

Incomplete fictions and Imagination

J. Robert G. Williams¹

Draft of 25/10/11

Some things are left *open* by a work of fiction. What colour were the hero's eyes? How many hairs are on her head? Did the hero get shot in the final scene, or did the jailor complete his journey to redemption and shoot into the air? Are the ghosts that appear real, or a delusion? Where fictions are open or *incomplete* in this way, we can ask what attitudes it's appropriate (or permissible) to take to the propositions in question, in engaging with the fiction.

In *Mimesis as Make-Believe* (henceforth, MMB), Walton argues that just as truth norms belief, truth-in-fiction norms imagination. Granting that what is true-in-the-fiction should be imagined, and what is false-in-the-fiction is not to be imagined, there remains the question of what to say within the Waltonian framework about things that are neither true- nor false-in-the-fiction---the loci of incompleteness.

After briefly reviewing Walton's framework (section 1) I outline how incomplete fictions can arise in the framework (section 2). In section 3 I describe two theses on what imaginative attitudes are permissible, in the face of incompleteness. I conjecture that each reaction can be traced to one of two *sources* for incompleteness in the Waltonian framework. Section 4 defends this conjecture against a counterexample. Section 5 identifies a tension in Walton's guiding analogization of fictionality to truth, and identifies two ways of resolving the tension, each of which support the conjecture.

1. Walton's framework

I briefly review Walton's framework for truth-in-fiction and imagination. Walton's basic notion is truth in a *game of make-believe*. In a game where we pretend stumps to be bears, when there is a stump in the bushes, it is *true in the game* that there's a bear in the bushes. Walton explains the *purpose* of introducing the notion of truth-in-a-game thus:

“Belief aims at truth. What is true and only what is true is to be believed. We are not free to believe as we please. ... Imaginings are constrained also; some are proper, appropriate in certain contexts, and others not. Here lies the key to notion of fictional truth. Briefly, a fictional truth consists in there being a prescription or mandate in some context to imagine something. Fictional propositions are propositions that are *to be* imagined---whether or not they are in fact imagined” (MMB p.39).

¹ I'm very grateful for discussion with many people, particularly audiences in Lancaster and Leeds. I'd particularly like to acknowledge discussions with Aaron Meskin and Rich Woodward over several years that shaped my thinking on many points. This work was supported by a British Academy Research Development Award (BARDA: 53286); and was supported by workshops funded by Spanish Government grant FF12008-06153 (MICINN)} .


“Imagining aims at the fictional as belief aims at the true. What is true is to be believed; what is fictional is to be imagined.” (MMB p.41).

Given this conception of the *point* of the concept of fictionality/truth-in-the-game, another question we might ask is what fixes the extension of the “true in game G” (the “game world”). Walton sees a role for *principles of generation* in explaining this. Such principles might be categorical (“let’s pretend that there are space aliens!”) or conditional, connecting features of actual-worldly objects to truths in the game (“where there is a stump, fictionally there is a bear”). The actual-worldly objects featuring in conditional principles of generation Walton calls *props*.

The eventual ambition is to use such notions to shed light on the properties of representational artworks. Specifically, Walton seeks to explain what’s *represented* by an artwork W (“true in work W”) in terms of the underlying notion of truth in a game. He thinks of a *representation* as something “whose function it is to serve as a prop in games of make-believe” (where things have functions, in virtue of intentions of maker, or in virtue of tradition or common practice or convention of using it for the purpose; or being a kind that is normally intended or used for the purpose, etc.). Representational artworks are, inter alia, representations. Crucially, Walton thinks we are able to read off this “function” of an artwork an *endorsement* of certain kinds of games of make-believe featuring the work itself as a prop. Thus, in reading the Sherlock Holmes novels, we’re supposed to play a game in which we imagine Watson having written the words on the page as a report of the events he has seen. We are certainly not *supposed* to play a game in which we imagine Watson to a madman hallucinating a series of adventures. Both of these are *possible* games of make-believe, but only the first is *authorized*--i.e. only the first is one of the games it is the *function* of the Holmes stories to serve in as a prop (cf. MMB p.51).

Truth-in-a-work is then characterized by Walton as the product of truth-in-a-game and the authorization relation, as the common core of any authorized game: “what is fictional [in a work] is fictional in any game in which it is the function [of the work] to serve as a prop, and whose fictionality in such games is generated by [the work] alone” (MMB p.60). The set of things that are true in the work we call the “work world”.

In summary:



But how exactly does the function of the work authorize one game and not another? Games, we said, are characterized by principles of generation. It's natural to think of the authorization relation as working by *endorsing* certain kinds of principles of generation for games (only games generated by those principles will be authorized). As theorists, it'd be nice if we could pin down the kind of principles of generalization that actually are authorized by typical representational artworks. Thus we reach Walton's discussion of the "mechanics of generation" for works of fiction, which aims to describe the generation principles characteristic of representational artworks. One model for this that Walton explores is to say that a work of fiction *directly generates* some *primary truths* (in a novel, this might be those truths that arise from a conditional principle of generation, that whenever S is a sentence of the novel, fictionally the narrator says S). The work also *indirectly generates* some *implied truths*. Indirect generation thus relies on "*principles of implication*". If F are the primary truths), the principles of generation might, for example, take one of the following forms:

Reality:

P is an implied fictional truth if: were F the case, then p.

Mutual belief:

P is implied fictional truth if: it's mutually believed that were F the case, then p.

To emphasize: the principles of generation are the principles characteristic of *games of make-believe* one can play with the work. What relates the principles to the work as such is that games are only *authorized* if their game-world is generated via the relevant principles.

The heart of Walton's account is the normative role that truth-in-a-game bears to imagination, which is then embedded within more detailed theses concerning how works, their functions, and games of make-believe we play with the work are tied together. The "engineering" question about the actually-instantiated mechanics of generation only arises at a further level of detail---and Walton himself is rather sceptical that there'll be any relatively simple and systematic description of the rules in play. Our primary concern here will be with questions that arise at the level of the fundamental structure of the account, though downstream, the engineering side of the project will also provide constraints.

2. Incompleteness.

From the above description, we can see that there are two fundamentally different kinds of incompleteness to consider within Walton's framework. We could look at incompleteness in the works themselves, or in the games we play with them. Let's introduce some terminology:

P is a **gap in game G** iff neither P nor ~P is fictional in G.

P is a **gap in work W** iff neither P nor ~P is fictional in W.

G is **incomplete** if there's a gap in G

W is **incomplete** if there's a gap in W.

Appreciation of this difference allows us to identify two fundamentally different *sources* of incompleteness in a representational artwork; we could trace a gap P in a work either to *multiple competing games that say different things about P*, or to *gappiness in the games themselves*. More terminology:

(i) P is a **pure work gap** for W iff some W-authorized games prescribe P; others prescribe \sim P.

(ii) P is a **pure game gap** for W iff P is a game-gap in every W-authorized game.

Of course, mixtures of the two cases are possible, when P is a gap in some but not all authorized games. I'll set these aside for now.

What kinds of cases of incompleteness might there be to consider? Here's an initial list:

- A. Unspecified details: the number of hairs on Holmes' head; colour of Watson's eyes, etc.
- B. Salient plot-related withholding of information: a novel ending with a shot ringing out; nothing said over whether the guard has shot into the air to let the hero escape; or shot the hero (the guard having battled between duties to his organization and wider moral concerns throughout the novel).
- C. Incompleteness resulting from multiple/secondary readings, or ambiguity: the ghost story vs. delusional readings of *Turn of the Screw*, for example.
- D. Parameterized features. In some paintings it's important that the *viewer themselves* is represented as gazing on a scene. Walton cites this as an example of incompleteness, since there are authorized games where Harry is represented as the viewer of the scene (when Harry is in fact the appreciator), and authorized games where he is not so represented (when Larry is the appreciator).
- E. Silly questions. How did Othello manage to speak in fine verse off the cuff? If someone did this in real life, various far-fetched explanations would have to be looked at. None seems remotely appropriate to the play. Perhaps no explanation of Othello's versification is true-in-the-fiction.

(D is perhaps a questionable case, since *once the context of appreciation* is fixed, no gap remains. Not so in other cases. Note also that while some cases of incompleteness are silly questions in Walton's sense, there may well be silly questions which *aren't* gaps.)

3. Incompleteness and imagination.

Our core question was the following: What attitudes are permissible, and which required, to a proposition which is left *open* by a representational artwork—which is a *gap*? I believe that we should endorse *Pluralism*: that there is no single correct answer to this question. In particular, I think we can find cases that fit each of the following templates:

- a. **Permissivism**: Permissible to imagine P; Permissible to imagine \sim P.
- b. **Quizzicalism**: Requirement to be imaginatively uncertain

For the first kind of case, consider the type-C, “multiple readings” cases of incompleteness. Plausibly, it is permissible to imagine that the lead character sees ghosts, in the Turn of the Screw, and permissible to imagine that she is suffering delusions. On the other hand, such permissivism seems inappropriate in other cases. Consider a detective novel, on which finely balanced evidence is presented throughout; and which leaves open the identity of the murderer at the end. It seems appropriate to imaginatively *speculate* and *wonder* about the identity of the killer, but entirely inappropriate to “jump to the conclusion” that the Butler did it, if what is true-in-the-fiction does not provide sufficient reason for this conclusion. In the detective fiction case it seems that what we’re supposed to do is adopt the imaginative analogue of that attitude that *would* be appropriate if the story had been presented as fact---uncertainty. Something similar can be said about the case raised earlier where it is left open whether the Hero was ultimately shot---it’d be inappropriate to *assume* that he wasn’t, and feel relief; and equally inappropriate to *assume* that he was shot, and feel despair. *Worry* and *fear* seem to be what is called for---emotions that are naturally associated with uncertainty.

So we have to be pluralists, I think. Given commitment to *two* kinds of answers to our core question, the next strongest result we could aim for is the claim that *this is it*---no *other* kind of pattern of imaginative engagement with incompleteness in fiction is called for.

Furthermore, if we can resist stronger pluralism, an elegant diagnosis becomes available. Recall that there were essentially two *sources* for incompleteness in the Walton framework, leading to pure work gaps (on one extreme) and pure game gaps (on the other). Conjecture: different cognitive roles for gaps are explained by differences in their *source*. The imaginative role of pure work gaps is given by permissivism, and the imaginative role of pure game gaps by quizzicalism. (Given this view, mixed cases are handled in the natural way: if W authorizes some game that it gappy with respect to P, and authorizes another on which P is true, then one is permitted either to treat P as to-be-imagined, or treat it as an quizzicalism would require.) Let us call this package of views of the imaginative role of incomplete fictions *the Simple View*.

I think that the Simple View is credible, and it is certainly theoretically attractive. To properly evaluate it, however, one would need detailed case-by-case treatments of a representative variety of incompletenesses. While this is an excellent research project, it’s not something there’s room to pursue here. Instead, I want to examine a problem case for the Simple View,

by way of illustration of the resources it has for dealing with them. And I will examine whether the Simple View can be fitted into the Waltonian theory that we began with.

4. A counterexample to the Simple View?

The defence of the Simple View gets off to a good start by noting that Walton's theory *entails* permissivism for pure work gaps. After all, in that case, we have multiple authorized games that differ over P. Playing a P-prescribing game is permitted (since it's authorized), and likewise playing a P-proscribing game is permitted (it's also authorized). For mixed cases, it similar entails an analogue: one is permitted to react in one of the ways mandated by an authorized game.

If the Simple View fails, it will fail with some game gap that isn't treated quizzically. One case could be if some pure game gap has a permissive imaginative role---the game is incomplete with respect to P, but the norms of engagement with the fiction permit you to imagine that P, or imagine that \sim P. At first pass, it looks like there are such cases.

Consider, for example, the question of Watson's eye-colour. In engaging with the Holmes stories, I might "fill out" the explicit content (especially on "don't care" issues like this)---perhaps in the process of visualizing the scenes that are being described. Suppose that I thereby come to imagine Watson having blue eyes. Have I done anything impermissible? Intuitively, it seems not. Likewise, of course, if I "filled out" the scene with a brown-eyed Watson.

This is a problem for the Simple View only if we also say that Watson's eye-colour is a game gap. An alternative would be to say that the Holmes stories authorize two games: one in which it's true that Watson has brown eyes, one on which he has blue eyes. I think it would be contentious to try to defend the view this way. For we would then be committed to explaining what these authorized games were that respectively *mandated* the blue and brown eyed versions of the Holmes stories. What principles of generation would characterize those distinct games? In particular, what principle of generalization characterizes the first game, in virtue of which that game features Watson with blue eyes? It doesn't seem to get in there in virtue of being directly represented by what's written in the stories; and it doesn't seem to get there by counterfactual extension of those directly represented truths (and of course, if it did get in this way, we'd be in even more trouble explaining how the content of the second game was generated). Furthermore, we have to walk a fine-line, since if we're too liberal in what counts as an authorized game, we will get paradigm cases wrong. Permissivism is the wrong description of game-gaps like the (undisclosed) identity of the criminal in detective fiction. So if we said it was the right description of a case like Watson's eye-colour, we'd have to explain wherein the difference consists. Someone wishing to posit multiple *authorized* games here undertakes a host of explanatory tasks.

I don't want to insist that this strategy is forlorn. Walton himself, rather sceptical about identifying neat principles of generation, might not regard as illegitimate the positing of an authorized game world containing propositions which *are not* explicable by a more general rule. But it would be nice to have a defense of the Simple View that didn't rely so heavily on pessimism over prospects for articulating the mechanics of generation. And I think one is available.

The strategy I favour is to deny (against initial appearances) that imagining *that Watson has blue eyes* is a permissible way to engage with the Holmes stories. But then what should one say about the case described earlier, where it seemed perfectly ok to fill in such details?

One strategy is to distinguish between *visual* imaginings and *cognitive* imaginings. Walton's theory deals in the first instance with the latter. So perhaps there's nothing wrong, so far as his theory goes, with *visualizing* Watson as blue-eyed---but one shouldn't *endorse* those visualizations even in imagination.

This may be right, but I'm a little nervous about the idea that one might visually imagine a scene, of which *p* is clearly a feature, and still count as not imaginatively accepting *p* in any sense. Clearly there's a lot to be said about the relation between visual and cognitive imaginings, but I don't think we should bet the house on them being as cleanly separable as this response would need.

Better, I think, to distinguish *within* the cognitive imaginings. Consider the analogy to acceptance states more generally. In engagement with the world, I sometimes *accept* things as a true representation of the way things are. I see a box on the table, and come to *accept* that there's a box on the table. It would be wrong (given my evidence) to accept in the same sense that there's a cat in the box---I'm just not in a position to take a stance on that issue. Nevertheless, I might accept *suppositionally* or *for the sake of argument* that there's a cat in the box---in order to work out a contingency plan if the putative cat in the box attacks. So while we accept both that there's a box on the table and that there's a cat on the box, the first is a belief-type acceptance and the second is a supposition-type acceptance; and these have clearly very different roles in our cognitive lives.

If (as e.g. Meskin and Weinberg (2006) argue) we should think of imagination as an "off-line" analogue to belief, it would be no surprise if it came along accompanied with off-line analogues of surrounding attitude types. If we use "imagination" as a general term for offline acceptance-states, we expect to find belief-like ones, and supposition-like ones. If these arise in the course of engaging with a fiction, I'll call them *fictive belief* and *fictive supposition* respectively.

I think we've good reason to think that these are important to our engagement with fiction. Consider the best case for an quizzical-type game gap. In the course of a detective fiction, part of the point is to try to work out who did the murder. And to play along, we need to replicate patterns of thought familiar from real life cases---we suppose that the Butler did it,

consider what would be appropriate to believe-under-that-supposition, note this clashes with previous commitments, so come to endorse the claim that that the Butler wasn't the Murderer. Alternatively, perhaps under the supposition that the Butler did it, we'd end up believing that the Gardener must have helped him. So we end up believing the conditional: if the Butler did it, the Gardener helped. In the real-world case, the talk of beliefs and suppositions can be taken at face value. But to go through the analogous reasoning *when engaging with the fiction*, it's not that we're really *believing* the claims we end up "endorsing"---we're *fictively believing* them. And we need *another* imaginative state that functionally relates to fictive belief as supposition does with genuine belief---this is our fictive supposition.

Turning back to the case of blue-eyed Watson, I suggest that insofar as we imagine him to be blue-eyed, we can think of this as something we're merely fictively supposing, rather than fictively believing. A couple of things make this suggestion non-ad-hoc. First, analogous "filling out" phenomena arise when cognitively engaging with factual reports. If I am reading about the exploits of an actual detective, I might visualize those exploits, including (say) his blue eyes. But it's natural if challenged to say that I was merely *supposing* that to be the case (since it didn't matter anyway)---rather than (absurdly) *coming to believe* that his eyes were that colour. Second, some of the characteristic functional role of fictive belief doesn't seem present in the case of blue eye colour. Fictive belief of course doesn't have the connections to perception and action that real belief has (we don't jump from our chairs and run out when we imagine the monster rising from the dead in a horror film). But arguably the functional connections to emotion remain---it is central to the "paradox of horror" that we do, apparently, feel fear in response to an imagined monster (cf. Meskin and Weinberg, op cit). If we fictively believed that Watson had blue eyes, we should be disposed to feel *despair for Watson* on learning that (fictionally) all blue-eyed people staying in his inn had been killed. But we are not so disposed. The idea that we're merely fictively supposing the blue eyes explains this nicely.

Fictive supposition can go a long way to explaining away appearances of permissivism-style reactions to game gaps, I think. So the Simple View is still a runner. Rather than considering further the encyclopedic project of looking through cases of game-gaps on a case-by-case basis to see if similar things can be said, I want to turn to more theoretical issues, about the fit (or lack of it) between the Simple View and Walton's framework.

5. Quizzical imaginative role and game-incompleteness.

Does the Waltonian framework play nicely with the Simple View. We've already seen it plays very nicely with one half of it: it predicts permissivism for pure work gaps. But what about game gaps? First, are quizzical-style gaps predicted by the Waltonian framework? Second, are they at least consistent with it? The latter question has interest beyond the Simple View itself. For if we had a strongly pluralistic view, on which there are varying imaginative norms

for game gaps, then still the quizzical response is *sometimes* what is required---so any framework that doesn't at least allow for it is objectionable.

My answer to these questions is rather involved. I think that there's a good case that *as it stands* Walton's framework is inconsistent with the quizzical-style norms for game-gaps. It needs to be changed in order to even make room for the coherence of an quizzical style response. But the only ways I see to make all the tweaks necessary to remove the tension, end up making us *predict* the quizzical response to *all* cases of game gaps.

The tension I see is the following. Walton's overarching analogy is that fiction stands to imagination (relative to engagement with a given game of make-believe) as truth stands to belief. Pursuing this analogy, propositions that are neither true nor false in the game should stand to imagination as propositions that are neither true nor false *simpliciter* stand to belief.

But it doesn't seem *in general* that a doxastic "quizzical" response (e.g. one of uncertainty, or partial belief) is what is called for when faced with a truth value gap. Think of cases of presupposition failure, for example. Uncertainty or half-confidence is a poor description of the appropriate attitude to "the King of France is (not) bald" for example.

Perhaps other putative cases of truth-value gaps might provide a better analogy. Some suggest (cf. Thomason 1970)) that future contingents are neither true nor false (a view that might date back to Aristotle). Future contingents are paradigmatic cases where partial belief and uncertainty seem appropriate. The trouble is that it seems *a problem* for accounts of the open future such as these that they allow us to be uncertain about P when we know P to be untrue---it's a bug, not a feature of the account! I don't think we find here any way of *resolving* the prima facie tension between uncertainty and truth value gaps; just a second case where it'd be nice to have a way of resolving the tension.

If truth value gaps and quizzical/uncertainty type reactions fit badly together, then Walton's analogy between fictionality and truth looks in trouble. I think we should modify Walton's setting to remove the tension. I suggest two tweaks below: the first preserves Walton's guiding analogy, but *eliminates* game gaps altogether, in favour of *game-indeterminacies*. And the second preserves game gaps, but drops the guiding analogy.

A. Game indeterminacies vs. game gaps. How might Walton respond to the tension identified above? One option is to deny it arises: to deny there are game-gaps at all. Perhaps every game is *complete*, in that every proposition is either fictional in the game, or its negation is. Putative cases of incompleteness (as in the detective fictions, or the question over eye-colours, number of hair, etc) are to be given a different treatment: it is said to be *indeterminate* whether or not, in the fiction, Watson has blue eyes. Game *gaps* are replaced with game *indeterminacies* (these are distinct concepts: if it's indeterminate whether p is true in some game, it certainly doesn't follow that it *is not true* in the game, as would be required by game gaps).

This is something that we might *independently predict* on some ways of articulating the mechanics of generation. Walton's "reality principle", for example, fixes the extension of fictionality via a counterfactual conditional. It is true in the fiction that P iff were F to be the case, then P (where F lists the primary fictional truths).

What seems like data is that we shouldn't classify the conditional "Were the Holmes stories true, then Watson would have blue eyes" as *clearly true*. But that's not to say that we should classify it as clearly false. In the literature on conditionals, two lines of thought on such cases have emerged. David Lewis argues that such conditionals are false---and so have true negations. On a Lewisian picture, then, the reality principle gives us game gaps. But Robert Stalnaker argues, against Lewis, that such conditionals are *indeterminate*---there's no fact of the matter whether they hold or not (Stalnaker is able to preserve various attractive features of conditional logic by this maneuver). If so, then the (determinate truth of) the reality principle would tell us that in this case it's indeterminate whether it's true in the fiction that Holmes has blue eyes. So the Stalnakerian view on counterfactuals---something developed and motivated quite independently of the current setting---eliminates game gaps.

Now, I think there's *some* theoretical settings in which this would be a useful tweak. Suppose one was an *epistemicist* about indeterminacy: one thinks that when P is indeterminate, there's a fact of the matter about whether P or rather $\sim P$ is the case, but that we're (necessarily) ignorant of which way it goes (cf. Williamson 1994). If the relevant (complete) "game world" is picked by epistemicist-style indeterminate conditionals, then there will be a fact of the matter which such world is the world of the fiction---but the epistemicist indeterminacy means many aspects of that world will be forever beyond our ken. Just as uncertainty is the appropriate reaction to cases of ignorance of this kind in the case of genuine belief, imaginative uncertainty seems entirely appropriate in response to ignorance of identity of the putatively complete game world.

Epistemicism and game indeterminacies, rather than game-gaps, would form an elegant package, *predicting* the quizzical-style response. The Simple View would be vindicated! But one has to buy into epistemicism to get this package, and many find that a step too far.

Might non-epistemicist views of indeterminacy be appealed to at this point, if married to game-indeterminacies? Again, an encyclopedic project beckons, on which we canvass all possible theories of indeterminacy to see what they'd predict here (a difficulty being that accounts of indeterminacy are often somewhat inexplicit about the cognitive role of the notion). But a reason for pessimism on this front is that one source of *dissatisfaction* with epistemicism as a treatment of indeterminacy in general is that paradigmatic indeterminacies---like borderline cases of vague predicates---do not seem to have an uncertainty-like cognitive role. We don't think that the cut-off of "red" *might* lie between two indiscriminable colours--but surely we would endorse this epistemic modal if ignorance were our model. Learning that something is indeterminate is supposed to be inquiry-ending. Learning about our ignorance is not. It seems inappropriate to hope or fear that P, when we're

well aware that there's no fact of the matter as to whether P. The epistemicist is committed to a kind of revisionism here. Exactly the factors that make epistemicism elegant as a theory of fictive attitudes make it problematic as an account of (say) borderline cases. But the flipside of this is that any account of indeterminacy that cleaves to the apparent data provided by borderline cases will struggle to be consistent with (fictive) uncertainty as a reaction to putative indeterminacy in what's fictional.

Epistemicism would predict the Simple View. I doubt that non-epistemicist treatments of indeterminacy will predict it---indeed, there seems reason to think that they will be inconsistent with it. But as emphasized earlier, fictive uncertainty does seem the right reaction to these phenomena in *some* cases---so appeal to non-epistemicist game-indeterminacy leaves us with the original puzzle for the Walton framework as a whole as yet unresolved.²

B. Changing Walton's analogy Suppose we had Walton's *framework* of work and game gaps, but hadn't yet committed ourselves to the normative role of fictionality. How might we characterize this role in the light of quizzical responses to game-gaps?

One idea is that knowledge of truth-in-fiction plays an *evidential* role analogous to knowledge of facts. Consider the following picture of the evidential role of knowledge, drawn from Williamson 2001. The *degree of evidential support* for a proposition P, for a person at a time, is the probability of P *conditional on the evidence that person has at that time*. Williamson identifies a person's evidence with what they know. So the evidential probability for x at t is the probability of P *given* what x knows at t. (Note the appeal to hypothetical prior probabilities on which to conditionalize).

Now, consider the probability obtained via conditionalizing (via exactly the same hypothetical priors) on what is *true in the fiction*. Things that are true in the fiction get probability 1, on the posterior measure. Things that are false get probability 0. That Holmes eyes are blue, and other cases of incompleteness, get intermediate probabilities. Call these the fictive evidential probabilities.

It is plausible, in the original setting, that one's degree of belief in a proposition should match the relevant evidential probability---one should fit one's beliefs to the evidence. And the analogy this suggests is that fictive degrees of belief should fit the fictive evidence. This sort

² There is one way of treating the cognitive role of indeterminacy that would be compatible with differential treatment of borderline cases and game-indeterminacies---if the characteristic cognitive role of indeterminacy were itself a pluralistic one. In the special case of ungrounded sentences, Maudlin develops such a view, and I've argued elsewhere there are reasons for liking it as a general account of indeterminacy. This view would interact interestingly with the game-indeterminacies maneuver---it would at least hold out the prospect of a more fine-grained pluralism even within game-indeterminacies, contra to the Simple View (whether this is a realistic prospect depends on many fine-grained details, such as the proper treatment within this account of indeterminate conditionals). But I have no room here to fully explore the interesting direction.

of normative role would predict, in a rather fine-grained way, an quizzical-type response to such cases of incompleteness.

It would be misleading to summarize this by an analogy between truth-in-fiction and truth *simpliciter*, as in Walton's original treatment. For game gaps are *not* treated like truth value gaps, but rather as cases of *evidential gaps*---cases of *ignorance*, if we adopt Williamson's model. It's not so clear that there's a nice slogan that captures this. Perhaps the best we can achieve is to embed Walton's analogy under epistemic operators: rather than fictionality being analogous to truth, *known* fictionality is analogous to *known* truth.

Either epistemicist game-indeterminacy or the remoulding of Waltonian norms would suffice to defuse the tension identified above. Both involve giving up something in the original picture: either abandoning game-gaps or altering the norms. But note also that once we've made the change, there's no room left for allowing entirely *different* styles responses to game gaps (or game indeterminacies) – on either model, a *quizzical* reaction to a *game* gap would be mandatory. We've not yet seen any way to make a principled alteration to the framework that allows evidential uncertainty without enforcing them.

Conclusion.

Within a Waltonian framework, incompleteness in fiction has two distinct sources: a shortfall in the principles of generation that characterize what's true and false in individual games; or an overabundance of games that stand in the authorization relation to a given work. The Simple View says that the appropriate imaginative response to incompleteness in fiction similarly falls into two kinds. When we have incompleteness because of multiple games, we are *permitted* to respond to the gap in question in whichever way suits us. But where we have incompleteness due to (apparent) game gaps, the characteristic response is one of uncertainty (if you like: fitting degrees of fictive belief to the fictive evidence). In the last two sections, I defended this conjecture. In particular, I've argue that although we might *think* that there are cases of permissive gaps that aren't of the work-gap kind, a closer inspection of the attitudes in question will reveal these we are not genuinely permitted discretion in fictive belief in these cases. I've also argued that Walton's guiding analogy (of fictionality to truth) is in tension, not just with my conjecture, but to what seems the undeniable fact that in *some* cases of incompleteness in fiction, fictive uncertainty is appropriate. I've outlined two ways of reconciling the coherence of a quizzical response with game gaps, both of which "universalise"---give motivation for thinking that evidential responses are *always* the appropriate response to game gaps.

Bibliography.

Lewis, DK: 1983 "Truth in fiction" in *Philosophical Papers vol 1*. OUP, Oxford.

Maudlin, T: 2003 "Truth and paradox" OUP, Oxford.

Stalnaker, R: 1980 "A defense of conditional excluded middle," in *Ifs: Conditionals, Belief, Decision, Chance and Time*, ed. Harper, Stalnaker, and Pearce (The Netherlands: Kluwer Academic Publishers, 1980).

Thomason, 1970 "Indeterminist time and truth value gaps", *Theoria*, 1970.

Walton, K. 1990 *Mimesis as Make-Believe* Harvard University Press, Cambridge: MA.

Weinberg, J. and Meskin, A. 2006 "Puzzling over the imagination: philosophical problems, architectural solutions". In *The Architecture of the Imagination: New Essays on Pretence, Possibility and Fiction*. ed. Nichols, S. OUP, Oxford.

Williamson, T. 1994 *Vagueness*. Routledge, London.

Williamson, T. 2001 *Knowledge and its limits*. Routledge, London.