STOPPISM: RETROSPECTS AND PROSPECTS*

The simplest approach to understanding stoppism is through the answer it gives to that vexed but compulsory philosophical question, "Why are there locals but also expresses?" I am not here concerned with the local/express distinction. I hold that distinction to be exclusive but not exhaustive with respect to trains, and both exclusive and exhaustive with respect to stops.[1] But nothing I defend depends on those views, or on anything beyond the banal claim that the local/express distinction applies first of all to either trains or stops and only later, and in virtue of this prior application, to anything else. Uses such as "express platform" and "local track" undoubtedly occur; any account of the local/express distinction must permit them. But no one seriously contends that these uses are basic, and that local and express trains and stops are to be explained in terms of local or express tracks or platforms.

Thus there are only three serious answers to the vexed but compulsory question: that there are local and express trains because there are local and express stops; or, that there are local and express stops because there are local and express trains; or, that there are local and express trains and stops because of something else altogether. The first is the answer of the stoppists; those giving the second answer are nowadays usually called train-realists. There is no helpful, general term for "Views of the Third Kind," as they are sometimes called. They come in bewildering variety. Loosely, they can be grouped in two: either they appeal to something "outside the subway," in which case we stray out of philosophy and into the realms of magic or religion; or they try to account for the existence of local and express trains and stops entirely on the basis of reality "inside the subway." Views of this last kind are commonly known as "naturalist," though this term borders on, and very often trespasses into, sheer vacuity.

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[1] An anonymous reviewer notes: "There are trains that are neither expresses nor locals and which halt quite haphazardly (for example, the flat-bed trains that carry garbage, or materials to be used in track work, and those mysterious yellow-and-black trains you sometimes see in the wee hours of the morning)." To these we might add Shuttles, "test trains" and other trains not in service, trains leaving from their last stop, and so on. It is in general harder for stoppists than for train-realists to account for such trains, but it is in general harder for train-realists than for stoppists to account for locals and expresses.

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I do not count coincidentalism among the serious answers: to the extent that it is serious it is no answer, and to the extent that it is an answer it is not serious. Coincidentalism holds that trains and stops are independent, the account of the one, whatever it may be, having no connection with the account of the other. The coordination between stops and trains is therefore the sheerest accident. That trains stop at stops is happenstance. Anyone believing this is not to be argued with but pitied.

I. RETROSPECTS

Stoppism is hardly found among the sensible ancients. In the main, this was because there was then no good understanding of why trains stop between stops. Stoppists give metaphysical priority to stops over trains. Stops are the ends of trips, trains a mere means to those ends: "The train goes to the stop; the stop does not come to the train." Stoppism at its purest asserts a strict identity between *a stopped train* and *a train at a stop*; these are not two things but one. Absent some explanation of why trains stop between stops, stoppism is no more than an elegant theory that might have been true, if only reality had been vastly different. The majority of ancient thinkers, then, were either train-realists, attributing stops to the train both at and between stops, or else were theologians or mystics.

Nevertheless, some brilliant and wild minds, the most famous from around Canarsie, were drawn to stoppism, and they necessarily adopted radical measures to save the theory from the phenomena. Some gave up on the phenomena altogether: they denied that trains ever stopped between stops. What appears as a dead stop in a tunnel is merely extremely (in some writers, infinitely) slow forward motion. The best arguments in support of this view were, however, arguments against the possibility of motionlessness *tout court*. Only the most flexible or flabby of thinkers could contemplate stoppism with no stopping either at or between stops. The principal legacy of this early blunder is the "Van Siclen paradoxes"—puzzles about motionlessness familiar to many from their regular use in bewildering beginning students of philosophy.

Other ancient stoppists distinguished stops proper from bare "halts"—episodes of motionlessness not at a stop. The simplest accounts relied on door-opening to discriminate real from merely apparent stops; on this view, it is a *facon de parler* to say that the train is stopped unless the doors are open (or opening, or closing). But everyone knows that doors sometimes reopen: shall we say that between closing and reopening the train is not at the stop? Where is it then? Doors have been known to remain closed for long periods while at a stop—but this is not a possibility that can be admitted if *being at a stop* means *being stopped with the doors open*. Finally, and most disturbingly, doors

are occasionally reported to have opened between stops. Whether this has happened or not, it is conceivable that it might happen; the danger that it might is usually taken to explain the prohibition on leaning on the doors. So we cannot identify being at a stop with being stopped with the doors open.

Besides doors, appeal was made to signals and—as so often in ancient thought—numbers. All sorts of trivially distinct criteria were tried out. None addressed the fundamental problem, which was how to account for "stops between stops" without giving up the internal connection between "being stopped" and "being at a stop." How to account for motionlessness not at a stop entirely in terms of motion towards a stop and motionlessness at a stop? No one in the ancient world had any good idea how to do this, and the bad ideas were largely inhospitable to stoppism. Thus Livonia views all natural motion as motion towards a stop and so distinguishes *natural motionlessness* at a stop from *violent motionlessness* anywhere else. The train really is motionless between stops, but this motionlessness is of a different character from the natural motionlessness of a train when at a stop. Violent motionlessness requires a force continually acting to prevent the natural motion of the train towards its next stop (and so is not to be identified with the brake, which even the ancients knew was involved only in slowing and stopping a train but not in its then remaining stopped). Something like this distinction seems to have been taken for granted by many others in antiquity, and the account of natural motion on which it rests has a certain commonsense charm. Livonia herself thought of motion towards a stop as an act belonging to the train, which seeks its proper place at its next stop, rather than an act belonging to the stop, drawing the train towards it by some sort of attraction—magnetic, perhaps, or romantic. She was a train-realist rather than a stoppist. Stoppists attribute the source of motion to the stop rather than to the train: the train stops moving towards its next stop only when that stop ceases to attract it; that does not happen until the train is actually at the stop attracting it—its "next stop"; once the train is at that stop it is immediately attracted to the next stop, for once the train is at a stop, that stop is no longer its next stop and so no longer attracts it. But how can a stop exert an arresting influence on a train that is moving naturally towards it, so that it is stopped between stops? This problem—the problem of "arrest at a distance"—has no truly satisfactory solution until early modern times.

Junius, the most mysterious of the ancient stoppists, claimed that trains stopped at past stops as well as present. Later research has confirmed the existence of several defunct stations, but Junius arrived at his conclusions on purely mathematical grounds, all having to do with the special properties of numbers and sets of numbers. His life

was devoted to numerology. To him we owe many fundamental theorems concerning station numbering. But in this case numbers misled him. To explain all stops as stops at past or present stops requires a vast number of past stops, for which there is simply no evidence. Some of Junius's followers, though not as far as we know Junius himself, went further, suggesting that trains stopped at all stops past, present, and future; this neatly sidestepped the problem of lack of evidence, but the idea has nothing else to recommend it.

Though outlandish, these measures reflected deep and abiding metaphysical prejudices in favor of motionlessness over motion and were driven by the intuition that trains serve stops rather than the other way round. Part common sense, part mystery, part logic-chopping, ancient stoppism remains an object of fascination both for historians of philosophy and for contemporary stoppists in search of intellectual forerunners. Nor are the metaphysical prejudices undergirding stoppism entirely overcome, for though no one would now give the medal to stops over trains simply on the grounds that stops do not move but trains do, trips begin and end at stops, even if most of the trip is spent on the train. Stops are where we enter and exit; the train is how we get from wherever we enter to wherever we exit. These undeniable and ordinary facts underlie contemporary stoppism and give it much of the appeal it undeniably has; we can suppose that many ancient stoppists, wild-minded though they may have been, saw an equivalent appeal, if less clearly.

Train-realism was the dominant school in classical and late antiquity. It is traditionally associated with Manhattan, though there were train-realists in all (known) boroughs in ancient times. If forced to distinguish among them, I would point to a divide between the mathematically inspired train-realists of the Bowling Green schools on the one hand, and the vitalist and organic train-realists of Broadway/Nassau on the other. This in turn correlates, at least roughly, with another divide between hierarchical explanations in which the more rational is the more real, the less rational the less real—trains are more rational and so more real than stops, so there are stops because there are trains—and a flatter model in which the direction of explanation is teleological—the stops are for the trains, not the trains for the stops—but the explanans and explanandum nevertheless exist on the same ontological level. Whether trains were conceived as ensouled beings intelligently navigating a system modeled, if imperfectly, after an ideal and eternal archetype, or else taken to be natural creatures whose purposes were built into them from the beginning, still there was agreement that it was only because there were trains that there were stops; that is the central train-realist claim. Against

that claim the ancient stoppists reacted violently; finding no midpoint, they came to rest at the opposite extreme, insisting that it is only because there are stops that there are trains. The earliest substantial philosophical writings that have come down to us give us glimpses of this dispute, and it then becomes a reliable source of disagreement amongst the ancient philosophical schools.

Ancient sacred writers cared little for this priority dispute between stops and trains, stoppists and train-realists. The subway is the creation of a powerful, wise, and loving being. Trains and stops exist for each other. More importantly, they exist for us, the riders, so that we can get from the stop where we enter to the stop where we exit. These theological views embody a strange tension. In them, everything centers on us, the riders. We are what the system is for. Yet everything of real value is located "outside the subway," in a realm that we supposedly inhabit before we enter and after we exit but about which nothing can be known through the exact or natural sciences, or through natural philosophy construed however broadly.

Stoppism, a minority view in ancient times, disappears in late antiquity. We know the name of not a single stoppist between Nostrand and Bergen, a gap of almost a thousand years. The story of its revival in the early modern period is well known. With technological advances in timekeeping, and thanks to the genius of Carroll in exploiting that technology, train schedules were established. With these it became possible to give a convincing explanation of stops between stops: trains stop between stops only because trains ahead are stopped at stops, and so all stops can be understood as deriving ultimately from stops at stops, even if they happen between stops.[2] Whenever a train is stopped between stops, there is up ahead of it another stopped train. That train is itself either stopped at a stop, in which case the explanatory chain comes to an end in a stop at a stop, or it is stopped because there is, up ahead of it, another stopped train that is itself stopped at a stop, so we again reach the end of explanation, or it is stopped between stops—and so on. This view is now so natural to us that we find it hard to imagine how anyone ever thought otherwise.[3]

[2] Some stops between stops (and even some stops at stops) are attributable to other factors: signal problems, track fires, "an earlier incident." Here I give the core of the modern, scientific view of the subway, one that furnishes us with a background of regularities against which it is possible to distinguish anomalies of the sorts mentioned. Stops at stops are, other than in bizarre cases, normal stops. So are stops between stops that result from there being, up ahead, a train at a stop. It is our understanding of the normal stops that I am discussing here.

[3] An anonymous reviewer for this JOURNAL wonders whether we are misled by words, and in particular by the word "stop." If we call a stop a *node* and explain nodes

Stoppism's revival did not come overnight. Train schedules and the timepieces on which they relied were greeted with skepticism (and they meet it to this day), but once the evidence was in place there was a rapid shift in outlook, among the educated at least. Train schedules were not in themselves damaging to train-realism—train-realists simply treated them as generalizations about the behavior of trains—but their principal intellectual significance is in the revival of stoppism that they facilitated. From this time on, the philosophical landscape has its recognizably modern form, with stoppists and train-realists marking a divide that the muddled middle tries to bridge, whether through idealism, pragmatism, or—as I prefer—naturalism.

II. PROSPECTS

Return to the vexed but compulsory question, "Why are there locals but also expresses?" Stoppism takes the distinction between local and express stops as primitive. It explains what it is to be a local train in terms of what it is to be a train and what it is to make a local stop. They give a similar account for express trains. Stoppism is sometimes dismissed as either trivial or else question begging: what do we learn on being told that a local train is a train that makes local stops? If we know what local stops are, we surely know what a local train is already. If knowing what local stops are requires that we already know what a local train is, we are no further forward. But this dismissal is too quick. So long as the local-stop/express-stop distinction does not rest on the local-train/express-train distinction, stoppism provides an account of the local-train/express-train distinction, and that is something. It is not everything, for we lack an account of the local-stop/express-stop distinction; but if that distinction is taken as primitive—resting on nothing at all, and so not on the local-train/express-train distinction—no charge of circularity can arise. Nevertheless, stoppism should be rejected. The objections are well known; I shall discuss them briefly.

First, express trains can, and express trains sometimes do, make local stops. This truth is familiar to everyone. Some stoppists respond by going probabilistic or statistical: "An express train is a train that usually makes express stops," and so on. These are known as "usual

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independently of facts about trains, how can it be a puzzle that trains sometimes stop between nodes, as well as at nodes? But this is in effect to abandon the task of accounting for the undeniable fit between stops and trains; it is to endorse coincidentalism. Stops are where trains normally stop. We know why trains normally stop at stops: to let riders on and off. What is harder to understand is why trains stop between stops. This remains so whatever words we use.

stoppists" or just "usualists." Others—"*ceteris paribus* stoppists" ("c-p stoppists")—fall back on complex qualifications, conditionalizations, contextualizations, renormalizations: prevarications, in short. However the hedging is done, the theory is complicated beyond all endurance.

Many stoppists do not hedge, and bite the bullet instead. Any train making local stops is a local, for a local is nothing more than a train making local stops; that is the core stoppist claim. To offer up as an objection to that claim what is little more than a disguised denial of it is to beg the question against stoppism, not to answer it. To a stoppist, "express train making local stops" is, strictly speaking, nonsense; there is no objection here to rebut.

How is it, then, that we dread the announcement, "This express train will be making local stops"? How can nonsense contain news, and bad news at that? Stoppists interpret such announcements as referring either to earlier times—"This train, formerly an express, is now a local"—or to what normally happens—"This train, though normally an express, is nevertheless a local." These two interpretations are known as "formerism" and "normalism." Against formerism, we can point out that sometimes an express makes local stops along its entire route and so is never "formerly an express." If "normally an express" is cashed out probabilistically, normalism is a variant of usualism. If a nonstatistical notion of norm is at work, we shall want an account of that. Either way, the central stoppist claim is again enveloped in a cloud of additional, typically impenetrable, theory.

Second, local trains stop at express stops. The standard stoppist move is to claim that some stops are both local and express. This merits a bewildered query: surely, stops are either express stops or local stops? Stoppists can do little in response besides appeal to inclusive disjunction, as if the question could be settled at the level of logic. They cannot give us reason to think that express stops are also local without betraying stoppist principles. For what reason is there, apart from the fact that local trains stop at 96th Street and Broadway, to think this stop is local? Anyone answering the question, "Is 96th Street and Broadway local or express?" answers wrongly if he answers "Local," rightly if he answers "Express." Local trains stop there, of course; but stoppists cannot appeal to that fact as the reason for holding it to be a local stop, for that concedes what the stoppist denies, that a stop is local because the local train stops there.

"Middle stoppists" sidestep this objection by defining local trains as trains that make both local and express stops. This disposes of the problem completely but obviously does nothing to explain how it is that expresses can, and sometimes do, make local stops. A parallel definition for express trains obliterates the distinction between local

and express. Defining expresses as trains that make express stops but that can also make local stops is also hopeless, if less obviously: a moment's consideration shows that all the difficulties have been gathered together and packed into the little weasel-word "can." Few things are more interesting to think about than "can," but this is a wing of the philosophical labyrinth that I must leave unexplored here.

Third, local stops have nothing in common. In order to show that the local-stop/express-stop distinction does not depend on the local-train/express-train distinction, it is not enough simply to say that it does not so depend: sometimes primitives turn out to have lots hidden under their grass skirts. If the local-stop/express-stop distinction underlies the local-train/express-train distinction, the former distinction must be drawn without reference to the latter. Were there anything that local stops had in common besides the fact that local trains stop at them, stoppists could appeal to this commonality in order to distinguish local from express stops; the local-stop/express-stop distinction would be made independently of the local-train/express-train distinction, resting instead on the shared characteristic or characteristics of local stops. This is the strategy of the "stop-realists." As every attempt to discover a feature common to all and only local stops has so far met with utter failure, it is not a promising strategy.

Does it matter that local stops have nothing in common? Not according to "stop-nominalism." Why should two stops have to resemble each other in any respect in order for it to be true that both are local? But this simply tries to make us regard a disadvantage of a theory as a feature instead. If the local/express distinction is arbitrary, it cannot be rendered any less arbitrary by pointing out that there is one thing all local stops do have in common: they are all called "local." So long as this is all local stops have in common, stoppism rests upon an arbitrary distinction, and that counts against it, not in its favor.

Fourth, stops change inexplicably. Some stops are local at one time, or for trains in one direction, but express at another time, or in the other direction. Stoppists can say nothing about why this is so, for they cannot appeal to the fact that trains run express at one time, or in one direction, but local at another time, or in the other direction. Stops must explain trains, not trains stops; otherwise the trains would, in that odd but useful expression of Zerega's, "wear the trousers."

In my view, this objection is decisive. Stoppists, barred from offering explanations for what must, on their view, be inexplicable, retort that the objection tells equally against train-realism. This is true, but of no help. In stressing that they are no worse off than train-realists, stoppists tacitly admit they are no better off either. The objection

against stoppism and the parallel charge against train-realism are equally decisive, but as I am neither a stoppist nor a train-realist, I have no reason to object to either objection.[4]

I shall now say a few words about Davis Wilde's so-called "station-stoppism." In my view, this is not a form of stoppism at all. It does not take as primitive stops but rather stations. But it upholds the core stoppist claim that locals are locals because they make local stops. Briefly, station-stoppism is this: stations are the primitives; *local stop* and *express stop* are properties ("stop-properties") of stations; locals are locals because they make stops at stations with the stop-property *local*; expresses are expresses because they make stops only at stations with the stop-property *express*. Stations may change their stop-properties from local to express, or express to local, but this is in principle no different than any change in any other property. Stations change from hot to cold, or from clean to dirty, all the time.

It is hard here not to suspect one is being hoodwinked. For how does it render changes in stops explicable to be told that there are no stops, only stations with changing stop-properties? Unless those changes in stop-property are in principle explicable, we have not gained in understanding. But explaining changes in the properties of things, Wilde says, is none of our business. That is the task of scientists, who we hope will sooner or later explain, naturalistically, the changes in the stop-properties of stations that we observe. Stop-properties supervene on physical properties, and these are the proper objects of science, not philosophy. (It is because Wilde says this that I regard station-stoppism as stoppist in letter but naturalist in spirit.)

Station-stoppism, in this bare outline, has the clarity and elegance that a simple and true theory often has (but which simple and false theories often have as well). The unification it offers, with trains and stations reckoned as individuals and stops reduced to properties of stations, is attractive. But what is plausible and attractive in outline is nightmarishly complicated and displeasing in detail. Finer-grained stop-properties than *local* and *express* are needed to handle stations that are local stops in one direction but express in the other, and finer-grained properties still to handle stations that are local for one line but express for another. Think, for example, of 59th Street-Columbus

[4] An anonymous reviewer, advancing what is said to be a "nontrivial point in favor of train-realism," asks: "What would it be for a platform to be an intrinsically uptown platform?" I do not know. By "uptown platform" I understand merely "platform on which the direction board reads 'Uptown'." There is no metaphysical puzzle when the uptown express leaves from the downtown local platform; the downtown local platform is designated as such by the direction board and remains such until the board is changed, whatever trains or riders do.

Circle, which has the stop-property *local with respect to the 1 train* and the stop-property *express with respect to the A, B, C, and D trains* (on the lower level). To deal with cases like this, Wilde relativizes stop-properties to routes, directions, and times. This generates an extraordinary zoo of stop-properties across the system. Though small recompense for this ontological blowout, it provides an elegant and pleasing dissolution of the dispute between exclusive and inclusive accounts of the local/express distinction. 96th Street and Broadway has the stop-properties *local with respect to the 1 train*, *express with respect to the 2 train*, and *express with respect to the 3 train*. These trains run on different routes (even though they run "on the same line"), so there is no question of a station being both local and express with respect to a particular train on a particular route, running in a particular direction, at a particular time.

Oddly, it is to Wilde himself that we owe what is perhaps the most devastating objection to station-stoppism. What binds the stop-properties of a station together? How do we know that the two stop-properties *local with respect to the 1* and *express with respect to the 2* are predicated of the same thing, namely, the station at 96th Street and Broadway? A station may be more than a bundle of stop-properties, but it is hard, once stops are reduced to stop-properties of stations, to stop the bundles coming unbundled.

How many stations at 96th Street and Broadway? "One" is the correct answer. Station-stoppists must prevent the multiplication of stop-properties from spilling over into multiplication of stations, bloating the ontology even further. At 96th Street and Broadway they can appeal to the intuition, widely accepted if admittedly rather puzzling, that the 1, 2, and 3 trains run "on the same line"; this gives additional reason to think the number of stations is one. However, this will not work at 59th Street-Columbus Circle, where two lines cross. What holds together the bundle of stop-properties predicated of this station? Wilde points to the possibility of transfer between the 1 train on the upper level and the A, B, C, and D trains on the lower level in order to justify the claim of single-stationhood, but this will not do. There is no transfer between uptown and downtown 1 trains at 110th Street and Broadway, but this is indisputably one station, not two. Who does not know the long, underground transfer between the 42nd Street-Times Square station and the quite distinct station at 42nd Street-Port Authority Bus Terminal? Possibility of transfer is neither necessary for single-stationhood nor sufficient; even if it were, we would lack an account of "possibility of transfer"—a notion that compounds all the conceptual turbidity of "possibility" with all the controversies, intellectual and practical, surrounding "transfer."

III. NATURALIZING STOPPISM

Understood as a naturalized deflation of stoppism taking stations as primitive, station-stoppism is a novel addition to the menagerie of Views of the Third Kind. But understood in this way, station-stoppism is vulnerable to many of the criticisms brought against other naturalized deflations of stoppism. Any naturalized stoppism must give an account of the local-stop/express-stop distinction that is neither trivial nor question begging, that is genuinely informative and yet does not rest on the local-train/express-train distinction. The clever trick in station-stoppism is to reduce stops to stop-properties of stations and then kick the explanatory can down the road, handing the task of providing an account of the changing stop-properties of stations over to the scientists. But it seems highly unlikely that scientific investigation of stations will shed any interesting light on stops. Who can seriously imagine that a physical change of any kind takes place in the station at 155th Street and Saint Nicholas Avenue when the A express surprisingly makes local stops between 145th Street and 168th Street? The station undergoes a sudden change in stop-property. Yet the station seems physically just the same: as dimly lit, as sketchy. Station-stoppism must say that, though the station seems just the same, the station just *seems* the same—it really *is* different, for its stop-properties have changed, and stop-properties supervene on physical properties. I believe that the station *seems* just the same because it really *is* the same. I believe that future investigation of the physical properties of stations undergoing change in stop-property will confirm my view.

Other naturalized stoppisms choose primitives other than stations. Two broad strategies are available. One rests the local-stop/express-stop distinction on some kind of frequency distribution. The other goes intentional, appealing to rider-relative facts about destination preferences. This second strategy, adapted from economic thinking, has been extremely productive in other areas of philosophy, but as far as the local-stop/express-stop distinction is concerned, it has been of very little help. Riders are in a rush to get where they are going as quickly as possible. Each therefore prefers that the train she is currently on run express from the time she boards until she reaches her stop. How can all these self-centered preferences combine to yield the (relatively) stable patterns of local stops and express stops that we find across the system? This might at first seem a rather simple problem, akin to the "hidden-hand" problem in economics, but remember that no appeal can be made to the local-train/express-train distinction. That would puncture stoppism, not deflate it. This strategy is anyway only weakly naturalistic, for intentions, purposes,

preferences, and the like have so far resisted reduction to facts recognized in the physical sciences.

The first strategy is more promising. Resting the local-stop/express-stop distinction on a frequency distribution is an old idea, going back to the ancient usualists, but if probability is understood in terms of variable outputs of some underlying process, it is not an idea that is friendly to stoppism. The most obvious places to find an underlying process are in the intentions of riders—but then we are back with the second strategy—or in the behavior of trains—but that is tantamount to abandoning stoppism. On a certain modern understanding of probability, however, these problems do not arise. Suppose there is no underlying process, and the indeterminacy is brute. This is an idea that we are familiar with (or have been forced to pretend familiarity with) from modern physics. When stopped, the location of a train can be determined to arbitrary precision, but then there is no fact of the matter as whether that train is express or local. We can say with certainty where the train is but say nothing certain about where it will stop next. "Express" and "local" are indeterministic notions that in strict rigor do not apply to individual trains at all.

Though basking in the glow of modern physics, this approach is little more than mystery mongering. Trains are macro- not microscopic; stops are nothing like electrons or photons. As we move from micro- to macro- we find uncertainty to diminish. How is it that indeterminism re-emerges at the level of stops or trains and comes to characterize the system as a whole?

These naturalized deflations of stoppism all face the same difficulty: finding a set of natural facts on which to rest the local-stop/express-stop distinction that preserves the priority of stops over trains and does not presuppose the local-train/express-train distinction. Naturalized deflations of train-realism face an equivalent difficulty, from the other direction. The natural facts, as far we can tell, accord no priority to stops over trains or trains over stops. We should therefore be naturalists rather than stoppists or train-realists, and thoroughgoing naturalists rather than naturalized stoppists or naturalized train-realists.

IV. CONCLUSION

Stoppism attempts to preserve a complex of claims shared with many religious views of the subway: that the subway system is in principle intelligible; that it exists for a reason; that this reason is related to the purposes that we, as riders, find ourselves to have; that these purposes are directed towards stops rather than trains; that trains are a means, whereas stops are our end. This entire complex of claims must be given up. It is nothing more than a relic of religion.

Were there really a realm "outside the subway" from which we enter and into which we exit, stops would indeed have metaphysical priority over trains; stops would be where we come from and go to; trains would exist to take us from one to the other. When we are thinking nonphilosophically, we cannot help but adopt a view of this sort, for after we enter we are in a rush to get to our stop, just as if there really were somewhere we were going beyond the stop where we exit. But as philosophers, we have rid ourselves of these superstitions. There is nothing "outside the subway." There is nowhere we have come from when we enter; there is nowhere we are going when we exit. Our stop is not an end to which the train serves as means. Freed from this unreasonable bias towards stops, we will find stoppism easy enough to resist. How we avoid falling into the arms of the train-realists—well, that is a topic that must be left for another occasion.[5]

MYRTLE WILLOUGHBY

[5] Below I reproduce some remarks of an anonymous reviewer at this JOURNAL to which I have not responded. There is much sense in them, but also some nonsense. I leave it to the readers to sort one from the other.

> I find myself baffled by the "Conclusion." The author's suggestion that "religious views of the subway" must be given up of course seems very much to the point. Who, these days, would in all seriousness argue that "the subway system is in principle intelligible"? But I do not see why abandoning such religious views requires, or even speaks in favor of, adopting the following: "There is nothing 'outside the subway.' There is nowhere we have come from when we enter; there is nowhere we are going when we exit. Our stop is not an end to which the train serves as means." At an earlier moment in the paper, the author rightly notes that people holding certain views are to be pitied, not argued with. But I fail to see why someone who simply denies the "inside the subway"/"outside the subway" distinction is not likewise just to be pitied. Seeking robust metaphysical, or, if we have embraced naturalism, baldly naturalistic foundations for such a distinction is, to be sure, some kind of mistake. There will always be complicated cases, where the answer to the question, "Is this inside or outside the subway (system)?" will have no clear answer…
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> …a hankering for philosophical theories that neatly divide everything into "inside" and "outside" "the subway (system)" is likely itself to be symptomatic of a certain kind of philosophical bewitchment.
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> Philosophy is "to leave everything as it is"; and the "outside the subway"/"inside the subway" distinction is part of how we—at least, a certain *we*—think about and experience the world. A "relaxed naturalism" can easily accommodate this distinction: all we require is that the distinction not be as such incompatible with such facts about the world as our best scientific (as opposed to: philosophical) theories have uncovered. The bald naturalism so casually (and, at least for this reader, unexpectedly) invoked by the author seems to be the product of the same impulse underlying religious views of the subway, only now bubbling forth in a "naturalistic" guise. A more relaxed naturalism (which, I would suggest, is actually more consonant with the author's overall approach) allows us to continue speaking of certain things as "inside," and others as "outside," the subway (and it allows us to say that we are unsure of the status of still other things); but we are now able to do so without feeling the *need* to explain this practice, to find foundations for it, and thus (somehow) to justify it. Rather, it simply is what it is.