God’s more particular and more general work in the world.

None of these wonderings should detract from the seminal nature of Carpenter’s work. Her emphasis on the importance of intra-human and divine-human affective relationships in moral formation and sanctification provides an important foundational structure to discussions of sanctification. Carpenter’s methodologically careful, insightful, and thought-provoking work will surely be a voice of continuing importance in ongoing discussions of sanctification within theology and in the needed intra-disciplinary dialogue between theology and the social sciences.

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PHILOSOPHY


In All Things Wise and Wonderful, E. Janet Warren develops a multidisciplinary, Christian understanding of causation with the hope that it will help us “to respond with integrity and compassion for those who suffer” (p. 182). Warren is not short on familiar examples of uncompassionate responses to suffering: “God caused the pandemic to teach us to be kind” (p. 127), “Everything happens for a reason” (p. 180), and “This tragedy happened to grow your faith” (p. 22). Warren argues that these symptoms point toward a common diagnosis: a false, “omni-causal” view of God, according to which God “causes everything that happens, including pandemics” (p. 31).

Chapter 1: Introduction lays the groundwork for the rest of the book in two ways: first, by giving a complex taxonomy of philosophical distinctions bearing on causation; second, by introducing (as Warren argues) the problematic practice of too easily explaining an event as the result of God’s direct causal intervention (e.g., God provided a parking spot!) when mundane explanations suffice. The tension between the complexity of causation and the human tendency to gravitate toward simplistic (divine) explanations becomes the book’s recurring theme. In chapter 2, Warren surveys biblical claims about causation, concluding that the Bible “does not give a simple account of causation,” (p. 45) and encouraging the reader to “accept ambiguity and complexity” (p. 36) in the text rather than demanding a coherent biblical theory.

The third chapter, “What Does Christian Theology Say about Causation?” is the clear standout and would make a provocative discussion-piece for an undergraduate class on divine providence in a science and religion course. Warren contrasts two pictures of God, one in which God is an omni-causal, omni-controlling dictator of a deterministic world (pp. 57, 77) and another in which God is a servant king who relinquishes the option to utilize God’s power in order to preserve space for indeterministic, creaturely freedom (pp. 53, 58). The strokes are intentionally broad, nudging the reader to see the potential ethical pitfalls of positing an omni-causal God. In particular, Warren worries that an omni-causal God would not be capable of being lovingly responsive to creaturely agents (p. 57).

In Warren’s preferred picture, God builds a world that can host longstanding causal patterns without repeated divine intervention; once created, the world is, in some sense “self-causing” (p. 35) and does not require any special act of divine conservation. Although God does act in the world, God refrains from fully exercising his power to control in order to respect “the freedom he has granted to humans and the created order” (p. 60).

The contrasting portraits, however vivid, also preempt discussion of various middle views—one might distinguish between an omni-causing and omni-controlling God, for instance. Warren is also stronger on critique than on the details of her own positive proposal—perhaps by design. “The language of metaphor and analogies is more accessible,” Warren writes, “than the language of philosophy or science” (p. 68). This is faithful to her refrain that real-world causal networks are messy and not easily wrapped in neat theological packaging, but it may prove frustrating to those readers eager to engage the details of a constructive project.

In chapter 4, Warren gives the reader a crash course in statistical concepts that are useful for understanding causation, quickly covering (for instance) base
rates, regression to the mean, and the law of large numbers. Genuine chance is not incompatible with a kind of sovereignty, Warren argues; rather, God “created randomness” (p. 90) and is capable of guiding overarching events through it while fostering the vulnerability, excitement, and intellectual humility that comes with real chanciness. Chapter 5 asks what science says about causation. Notable—both for the audience it will attract and exclude—is Warren’s commitment to take divine healings, demonic activity, and parapsychology seriously while also summarizing key concepts from quantum theory and medicinal practice.

In chapter 6, Warren turns to psychological explanations of why we jump to simple causal explanations. Drawing liberally from Kahneman, Warren introduces dual processing theory, distinguishing between our quick, automatic system 1 judgments and our reflective, deliberate system 2 judgments. Citing Barrett’s hypersensitive agency detection device and Taleb’s narrative fallacy, among other mechanisms, Warren suggests that causal explanations that invoke a narrative about God’s intentions are often psychologically easy for us to jump to (via system 1). A reflective Christian should, Warren argues, be aware of this tendency and moderate our confidence in unreflective judgments about divine intervention in ordinary events.

Chapter 7 and the conclusion that follows take a pastoral turn and will be of special interest to church study groups. Alongside giving practical recommendations for exercising discernment, Warren concludes that “by better understanding the nature of causation and the nature of God’s interaction with our wise and wonderful world, we can better evaluate how and why things happen, without glibly assuming God causes everything” (p. 177).

While the breadth of Warren’s book is impressive, any interdisciplinary book is liable to engage more fully with some disciplines than others. It is no surprise that Warren’s book is strongest when drawing on her expertise in medicine and theology and less so when discussing philosophy.

One philosophical concern for Warren’s argument against an omni-causal God is the possibility of causation from nonaction. Some philosophers think that absences cause: My not watering the plant causes it to die; my not calling on his birthday causes Dad to be sad. In each of these cases, there is something I could have easily done that would have prevented the effect. But if absences cause, then there is a serious challenge for Warren’s view. A powerful and wise (even if not classically omniscient) God can easily prevent most events from happening. God could easily have prevented me from getting that last parking spot or my friend from being infected with a virus. Perhaps, then, God’s not preventing these events should number among their causes (or at least their explanations).

This need not be a criticism of the overall theological picture Warren develops—one in which God does not intend or directly intervene to prevent the normal operation of the world except (usually) for explicitly theological reasons. Rather, I suggest that how much leverage can be gained by critiquing the concept of an omni-causal God depends on substantive philosophical commitments about the nature of causation and how causation relates to other philosophical concepts such as explanation and responsibility. Perhaps a God as powerful and involved as traditional Christian theology posits can’t help but be in close causal contact with the world—a God whose interventions, however sparingly placed, ripple far throughout the created world, either by preventing or by failing to prevent events that are well within God’s power to stop. If so, then “God didn’t cause that” may not often be strictly true. Even if God didn’t specially intervene with the purpose of bringing the event about, saying “God didn’t intend that,” “God didn’t plan that,” or “God didn’t want that” may be more honest. Retaining God’s action or inaction as causes of mundane events—while complicating the story about divine intent and providence—may also allow us to vindicate the biblical practice of prayerful complaint against God’s (in)action (with Job and
the psalmist) as a therapeutically important and theologically understandable response to suffering while simultaneously allowing us to join Warren’s critique of “comforting” clichés about God’s specific purposes for particular harms.

But these are concerns about tactics within the context of a shared goal to enrich and complexify Christian understandings of causation. At its best, Warren’s work therapeutically nudges the reader toward a healthy skepticism of over-easy ascriptions of God’s direct causal intervention in the world. And this amidst an ambitious, interdisciplinary conceptual toolkit that weaves accessibly through theology, philosophy, statistics, psychology, and the sciences more broadly.

Notes

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Elaine Howard Ecklund is a professor of sociology, the Herbert Autrey Chair in Social Sciences at Rice University, and the founder of Rice’s Religion and Public Life Program. She is well known for her studies of the intersection of science and spirituality, having published books on how scientists view religion (Science vs. Religion, Oxford University Press 2010, and Secularity and Science, Oxford University Press, 2019) and how religious people view science (Religion vs. Science, Oxford University Press 2017). In 2018 she delivered the Gifford Lectures at the University of Edinburgh on this topic. Her research takes advantage of a mixed methods approach, combining quantitative analysis of large-scale survey data and qualitative analyses of in-depth structured interviews. These scholarly studies have yielded interesting observations and paint a more complex and nuanced picture of this area than the caricature of irreconcilable conflict often suggested by the general media.

Why Science and Faith Need Each Other: Eight Shared Values That Move Us beyond Fear is Ecklund’s first book in this area directed toward a lay audience. It is an engaging book that integrates her research and that of others, as well as personal anecdotes and stories, to illustrate her main points. It is designed not only for individual reading, but also for discussion in small groups, as each chapter finishes with suggested questions for further discussion. Although oriented toward a lay audience, it is carefully referenced for readers who are interested in delving into the primary sources. While not explicitly stated, the book appears directed, in particular, to evangelical Protestants who are more likely than other Christians to have difficulties integrating science and faith in their worldviews. This is consistent with much of the data cited in the book in which evangelical Protestants are often more likely than mainline Protestants and Catholics to hold skeptical views regarding certain aspects of science. It is also consistent with the funding support for this book—a Templeton Religion Trust grant for a project entitled Reaching Evangelical American Leaders to Change Hearts and Minds.

The main thesis of the book is that science and faith share eight common values; an awareness of these commonalities can provide a meeting point where people of faith and scientists can come to better understand each other and thereby decrease fear and suspicion toward each other. These values are curiosity, doubt, humility, creativity, healing, awe, shalom, and gratitude, with a chapter devoted to each of these values. The first four values relate to what Ecklund calls “process” — values which speak to how scientists carry out their work and how people of