, fols. 123vH-124vM; for Duns Scotus’s distinction between production and operation, see Duns Scotus, Ordinatio, I, 6, 1, 14, ed. C. BALIC et al., Opera Omnia, IV, Vatican 1956, pp. 93, 8 – 94, 4.

20. See note 19. Also, see THOMAS AQUINAS, Quaestiones disputatiae de veritate, 4, 2, ad 3, ed. Leon., XXII.1, Rome 1970, p. 124. G. EMERY, The Trinitarian Theology of St. Thomas Aquinas, p. 193, cites SCG, IV, 12, and other passages where Aquinas denies that e.g., the Father is wise by means of the Word who is generated wisdom. From such passages Emery infers that, for Aquinas, the Word is not the object by which the Father knows the divine essence. However, earlier (pp. 59, 183-184) Emery seems to suggest that the Word is the object by which the Father knows the divine essence. On my reading, Aquinas’s mature psychological account of the generation of the Word renders the Word as the object/product of the Father’s act of understanding, and that Aquinas makes ad hoc qualifications elsewhere to say that no divine person knows the divine essence by means of the Word. In §6 I say what is entailed by Aquinas’s psychological account as such, and
Henry, and Scotus’s reasons for why the Father generates the Word.) In response to the first question above, Aquinas answers that the Father’s act of understanding is necessary for, and productive of, the Word; and, Aquinas believes the Word to be an internal mental object at which the Father’s act of understanding is intentionally directed such that the Father understands the divine essence.

Before moving onto Henry of Ghent I should say just how Aquinas interprets Augustine’s De Trinitate, XV, 16, 25. Aquinas takes Augustine’s second considered view (that the Father’s act of understanding (cogitatio) is not necessary for the generation of the Word) to be a denial that there is any imperfect knowledge in God. For, Augustine often characterizes cogitatio as discursive reasoning that bounces around trying to find the truth of something. Once a person finds the truth of something, she forms a true mental word. Since God is a perfect knower of all things, there is ‘no place’ for discursive reasoning in God21. Aquinas supposes that God the Father is a perfect contemplator such that the Father’s perfect contemplation, that is, an act of understanding with regard to the divine essence, is productive of the Word. By interpreting Augustine’s second view along epistemological lines, Aquinas believes Augustine supports his own claim that the Father’s perfect act of understanding and not an act of discursive reasoning, is necessary for, and productive of, the Word.

4. **Henry of Ghent: The Father’s Act of Understanding the Divine Essence is Necessary for, but not Productive of, the Word**

Henry of Ghent’s philosophical psychology is strikingly different from Aquinas’s. Although Henry agrees with Aquinas that the Father’s act of understanding the divine essence is necessary for the generation of the Word, he arrives at this conclusion by different reasons. Henry does not think the Father generates the Word in order that the Father (quasi-occurrently) knows the divine essence. Furthermore, whereas Aquinas seems to think that a mental word is produced through and

in note 88 I comment on how serious Aquinas seems to be committed to his psychological account of the generation of the Son/Word.

is the object of the act of understanding, Henry thinks that any intelligible object must be suitably present to the (possible) intellect (at least rationally) prior to an act of understanding intentionally directed at it. Further below I explain what Henry says about intellectual powers, objects, and acts in order to make clear Henry's own position.

We can see why Henry is unsatisfied with Aquinas's view if we consider the following. Aquinas and Henry believe that every divine person understands the divine essence. The Father’s act of understanding the divine essence is an 'essential' act, that is, numerically the same act had by every divine person. An ‘essential’ act is opposed to a ‘notional’ act that is not shared by every divine person. A divine person that produces another divine person has a 'notional' act. (The Father alone has the notional act of generating the Son/Word; and, the Father and Son alone — assuming the filioque clause of the Nicene Creed — have the notional act of spirating the Holy Spirit.) Given Aquinas's psychological account of the Father's intellectual generation of the Word, it seems that the Father's act of understanding the divine essence is both an essential act and a notional act. For Aquinas affirms that the act of understanding the divine essence is an essential act; but that in the case of the Father’s act of understanding the divine essence, it is also productive of the Word. But why suppose that it is only when the Father understands that the Word is generated? It would seem that if the act of understanding the divine essence were an essential act, then every divine person would generate the Word, which is unorthodox. Even more, it is impossible for the Word to generate himself by his act of understanding.

Aquinas might try to avoid the implication that every divine person's act of understanding the divine essence is productive of the Word by distinguishing between the Father's act of understanding and the generated Word. For Aquinas, the act of understanding the divine essence...
essence is not strictly identical to the Word\textsuperscript{24}. However, this distinction between the act of understanding and the generated word does not help, because on Aquinas’s view a necessary consequence of an act of understanding is that a mental word is generated. Yet for some unspecified reason when the Father understands the divine essence, he generates the Word, but when e.g., the Holy Spirit understands the divine essence no Word is generated. Aquinas provides no answer to why the Father’s act of understanding correlates with the generation of the Word, and e.g., the Holy Spirit’s act of understanding does not correlate with the generation of the Word. Instead, Aquinas seems to beg the question by asserting that when the Father understands, he generates a Word, but when other divine persons understand, they do not generate the Word\textsuperscript{25}. What is needed is a distinction between the conditions for an intellectual operation, and the conditions for the generation of a mental word; Henry of Ghent proposes just such a clarification.

Henry is a minimalist when it comes to intellectual causal powers\textsuperscript{26}. For example, unlike Aquinas, who thinks that the agent intellect and possible intellect are necessary accidents that inhere in a person’s substance\textsuperscript{27}, Henry takes intellectual powers to be intrinsic features (‘intentions’) of the rational soul (a substantial form). One ‘intention’ in a rational soul is the agent intellect, which is an active power that makes intellectual objects proximately and cognitively (consciously) accessible. Henry believes there are three other intellectual powers (that are ‘intentions’) in a rational soul, and these three powers go by the name ‘possible intellect’\textsuperscript{28}. Thus, when Henry uses

\textsuperscript{24} Cf. note 16 above.
\textsuperscript{25} See THOMAS AQUINAS, \textit{De ueritate}, 4, 2, ad 2, p. 124.
\textsuperscript{27} See R. PASNAU, \textit{Thomas Aquinas on Human Nature}, pp. 151-157, and references there.
\textsuperscript{28} I infer from what Henry says about passive power in the divine essence to a human rational soul. On this reading Henry posits a passive power for having intellectual operations and another passive power for having intellectual products (that are not intellectual operations), e.g., intellectual habits and a mental word. The issue of passive powers in
the term ‘possible intellect’, he has one (or more) of these intellectual powers in view. The possible intellect’s powers are as follows. There is a rational soul’s capacity (passive power) to receive intellectual operations, which for convenience I call the rational soul’s ‘intellectual operation-receptivity’. Furthermore, there is a rational soul’s capacity to receive (has passive power for) e.g., intellectual dispositions (intellectual habits) and a mental word. I call this the rational soul’s ‘product-receptivity’; in this context ‘intellectual product’ is satisfied by anything produced in the intellect that is not an intellectual operation. For greater accuracy we might call this capacity ‘intellectual disposition-receptivity’ so long as ‘disposition’ includes qualities that inhere in the possible intellect and the cognitive content united with such qualities. Lastly, there is the rational soul’s active power to produce things like propositions, dispositions, judgments, and mental words.


29. See HENRY OF GHENT, QI, XI, 7, fol. 459r-Vx, where Henry distinguishes between the categorical status of an intellectual habit, and the cognitive content of an intellectual habit; the cognitive content is a real being, although it does not fall under categorical real being. For Henry's statements about the ontological status of cognitive content («esse cognitum»), cf. HENRY OF GHENT, SQO, 28, 6, fol. 169vI; also, cf. HENRY OF GHENT, QI, IX, 2, ed. R. MACKEN, Leuven 1993, pp. 31, 53 – 32, 67.

30. Cf. HENRY OF GHENT, SQO, 40, 7, ed. G.A. WILSON, Leuven 1994, p. 286, 3-15: «Ad quorum omnium intellectum intelligendum est, secundum quod exposition est in praecedenti quae stione, quod intellectus quilibet, sive creatus sive increatus, dupliciter potest considerari: uno modo ut est potentia cognitiva, alio modo ut est natura quaedam. Et multum refert. Ut enim est potentia cognitiva, est velut virtus passiva, per se ordinata ad actum primum simplicis intelligentiae, in percipienti scilicet objectum intelligibile, et hoc non nisi ut mota sit, vel quasi mota, ab objecto intelligibili. Ut vero est natura quaedam, est velut virtus activa, quae, quasi prae supposito et substrato actum simplicis intelligentiae qui est actus eius primus, elicit eius actum secundum qui vocatur ‘dicere’, quo format in se conceptum simillimum illi quod est intellectum in simplici intellectu, qui
Below, I say what the conditions are for each of the possible intellect's three powers to be exercised.

Henry says that an act of understanding is an intellectual operation. An intellectual operation is a generated act intentionally directed at a suitably present intelligible object. An intellectual operation is an end in itself; it is a kind of doing and not a kind of making or production. A production has an end term distinct from itself, e.g., when a builder makes a house. The builder's making the house terminates at a product distinct from his making-action. If we consider Aquinas's (mature) account of the intellectual generation of the Word in conjunction with this distinction between an operation and a production, we can see that Henry rejects Aquinas's view that the Father's act of understanding is both an operation and the production of the Word on philosophical grounds. Even more, Henry has theological reasons to distinguish between an essential act and a notional act within his psychological account of the generation of the Word.

31. See *Henry of Ghent, SQO*, 54, 4, ad 10, fol. 86vR: «Dicendum secundum quod superius est expositum loquendo de diuina actione in generali, quod differunt actus qui est proprie actio et qui est proprie operatio. Et sicut differunt sic habent perfectiones differentes. Sicut enim operis perfectio consistit in actione circa obiectum perfectissima, vt patet in operatione quae est felicitas, sic perfectio actionis proprie dictae est quod habeat aliquum perfectum perfecte productum. Et ideo licet actus diuinius, qui est proprie operatio, cuiusmodi est intelligere, propter suam perfectionem non est propter aliud proueniens ab ipso, actus tamen qui proprie est actio, cuiusmodi sunt generare et spirare, propter alium modum perfectionis suae bene potest esse propter alium aut propter alium prouenientem ex sua actione». Also, see *Henry of Ghent, SQO*, 59, 2, fol. 143vO: «Ad cuius intellectum sic vtendo nomine actionis et passionis sciendum est de actione (et idem intellegendum de passione) quod actionem quaedam est operatio vt est illa a qua non relinquitur aliquid operandum. Quaedam vero est productio vt est illa a qua relinquitur operandum. Actionis autem qua est operation, quaedam est motus uel non sine motu vt est omnis operatio naturalis in creaturis, sed quandoque est motus corporalis ut est citharizatio, quandoque vero spiritualis vt est intellectio aut volitio; quaedam vero non motus et omnino est sine motu vt est omnis operatio in diuinis manens intra, vt est diuina intellectio aut volitio».

32. The phrase 'suitably present' is my gloss for what Henry means when he says that the agent intellect causes some intelligible object to be objectively present to the possible intellect such that this intelligible object efficiently causes or moves the possible intellect to have an act intentionally directed at this intelligible object. See *Henry of Ghent, Ql. IV*, 21, fol. 136vF; also, see *Quodlibet XIII*, 8, ed. J. Decorte, Leuven 1985, p. 51, 45-65.
For Henry, the Father’s act of understanding the divine essence is merely an intellectual operation and merely an essential act, and it cannot be the same act as the (notional) act productive of the Word. Otherwise, as I say in §6, undesirable theological positions would be entailed from such an account. In what follows, first I discuss Henry’s proposed conditions for an intellectual operation, and second the conditions for the intellectual generation of the Word.

Henry agrees in general with Aquinas’s account of the initial stage of the extra-mental object that sends information to a person’s sensitive organs and powers, and up to the stage of a person having this information in her imagination. But Henry (on his mature view) strikingly parts ways from Aquinas in his account of the causal interaction between the agent intellect and a phantasm. Whereas Aquinas proposes that an intelligible species is the product of such causal interaction, Henry believes that the ultimate term of the causal interaction between the agent intellect and a phantasm is an intellectual operation called the «first act of understanding» \(^{33}\). In order to arrive at this conclusion Henry gives an account of the causal interaction between the agent intellect and the phantasm, to which I now turn.

Henry proposes that a phantasm, which represents some extra-mental individual object, can also represent, under certain conditions, the extra-mental object by being a universal representation. Henry names the phantasm under such conditions a «universal phantasm» \(^{34}\). He stipulates that a phantasm is a universal representation if and only if an

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33. Henry changed his mind about the need to posit an intelligible species. For his early view, see HENRY OF GHENT, SQO, 1, 5, ed. G.A. WILSON, Leuven 2005, pp.124, 40 – 125, 60. Also, see T. NYC, De werking van het menselijk verstand, pp. 100-103; L. SPRUIT, Species intelligibilis. From Perception to Knowledge, Vol. 1, Leiden 1994, pp. 205-212. Henry seems to posit a theory much like Aquinas insofar as saying that the agent intellect (with a phantasm) produces an intelligible species that inheres in the possible intellect; but later in SQO, 58, 2, fols. 129vC-131vM, Henry has a long excursus in which intelligible species are rendered superfluous for explaining first acts of understanding. M. Mccord Adams (William Ockham, Vol. 1, Notre Dame 1987, p. 559, note 32) puzzles over why Duns Scotus thought Henry rejects a doctrine of intelligible species; but this can be explained in the first instance by looking at HENRY OF GHENT, Quod. XI, 7, fol. 459rR-vX, where Henry rejects intelligible species as anything other than an intellectual habit that is willingly generated posterior to first acts of understanding. For a fuller account of Henry’s rejection of a doctrine like Aquinas’s, see B. Goehring, Henry of Ghent on Cognition and Mental Representation, pp. 75-160; also, see M. Rombeiro, Intelligible Species, pp. 126-177.

34. Cf. HENRY OF GHENT, SQO, 58, 2, fol. 130rG: «Hic vero non est aliud re phantasma particulare et species quae est phantasma vniuersale, sicut nec res vniuersalis est alia
agent intellect is acting on — shining on — it. Henry expresses his intuition about 'universal phantasms' by using an analogy with objects that are seen by different kinds of light (e.g., sunlight and moonlight). For example, suppose you see a painting under sunlight such that you see the painting's distinct and particular colors. But, suppose you see the same painting under moonlight such that you see colors in a general and indistinct way. Under one kind of light you see the picture's individual colors, but under another kind of light you see the picture's colors in a general and indistinct way. On Henry's view, if moonlight were removed, we could no longer see indistinct colors. By analogy, if the agent intellect stops shining on a phantasm, we no longer have cognitive access to the 'universal phantasm'. However, this is not an illuminating or generally successful analogy. For example, under moonlight would I fail to see certain pale colors of an object? Surely I can intellectually cognize (however imperfectly) something that I imagine. Nevertheless, we can see what Henry is trying to get at. Certain features of a thing are cognitively accessible only under certain conditions. We might ask, however, whether e.g., my black cat Walter has universal features (e.g., black, feline), or individual features (this black, this feline), or both. On Henry's metaphysics, universals as such only exist in a mind. In any case, whatever a person intellectually cognizes by means


36. Cf. Henry of Ghent, SQO, 58, 2, fol. 129vE.

37. Henry supposes that one way that intellectual habits differ with universal phantasms is that intellectual habits have a universal signification without the agent intellect shining on them. What the agent intellect does, however, is cause the cognitive content of an intellectual habit to be suitably present to the possible intellect's operation-receptivity so that a person has an intellectual act intentionally directed at this cognitive content.

38. See Henry of Ghent, SQO, 53, 5, fol. 66vV for Henry's claim that a universal concept (e.g., persona) can be satisfied by an extra-mental thing. Also, see L.M. de Rijk, Giraldus Odonis O.F.M. Opera Philosophica. Vol. 2: De Intentionibus. Critical Edition with a Study on the Medieval Intentionality Debate up to ca. 1350, Leiden / Boston 2005,
of a ‘universal phantasm’ is irrelevant to Henry’s proposed to divine psychology. What bears on his proposed divine psychology is Henry’s (contentious) claim that if an intelligible object — including a ‘universal phantasm’ — is suitably present to the possible intellect, then it naturally causes the possible intellect to have an (first) act of understanding intentionally directed at this object. Furthermore, what matters is Henry’s belief that the possible intellect must first receive an act of understanding before it can make an intellectual product reflective of the contents of the prior (first) intellectual operation(s), which I explain below.

Henry believes that a ‘universal phantasm’ naturally causes the possible intellect to have an act that is intentionally directed at it (that is, at the ‘universal phantasm’). Henry suggests there is an essential order of efficient causes: the agent intellect naturally causes a phantasm to have the condition of being a ‘universal phantasm’, then the agent intellect naturally gives the ‘universal phantasm’ the active power to produce an intellectual act that inheres in the possible intellect39.

pp. 150-158, esp. 157. For Henry’s metaphysical claims about universals existing only in the mind, see 

Henry of Ghent, SQO, 53, 3, fol. 63rS; also, see SQO, 75, 1, fol. 290rG; SQO, 43, 2, ed. L. Höl, Leuven 1998, pp. 53, 57 – 54, 93.

39. Henry does not characterize a universal phantasm as an instrumental efficient cause, but holds that a universal phantasm immanently has active power to cause the possible intellect to have an act of understanding intentionally directed at it. However, universal phantasms only have this active power when the agent intellect ‘shines on’ them. See 

Henry of Ghent, Q. XI, 5, fols. 451vD-452rD; and, Q. XI, 7, fol. 459vX. For Henry’s affirmation that the agent intellect must cause intelligible objects (e.g., simple concepts, propositions, etc.) to be suitably present to the possible intellect for thinking and discursive reasoning to occur, cf. SQO, 58, 2, fol. 132rQ: «Nec tamen ab ista actione [i.e., occurrent discursive reasoning] excluditur irradiatio agentis»; also, cf. Q. XIII, 8, p. 51, 63-65: «[Intellectus agens] primo facit illa [i.e., phantasmata] esse actu intelligibilia, secundo dat eis vim movendi secundum actum intellectum possiblem, in quantum scilicet sunt quasi imbuta et commixta lumini agentis». Also, cf. Henry of Ghent, SQO, 58, 2, fol. 130rG: «phantasma habet virtutem immutandi intellectum, non secundum conditions particulares ad intelligendum primo et principaliter ipsum particularum rem (ut aliqui dicitum), quod est impossibile, sed secundum rationem phantasmatis simpliciter et quasi abstracti et separati a materia et conditionibus particularibus materiae, et hoc ad eliciendum in intellectu actum intellec tionis inhaerentem ipsi intellectui, et informantem ipsum absque omni ali specie rei vniuersalis intellectae illi inhaerente ad intelligendum rem universalem». This passage from SQO, 58, 2 should dissuade anyone from ascribing to Henry a thoroughly ‘relational metaphysics’ that might attribute to Henry the view that an act of understanding just is an intellectual relation of the rational soul to a suitably present intelligible object. For Henry, real relations do not inhere in (esse in) their subject. But Henry says intellectual acts produced and inhere in the possible intellect, and that
Hence, the rational soul receives an intellectual operation (thanks to the rational soul’s intellectual operation-receptivity). (Likewise, for a person to have an act of understanding what she dispositionally knows, she must will her agent intellect to give active power to what is dispositionally known to cause an act intentionally directed at this cognitive content.) There is also a formal cause: a phantasm qua ‘universal phantasm’ is the representation at which the generated intellectual act is intentionally directed. A universal phantasm is the cognitive content of a first act of understanding. Unlike Aquinas, Henry believes that the intentional object (e.g., a ‘universal phantasm’) at which an act of understanding is intentionally directed exists (logically) prior to the intellectual operation. In summary, an intellectual operation is a generated act that is intentionally directed at some suitably present object; in the case of a first act of understanding, the generated act is intentionally directed at a ‘universal phantasm’.

Henry believes that in the normal course of a human person's intellectual life first she thinks of simple (uncombined) concepts, and afterwards she can make things out of these prior known simple concepts, e.g., dispositions for thinking of such simple concepts again, and propositions (compounds of simple concepts)40. Henry seems to take Augustine's *dictum* that a person cannot desire to think of what she is entirely ignorant of, to entail that a person must first think of simple concepts before she can desire to understand better the object in question, and to do so she must will to make intellectual products, e.g., propositions, intellectual dispositions41. We
might say that, for Henry, if any cognitive content is stored in a person's mind, then the cognitive content must have been cognized prior to being dispositionally stored in the mind. On Henry's view a person cannot first have intellectual dispositions (that is an intelligible species) and then think of the cognitive content of these dispositions; rather, a person's having first acts of understanding (uncombined concepts) are a necessary condition for a person to produce any intellectual dispositions, or a mental word (explained below)\(^4\). Henry often describes the possible intellect that makes things from its first acts of understanding as the possible intellect's 'reflecting on' or 'converting on' its prior intellectual operations. For example, suppose I think of several uncombined concepts: 'human', 'animal', and 'rational'. Then suppose I reflect on these, that is, I produce the proposition «A human being is a rational animal» from the antecedently cognized simple concepts. The production of the proposition is dependent upon the prior cognized uncombined concepts (and likely any dispositions for thinking of
these uncombined concepts, which dispositions are generated consequent to the relevant first act of understanding) because the proposition is a compound of these concepts. If I never had an occurrent thought of the simple concepts that are required ‘ingredients’ of this proposition, then I could not produce a complex intellectual product that is made up of these simple concepts. Furthermore, Henry takes a perfect mental word, in the case of humans, to be the true definition of something. Thus, if a perfect mental word is the true definition of an (extra-mental) object, then a person must first have thought of the simple concepts required for this definition before she produces a mental word that is a certain compound of these.

Henry believes that what lies between human first acts of understanding and the production of a perfect mental word is an investigation called discursive reasoning. This middle stage of intellectual cognition is irrelevant to Henry’s account of the Father’s generation of the Word. What is relevant is that a first act of understanding must be prior to the production of a mental word. In the case of human intellectual life this makes sense because humans first think of simple uncombined concepts, and if they get things right, they end a long process of discursive reasoning with the true definition of whatever it is they desire to understand. However, in the case of God, no discursive reasoning is required.

43. I leave to the side the issue of what Henry says of *syncategoremata* because it is irrelevant for my purposes here.
44. See Henry of Ghent, SQO, 58, 2, fol. 132v Q: «Et quod haec intellecta singula facit esse unum per compositionem postquam erant multa, est intellectus materialis [i.e., ‘possible intellect’]. Iste enim distinguet intellecta singula et componit similia et diuidit diuersa. Et sicut opus intellectus in habitu est compositio et divisio in propositione, sic et discursus in argumentatione».
45. See Henry of Ghent, SQO, 36, 6-7, ed. G.A. Wilson, pp. 130, 1 – 143, 17; also, see R.L. Friedman, «In principio erat Verbum». The Incorporation of Philosophical Psychology into Trinitarian Theology, 1250-1325, Ph.D. Diss., University of Iowa 1997, pp.144-147.
46. Cf. Henry of Ghent, SQO, 40, 7, ed. G.A. Wilson, Leuven 1994, p. 294, 12-18: «Sed constar quod istam notitiam, investigatam et inquisitam per amorem, necessario praecedit notitia aliqua simplicis intelligentiæ, quia omnino incognita amare non possunt, sed solum quae aliquo modo cognoscimus, per amorem investigamus [...]. Et illa cognitio mentis de se ipsa post simplicem notitiam, non est nisi notitia, qua ‘verbum’ dicitur notitia in quo simplex notitia amplius manifestatur». 
since God has no epistemological imperfections. What are left to consider, in the case of God, is the first intellectual operation and the production of the Word.

Henry claims that the divine essence is a suitably present intelligible object that quasi-causes the Father’s quasi-intellectual operation-receptivity to have an intellectual operation. The divine essence (like a universal phantasm) not only counts as the quasi-efficient cause, but also the quasi-formal cause of this first intellectual operation that (we might say) is quasi-produced\(^{47}\). The Father perfectly knows the divine essence thanks to this first act of understanding intentionally directed at the divine essence\(^ {48}\). It would seem then that there is no need for the Father to generate a Word because he already has a perfect act of understanding the divine essence. However, there is an additional feature in Henry’s account of intellectual cognition on the basis of which he posits that the Father must generate the Word, to which I now turn.

Henry posits that the reason why the Father generates the Word is that the Father’s first intellectual operation is itself something


\(^{48}\) Cf. *Henry of Ghent, SQO*, 58, 2, fol. 131vM: «Vnde in Deo non dicitur verbum notitia declaratia quia clarior et perfectior est illa quae est memoriae [i.e., the first act of understanding] de qua formatur sicut contingit de verbo creaturae intellectualis, sed quia tamen dicendo et modo declaratius sive manifestatus ex hoc procedit». Also, cf. *Henry of Ghent, SQO*, 59, 2, fol. 141vG: «In Deo vero notitia quae verbum est et notitia simplex quae memoriae ascribitur aequae perfectae est secundum rem et illi aequata de quo est, quia tantum se novit Deus quantus est, et aequae perfecte cognoscuntur a deo singularia in notitiae simplici et essentiae et in notitia declaratia qua verbum est». Also, *Henry of Ghent, SQO*, 58, 5, fol. 136rR: «… primo enim modo [intellectus paternus] consideratur ur est in potentia ad notitiam simplicem generatam secundum rationem in ipso a sua essentia ur sub ratione veri est obiectum cognitum…». In the case of God, an intellectual operation is not a real product, we might say it is quasi-produced since it is only rationally distinct from every divine person that has it. Cf. *Henry of Ghent, SQO*, 58, 1, fol. 124rI (emphasis mine): «Et ideo intelligere quo dicitur intelligens non est intellegere per aliquam actionem alicuius mouentis intellectus eius, nisi secundum rationem tantum, sed est intelligere per essentiam. Et est istud intelligere operatio quaedam essentia intelligibilis, non autem aliquid operatum in intelligente, nec ab aliqua quod est in anima eum nisi secundum rationem, intelligendo sicut in eo idem sub ratione intelligibilis mouentis et intellectus moti, et actus intelligendi formati in intellectu, quemadmodum esta habent differet et esse secundum rem in acto nostro simplicis intelligenceae intelligibili extra agentia in nostrum intellectum, vt formetur in ipso actus intelligendi respectu cuius intellectus noster pure passiuus est». 
intelligible\(^{49}\), and if the Father is a perfect knower, then he should know this first intellectual operation. Since on Henry’s view the divine essence quasi-causes the Father to have a first intellectual operation, he infers that there must be another (quasi-efficient and quasi-formal) cause of the Father’s second intellectual operation. Consequently, there must be a produced representation, or rather image (that is, the Word)\(^{50}\), of this first intellectual operation. Hence, the divine essence quasi-receives the generated Word (thanks to its quasi-product receptivity). This generated image is the quasi-efficient and quasi-formal cause of the second intellectual operation. Thus, by knowing the generated Word the Father knows the first intellectual operation (that is, the prior act of understanding and its cognitive content).

In summary, Henry calls the intellectual act intentionally directed at the divine essence the “first act of understanding“, and the intellectual act intentionally directed at the Word “the second act of understanding“. This second act of understanding is how the Father knows the first act of understanding. (It is an important point to notice that Henry does not think that the divine Word just is the second intellectual operation, which is a point that Scotus seems to

\[\text{49. Cf. Henry of Ghent, SQO 58, 1, fol. 124vL, vM-N (emphasis mine): «ita quod totus intellectus vt sic ’informatius est et intelligere quoddam in actu’ est quoddam intelligible, [...] Et est ille actus intelligendi secundum quem est in actu pure essentiales in quo sunt idem re differentia sola ratione, intelligens, intellectum, actus intelligendi, et caetera huiusmodi. Idem vero intellectus in eadem persona existens vt est quasi in potentia ad actum declaratuum est id a quo habet produci emanans quod est ipsa notitia declaratia sive intellectio in actu intelligendi declaratiau existens in persona a qua emanat ut verbum in intelligentia non inhaerens sed subsistens, et declaratiau notitia eius a quo formatur, distinctum ab eo in quo est». Also, cf. Henry of Ghent, SQO, 58, 1, fol. 124vL: «sco-}
\[\text{[1.49. Cf. Henry of Ghent, SQO 58, 1, fol. 124vL, vM-N (emphasis mine): «ita quod totus intellectus vt sic ’informatius est et intelligere quoddam in actu’ est quoddam intelligible, [...] Et est ille actus intelligendi secundum quem est in actu pure essentiales in quo sunt idem re differentia sola ratione, intelligens, intellectum, actus intelligendi, et caetera huiusmodi. Idem vero intellectus in eadem persona existens vt est quasi in potentia ad actum declaratuum est id a quo habet produci emanans quod est ipsa notitia declaratia sive intellectio in actu intelligendi declaratiau existens in persona a qua emanat ut verbum in intelligentia non inhaerens sed subsistens, et declaratiau notitia eius a quo formatur, distinctum ab eo in quo est». Also, cf. Henry of Ghent, SQO, 58, 1, fol. 124vL: «sci-}
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\[\text{[1.49. Cf. Henry of Ghent, SQO 58, 1, fol. 124vL, vM-N (emphasis mine): «ita quod totus intellectus vt sic ’informatius est et intelligere quoddam in actu’ est quoddam intelligible, [...] Et est ille actus intelligendi secundum quem est in actu pure essentiales in quo sunt idem re differentia sola ratione, intelligens, intellectum, actus intelligendi, et caetera huiusmodi. Idem vero intellectus in eadem persona existens vt est quasi in potentia ad actum declaratuum est id a quo habet produci emanans quod est ipsa notitia declaratia sive intellectio in actu intelligendi declaratiau existens in persona a qua emanat ut verbum in intelligentia non inhaerens sed subsistens, et declaratiau notitia eius a quo formatur, distinctum ab eo in quo est». Also, cf. Henry of Ghent, SQO, 58, 1, fol. 124vL: «sci-}
\[\text{[1.49. Cf. Henry of Ghent, SQO 58, 1, fol. 124vL, vM-N (emphasis mine): «ita quod totus intellectus vt sic ’informatius est et intelligere quoddam in actu’ est quoddam intelligible, [...] Et est ille actus intelligendi secundum quem est in actu pure essentiales in quo sunt idem re differentia sola ratione, intelligens, intellectum, actus intelligendi, et caetera huiusmodi. Idem vero intellectus in eadem persona existens vt est quasi in potentia ad actum declaratuum est id a quo habet produci emanans quod est ipsa notitia declaratia sive intellectio in actu intelligendi declaratiau existens in persona a qua emanat ut verbum in intelligentia non inhaerens sed subsistens, et declaratiau notitia eius a quo formatur, distinctum ab eo in quo est». Also, cf. Henry of Ghent, SQO, 58, 1, fol. 124vL: «sci-}
have overlooked or not acknowledged. Instead, the Word is the quasi-causal source of the Father's second intellectual operation.) Of course, Henry qualifies the way in which the quasi-causal sequences happen from the Father's first intellectual operation up to the second intellectual operation, that is, they are rationally prior and posterior. Hence, the Father's first intellectual operation is only rationally prior to the generation of the Word.

Henry's claim that a mental word is precisely what is required for a person to know prior intellectual operations usually takes place within his discussion of the divine Word. It is unsurprising that Henry ascribes a special functional status to the Word because he is seeking after a reason for why the Father intellectually generates the Word. After all, Henry discards Aquinas's reason that the Father generates the Word in order that he (as it were, occurrently) knows the divine essence. Let \( R \) (for 'reflexive') stand for Henry's exclusive claim about the divine Word and mental words in general.

\[ R \text{ If a person has an intellectual act}_1 \text{ intentionally directed at an object } o_1 \text{ and wishes to have an intellectual act}_2 \text{ intentionally directed at the total object 'intellectual act}_1 \text{ intentionally directed at } o_1' \text{ (=} o_2\text{), then she must produce a mental word that represents (or is an image of) } o_2, \text{ and this} \]

51. Cf. DUNS SCOTUS, Ordinatio, I, 27, 3, 25-6, ed. C. BALIĆ et al., Opera Omnia, VI, Vatican 1963, pp. 74, 3 – 75, 7; also, Collatio, 39, ed. L. WADDELL, Opera Omnia, XI, 3, Lyons 1639, pp. 429-430. R. CROSS, Duns Scotus on God, Aldershot / Burlington 2005, p. 226; in following what Scotus reports of Henry, Cross ascribes to Henry the view that «the Father knows (merely) in the Son, or through the Son – that the Son is, in short, the Father’s act of knowledge just as he is that of the other persons too». On my view, Scotus's misreading of Henry can in part be explained by his (mis)interpretation of Henry's matter-form analogy for the divine substance and personal properties. In a chapter of my forthcoming D.Phil. thesis I explain what Henry means by his matter-form analogy. Also, see J.C. FLORES, Henry of Ghent Metaphysics and the Trinity, pp. 65, 74-75: «Generation in God is an emanation according to intellect elicited by the Father, whereby the Father produces his perfect word or self-knowledge. […] the Father and Son, simple and declarative knowledge respectively, are two sides of one and the same intellectual reflection». Although Flores rightly says that Father and Son are really distinct (in some sense), he does not explain what it means for the Son/Word to be the Father's 'self-knowledge'. If 'self-knowledge' means «the Father knows the Father», then this cannot be right because Henry says that the Father's knowing the Father does not require that the Father knows the Word; cf. HENRY OF GHENT, SQO, 58, 1, fol.124rH.

52. See J.C. FLORES, Henry of Ghent: Metaphysics and the Trinity, pp. 90-95.

53. See HENRY OF GHENT, SQO, 54, 9, fol. 104vC; also, B. GOEHRING, Henry of Ghent on Cognition and Mental Representation, pp. 203-205.
produced mental word (under the right conditions) efficiently causes her to have an intellectual act, intentionally directed at the mental word that represents (or is an image of) $\theta_2$.

But why suppose that by knowing a generated mental word one also knows a prior intellectual operation on which the generation of the mental word (quasi-formally) depends? Recall that for Henry intellectual operations are not productions, and vice versa. If the divine essence quasi-efficiently causes the Father to have a first act of understanding the divine essence, then there is something intelligible, namely the Father’s first intellectual operation, which is not known through the first act of understanding. Thus, there must be something else besides the divine essence as such that is the quasi-efficient cause and suitably present intelligible object (image) by which the Father knows the first intellectual operation. The Father’s first intellectual operation cannot produce the Father’s second intellectual operation for the simple reason that intellectual operations are not productive; however, a suitably present image is quasi-productive of an intellectual operation. Therefore, the Father must generate the Word (that is, an image of the Father and the first intellectual operation) in order that the Father has the second intellectual operation and thus knows the first intellectual operation.

We can now see why Henry thinks the Father must generate the Word. The Father generates the Word in order that he knows the first intellectual operation. Hence, the Father’s act of understanding the divine essence is merely a necessary condition for the generation of the Word. Furthermore, since intellectual operations are not also productions (as Aquinas has it), it follows that the Father’s first intellectual operation is not productive of the Word. There must be a production distinct from the Father’s first intellectual operation if the Word is to be generated. Consequently, other conditions than those

54. See Henry of Ghent, \textit{SQO}, 59, 2, fol. 140r-bvC. If we abstract from the Trinitarian context, we can infer a less exclusive claim about what is required for knowing one’s prior intellectual operations. $R$: A person has an act of understanding, the total object «act of understanding, an object $\theta_1$», if and only if a person has an act of understanding, intentionally directed at any intellectual product that represents $\theta_1$, and this product is not an intellectual operation.

55. I say «formally depends» to indicate a mental word’s being a certain compound of formal ‘ingredients’.
sufficient for the Father's first intellectual operation must obtain if the Word is to be generated.

Lastly, it is important to keep in mind that, for Henry, the first and second intellectual operations are essential acts. An essential act is numerically the same act shared by every divine person. The Father, Son, and Holy Spirit have numerically the same essential act understanding the divine essence. Likewise, the Father, Son, and Holy Spirit have the essential act understanding the first intellectual operation. Essential acts are opposed to notional acts that are not shared by every divine person. Unlike Aquinas's psychological account of the Father's intellectual generation of the Word in which an essential act and a notional act seem to be insufficiently distinguished, on Henry's psychological account an essential act (namely, the Father's first intellectual operation) is sufficiently distinct from a notional act (namely, the production of the Word).

In summary, Henry proposes the following jointly necessary and sufficient conditions for the Father's act of understanding the divine essence: (1) The Father has the divine essence essentially, and thus the Father has the divine essence's intellectual quasi-passive and quasi-active powers; (2) the divine essence is suitably present to the Father's quasi-intellectual operation-receptivity; and, (3) the divine essence quasi-efficiently and quasi-formally causes the Father to have the first act of understanding the divine essence. Furthermore, Henry proposes the following necessary conditions for the generated Word: (3.1) the Father has the first act of understanding the divine essence; (4) the Father is in quasi-potency to know this intelligible first act of understanding the divine essence; (5) the Father has the intellectual active-productive power (under the right conditions, that is the Father has the intelligible first intellectual operation) to generate ('speak') the Word who is the image of the Father and the first intellectual operation, and, (6) the Father generates the Word. In turn, the generated Word quasi-causes the Father (and every divine person) to have the second intellectual

56. Cf. Henry of Ghent, SQO, 40, 7, ed. G.A. Wilson, Leuven 1994, pp. 295, 35 – 299, 40; SQO, 54, 10, fol. 105r–v1; SQO, 58, 2, fol. 129rA–vB. In these passages Henry glosses Anselm’s discussion of «essential speaking» (Henry refers to Anselm, Monologion, 63) to mean that a second act of understanding intentionally directed at the Word is shared by all divine persons.
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operation so that the Father (and every divine person) knows the first intellectual operation57.

A consequence of Henry’s account of the Father’s intellectual generation of the Word is that we can say that every divine person knows the divine essence without also producing a mental word precisely because to have an intellectual operation does not entail the generation of a mental word (as Aquinas’s view does). For Henry, there must be a productive act (notional act) distinct from the intellectual operation (essential act) if the Word is to be generated. However, what remains problematic is Henry’s claim that to know a prior intellectual operation one must generate a mental word that represents (or is an image of) the prior intellectual operation, and which causes another intellectual operation. I call this Henry’s ‘infinite reflex problem’, which I explain below.

Suppose we ask whether the second intellectual operation is itself something intelligible. If the second intellectual operation is intelligible (as it rightly seems), then on Henry’s view we must posit another generated mental word that quasi-causes another intellectual operation so that every divine person knows the second intellectual operation. If Henry’s psychological theory entails another generated Word for every divine person to know the second intellectual operation, then a vicious infinite regress ensues that requires infinitely many divine Words. But to posit something that entails infinitely many divine Words is theologically unorthodox since it entails more than three divine persons. To this problem Henry does not seem to have a satisfactory answer58.

57. Logically posterior to the Father knowing the divine essence, Henry adds that (3.2) the Father loves what he knows. Henry takes the Father’s loving the known divine essence to be a necessary condition for the generation of the Word. Thus, (3.1), (3.2), (4), (5), and (6) are jointly necessary and sufficient for the generation of the Word. See, HENRY OF GHENT, SQO, 54, 4, ad 2, fol. 88vD; SQO, 58,1, fol. 124vL–M; SQO, 59, 6, fol. 152vI. Also, see Flores, Henry of Ghent: Metaphysics and the Trinity, pp. 72-73, esp. note 48; B. Goehring, Henry of Ghent on Cognition and Mental Representation, pp. 177-181.

58. In an attempt to prevent the need to produce more than one divine Word, Henry claims that the productive power, which the Father exercises, is ‘exhausted’ by the generation of the Word. However, this would imply that there is no productive power for additional divine words, and that every divine person does not have sufficient resources to know the second intellectual operation. To say every divine person lacks the sufficient resources to know the second intellectual operation is a problematic if one wishes to affirm divine omniscience. On the ‘exhaustion’ argument cf. HENRY OF GHENT, QI, VI, 1, ed. G.A. Wilson, Leuven 1987, pp. 22, 51 – 25, 26; also, cf. HENRY OF GHENT, SQO,
Before moving onto Duns Scotus, I should say how Henry sees his own psychological account aligning with Augustine’s. Augustine is motivated to posit his second view because he wants to reject any suggestion that the Word is formable. Since acts of understanding are typically episodic, and Augustine denies that the Word is episodic, that is, formable, he denies that something episodic is a necessary condition for the generated Word. Since Henry takes the Father’s act of understanding the divine essence to be merely rationally distinct from the Father, Henry allows that his intellectual operation can be necessary for the production of the Word. Moreover, Henry focuses on Augustine’s additional statement that for something to be formable requires that it is first formless, and that the Word is not formless and then formed. Henry interprets Augustine to be denying that the divine essence first is deprived of an absolute form (that is, the divine essence lacks the form of the Word) and then the divine essence acquires the absolute form. On Henry’s view a material substance can be deprived of e.g., the absolute quality being white, and later it can acquire this quality such that the quality inheres in the material substance. Consequently, Henry takes Augustine’s denial that the Word is formless and then formed to imply that the Word is not an absolute form that inheres in the divine essence just as an absolute accident (e.g., a quality) inheres in a material substance. Whereas Aquinas interprets Augustine’s second view along epistemological lines as a way to have Augustine (seem to) support Aquinas’s view, Henry interprets Augustine’s second view along metaphysical lines. Henry believes that Augustine warns us against supposing there is a composition of two absolute things in a divine person (that is, the divine essence and a personal property). Thus, by agreeing with what Henry takes to be Augustine’s


59. Cf. HENRY OF GHENT, SQO, 54, 9, fol. 104vC (emphasis mine): «Vt enim dicit Augustinus XV de Trinitate capitulo 16 [sicl., De Trinitate, XV, 16, 25, p. 500, 1-3, 10-13], ‘dicitur dei verbum vt dei cognitio non dicatur, ne aliquid quasi volubile credatur in deo quod recipiat formam ut verbum sit. […] Cognitio quippe nostra perueniens ad id quod scimus, atque inde formata, verbum nostrum verum est, et ideo verbum dei sine cognitione debet intelligi, vt forma simplex intelligatur, non aliquid formabile quod esse posset informe’, et hoc subsistens in eo in quo formatur, non et inhaerens, sicut contingit in verbo nostro, in quo tamen intelligit est a quo formatur, quemadmodum et nos in verbo formato a nobis». 
denial that the Word is an absolute form that inheres in the divine substance, Henry is happy to support Augustine's first view. Since Henry distinguishes between operations and productions, he does not think the Father's intellectual operation, which is rationally distinct from the Father, is productive of the Word (like Aquinas) but it is merely necessary for the production of the Word.

Augustine claimed that the Word is «knowledge [generated] from knowledge» (scientia de scientia) or knowledge generated from memory. Henry allows that 'memory' need not be disposition-like (as Aquinas and Duns Scotus suppose), but it can be an intellectual operation. That is, the first intellectual operation is knowledge (notitia) of which the generated Word is an image (notitia declarativa). The Word, for Henry, is knowledge declarative of the prior intellectual operation; by having an intellectual act intentionally directed at the Word every divine person (quasi-occurrently) understands this declarative knowledge. Given that God is pure act (actus purus), Henry supposes that it is more felicitous to say that the Word is an image of something fully actual (an intellectual operation) than of what is merely dispositionally known.


61. Augustine likewise takes memory to be dispositional and not an intellectual operation; cf. Augustine, De Trinitate, XV, 21, 40, pp. 517, 8 – 518, 14.

62. Cf. Henry of Ghent, SQO, 58, 1, fol. 124vL; SQO, 54, 9, fol. 104vC: «Et sic actus qui est dicere sive generare non est idem quod intelligere siue primum siue secundum, quia dicere est vera actio procedens a memoria siue a notitia simplici existente in ipsa siue de re obiecta vt est in memoria, et sic est actio siue operatio quaedam intellectus informati simplici notitia [i.e., first intellectual operation] quae in se ipso format notitiam declaratiam simillimam illi simplici notitiae». Also, see R.L. Friedman, «In principio erat Verbum», pp. 144-146.

63. Cf. Henry of Ghent, SQO, 28, 5, fol. 170vN: «Cum igitur omnis potentia quae cum actu nata est facere aliquam compositionem differens est ab ipso, in deo autem omnino non distat potentia ab actu neque differt, in deo ergo nulla potest esse omnino compositio ex potentia et actu. Ex quo relinquitur quod sit actus purus et simplex [...]».
5. Duns Scotus: The Father's Act of Understanding the Divine Essence is Neither Necessary for, nor Productive of, the Word

For Duns Scotus the Father's act of understanding the divine essence not only is not productive of the Word, but neither is it causally necessary for the generation of the Word. Scotus agrees with Henry that the Father's intellectual operation (an essential act) is distinct from the Father's intellectual production of the Word (notional act), and that the Father's act of understanding the divine essence cannot be productive of the Word. Scotus firmly criticizes Aquinas for seemingly making a category mistake in suggesting that an intellectual operation is also an intellectual production. Like Henry, Scotus also denies Aquinas's suggestion that the Father generates the Word in order that the Father has an act of understanding the divine essence. Yet Scotus takes Henry's view one step further by denying that the Father's act of understanding the divine essence is even a necessary condition for the Father's intellectual generation of the Word. Scotus's reasoning is fairly straightforward. He denies Henry's bold statement (see conditions (4)-(5) and R above) that the Father generates the Word in order that the Father knows the first intellectual operation. Instead, Scotus claims that the Father generates the Word because the infinite divine essence has an infinite intellectual power (called memory) that must have an adequate infinite product that is the Word.

Also, cf. HENRY OF GHENT, SQO, 58, 1, fol. 124vM: «Intellectus enim diuinus in persona illa prima quae non est ab alia a qua procedit ista prima emanatio, vt secundum iam dictum modum est intelligere quoddam in actu est ratio qua habet elicere actum huiusmodi emanationis. Et est illud intelligere in tali persona sicut actualis memoria, quam oportet esse actualem quia ex quo perfectissima est ista emanatio debet esse summe actualem id quod est ratio eliciendi ipsum». 

64. Cf. DUNS SCOTUS, Ordinatio, I, 2, 2, 1-4, 324-6, ed. C. BALI et al., Opera Omnia, II, pp. 320, 14 – 321, 9; esp. 321, 6-9. Also, Ordinatio, I, 2, 1-4, 292, Opera Omnia, II, pp. 300-301; Ordinatio, I, 27, 1-3, 55-6, Opera Omnia, VI, p. 86, 11-21: «Nec etiam est alius terminus productus per intellectionem, quia intellectio non est actio productiva alius termini: tunc enim incompossibile esset intelligere eam esse [...]. Non est autem impossible intelligere intellectionem in se, non intelligendo quod sit alius termini ut producti per ipsam. Confirmatur etiam, quia operationes tales debent essse actus ultimi ex I Ethicorum et IX Metaphysicae [...] qualiter est quaedam actio de genere actionis, et alia quae est qualitas, cuiusmodi est intellectio».

The Word is generated infinite knowledge that is equal to the memory’s infinite knowledge from which the Word derives; hence, neither is more perfect than the other.

The infinite productive power by which the Father brings about the Word is ‘memory’. Recall Augustine’s claim that the Word is generated from memory such that the Word is scienza de scienza. Scotus takes memory to be an «intellect having an intelligible object present to it»66. Memory, for Scotus, consists of two partial efficient causes that are jointly sufficient as a productive power. Neither the intelligible object nor the intellect taken individually is a sufficient efficient cause for bringing about an intellectual product that is the Word. In the case of human cognition, Scotus argues that the causal interaction between the agent intellect and a phantasm results in a produced intelligible species that inhere in the possible intellect67. Consequently the intelligible species's being present to the possible intellect counts as ‘memory’. Like Aquinas, Scotus denies that, in the case of God, an intelligible species need inhere in the divine intellect. But whereas Aquinas says the divine essence is (in some sense) the intellectual productive power68, Scotus distinguishes

66. Cf. DUNS SCOTUS, Ordinatio, I, 3, 3, 4, 599, ed. C. BALI et al., Opera Omnia, III, Vatican 1954, p. 353, 14-16: «quod Pater in quantum habens essentiam divinam praesentem sibi sub ratione actu intelligiblis – quod competit Patri in quantum est ‘memoria’ – hoc modo Pater gignit […]». Also, cf. DUNS SCOTUS, Ordinatio, I, 2, 2, 1-4, 291, 310, ed. C. BALI et al., Opera Omnia II, pp. 299, 13 – 300, 9; 313, 1 – 14 (emphasis mine): «Verbum non gignitur ab intelligentia sed a memoria, secundum Augustinum XV De Trinitate cap. 14 [n.24]: igitur licet in Patre concurrant memoria, intelligentia et voluntas, Pater non gignet Verbum formaliter intelligentia in ‘quo’, sed ut est memoria. Ut autem habet notitiam actualem quasi elicitam et ut actum secundum, est in actu intelligentiae, cuius est omne intelligere actuale; igitur ut sic, non gignet Verbum, sed ut est memoria. Ut autem habet notitiam actualem quasi elicitam et ut actum secundum, est in actu intelligentiae, cuius est omne intelligere actuale; igitur ut sic, non gignet Verbum, sed ut est in actu memoriae, hoc est, habet obiectum intelligibile praesens intellectui suo […]. Ad primum respondeo quod hic totum ‘intellectus habens obiectum actu intelligibile sibi praens’ habet rationem memoriae perfectae in actu primo, quae scilicet est immediatum principium actu secundi et notitiae genitae, in hoc autem principio quod est memoria concurrent duo, quae constituent unum principium totale, videlicet essentia in ratione obiecti, et intellectus, quorum ururumque per se est quasi paritale principium respectu productionis adeaquatae huic totali principio. Cum ergo arguitur quod ratio naturae non tantum competit intellectui, sed essentiae, respondeo quod totale principium, includens essentiam ut obiecut et intellectum ut potentiam habentem obiectum sibi praens, est principium productivum quod est naturae et principium completem producendi per modum naturae».


between the intelligible object (divine essence) and the required kind of power (divine intellect) such that «the divine essence’s being present to the divine intellect» suffices as ‘memory’ that is a sufficient (quasi-composite) productive power by which the Father generates the Word. Moreover, whereas Henry believes that the divine essence, which is suitably present to the divine intellect, is a sufficient quasi-efficient cause of an intellectual operation, Scotus believes that the divine essence is merely a partial efficient cause and so cannot bring anything about by itself, whether an intellectual operation or the Word. Scotus asserts that the divine essence and divine intellect are jointly sufficient for the production of the Word (and the quasi-production of an intellectual operation, discussed below). Consequently, since ‘memory’ is a sufficient power for the production of the Word, the Father’s act of understanding the divine essence is not necessary for the generation of the Word69.

Scotus believes that the Father generates the Word in order that divine memory, qua intellectual productive power, is adequately perfected70. For Henry, the Word not only perfects the divine essence that is an active intellectual power, but the Word also perfects every divine person because the Word is the quasi-causal source and object of the second intellectual operation. Inspired by Augustine, Scotus worries that to say the Word is per se a known object that intellectually perfects every divine person appears to entail the theologically illicit view71. Hence, Scotus believes that the generated Word is a generated act, and not an object of thought, as Aquinas and Henry believe72.

70. Cf. note 65. Also, see DUNS SCOTUS, Ordinatio, I, 2, 2, 1-4, 311, ed. C. BALI et al., Opera Omnia, II, p. 314, 13-14.
Furthermore, Scotus believes that divine memory not only is a productive power, but it is also an operative power. That is, divine memory is also the power by which the Father quasi-produces his act of understanding the divine essence. The Father (and every divine person) is intellectually perfected by this operative power. We might say that for Scotus a divine intellectual operation is quasi-produced in the way that, e.g., a fire brings about heat in itself. For Scotus supposes that if a divine person has divine memory, then it is a necessary consequence that such a person has an intellectual operation. Scotus worries that to say a divine intellectual operation is produced entails that it is really distinct (though inseparable) from its producer. But only the divine persons are really distinct from one another; a divine person is not really distinct from his intellectual operation. Given Scotus’s worry that a divine person, who has divine memory, is not really distinct from the intellectual operation that the person (as it were) brings about from memory, he suggests that the Father’s intellectual operation is merely quasi-produced.

If one accepts Scotus’s strategy to distinguish between the Father’s quasi-produced intellectual operation and the produced Word, then his account as compared with Aquinas and Henry’s would seem to be preferable. Like Aquinas, Scotus avoids making the infinite reflex problem native to his account of the Father’s intellectual generation
of the Word, and like Henry he distinguishes between the conditions for an intellectual operation (an essential act) and the conditions for an intellectual production (a notional act).

Scotus denies that the Father’s act of understanding the divine essence is causally necessary for the intellectual generation of the Word for at least three reasons. First, an intellectual operation is not a production (contra Aquinas). Second, Scotus denies that the Word is that by which the Father knows his act of understanding the divine essence (contra Henry). Scotus supposes that the Father has perfect infinite knowledge thanks to the intellectual operative-power; and the Word likewise has this perfect infinite knowledge thanks to having this intellectual operative-power. Hence, Scotus denies that the Word has a special functional role in the Father’s intellectual perfection. Instead, the generated Word perfects divine memory qua productive power. We might say that for Scotus, any reflexive knowledge is contained in whatever a divine person knows by means of the intellectual operative-power. Lastly, Scotus seems to take Augustine’s second view to suppose that memory in itself is a sufficient power for the Father to intellectually generate the Word. Whereas Henry thinks that the divine essence, which is suitably present to the divine intellect, is a sufficient quasi-efficient cause of the first intellectual operation (that Henry counts as ‘memory’), Scotus denies that the divine essence as such is a sufficient quasi-efficient cause of an intellectual operation. Instead, Scotus renders divine «memory» as the conjunction of the divine essence and the divine intellect, which are partial efficient causes, that are jointly sufficient to produce the Word and to quasi-produce an intellectual operation. A key disagreement between Henry and Duns Scotus is whether, and if so how, to posit passive powers in the divine essence (e.g., Henry’s proposed ‘intellectual operation-receptivity’). But their (one-way) debate over divine quasi-passive power(s) falls outside the scope of this article.

6. Theological Entailments: An Immanent Perfection Had Intrinsically or by Dependence on the Word

Up to this point I have surveyed three scholastic accounts of the Father’s intellectual generation of the Word. Now I would like to consider what I take to be certain theological opinions entailed by the psychological explanations of the Father’s intellectual generation of
the Word. To bring these theological opinions into focus it is helpful to consider the distinction between a divine person having an immanent perfection either intrinsically or by dependence on another divine person. An immanent perfection is something that perfects an individual person. For example, if the Father understands the divine essence, his understanding the divine essence perfects the Father and not some other divine person. There are two ways a divine person might have an immanent perfection: intrinsically or by depending on another divine person. If a divine person has an immanent perfection intrinsically, then such a divine person *in se* has the jointly necessary and sufficient conditions for having this immanent perfection. But if a divine person has an immanent perfection by depending on another divine person, then such a divine person *in se* does not have the jointly necessary and sufficient conditions for having this immanent perfection. If a theologian says that a divine person satisfies the criteria for having an immanent perfection intrinsically, then this theologian has a theologically *strong* view of a divine person's immanent perfection. But if a theologian says that a divine person satisfies the criteria for having an immanent perfection by depending on another divine person, then this theologian has a theologically *weak* view of a divine person's immanent perfection. Notice that on either view every divine person has the perfection in question immanently. Consequently, the theologically strong and weak views of the immanent perfection of a divine person avoid the theologically illicit view that posits that e.g., the Son has or is the divine act of understanding the divine essence such that no other divine person immanently has this act of understanding. As Augustine puts it, this theologically illicit view says e.g., «the Son does the Father’s understanding for the Father».

At this point I would like to consider the question «Does the Father have an act of understanding the divine essence, which is an immanent perfection, intrinsically or by dependence on the generated Word?» With this question to hand we discover an array of theological positions entailed by Thomas Aquinas, Henry of Ghent, and John Duns Scotus’s psychological accounts of the Father’s intellectual generation of the Word.

In §3 we saw that Aquinas uses his philosophical psychology to help explain the Father’s generation of the Word. On Aquinas’s
philosophical psychology, the Father generates the Word by the divine essence and through his act of understanding. The generated Word is the required object of thought such that the Father (quasi-occurrently) knows the divine essence by having an act of understanding intentionally directed at the Word who is identical with the divine essence. Thus, the Father (quasi-occurrently) knows the divine essence because of the generated Word. Therefore, we can say Aquinas’s psychological account of the Father’s intellectual generation of the Word entails a theologically weak view of the Father’s immanent intellectual perfection of understanding the divine essence.

However, on Aquinas’s psychology it is unclear how he would ascribe the immanent intellectual perfection of understanding the divine essence to the Son and to the Holy Spirit. Aquinas, of course, asserts that the act of understanding the divine essence is an essential act of the divine persons. But he does not sufficiently explain why every divine person who has this essential act of understanding the divine essence does not produce the Word. To block the entailment that e.g., the Word produces himself, Aquinas would need to deny that the act of understanding productive of the Word is an essential act. But if Aquinas denies that the act of understanding the divine essence that is productive of the Word is an essential act, then the Father would be the only divine person that understands the divine essence; for this productive act is the act of understanding the divine essence. Consequently, the Son and Holy Spirit would understand the divine essence only by being related to the Father


77. To characterize Aquinas to have a weak view of the Father’s immanent intellectual perfection is based solely on Aquinas’s psychological account of the generation of the Word. Aquinas’s opposed-relations account of the divine persons, which some have argued is more explanatorily basic than Aquinas’s psychological account, supports a strong view of the immanent perfection of divine persons; cf. note 88. Also, see THOMAS AQUINAS, ST, I, 37, 2, ed. Leon., Opera Omnia, IV, Rome 1888, pp. 389-390; ST, I, 42, 1-6, ed. Leon., Opera Omnia, IV, Rome 1888, pp. 435-444.
who has the act of understanding the divine essence. In Augustine's idiom, the Father would do the understanding for the Son and Holy Spirit. But to say the Father understands the divine essence for the Son and Holy Spirit amounts to the theologically illicit view that Augustine (and Aquinas outside the immediate context of his psychological account of the intellectual generation of the Word) consistently rejects. But if Aquinas asserts that the Father generates the Word through his act of understanding, and that no other divine person generates the Word through an act of understanding, and if Aquinas provides no other conditions to show us why e.g., the Holy Spirit's act of understanding is not productive of the Word, then Aquinas begs the question and has not given us a satisfactory psychological account of the Father's intellectual generation of the Word.

For Henry, the Father's act of understanding the divine essence in no way requires the generated Word. Thus, contrary to the theologically weak view entailed by Aquinas's psychological account, Henry's psychological account entails a theologically strong view of the Father's immanent intellectual perfection of understanding the divine essence. Likewise, since Henry believes that the first intellectual operation is an essential act and every divine person has the first intellectual operation in virtue of the divine essence (and its attributes, e.g., the divine intellect), it follows that Henry's psychological account also entails a theologically strong view of every divine person's immanent intellectual perfection with regard to what Henry calls the 'first intellectual operation'.

However, unlike Aquinas and Scotus, Henry introduces the second act of understanding intentionally directed at the Word in order to explain why the Father generates the Word. Furthermore, Henry distinguishes between an essential feature of the Son (quasi iuxta primum modum dicendi per se), which is to be intellectually generated (that is, a generated act), and a necessary consequence of being intellectually generated, that is, being the intentional object of the second intellectual operation. Henry uses the name 'Son' to pick out the

essential feature of what the Father intellectually generates, and the name ‘Word’ to pick out what is a necessary consequence of this intellectual product. I take ‘being a necessary consequence’ to mean roughly: for Son $x$, and Word $y$, $y$ is a necessary consequence of $x$, if $x$ explains $y$, and, $x$ and $y$ are mutually inseparable. To be the divine Word is to be an intellectually generated act that is an intelligible object (the ‘image’ of the Father) and quasi-efficient cause of the Father’s (and every divine person’s) second intellectual operation. The Word is not e.g., the Father’s second intellectual operation, but a quasi-causal source of it.

sapientia ut notitia et arte simpliciter, creat autem Verbo ut notitia et arte declarativa. Sic ergo dico quod respectus verbi ad ea quae dicuntur verbo inquantum huiusmodi non conuenit verbo ratione sibi appropriati sed ratione sui proprii. Quod contingit et bene et male intelligi. Cum enim proprium sit hoc quod uni soli conuenit ita quod non aliter, vt in divinis dicatur proprium quod conuenit uni personae ita quod nulli alteri. Est enim singularis persona in divinis quasi unicum singulare in ratione personalis sui quae quasi in ratione unius speciei. Sicur ergo uni soli personae in divinis potest aliquid conuenire, ita quod non ali dupliciter: et sic esse proprium uni personae dupliciter, sic dupliciter potest alciun conuenire respectus aliquis ratione sui proprii. Vno enim modo aliquid in divinis conuenit uni soli personea ita quod non ali principaliter, scilicet quia est id quo vna persona distinguitur ab alia. Alio vero modo conuenit illi consequenter, scilicet quia consequitur ex illo principali in illa persona cuius est. [...] Cum ergo quaeritur verbum respectus verbi inquantum verbum habet respectum ad solum Patrem dicentem: Dicendum quod si intelligatur reduplicari verbum ratione respectus originalis qui convenit ei quasi sicut primum modum dicendi per se, sic (ut dictum est) verbum inquantum verbum habet respectum ad solum Patrem. Si vero intelligatur reduplicari ratione respectus consequentis qui convenit ei quasi sicut secundum modum dicendi per se, sic verbum inquantum verbum non solum ad patrem habet relationem sed etiam ad omnia essentialiiter dicta verbo, ut dictum est». On the Word being a generated act, see HENRY OF GHENT, Ql. V, 25, fol. 204r.

79. Cf. HENRY OF GHENT, SQO, 59, 4, fol. 147r; also, see HENRY OF GHENT, Ql. VI, 1, ed. G.A. WILSON, Leuven 1987, p. 27, 74-83. Aquinas also supposes that ‘Son’ picks out the second person’s relation to the Father, and ‘Word’ picks out what is spoken in this intellectual product. (See G. EMERY, The Trinitarian Theology of St. Thomas Aquinas, pp. 184-187, and references there.) However, where Aquinas and Henry differ is in the conditions required for the production of the Son/Word. Since Aquinas claims the Father’s act of understanding is productive of the Word, it would seem that such an intellectual product essentially (and not merely as a necessary consequence) is an intellectual object. For Aquinas says the term of the intellectual operation/production is an intellectual object. Hence, Aquinas’s distinction between essential (‘Son’) and non-essential but necessary features (‘Word’) of what the Father generates seems to be an ad hoc qualification of his psychological account in order to satisfy concerns extrinsic to the psychological account as such; whereas Henry’s use of this distinction does some work within his psychological account of the generation of the Word.

80. In the case of creatures there is a difference between a mental word efficiently causing an act of understanding and a universal phantasm efficiently causing a first act of understanding. That is, the will is causally required in the former case such that a person wills the agent intellect to cause a mental word to be suitably present to the possible intellect’s
intellectual operation receptivity, and as suitably present the mental word efficiently causes the possible intellect to have an act intentionally directed at the mental word. Henry supposes that if a person imagines something, then their agent intellect naturally acts on it, unless the will blocks such an action. On the causal role of the will, cf. HENRY OF GHENT, Ql. XI, 6, fol. 452rX-IV. On the natural action of the agent intellect on phantasms «proposed to» the agent intellect, cf. HENRY OF GHENT, Ql. III, 14, fol. 71rF. On the efficient causality of universal phantasms, cf. HENRY OF GHENT, SQO, 58, 2, fol. 130vG (see note 39 above). On the efficient causality of a mental word cf. HENRY OF GHENT, SQO, 54, 9, fol. 104rC (emphasis mine): «quod cum artingimus statim scibile vt scitum est actualiter et simplici notitia existens in memoria generat de se quasi subito collectis omnibus differentiis cum genere quod quid est, quod in ipsa intelligentia est quaedam notitia distinctiua et discreta seu declarativa, quam 'verbum' appellamus, in quo res ipsa existens vt explicata per partes, mouet ipsam intelligentiam ut intelligat cogitando, non cogitatione volubili, qualis erat ante verbi formationem, sed stabili qua res perfecte cognoscitur et scitur».

81. Henry has an analogous view about divine love. Henry has a theologically weak view of the Father and Son’s having the volitional perfection called «declarative love», and a strong view of the Holy Spirit’s having «declarative love». For general discussion of this see J.C. FLORES, Henry of Ghent: Metaphysics and the Trinity, pp. 106-111.

82. For his claim that personal properties entail a qualified perfection, cf. HENRY OF GHENT, SQO, 57, 1, ad 1, fol. 118rR: «Ad primum in oppositum qua spiritum sanctum esse a quo nullus, non est proprietas, ergo nec proprietas patris qua sit a nullo. Diceendum qua
to have than not to have *simpliciter*. For example, justice is better than injustice; wisdom is better than no wisdom. But a qualified perfection is any property that is better for a certain kind of thing to have than not to have, or a property that it is better for a certain kind of thing not to have than to have. Henry gives the examples that it is better for wine not to be bitter than to be bitter; but it is better for absinthe to be bitter than not to be bitter83. Since, on Henry’s view, the Word is the image of the Father and of the first intellectual operation, it would follow that the Word has the qualified perfection of being a quasi-efficient and quasi-formal cause of the second intellectual operation84. (This qualified perfection extends to any suitably present intelligible object that is not an intellectual operation (intellectual operations cannot be productions), e.g., the divine essence in the case of the first intellectual operation.) Consequently, the Father and Holy Spirit’s having the second intellectual operation by depending on the Word does not amount to an imperfection in the Father and Holy Spirit in the sense that they lack something that it is better to have than not to have *simpliciter*. Rather, the Father and Holy Spirit merely lack what it is better for the image of the Father and the first intellectual operation to have than not to have.

In §5 I showed that Duns Scotus teaches that the Word is a generated act, and not a *per se* known object. Scotus is clearly at odds with Aquinas because Scotus denies that the Word is *per se* a known object. Scotus is at odds with Henry too, insofar as Henry considers that the Son has the quasi-necessary consequence of being a known object (that is the quasi-cause of the shared second intellectual operation). For
Scotus, the Father intrinsically has the immanent perfection of understanding the divine essence because the Father intrinsically has divine memory\textsuperscript{85} such that the Father quasi-produces his intellectual operation. Likewise, Scotus believes that every divine person has the essential act of understanding the divine essence immanently and intrinsically because every divine person has the operative intellectual power immanently and intrinsically. It is clear that Scotus ensures that his psychological account of the generation of the Word coheres with his theological opinion about the equal perfection of every divine person.

Scotus follows Augustine’s worry that if e.g., the Father did not have the act of understanding the divine essence immanently but only in virtue of being related to the Word, then the Father would lack an immanent perfection that should be ascribed to him\textsuperscript{86}. Scotus thinks that since the Father has divine memory immanently and intrinsically that there is no reason to suppose that the Father does not have an intellectual operation immanently and intrinsically. Furthermore, since Scotus believes divine memory is a sufficient productive power for the generation of the Word, there is no need to posit that the Father’s quasi-produced intellectual operation is a necessary causal condition for the generation of the Word. All that needs to be done is for the Father to exercise this intellectual productive power.

Scotus’s disagreement with Henry not only derives from their diverse philosophical psychologies, but also from an apparent theological disagreement. For Scotus’s philosophical psychology applied to the case of the Father’s intellectual generation of the Word supports Scotus’s systematic theologically strong view of every divine person\textsuperscript{87}.

\textsuperscript{85} Cf. DUNS SCOTUS, Ordinatio, I, 2, 2, 1-4, 321, 325, ed. C. BALIĆ et al., Opera Omnia, II, pp. 318, 10-17; 321, 4-9; Ordinatio, II, 1, 1, 20, 29-32, 48, ed. C. BALIĆ et al., Opera Omnia, VII, pp.12, 1-14; 16, 3 – 19, 2; 31, 17-22.

\textsuperscript{86} Cf. DUNS SCOTUS, Ordinatio, I, 3, 3, 4, 584, ed. C. BALIĆ et al., Opera Omnia, III, pp. 345, 12 – 346, 9.

\textsuperscript{87} Cf. DUNS SCOTUS, Ordinatio, I, 2, 2, 1-4, 320, ed. C. BALIĆ et al., Opera Omnia, II, pp. 317, 14 – 318, 8. «Dico quod Pater formaliter est memoria, intelligentia, et voluntas, secundum Augustinum XV De Trinitate, cap. 7 [n. 22], sive cap. 15 ‘de parvis’; ‘In illa Trinitate quia audeat dicere Patrem nec se ipsum nec Filium nec Spiritum Sanctum intelligere nisi per Filium, per se autem meminisse tantummodo vel Filii vel Spiritus Sanctus?’ - sequitur - ‘quis hoc in illa Trinitate opinari vel affirmare praeumat? Si autem solus ibi Filius intelligat nec Pater et Spiritus Sanctus sint intelligentes, ad illam absurditatem reditur quod Pater non sit sapiens de se sed de Filio’. Haec ille. Intelligit igitur quod Pater formaliter est memoria sibi, intelligentia sibi et voluntas sibi, et in hoc est dissimilitudo inter personas et partes imaginis.
In particular, Scotus denies Henry’s theological opinion that the Father requires the Word for the Father (or any divine person) to have an essential act that Henry calls the ‘second intellectual operation’.

7. Conclusion

I have shown that in *De Trinitate*, XV, 14-16, 23-25, Augustine first considers that the Father’s act of understanding the divine essence is necessary for the generation of the Word, and then backtracks by saying that this act of understanding is not necessary. Afterwards I explained how Aquinas and Henry opt for the first view. However, there are significant differences between their philosophical psychologies such that each gives different reasons for why the Father’s act of understanding the divine essence is necessary for the generation of the Word. By contrast, Scotus opts for the second view and defends it with his own philosophical psychology.

To bring some theological entailments of these three scholastics’ views into focus I showed how each theologian answers the second question: «Does the Father have an act of understanding the divine essence, which is an immanent perfection, intrinsically or by dependence on the generated Word?» Aquinas’s psychological account of the Father’s generation of the Word entails a theologically weak view of the Father’s immanent perfection of understanding the divine essence. In addition, Aquinas’s psychological account seems to conflate the distinction between an essential act, e.g., an intellectual operation, and a notional act, e.g., the intellectual generation of the Word. However, outside the immediate context of discussing divine psychology as applied to the generation of the Word, Aquinas firmly states a theologically strong view of every divine person’s intellectual perfection. Nonetheless, if we focus on the psychological account as such we find some theologically undesirable consequences. On Aquinas’s psychological account as such, if Aquinas were to deny that the Father’s act of understanding is a notional act, then he still needs to give us an account of the generation of the Word. If Aquinas were to deny that in nobis secundum ipsum. Cum igitur dicitur ‘proprius actus intelligentiae est Verbum’, nego, immo de ratione Verbi est quod sit notitia genita». *Duns Scotus, Ordinatio*, I, 3, 3, 4, 570, 599, ed. C. Balic et al., *Opera Omnia*, III, pp. 339, 4-9; 353, 8-22.
the Father's act of understanding is an essential act, then this would entail that only the Father (or at least, not every divine person) has the act of understanding the divine essence; but this entails the theologically illicit view, which Augustine (and Aquinas elsewhere) consistently denies. But if Aquinas maintains that the Father's act of understanding is an essential act and a notional act, then this entails that every divine person understands the divine essence and is productive of the Word. But this cannot be, because only the Father generates the Word, and it is impossible for the Word to be a self-cause. Aquinas seems to beg the question when saying that only the Father's, and not any other divine person's, act of understanding is productive of the Word.

Furthermore, Henry's psychological account entails a theologically strong view with regard to the Father's (and every divine person's) first intellectual operation. But Henry's psychological account also entails an overall mixed view with regard to the second intellectual operation, that is, he has theologically strong view of the Son's immanent perfection, but a theologically weak view of the Father's and Holy Spirit's immanent perfection. Lastly, Scotus's psychological account entails a systematic theologically strong view of every divine person's immanent intellectual perfection.

If we compare these diverse divine psychologies together with the theological opinions entailed by these, we find an interesting theological trajectory. Starting from Aquinas we find a theologically weak view of the Father's immanent intellectual perfection, and with Henry we find an assortment of theologically strong and weak views of immanent intellectual perfections of divine persons on a case-by-case basis, and finally with Duns Scotus we find a systematic theologically strong view of such immanent intellectual perfections. We might characterize this theological trajectory — supported by diverse philosophical psychologies — as one in

88. Given that Aquinas’s psychological account entails theological positions that Aquinas elsewhere rejects, one might doubt how serious Aquinas is committed to his psychological account of the generation of the Word and of the identity and distinction of the divine persons. It would seem that R. Friedman and J. Decorte are right to suppose that Aquinas takes his account of opposed-relations to be explanatorily more basic than the psychological account. See R.L. Friedman, «In principio erat Verbum», pp. 30-40; J. Decorte, «Giles of Rome and Henry of Ghent on the Reality of a Real Relation», in: Documenti e Studi sulla Tradizione Filosofica Medievale 7 (1996), pp. 184-189. One way to see Duns Scotus’s systematic strong view at work might be to see how he considers the Father’s production of creatures. In Duns Scotus, Ordinatio 2, 1, 1, 43, 48, ed. C. Balic
which there are particular functional roles assigned to certain divine persons (as with Aquinas, but only in part with Henry), and later replaced by affirming complete functional equality among the divine persons (as with Henry in part, and entirely with Duns Scotus). However, one scholar has charged Augustinian psychological accounts of a «Trinitarian … functionalism», or what I have called a theologically illicit view:

The Trinitarian doctrine both of Augustine and his Western followers could be characterized as sui generis modalism, or at least, as a functionalism, and it should be defined as a vestige of pre-Nicean tradiology.  

Nevertheless, I have shown that such a charge is false, at least to the extent that Augustine, Thomas Aquinas, Henry of Ghent, and John Duns Scotus affirm a theologically strong or weak view of the divine persons.

By attending to the theological views entailed by their diverse psychological accounts of the Father's intellectual generation of the Word we are in a better position for assessing explanations of the identity and distinction of divine persons. For example, if we wished to reject Aquinas's opposed-relations account of the identity and distinction of the divine persons in favor of his psychological account of the divine persons, then we must be prepared to accept the theological views that his philosophical psychology entails; that is, a theologically weak view of the Father's immanent intellectual perfection of understanding the divine essence, and a significant ambiguity that may suggest a theologically illicit view as regards the Son and Holy Spirit's perfection of understanding the divine essence. However, if we wished to set aside Aquinas's opposed-relations account in favor of a psychological account, and defend a theologically strong (or weak) view of the immanent perfections of every divine person that unambiguously


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excludes the theologically illicit view, then we ought to consider a psychological account that supports such a theological position.91

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