“Bütün insanlar, doğaları gereği bilmek isterler.”

HEGEL ÖZEL SAYISI

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NURGÜL KARABAĞ ERDEM
Hegel's Critique of Parmenides in the Science of Logic

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Abstract
Parmenides plays an important role in the first section of Hegel's *Science of Logic* due to his definition of being as a pure thought-determination. This article investigates, first, how Hegel conceives the Parmenidean being. Secondly, by discussing Hegel's logical analysis of pure being and pure nothing, it aims to show why and how such conception of being, according to Hegel, provides a crucial insight into the function of the understanding.

Keywords: Hegel, Parmenides, being, nothing, becoming, dialectic, transition

Hegel'in Mantık Bilimi'nde Parmenides Eleştirisı

Özet

Anahtar sözcükler: Hegel, Parmenides, varlık, yokluk, oluş, diyalektik, geçiş

Hegel's *Science of Logic* opens with the speculative analysis of the pure being, namely with the most fundamental concept which is immediately available to the logical thinking. In the Remarks, however, Hegel...
links his own account of pure being and pure nothing with that of Parmenides, thus offers both a systematic and historical account of these concepts. But the relation between these two standpoints raises a difficulty: how does Parmenides’ theory of being fit into Hegel’s discussion of pure being and pure nothing? How should we understand Hegel’s mention of the Parmenidean being in the Remarks? Can we consider it as a simple historical illustration of Hegel’s speculative reading in the main body of the text?

In this paper I claim that Hegel’s reading of the Parmenidean being is more than a matter of historical comparison and that it helps to unravel the difficulties of Hegel’s discussion of the transition from pure being to pure nothing. I argue that the encounter with Parmenides provides primarily an important insight into the Hegel’s critique of the nature and function of the understanding in its act of grasping the determinations of thought. Hegel finds the first significant formulation of such “cognition” of the thought-determinations “by means of thinking (denkendes Erkennen)” in Parmenides. But while Parmenides’ great achievement lays in the pure thinking of being, it falls short of, according to Hegel, in its account of the difference and negativity in thought. Accordingly, unlike most of the commentators who focus on the accuracy of Hegel’s portrayal of Parmenides, I examine Hegel’s strategy for overcoming the monistic ontology of Parmenides. The structure of the paper will be as follows. In Section I, I examine Hegel’s translation of the Parmenidean being, and the implications of his interpretation. In Section II, I offer a brief exposition of Parmenides’ account of being. In Section III, I focus on Hegel’s account of pure being and pure nothing in the Science of Logic which will allow us to see how and why Hegel comes to the conclusion that becoming is the logical result of being and nothing. Finally, in Section IV, I discuss


2 See, Hegel, The Science of Logic, 60; GW 21, 70/4 et seq.


Hegel's reversal of the Parmenidean logical priority of difference and conclude by appraising the outcome of Hegel's encounter with Parmenides.

I. Being Without Nothing

Before discussing Hegel's interpretation of the Parmenidean being in detail, let us begin by examining Hegel's translation of the fragment where Parmenides asserts the necessity of the thought of being. As it is well known, Parmenides holds that there are only two ways of inquiry which can be thought of. The first one, namely "the way of persuasion," is the following: "the one [says]: 'exits' and 'it is not possible not to exist (η μὲν διὰ τῆς ἐστίν τι καὶ ός οὐκ ἔστι μὴ ἔσται')."5 In the first Remark to Chapter I ("Being") of the Science of Logic Hegel mentions only the way of persuasion6 and translates it as "nur das Seyn ist, und das Nichts ist gar nicht," that is, "only being is, and nothing is not absolutely."7

The first thing to notice is Hegel's choice of translation strategy. We know that Parmenides does not explicitly name the grammatical subject in the first and the second part of the verse. Therefore, it is not clear what the subject of the verb ἔστιν (which literally means 'is'), and the οὐκ ἔστι (which literally means 'is not') is. The ambiguity caused by the absence of a subject has led modern scholars to propose different solutions.8 But for Hegel the only possible translation is the ontological one: on the one hand, he interprets ἔστιν as the subject of the first proposition, transforming it into his own understanding of the category of being, and on the other hand, he takes μὴ ἔσται to be the subject of the second proposition such that it turns into the category of nothing. As for οὐκ ἔστι, it designates


6 For the way of error, see, DK 28 B 2.5; Tarán, Parmenides, 32: "ἡ δ' ὡς οὐκ ἔστιν τε καὶ ός γεων ἔστι μὴ ἔσται (the other [says]: 'exists-not' and 'not to exist is necessary')." Cf. also, DK 28 B 6.

7 Hegel, The Science of Logic, 60; GW 21, 70/19. See also Hegel, The Science of Logic, 70; GW 21, 81/30: nothing "absolutely is not, only being is." In the Lectures on Parmenides Hegel downplays the idea of the necessity in the second part of the verse when he translates it as "only being is, and non-being is not (nur das Sein ist, und daß das Nichtsein nicht ist)," see, G. W. F. Hegel, Lectures on the History of Philosophy (1825–6), Vol. 2: Greek Philosophy, trans. R. F. Brown. (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2006), 59; G. W. F. Hegel, Vorlesungen über die Geschichte der Philosophie, Teil 2: Griechische Philosophie I, eds. Pierre Garniron and Walter Jaeschke. (Hamburg: Felix Meiner, 1989), 55.

only the modality of necessity, namely that of "not absolutely." But what does Hegel's translation suggest?

It is not difficult to see here that Hegel's way of depicting the meaning of τὸ ἐὰναι intends to classify Parmenides as the first thinker of being. In Hegel's view, the Parmenidean being, if understood as "the most abstract and the poorest" category of thinking, necessarily marks the very beginning of the logical thinking since being as such gives us the very first abstract definition of the Absolute. It is likely that the reason behind this speculative reconstruction is twofold: 1/ according to Hegel's own conception of the history of philosophy the development (Entwicklung) of the logical determinations (or simply the thought-determinations) proves that there is, and there must be, a gradually unfolding rational order of the logical (das Logische) itself, of which the purest form possible is the Parmenides' τὸ ἐὰναι. 2/ The method of the Science of Logic, whose sub-

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11 Cf. Hegel, The Encyclopaedia Logic, §86, Addition 2, 138; Werke 8, 184: "We find the various stages of the logical Idea in the history of philosophy in the shape of a succession of emerging philosophical systems, each of which has a particular definition of the Absolute as its foundation. Just as the unfolding of the logical Idea proves to be an advance from the abstract to the concrete, so the earliest systems in the history of philosophy are the most abstract and therefore at the same time the poorest." Cf. also, Hegel, The Encyclopaedia Logic, §104, Addition 3, 167; Werke 8, 221: "(...) the Eleatics, however, and in particular Parmenides, advanced to pure thinking in the form of being."
12 For Hegel, the empirico-historical development of philosophy is not the same with the rational or the logical development because the historical succession of the philosophical figures does not necessarily entail a progress (Fortgang) in the unfolding of the rationality. That is why Parmenides (i.e. the idea of pure being) comes first and Heraclitus (i.e. the idea of becoming) comes second in the Science of Logic. For a study of the differences between these two orders, see, Clark Butler, "Empirical vs. rational order in the History of Philosophy," Owl of Minerva, vol. 26, no. 1 (1994): 31-37.
13 The distinction that Hegel draws between the logical (das Logische) and the Logic (die Logik) is particularly important: the former designates "the absolute form of the truth" (Hegel, The Encyclopaedia Logic, §19, Remark, 46; GW 20, 62/11) since it contains the "moments of everything logically real (logisch-Reellen)," that is, "every concept or everything true in general" (Hegel, The Encyclopaedia Logic, § 79, Remark, 125; GW 20, 118/18). Any particular development in the history of philosophy, such as the thought of being in Parmenides, reveals eventually the universality of the one and the same logical truth. Thus, as Gadamer puts it, the logical becomes "the dimension which underlies all posited determinations of thought," see, Hans-Georg Gadamer, "The Idea of Hegel's Logic," in Hegel's Dialectic: Five Hermeneutical Studies, trans. P. Christopher Smith. (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1976), 95. As to the latter, it designates the particular forms that this logical structure contains in itself. For a discussion of the moments of the logical, see, André Stanguennec, "Le dialectique, la dialectique, les dialectiques chez Hegel," in Lectures de Hegel, eds. Olivier Tinland. (Paris: Le Livre de Poche, 2005), 86-112.
ject matter is the “thinking of thinking (Denken des Denkens),”\(^\text{14}\) requires equally to begin the study of the logical processes of thought-determinations without assuming anything that has an already immediately distinguishable aspect. Hegel famously holds\(^\text{15}\) that any starting point relying on a pre-supposition (Voraussetzung) — such as principles or laws about the nature of knowing itself, annihilates the act of “conceptual thinking”\(^\text{16}\) by transforming it into a justification of a series of unexamined and already determined subjective assumptions. In other words, Logic as Science must begin without presupposing any kind of determined form or content so that thinking can be able to ground itself systematically, i.e. scientifically, in the absence of a pregiven determination. Thus, two requirements for a genuine logical thinking (being as the very first universal thought of the logical thinking, and the beginning with an absolutely presuppositionless point of view) are internally related — and therein lies the Hegel’s choice of translation of τὸ ζεύγιον, not as is, but as being. This is clear from Hegel’s discussion in the second Zusatz to the paragraph 86 of the Encyclopaedia Logic. There, Hegel claims that:

[…] the starting point of the Logic is the same as the starting point of the history of philosophy in the proper sense of the word. This starting point is to be found in Eleatic philosophy, and, more precisely, in the philosophy of Parmenides, who apprehends the Absolute as being. For he says that, ‘Only being is, and nothing is not.’\(^\text{17}\)

The same argument can be found in the first Remark to the first Chapter (Being) of the Science of Logic:

What is the first in science had of necessity to show itself to be the first historically. And we must regard the one or the being of the Eleatics as the first instance of knowledge by thought. Water and suchlike material principles are indeed meant to be universal even though, as things material, they are not pure thoughts; numbers are neither the first simple, nor the self-abiding thought, but thought rather which is entirely self-external.\(^\text{18}\)

It should be clear from these remarks that the most fundamental and the most abstract thought-determination, as Hegel maintains, has the characteristics of what Parmenides defines as τὸ ζεύγιον. Moreover, since the logical beginning is a matter of pure thinking, it should be free from any

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\(^{14}\) See, Hegel, *The Encyclopaedia Logic*, §19, Remark, 56; GW 20, 62/11.

\(^{15}\) See, “With what must be the beginning of Science be made?” Hegel, *The Encyclopaedia Logic*, 45-57; GW 21, 53-68.


\(^{17}\) Hegel, *The Encyclopaedia Logic*, §86, Addition 2, 138; Werke 8, 185.

\(^{18}\) Hegel, *The Science of Logic*, 64; GW 21, 76/4. Note that the formula (“Was das Erste in der Wissenschaft ist, hat sich müssen geschichtlich als das Erste zeigen”) is added by Hegel in the second edition (1832) of the *Science of Logic.*
kind of sensible perception (such as the original principle of Thales) and any kind of representations (such as the Pythagorean doctrine of numbers) which implies representational thinking's point of view. Given this framework the Parmenidean being seems to be the best candidate for the presuppositionless foundation of Hegel's own logical thinking. Arguably, it is on these grounds that Hegel had recourse to Parmenides.

However, the fact that Hegel finds in Parmenides the idea of the most abstract being, or 'to be,' does not mean that Hegel himself advocates a similar take on being in his *Logic*. Hegel argues that in the beginning of logical thinking the most we can say or think about anything is that it *is*. This is because thinking, for Hegel, can only be set in motion with an indeterminate thought such as *to be*, while nothing, as there is nothing to be known in it, cannot serve as a starting point. Similarly, for Parmenides, "it is necessary to say and to think Being; for there is Being, but nothing is not (Χρη τὸ λέγειν τε νοεῖν τ' ἐόν ἐμεναι. ἐστὶ γὰρ ἐναὶ, μηδὲν δ' οὐκ ἐστιν)."19 In that regard, Hegel seems to agree with Parmenides.

But, once the thinking advances from such being, for Hegel, it cannot remain indifferent to the idea of nothingness. Because, as thinking progresses, it gradually realizes that both pure being and pure nothing are equally formless and contentless abstractions and that it is not possible to separate the one from the other since each implies higher unifying category, namely becoming. The Parmenidean ontology, on the other hand, leaves no room even for a determinate opposition of being with nothing, let alone equating being and nothing, for it would imply the existence of determined nothing, which is, in Parmenides view, the ultimate error of the mortals.20

Thus, it is one thing to begin with the positive implications of being within its abstract aspect as Hegel points out, and quite another thing to grasp it without the work of negativity as Parmenides does. Hegel's interest in Parmenides can be traced to this fundamental difference. As for the validity of a logical beginning and its relation to Parmenides, it seems to be of secondary importance. Therefore, to understand Hegel's treatment of the Parmenidean being we must leave aside such a secondary aspect and concentrate primarily on why Hegel believes that the Parmenidean being and nothing create problems for the logical thinking.

II. Being and Nothing

With all this in mind, let us proceed with the meaning and the implications of Hegel's interpretation. First, it is important to note that by

19 DK 28 B 6.1; Taran, *Parmenides*, 54.
20 Cf., DK 28 B 7.1: "Οὐ γάρ μὴ ποτε τοῦτο διὰμ ἐναι μὴ ἔόντα (For never shall this be forced: that things that are not exist)," Taran, *Parmenides*, 73.
translating the Parmenidean way of persuasion as “only being is, and nothing is not absolutely” Hegel seems to alter what Parmenides seeks to establish. The first (ἡ μὲν ὅπως ἔστιν) and the second part (ὦς ὃς ἔστι μὴ ἄναι) of the fragment suggest the absolute necessity of ἔστιν and of ὃς ἔστι μὴ ἄναι regardless of how we should conceive them. Thus, if we are to understand ἔστιν as the grammatical or the logical subject of the dictum, as Hegel understands, then an accurate interpretation should give us, first the position of ἔστιν, and secondly the negation of the impossibility of the same ἔστιν. And if we are to follow Hegel’s line of thought, namely if we take ἔστιν as being, then the verse should be understood as a statement on the position of being and the exclusion of the possibility of its non being rather than the position of being and nothing. Why does Hegel need to reformulate the contradiction of being’s non-being into an affirmation of the nothingness of nothing? Doesn’t this amount to accepting being of nothing, something which Parmenides forbids and condemns on many occasions as pure ἰδανικα?21

Hegel’s decision to interpret ὃς ἔστι μὴ ἄναι (the impossibility of being’s not being) as nothing can hardly be unintentional for the following reasons. First, this translation makes it possible for Hegel to reconstruct the self-identical Parmenidean being as a contentless and empty being which is opposed to an equally self-identical, thereby empty, nothing so that the identity claim of Parmenides can be turned into an empty opposition between a formally separated self-identical being and a self-identical nothing — hence Hegel’s second formula follows: “being is being, and nothing is nothing (Seyn ist Seyn, und Nichts ist Nichts).”22

Second, according to Hegel, such being, and such nothing for that matter, are the products of the abstraction of the understanding, which can function only by fixing and isolating the opposite concepts. This enables also Hegel to classify Parmenides’ account of the all-inclusive being as the foundation of “the older metaphysics (die ältere Metaphysik),” i.e., the metaphysical tradition which, in Hegel’s view, goes roughly from Parmenides to pre-Kantian philosophy23 because of the logical priority of the principle of identity over the work of negativity. But Hegel has a special name for the foundation in question. As he writes “the philosophical view

21 See, for example, DK 28 B 7.2-6.
22 Hegel, The Science of Logic, 82; GW 21, 95/16. E. Berti rightly emphasizes that Hegel’s strategy is to rule out the contradiction between the way of persuasion and the way of error in order to reduce the identity of being into an identity judgment, which is in fact a pure tautology, see, Berti, ‘Hegel,’66.
23 Hegel generally uses two expressions — “the older metaphysics (ältere Metaphysik)” in Hegel, The Science of Logic, 25; GW 21, 29/15 and “the traditional metaphysics (vormalige Metaphysik)” in Hegel, The Encyclopaedia Logic, §47, 90; GW 20, 83/3 — to distance his own speculative philosophy from the metaphysical tradition.
that accepts as principle that being is only being, nothing only nothing, deserves the name of system of identity (Identitätssystem).24 But how does Hegel define the identity system and in what sense he considers Parmenides to have constructed such a system?

An identity system or "philosophy of identity"25 is constructed upon the understanding's tendency to consider opposing aspects of its objects as determinations that are to be comprehended through their absolute diversity. For Hegel, once they are separated from each other, one of these determinations is recognized by the reflection of the understanding as the "true" determination while the other is taken as the "false" one due to its contradictory nature.26 This kind of thinking through opposition is in fact the activity of abstracting the identity from the difference because the understanding functions in such a way that for there to be an absolutely self-identical, i.e. self-subsisting and autonomous, content, any reference to the movement of self-differentiation must be excluded from its very determination.27

It is no surprise that for Hegel the understanding as "the first form of logical thinking (erste Form des Logischen)"28 goes hand in hand with the principle of identity which is the "first originary law of thought (erstes ursprüngliches Denkgesetz)."29 Therefore, what establishes an identity system is the coincidence of these two aspects. Hegel's claim is that the fundamental characteristics of such a system was already at work, and historically speaking, was initiated by Parmenides: the understanding's formal treatment of its contents, namely the thought-determinations such as 'being,' and 'nothing,' leads to the assumption that 'to be,' as the universal condition of the intelligibility of anything that exists, must by definition be absolutely distinct from 'not to be.' In other words, Parmenides apprehends being and its negation not as two interrelated dynamic processes, but only as static, self-relating and one-sided thought-determinations.

Now a closer look at the manner in which Parmenides proceeds in his Poem reveals why Hegel believes that such being constitutes an identity

25 Hegel, The Encyclopaedia Logic, 7; GW 20, 8/24.
27 Cf. Hegel, The Encyclopaedia Logic, §80, 125; GW 20, 118/25-27: "Thinking as understanding stops short at the fixed determinacy and its distinctness (Unterschiedenheit) vis-à-vis other determinacies; such a restricted abstraction counts for the understanding as one that subsists on its own account, and [simply] is (bestehend und seyend)."
system.

First, Parmenides begins with a presupposition: "ἐστιν ἢ ὁδὲ ἐστιν"30 either there must be something, (namely is) or there is not something at all (namely is not) and tertium non datur: "οὖτως ἢ πάμπαν πελέναι χρωνέστιν ἢ οὐχί (thus it is necessary either to exist at all in all or not at all)."31

Secondly, if the criterion of truth relies entirely on the thinking itself and on the intelligibility of that which is, then that which is not (τὸ μὴ ἐόν) cannot be known.32 It cannot be an object of thought, because that which is not is "unthinkable (ἀνώθητον)" and even "unnamable (ἀνώνυμον)."33 Moreover, that which is not cannot be, for a very simple reason: any affirmation of its existence would introduce diversity and change into the immobile totality of that which is. This would imply that the latter is conditioned by that which is not. In this case, that which is would be something created ex nihilo. And that would be also impossible (i.e. contradictory) because that which is nor subjected to the constant movement of coming into being and perishing (ἀπεμεβάς/αὐτεφέβας).34 It is eternal (ἐὰν γὰρ ἐγενετ', ὁδὲ ἐστὶ, ὁδὲ εἶ ποτε μέλλει ἑσεθαί),35 motionless (ἀκίνητον)36 and "like the body of a well-rounded sphere (ἐξωκύκλου σφαίρης ἐναλλιγκιον ὀγκων)'37 stays within its self-enclosed limits (οἷο γὰρ πάντοθεν ἱσον, ὀμοίως ἐν πείρασι κόρει)."38 Therefore, if that which is not cannot be and cannot be known39 then it cannot have any predicates at all. This leads Parmenides to the assumption that that which is must be absolutely different and separated from that which is not:

Since it remains the same and in the same, it lies by itself and abides so firmly where it is; for powerful Necessity holds it in the bonds of the limit which encircles Being, because it is not right for Being to be incomplete,

30 DK 28 B 8.16.
32 See, DK 28 B 2.7; Tarán, Parmenides, 32: "οὔτε γὰρ ἐν γνώσει τὸ γε μὴ ἐόν - οἷο γὰρ ἀνυστόν (For you could not know that which does not exist - because it is impossible).
33 See, DK 28 B 8.17; Tarán, Parmenides, 85.
34 DK 28 B 8.3-4; Tarán, Parmenides, 85.
35 DK 28 B 8.20; Tarán, Parmenides, 85.
36 DK 28 B 8.26; Tarán, Parmenides, 85.
37 DK 28 B 8.43; Tarán, Parmenides, 86.
38 DK 28 B 8.49; Tarán, Parmenides, 86.
39 DK 28 B 8.8-9; Tarán, Parmenides, 85: "οὐ γὰρ φατόν οὐδὲ νοητόνέστιν ὀπως οὐκ ἑστι (for it is not possible to say or to think that it is not)."
for it is not in need; for it were it would need all.\(^{40}\)

Finally, no account of intelligibility of \(\varepsilon\sigma\tau\iota\nu\iota\) (is) is possible without the absolute negation of \(\varnothing\kappa\varepsilon\sigma\tau\iota\nu\iota\) (is not): from the incompatibility and the exclusivity between being and non-being Parmenides deduces the logical necessity of \(\varepsilon\sigma\tau\iota\nu\iota\) and the impossibility of \(\varnothing\kappa\varepsilon\sigma\tau\iota\nu\iota\). Such conceptual unity (\(\varepsilon\nu\)\(\varepsilon\nu\)) of \(\varepsilon\sigma\tau\iota\nu\iota\) provides in this way its identity with itself (\(\tau\alpha\nu\alpha\nu\tau\iota\nu\iota\ \tau\alpha\nu\iota\tau\iota\delta\)),\(^{43}\) creating a separation not just between being and non-being but also between the sphere of knowledge and the sphere of opinion, namely the empirical/phenomenal sphere.

This brief recapitulation of Parmenides' account suggests that the crux of the Parmenidean being, at least in Hegel's view, appears to be the self-referential structure of the ontological difference which marks at the same time the absence of negativity in thought. All the characteristics of the understanding's "naïve way of proceeding (unbefangene Verfahren),"\(^{44}\) namely what Hegel ironically calls the logic of "Either-Or (Entweder-Oder),"\(^{45}\) can be found here. To properly understand Hegel's account of Parmenides, however, we also need to examine Hegel's own account of being and nothing. Next, I will consider how Hegel explains the logical movement from being to nothing and examine how he comes to the conclusion that being and nothing entail becoming.

**III. Being and Nothing as Vanishing Moments**

It should be clear by now that for Hegel Parmenides takes for granted the substantially self-identical being and its absolute distinction from nothing. Hegel's main aim in the opening section of the *Science of Logic* is to challenge this static understanding of being by showing that both being, and nothing cannot be what they are taken to be by Parmenides and that a logical analysis of pure being and pure nothing is required. In this part of the paper, I will examine Hegel's account of being and nothing in two separate sections respectively.

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\(^{40}\) DK 28 B 8. 29-33; Tarán, *Parmenides*, 86.


\(^{42}\) See, DK 28 B 8.6.

\(^{43}\) See, DK 28 B 8.29.

\(^{44}\) See, Hegel, *The Encyclopaedia Logic*, §26, 65; *GW* 20, 69/20.

\(^{45}\) That is, the metaphysical understanding which excludes logical mediation between opposing determinations, see, for example, Hegel, *The Encyclopaedia Logic*, §65, 114; *GW* 20, 107/23.
1. Hegel on Being.

In accordance with the presuppositionless point of view, **thinking of thinking** begins with the treatment of "Being, pure being — without further determination." At this very first stage of thinking, the concept of being is to be thought of in its absolute purity and any attempt to do so can only be carried out by apprehending the subject-matter as determinateless. This is to say that pure being, due to its purity, is something entirely immediate in such a way the thought of its negation, i.e. nothing, is not even an issue here. Such pure being does not oppose to what we mean by nothing in general. It is not even possible to think of pure being as something opposed to nothing because this very opposition would turn the purity of being into something already determined. Therefore, the only thing one can say or think about pure being is that it simply is. To emphasize the thoroughly abstract, unqualified nature of the pure being, Hegel describes it as "the indeterminate immediate (das unbestimmte Unmittelbare)." Hegel's formulation is significant for it means that pure thought of pure being entails the indeterminateness of being. Pure thought of pure being is indeterminate because there is not yet any distinction which is posited in it by a process of determination, and as such, it is immediate because pure thought is not yet related with another pure thought, such as nothing. As Wolfgang Marx points out, there is no ground possible for self-distinguishing in the pure thought of pure being. This point is important because all further determinations such as the transition between pure being and pure nothing will be brought forth by the indeterminateness of the immediate pure being.

Hegel goes on to claim that because pure being is taken "in its inde-
terminate immediacy, it is equal only to itself (nur sich selbst gleich) and also not unequal with respect to another."\textsuperscript{50} Hegel clearly accepts Parmenides' challenge on thinking being in its absolute self-equality, namely the thought of a being that is full with itself, therefore only in contact with itself without having anything other than its own being: "\textit{πῶς χωρικής πᾶν ἐστὶν ἐστὶν γὰρ ἐστὶν πελάζει} (therefore it is all continuous, for Being is in contact with Being)."\textsuperscript{51} In a similar vein, Hegel adds that such pure being "has no difference (Verschiedenheit) within it, nor any outwardly."\textsuperscript{52} That is, we are to think of pure being without any inner or outer qualitative distinctness, which defines the finite nature of any determinate being. The emphasis on the absence of limitation is crucial because Hegel insists again that the task is to avoid apprehending pure being as already determined Dasein. In other words, the "lack of determination (Bestimmungslosigkeit)"\textsuperscript{53} in question is so abstract that pure being must be and can be thought only with reference to itself,\textsuperscript{54} just like Parmenides wants us to think: "if any determination or content were posited in it as distinct, or if it were posited by this determination or content as distinct from an another, it would thereby fail to hold fast to its purity."\textsuperscript{55}

By trying to think of an indeterminate, unmediated, self-equal pure being which, just as Parmenides demands, does not come from nothing (in accordance with the principle of \textit{ex nihilo}) or which is not related in any way to nothing, we arrive at the very opposite of what we are trying to achieve. As Hegel argues, such pure being simply is \textit{not}. More precisely, the pure thought of pure being, as Hegel holds, is itself "\textit{nothing — something that cannot be said} (Nichts — ein Unsagbares)."\textsuperscript{56} The absence of any thinkable content makes it impossible to say\textsuperscript{57} or think\textsuperscript{58} anything

\textsuperscript{50} Hegel, \textit{The Science of Logic}, 59; \textit{GW} 21, 69/20. Note that Hegel says \textit{equality} instead of \textit{identity} because identity is mediated, reflexive determination which belongs to the logic of \textit{Essence} while equality is something immediately available to pure thinking.

\textsuperscript{51} DK 28 B 8,25; Taran, \textit{Parmenides}, 85.

\textsuperscript{52} Hegel, \textit{The Science of Logic}, 59; \textit{GW} 21, 69/31.

\textsuperscript{53} Hegel, \textit{The Encyclopaedia Logic}, §86, \textit{Addition} 1, 137; \textit{Werk} 8, 184.


\textsuperscript{55} Hegel, \textit{The Science of Logic}, 59; \textit{GW} 21, 69/1-4.

\textsuperscript{56} Hegel, \textit{The Encyclopaedia Logic}, §87, \textit{Remark} 1, 137; \textit{GW} 20, 124/6. However, it is the other way around for Parmenides since it is conceptually impossible to express nothingness, see, DK 28 B 2.7-8; Taran, \textit{Parmenides}, 32: "\textit{οὐδὲ γὰρ ἐὰν γνωτιξ το μὴ ἐστὶν ὁμοίως} (for you could not know that which does not exist (...) nor you could express it)."

\textsuperscript{57} Cf. \textit{GW} 23,1, 65/19: "One can say absolutely nothing about being, it is sheeply indeterminate (\textit{Vom Seyn kann gar nichts gesagt werden, es ist das rein unbestimmte})," (my translation).

\textsuperscript{58} Cf. Hegel, \textit{The Encyclopaedia Logic}, §87, \textit{Addition}, 140; \textit{Werk} 8, 187: "Someone might want to say that being and nothing are still both thoughts, and so to be a thought is what is
about it while every act of saying or thinking is conditioned first and foremost by a concrete determination, say, quality, quantity, etc. Therefore, Hegel observes that "there is nothing (nichts) to be intuited in it, if one can speak of here of intuiting; or, it is only this pure empty intuiting itself. Just as little is anything to be thought in it, or, it is equally this empty thinking (leere Denken)." \(^59\)

Next comes the first speculative definition of the logical thinking which anticipates the relation between such pure being and pure nothing by annihilating their presupposed heterogeneity. As Hegel writes, "Being, the indeterminate immediate is in fact nothing (Nichts), and neither more nor less than nothing." \(^60\)

"Being is not" or "being is nothing" means that no account of pure being is possible when it is taken in its complete indeterminateness. Such pure being necessarily escapes from thinking, and it slips into the opposite of itself. This is, because nothing, namely the absolute nothingness imaginable, cannot be absolutely different or separable from such empty pure being. For this reason, according to Hegel, there is nothing shocking in saying that such pure being is unintelligible on its own account.

However, it would be a mistake to assume that its equation with pure nothing is imposed by an external subject just as it would be mistake to think the nothingness of pure being as nothingness of something concrete (i.e. determinate), say, this table. On the contrary, Hegel's point is to show that pure being logically vanishes into nothing in and by itself, and that this very first of movement of differentiation in the logical thinking is realized by virtue of pure being's own immanent development. What keeps pure being absolutely separated from nothing is rather this thinking of the external subject (more precisely the "external reflection") which apprehends pure being, as is the case in the Parmenidean conception of being, as immediately distinguishable from pure nothing. But what seems to be immediately given is in itself already a differentiated content. \(^62\)

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\(^{59}\) Hegel, *The Science of Logic*, 59; *GW* 21, 69/4-6.

\(^{60}\) Hegel, *The Science of Logic*, 59; *GW* 21, 69/7.

\(^{61}\) In Hegel's terminology, the external reflection refers to the formal separation between the reflection and what is reflected. Since the latter is presupposed by the former as something immediate and different, the content remains external to the thought itself; see, Hegel, *The Encyclopaedia Logic*, 348-351; *GW* 11, 252-256.

\(^{62}\) Cf. Hegel, *The Encyclopaedia Logic*, §28, Addition, 66; Werke 8, 94: "The presupposition of the older metaphysics was that of naive belief generally, namely, that thinking grasps what things are in-themselves, that things only are what they genuinely are when they are [captured] in thought. Nature and the mind and heart of man are protean, constantly in a process of transformation, and the reflection that things as they immediately present themselves are not the things in themselves is an obvious one."
reover, Hegel does not say that this table as something determinate is itself nothing. What is empty and therefore nothing is the thought of indeterminate immediate pure being which, as we have seen, does not refer to any concrete conceptual thought. Therefore, pure being shows itself to be an empty thought rather than a fixed/immobile substrate of which anything can be predicated.

2. Hegel on Nothing

Having explained Hegel's account of pure being, the second task is thus to explore this pure nothingness (Nichts) or this simple 'not' (nicht) which appears immediately in indeterminate pure being and to determine whether the Parmenidean claim of "μηδὲν δ’ οὐκ ἔστιν (nothing is not)" is logically possible or not. As it is the case with pure being, we are to think of "Nothing, pure nothingness (Nichts, das reine Nichts)" in its "simple equality with itself (einfache Gleichheit mit sich selbst)." Pure nothing, due to its purity, is "complete emptiness, complete absence of determination and content." Again, we must be careful not to mistake such formless and contentless pure nothing for some distinctively negative content since it expresses only the "lack of all distinction within (Ununterschiedenheit in ihm selbst)." That is to say, nothing in question is radically different from some already determinate and thus already mediated non-being (Nichtseyn) which is in fact a "contentful nothing (inhaltslose Nichts)," namely already a "determinate negation (bestimmte Negation)" because it contains both being and negation of being at the same time. On the contrary, Hegel forces us to consider a "negation devoid of reference (beziehunglose Verneinung)," namely that which is absolutely self-identical and thereby absolutely different from pure being.

63 Cf. Hegel, The Science of Logic, 75; GW 21, 86/11: "(...) because being is posited as immediate, the nothing only breaks out (hervorbringen) in it immediately."
64 DK 28 B 6,2; Taran, Parmenides, 54.
68 The negation here does not suggest being relative to something or being other than something, as it is with Plato's μὴ ὄν in Sophist (257b). This point is rightly emphasized by André Doz; see, André Doz, La Logique de Hegel et les problèmes traditionnels de l'ontologie (Paris: Vrin, 1987), 48.
69 Hegel, The Science of Logic, 78; GW 21, 89/25.
71 Hegel, The Science of Logic, 60; GW 21, 70/14.
72 Note that in the first edition of the Science of Logic (1812), Hegel borrows Kant's terminology and says that such pure nothing is "the pure absence of being, nihil privativum," see, G.W.F. Hegel, Gesammelte Werke 11, Wissenschaft der Logik. Erster Band. Die objektive
Now, Hegel holds that however hard we try to apprehend pure nothingness in its immediacy, we are driven back to the pure thought of pure being. Thinking of nothing cannot establish the intended difference from the initial pure indeterminateness which amounts to pure being. Thus Hegel concludes that "to intuit or to think nothing has therefore a meaning (Bedeutung)." The thought of pure being now turns out to be a condition of the possibility of pure nothing in the sense that one can think of it only with reference to (pure) being: "nothing is (exists) in our intuiting or thinking," Hegel says, simply because "nothing is thought of, represented of; it is spoken about; it therefore is; nothing has its being in thinking, representing, speaking, etc." Hegel's gesture seems quite similar to that of Gorgias even though he is mentioned nowhere in the Science of Logic. It can be argued that Hegel proceeds in the same way with Gorgias when he says that one can assert the existence of nothing just by acknowledging that it has its being in thought. Similarly, Gorgias holds that "(...) there is not what is not. For if there is what is not, it will both be and not be at the same time; in so far as it is considered (νοείται) as not being, it will not be, but in so far as what is not is, it will on the other hand be (η ὑπὸ ἔστι μὴ ὄν, πάλιν ἔσται)."

It is not straightforward whether Hegel has in mind here Gorgias' argument, but he maintains that this line of thought is a "well-known reflection" and that it is not difficult to see that "when taken in its immediacy, nothing shows itself as existing (seyend)." However, it is not "absurd" to imagine that Hegel follows here Parmenides' reasoning, but obviously for different reasons. In the Lectures, Hegel interprets that which is not (τὸ μὴ ὑπό) in the second way of inquiry with the following phra-
se: “in fact nothing inverts itself into Something since it is thought or said. We say and think something when we want to think and say nothing.”

Pure nothing is in fact impossible, but not because it is not, as Parmenides maintains, but because it is devoid of determination and as such, it must be thought with reference to being, and therefore it is, even though its existence is purely in thought. Thus, we arrive at the conclusion that, pure nothing logically vanishes into pure being in and by itself just as pure being logically vanishes into pure nothing in and by itself. Or, to put it more exactly, such vanishing into the opposite side is becoming itself.

IV. Hegel's reversal of the parmenidean logical priority of difference

Parmenides' claim to truth depends upon the separation between the genuine knowledge of unconditioned Being of all beings and the multiplicity of appearances which implies the existence of negation. In this way the conceptual totality of being (έσόν) necessarily excludes the assertion of έόντα which are not. Inquiring into the nature of pure being and pure nothing, Hegel now argues that such self-relation of being cannot be legitimate at all, for “each [i.e. being and nothing] immediately vanishes in its opposite (jedes in seinem Gegenteil verschwindet).” By vanishing (Verschwinden) Hegel means that being and nothing are not static, immediately distinguishable opposed terms. On the contrary, each contains the other as its constitutive element in itself, thereby each vanishes into the other. That is to say, contrary to what Parmenides asserts, each term has an inner movement by which the one becomes the other. And what Hegel calls the vanishing is this logical transition into the other (Übergang). This is the case when thought thinks of pure being, it posits immediately pure nothing and vice versa, with the result being that each term becomes the opposite of what they are initially taken to be. Becoming (Werden), which is strictly banished from the Parmenidean conception of truth, is thus proved to be a middle term which relates pure being to pure


81 Or, as Anton Friedrich Koch puts it, pure nothing is just an “empty logical space,” that is something completely devoid of structure, see, Anton Friedrich Koch, Die Evolution des logischen Raumes: Aufsätze zu Hegels Nichtstandard-Metaphysik (Tübingen: Mohr Siebeck, 2014), 71.

82 Cf. Hegel, The Science of Logic, 77; GW 21, 88/22: “(...) nothing refers to a being.”

83 See, DK 28 B 7.1.

84 Hegel, The Science of Logic, 60; GW 21, 69/29.
nothing as something different from both of them.

But becoming, in the Hegelian sense, does not transform externally the contentless empty thoughts into one intelligible unity. Hegel's understanding of becoming is rather a complex process of the unification of being and nothing where one should carefully consider not only their unification but also their distinction. It is therefore necessary to turn to Hegel's discussion of the transition in becoming and clarify several points.

According to Hegel, the first outcome of the analysis of pure being and pure nothing is that they are to be understood as similar, yet distinct processes. As he argues (i) "pure being and pure nothing are therefore the same," but, (ii) "the truth is just as much that they are not without distinction; it is rather that they are not the same."\(^85\) It seems almost impossible to conceive such states of affairs. Hegel is nevertheless well aware that the contradiction in question cannot be resolved just by acknowledging that pure being and pure nothing are only empty thoughts, and that they are in fact unified in the category of becoming. Their inner tension, namely the tension between the sameness and the otherness, must be equally taken into consideration because 'becoming' relies on the logical differentiation in which both being and nothing undergoes a unifying process of self-relation on the one hand and other-relation on the other. In other words, each thought is in itself self-contradictory, hence leading to the emergence of becoming.

To understand Hegel's claim on becoming, let us take a closer look at the dialectic between these two conclusions, namely the sameness and the otherness of being and nothing. If pure being is pure nothing and pure nothing is pure being, then (i) pure being and pure nothing are one and the same: they are logically interrelated and precisely because of this relation, they must be "unseparated (ungetrennt)."\(^86\) As we have already seen, both terms are equally indeterminate and due to their lack of determinateness, they are to be thought of as "empty figments of thought (die leeren Gedankendinge)."\(^87\) In this respect, it can be said that they appear as the two aspects of the same empty thought because any effort of the understanding to separate one from the other fails to establish their logical difference. The thought of pure being logically proves that such being is not what it is supposed to be. In the same way, pure nothing proves to be the opposite of what it initially seems to be. Therefore, they must be one and the same determination as they share a common ground which is their indeterminate nature.

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\(^85\) Hegel, *The Science of Logic*, 59-60; *GW* 21, p. 69/24 et seq.

\(^86\) Hegel, *The Science of Logic*, 60; *GW* 21, 69/28.

\(^87\) Hegel, *The Science of Logic*, 62; *GW* 21, 72/14. Cf. Gadamer, "The Idea of Hegel's Logic," 88: "Empty does not mean that something is not, but rather that something is which does not contain what actually ought to be there, something deprived of what it could be."
However, this line of reasoning does not take us far enough: for if they were simply the same thing there would not be constant transition from one term to the other. The fact that there is a circularity involved in thinking them demonstrates that they cannot only be convertible with one another. They must also be "absolutely distinct."  

In this case, (ii) pure being and pure nothing are not the same but distinct: each must be absolutely different from one another because, as we have seen, pure being is not what pure nothing is. Again, it is not difficult to see that if they were not distinct, the transition from one to the other would not occur at all. Nevertheless, the transition does not seem to cease at all. For when we attempt to think of one of the terms as entirely distinct from the other, the other immediately emerges.

Hegel concludes from this logical analysis that pure being and pure nothing are neither immediately one and the same, nor absolutely distinct. Instead, they coexist as non self-subsistent relata of a third term in which they are immediately distinct, yet have identical contents: "the two have no subsistence on their own but are only in becoming in this third" because "neither being nor nothing are something true but that becoming is their truth." Therefore, becoming is the unity which contains pure being and pure nothing as two distinct but equal logical moments.

Now, in arguing that becoming is the middle term between being and nothing, the speculative discourse explicitly reverses the order of Parmenidean ontological discourse. First, for Hegel, being in the Parmenidean sense of the term, cannot be logically prior to nothing since nothing as the negation of being is just as empty as being itself. But it is equally true to say that neither one can precede the other in thought. The logical priority of being's self-identity to nothing then can only come from the understanding's vain attempt to apprehend these vanishing processes without taking into consideration of their inner differentiation. But it is also important for Hegel to underline that the interpenetration of being and nothing in becoming is not something which our thinking externally imposes upon them. Unlike the Parmenidean reflection, the speculative thinking does not presuppose such interpenetration, rather it allows them to vanish into each other by virtue of their own natures without any interference. If this was not the case, then they would be only juxtaposed to one another and we would fall back into a similar position adopted by Parmenides. In other words, we would have missed Hegel's point about the becoming.

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89 Hegel, *The Science of Logic*, 69; *GW* 21, 81/2.  
90 Hegel, *The Science of Logic*, 70; *GW* 21, 81/18.  
91 Hegel's speculative logic is not only a study on the thinking of thinking but it is also a study on the conceptual thinking of what there is. "Logic" in the Hegelian sense of the term "has
Secondly, from the perspective of speculative discourse, the absolute difference which Parmenides seeks to introduce between being and nothing cannot be realized but can only be intended by the subjective reflection, because in itself each one is unified with the other through becoming: "the distinction of being and nothing (...) merely intended (gemeinten)."\(^{92}\) As the wordplay between meinen and mein suggests, the subjective reflection does not operate according to the totality of content (namely being and nothing), but according to its own one-sided assumption (such as 'only being is'). As a result of this abstraction, the distinction between is and is not cannot be posited properly. Moreover, Hegel implies that this subjective assumption leads Parmenides to oppose a realm of genuine knowledge (ἀλήθεια) together with the realm of appearances (ἐστὶ δοκοῦντα)\(^{93}\) which are, for Parmenides, "opinions of mortals (βροτῶν δόξας)."\(^{94}\) As Hegel points out "Parmenides has to make do something semblance (Scheine) and opinion (Meynung), the opposite of being and truth."\(^{95}\) That is to say what appears to Parmenides as a purely subjective opinion, is in fact Parmenides' own subjective opinion.\(^{96}\)

Thirdly, according to Hegel, the possibility of ontological difference is not an evidence of the immediate distinctness of pure being and pure nothing. For Hegel, their identity precedes this very distinction. Becoming as mediation is what makes any logical distinction possible in the first place because the intelligibility of any content depends on its self-differentiation vis-à-vis another thought-determination. The mediation, which is introduced by becoming, logically comes first since the two opposed terms are already contained within it as distinct moments. Only

\(^{92}\) Hegel, The Science of Logic, 68; GW 21, 79/19. Cf. Hegel, The Encyclopaedia Logic, §87, Remark 2, 139; GW 20, 124/6: "What distinguishes it [i.e., pure being] from nothing is something merely meant (Meynung)."

\(^{93}\) DK 28 B 1.31.

\(^{94}\) DK 28 B 1.30; Tarán, Parmenides, 9.

\(^{95}\) Hegel, The Science of Logic, 74; GW 21, 85/20.

\(^{96}\) Phenomenologically speaking, the same is true for the consciousness. In the first Gestalt of Phenomenology of Spirit, the consciousness accepts what is immediately given as "the most genuine cognition (die reichste Erkenntnis)" because of its Meynung, see, G.W.F. Hegel, The Phenomenology of Spirit, trans. Michael Inwood. (Oxford: Oxford University Press 2018), 43; G.W.F. Hegel, Gesammelte Werke g, Phänomenologie des Geistes, eds. Wolfgang Bonsiepen and Reinhard Heede. (Hamburg: Felix Meiner, 1980) 63/10. According to this naïve opinion of consciousness "(...) the Thing (Sache) is, and it is, only because it is. It is—this is what is essential for sensory knowledge, and this pure Being, or this simple immediacy, constitutes its truth," see, Hegel, The Phenomenology of Spirit, 43; GW 9, 63/27.
then can the understanding achieve the separation and fixation of the thought-determinations even though this is done without acknowledging that the opposed terms share an originary identity. It is in this sense that Hegel describes the transition into the other as purely conceptual and atemporal process: "the truth is neither being nor nothing, but rather being has passed over into nothing and nothing into being — 'has passed over,' not passes over."97 The transition does not mean that there is an ongoing vanishing into the other in time, just like in the physical world, and that reflection can detect the conceptual differentiation if it pays enough attention. On the contrary, the transition into the other in becoming is an always already accomplished atemoral process of mediati on, which poses itself as something immediate. Since the understanding cannot rise above the sphere of immediacy, it cannot grasp the mediated content as such.98 This also explains why Hegel does not take the necessity between the first and second way of inquiry in Parmenides seriously. Unlike modern scholars of Parmenides, Hegel is not concerned with the question of whether there is a "double negation" or not.99 This is because Hegel argues that the opposition between being and nothing is posited "still unconsciously,"100 which implies that there is not a "real contradiction"101 between the two ways of inquiry. The real contradiction, according to Hegel, is to be found both in the understanding's way of thinking and in the thought-determinations themselves.

V. Significance of Hegel's encounter with Parmenides

Hegel ends his discussion of Parmenides' account of being and nothing with the emergence of the category of becoming. The latter contains a more concrete elaboration of the logical moments such as coming-to-be and ceasing-to-be102 which are initially only pure being and pure nothing.

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98 Cf. Hegel, *The Science of Logic*, 12, *GW* 21, 11/17: "(...) union of opposites which is the result of speculation but to the understanding is nonsensical."
99 For Néstor-Luis Cordero, there is a "double negation" in Parmenides: both in the way of persuasion ('the being of being and the non-being of not-being') and in the way of error ('the non-being of being and the being of not-being') "there is a notion that splits into two and that is predicated or attributed to itself", see, Néstor-Luis Cordero, *By Being, It is. The Thesis of Parmenides* (Las Vegas: Parmenides Publishing, 2004),73. On the other hand, Hervé Pasqua rules out such "absolutization of Being," claiming that this line of thought would make being dependent on nothing, see, Hervé Pasqua, "L’unité de l’Etre parménidien," *Revue Philosophique de Louvain*, 90, no. 2, (Mai 1992): 144-146.
100 Hegel, *Sämtliche Werke* 17, 308.
101 See, Berti, "Hegel," 73.
102 The vanishing of pure being and of pure nothing demonstrates that there is indeed a logical transition, which is becoming. This will bring us to the second step where the unseparated being and nothing will be determined as two unities: on the one hand coming-to-be will be
While the emergence of the category of becoming is understood in relation to Parmenides, the development and the sublation of becoming, according to Hegel, are to be understood with reference to Heraclitus. Since with Heraclitus we first begin to find the idea of the self-determining negativity in general. In that respect, Hegel’s interpretation of Parmenides gives us only the transition from the indeterminate pure being and pure nothing to becoming, not the whole truth of the category of becoming.

In the light of what we have seen so far one must ask the following question: does Hegel’s interpretation shed new light on our conception of Parmenidean being in any way? Presumably, the answer ought to be negative. For one thing, Hegel does not take into account the two uses of the verb ‘to be’ in Parmenides. He uses the terms τὸ ἔstanding (the logical idea of being or das reine Sein) and τὸ ἐστὶ (the existent or das Seinde) interchangeably without questioning the implications of their relation. One reason for this is that Hegel bases his idealistic interpretation of τὸ ἐστὶ, as is almost always the case with Hegel’s relation to Presocratics, on Aristotle. In the Lectures on Parmenides, he follows Aristotle’s characterization of the Parmenidean being according to which τὸ ἐστὶ is not something material but rather an ideal or logical content. A further reason for this idea-

the transition from immediate nothing to immediate being whereas ceasing-to-be will be the transition from being to nothing. According to Hegel the discussion of the tension between these two opposite directions cannot be found in Parmenides, See, Hegel, The Science of Logic, 80-83; GW 21, 92-96.

103 See, Hegel, The Science of Logic, 60; GW 21, 70/21: “Against that simple and one-sided abstraction, the profound Heraclitus proposed the loftier, total concept of becoming and said: being is no more than nothing, or also, all flows that is, all is becoming” Cf. Hegel, The Encyclopaedia Logic, §68, Addition, 144; Werke 8, 193: “When Heraclitus says, ‘Everything flows’ (πάντα ρέει), then it is becoming that is thereby pronounced to be the basic determination of everything that is there; whereas on the contrary, as we said earlier, the Eleatics took being, rigid being without process, to be what is uniquely true. In connection with the principle of the Eleatics Heraclitus says further, ‘Being is no more than not-being’ (οὐδὲν μάλιστα τὸ ὅν τὸν μὴ ὄντος ὑπὲρ); what this expresses is precisely the negativity of abstract being, and the identity, posited in becoming, between it and nothing, which, in its abstraction, is equally unstable.”


listic reading is that Hegel understands Parmenides’ dictum on the so-called *identity* of being and thinking\(^{106}\) as a self-externalization of a spontaneous thinking in being. Though Hegel does not mention the fragment in the *Science of Logic*, we read in the *Lectures* that “thinking produces itself, what is produced is thought.”\(^{107}\) Here Hegel does not ground his understanding of being (\(rò \, eïvai\)) on Parmenides but rather on Plotinus.\(^{108}\) Still, in both cases, he simply repeats the traditional understanding that dates back to Aristotle, thus leaves no room for a non-idealistic reading of being in Parmenides. Therefore, one cannot help but notice that Hegel’s claim on the presuppositionless conception of thought-determinations does not seem to apply to his understanding of Parmenides.

What, then, should we make of Hegel’s critique of Parmenides? This idealistic approach is certainly problematic, nevertheless, Hegel’s encounter with Parmenides is important for a couple of reasons. First, the Parmenidean ontological monism serves as a blueprint for Hegel’s critique of the understanding and its functions. As we have seen, “the understanding...
determines, and holds the determination fixed\(^{109}\) and thus does not allow thinking to apprehend any logical mediation between the opposites. In Hegel's reading of Parmenides, we can see how the understanding operates through a series of assumptions about the truth and reality and why this is the cause of its own inability to surpass the contradictions that it creates itself.\(^{110}\) Secondly, Hegel maintains that all the further logical processes in the *Science of Logic* is founded upon the lesson we drew from the unification of pure being and pure nothing.\(^{111}\) Therefore, without a proper understanding of Hegel's treatment of Parmenides and the transition which takes place in becoming, we cannot fully comprehend the logical progression from one moment to another that occurs throughout the *Science of Logic*. Thirdly, and finally, Hegel keeps returning to Parmenides' philosophy (and of Eleatic school in general), directly or indirectly, in his discussion of his predecessors and contemporaries. He seems to find the echoes of the Parmenidean monism of being in the Spinozian substance, understood as *causa sui*,\(^{112}\) and in his so-called pantheism\(^{113}\) or

\(^{109}\) Hegel, *The Science of Logic*, 10; *GW* 21, 9/3.

\(^{110}\) In the Hegelian perspective, Parmenides is "the first thinker of the understanding," see, Vittorio Hösle, *Wahrheit und Geschichte*, 200.

\(^{111}\) See, Hegel, *The Science of Logic*, 51-52; *GW* 21, 60/26; "An analysis of the beginning would thus yield the concept of the unity of being and non-being — or, in a more reflected form, the concept of the unity of differentiated and undifferentiated being — or of the identity of identity and non-identity. This concept could be regarded as the first, purest, that is, most abstract, definition of the absolute — as it would indeed be if the issue were just the form of definitions and the name of the absolute. In this sense, just as such an abstract concept would be the first definition of the absolute, so all further determinations and developments would be only more determinate and richer definitions of it." Hegel adds that "all further logical determinations besides becoming (...) are therefore examples of this unity," see, Hegel, *The Science of Logic*, 62; *GW* 21, 72/7. This may sound contradictory but what Hegel means by this is rather simple: the emergence of becoming is the logical result of this unity of being and nothing whereas the sublation of becoming itself is quite different from this unity and from all the logical moments in the *Science of Logic*; one can even say that it has a peculiar status. Hegel argues that becoming is "the vanishing of vanishing" or "a union" which "destroys itself" and thus "collects itself in quiescent unity" which is existence (*Dasein*), see, Hegel, *The Science of Logic*, 81; *GW* 21, 93-94. To put it more exactly, the sublation of becoming is the dissolution of coming-to-be and ceasing-to-be which cancels their subsistence in thinking and only in this sense the process of becoming is unique in the *Logic*. Unfortunately, I leave aside the discussion on the peculiarity of becoming as it is beyond the purpose of this paper.

\(^{112}\) Please refer to, G.W.F. Hegel, *Sämtliche Werke. Jubiläumsausgabe in zwanzig Bänden, Band 19. Vorlesungen über die Geschichte der Philosophie III*, eds. Hermann Glockner. (Stuttgart: Frommann-Holzboog, 1965), 376] where Hegel claims that the substance of Spinoza is "the same thing with what Eleatics calls óv (Dies ist im ganzen die Spinozistische Idee. Es ist dasselbe, was bei den Eleaten das óv)" (my translation). Cf. also, Hegel, *Lectures on the History of Philosophy (1825-6)*, 60; Hegel, *Vorlesungen über die Geschichte der Philosophie*, 56: "This is the principal definition. Only being is what is true, only being is, and the nothing is not at all. In this brief definition, negation in general comes under the head of this nothing. We have non-being before us in more concrete form — limit, finitude, restrictedness, particularity, and so on; for the Eleatics all this is negation. *Omnis determinatio est
These examples can be multiplied\(^1\) as, in Hegel’s view, the impact of Parmenides’ thought cannot be reduced to an antiquated form of philosophical thinking.

**Bibliography**


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\(^1\) See, amongst others, Hegel, *The Science of Logic*, 61; *GW* 21, 71/13: "Those who zealously hold firm to the proposition, nothing is just nothing, are unaware that in doing so they are subscribing to the abstract *pantheism* of the Eleatics and essentially also to that of Spinoza."

\(^1\) For example in a letter to Niethammer (October 23,1812), Hegel writes that "(...) the antinomies really constitute all too poor a dialectic, (...) infinitely better is the dialectic of the ancient Eleatics and the examples preserved from it for us," see, Hegel, *The Letters*, trans. Clark Butler and Christiane Seiler. (Bloomington: University of Indiana Press, 1984), 281; Hegel, "Über den Vortrag der Philosophie auf Gymnasien," in *Werke in zwanzig Bänden, Band 4, Nürnbergber und Heidelberger Schriften 1808-1817*, eds. Hermann Glockner. (Stuttgart: Frommann-Holzboog, 1965), 515: "In Parmenides [i.e. Parmenides of Plato] it is true that this One is defined as *thought*, or that what thinks is what has being; so too in Spinoza substance is defined as the unity of being (or extension) and thought."

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\(^1\) See, amongst others, Hegel, *The Science of Logic*, 74; *GW* 21, 74/20: "Thus Parmenides has to make do with semblance and opinion, the opposite of being and truth; Spinoza likewise, with attributes, modes, extension, movement, understanding, will, and so forth." Cf also, G.W.F. Hegel, *Lectures on the Proofs of the Existence of God*, trans. Peter C. Hodgson. (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2007), 142; G.W.F. Hegel, *Sämtliche Werke. Jubiläumsausgabe in zwanzig Bänden, Band 16, Vorlesungen über die Philosophie der Religion II*, eds. Hermann Glockner. (Stuttgart: Frommann-Holzboog, 1965), 515: "In Parmenides [i.e. Parmenides of Plato] it is true that this One is defined as *thought*, or that what thinks is what has being; so too in Spinoza substance is defined as the unity of being (or extension) and thought."

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\(^1\) In the four *Remarks* that follows the *Chapter I*, Hegel discuss successively Kant’s ontological argument (*The Science of Logic*, 63-66; *GW*, 21, 74-78), Jacobi’s critique of Kant (*The Science of Logic*, 71-74; *GW* 21, 82-86) and the unconditional nature of the first principle of Fichte (*The Science of Logic*, 71; *GW*, 21, 82) which are in some way or other related to Hegel’s discussion of Parmenides.


--- *Sämtliche Werke. Jubiläumsausgabe in zwanzig Bänden, Band 19, Vortreungen über


