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Emotion in narrative

How are narratives inflected with emotion? Some narrators imbue their stories with emotion effects intended to arouse a response in their recipients (Warhol 1992: 116–120).¹ In those instances, we would be concerned with the rhetoric of persuasion (Burke 1974a [1945], 1974b [1950]) and reader/hearer reception theory (Iser 1972). But some narratives appear to be imbued with emotion for their tellers. These are characteristically personal experience narratives (Labov 1972: 354–396) but they might include any narrative in which the narrator takes the position of the central character (Rimmon-Kenan 1984: 74).² Hearers, insofar as they are aligned with that character, may be susceptible to the same access of emotion.³ Personal experience narratives bring forward the possibility that the narrator is not just representing emotions but expressing emotions, not that she is expressing the emotions she had on the occasion narrated, which would be a form of representation, but that she is having the emotions she had on that occasion, which would be a form of embodied experience. So the question is, do narratives configure emotions in their tellers (and hearers) or are narratives constructed in such a way as to get access to emotions configured elsewhere?

A conventional psychology of emotion would hold either that the authentic originary site for emotions evoked in the teller by the story is the occasion in the past on which the events recounted in the story transpired, or that the original emotions persist as an unconscious state and are triggered by the telling. On the first theory, the narrative retrieves the emotion from the past; on the second, the narrative taps into emotion in the unconscious. On both theories, emotion is configured elsewhere, in the past or in the unconscious, and maintained there until the narrative allows it to break through into the narrator’s present consciousness.

¹ Warhol 1992
² Rimmon-Kenan 1984
³ Personal experience narratives bring forward the possibil...
Both theories regard the emotions stories make us feel as somehow spurious: sentimental in the pejorative sense. Robyn Warhol, writing about nineteenth-century novels, argues that,

one reason we dislike sentimental texts which make us cry is that we cling to an idea of the body as a repository of ‘real’ emotions, a reservoir of passions that high art (such as classical or Shakespearean tragedy) can legitimately tap into and that sentimental texts can divert for exploitative or commercial purposes, thus rendering the emotions somehow less ‘authentic’. (1992: 102)

Against these theories, I would like to argue that the locus of emotion is neither the past nor the unconscious. Emotion is constructed by and for the narrative in the course of which it appears. This brings into question, as Warhol points out, ‘traditional criticism’s assumption that some feelings are “genuine” or authentic and others are not’, and puts us in the postmodern ‘position of being able to ask, is not all interior experience to some degree socially or culturally constructed?’ (1992: 104). On my argument, narrative evocations are not derivative or second-order emotions but authentic originary instances of emotion. Emotions are not being represented here; they are being occasioned.

Theories of the storage of emotion in the past or the unconscious are implicitly humoral. Emotion is conceived as an ethereal substance, kept in the body under pressure until either it bursts out onto the surface in a single explosion or is let off in puffs of steam. This conception the philosopher, Robert Solomon, calls the hydraulic theory of emotion (Solomon 1976; in Lutz 1988: 6). In her critique of such ‘ventilationist’ views, Carol Tavris points out that this language does not arise (Solomon 1976; in Lutz 1988: 6). In her critique of such ‘ventilationist’ views, Carol Tavris points out that this language does not arise from scientific observation; it is merely metaphorical (1982: 22). And, Catherine Lutz contends, the idea the metaphor expresses — that emotion is contained in the body under pressure — is not inherent in emotion phenomena but idiosyncratic to Western culture (1968: 6–7). It is, in fact, our prevailing cultural metaphor.

When emotions are seen to be occasioned, not merely represented, it becomes apparent that they are not a single monothetic effusion of substance; they are inflicted ongoingly over the course of their production. They unfold over time, modulate, shift between subject and object, reveal different aspects. They evidence, in fact, affinities, not with steam under pressure, but with sentences. Solomon calls them a species of judgement (1980: 258, 261); I regard them as a mode of perception. Martin Heidegger argues that our attention to the world is always inflected with a mood and the mood of our attention determines what it is that we are able to perceive, what comes to our attention, what we are interested in. Without mood, we would be unable to pick out anything at all from the flux of experience (Guignon 1984: 237). Perception is always emotionally inflected. Because it alters our experience of the world in this way, Jean-Paul Sartre describes emotion as a magical transformation (1939: 58). To argue, with social constructionists like Kenneth Gergen, that because emotion terms do not reflect inner states but take their meaning from social use, there are no inner states to reflect (1997: 94, 98, 102) and therefore to propose the examination of ‘emotion as discursive practice’, as discourse theorist Lila Abu-Lughod puts it (Lutz and Abu-Lughod 1993: 27), would be to suppose that fear is not in the body. To argue, with William James that emotion simply is the perception of a bodily disturbance, by contrast, would be to argue that fear is only in the body (1984 [1884]: 128). Emotion is neither in the body nor the world. Fear is experienced as an intense alertness at the rim of my auditory, visual, and tactual field. It can of course be felt in, or rather as, body but that does not mean that it can be translated into a physiochemistry of the ear, eye, or skin. I do not experience fear in those sites, still less in the brain. Fear is out there, where my senses reach for terror. As Paul Ricoeur remarks, fear is not an internal state; it is a world to be shunned (1966: 271). Fear is not merely a discourse phenomenon; what is socially constructed is not the discourse but world and the body. If emotions are perceptions or judgements of this kind, then narratives do not excavate emotions out of the past or the unconscious but rather construct them in the present in the body.

**Gestures**

When a story is told rather than written, this bodily construction of emotion is visible as gesture. Ray Birdwhistell regards ‘terms such as “gesture”, “posture”, “facial expression”, and so forth, as folk labels for outstanding, highly noticeable “peaks” of body motion’ (Kendon 1998: 247; Birdwhistell 1970: 220). These peaks are here described as gestures. In contemporary analysis, gestures are taken either to illuminate the interior processes involved in utterance production or the exterior processes of communication (Kendon 1998: 246). Their relationship to emotion is complex. Usually the face is inspected as an expressive site for emotion (Kendon 1990a: 7). Following Charles Darwin, Paul Ekman takes facial expressions to be symptomatic of emotional states (Darwin 1879; Ekman 1992: 181). But as Adam Kendon points out, the face also regulates interaction (1990a: 150). The face, specifically the gaze, oriented to the other, indicates, for instance, that the person is giving attention to the other. Prolonging the gaze evidences an intensification
of emotional involvement just as avoiding gazing evidences a diminution of involvement. Mutually held gazes mark heightened states of involvement (Kendon 1990a: 76). Kendon notes that analysts have paid far less attention to the interactional uses of the face than to the expressive ones. My intention here is to inspect the face, neither as merely expressive nor merely strategic, but as a locus for the 'socially informed body's' construction of emotion (Bourdieu 1989: 124). In this vein, it might be more useful to think of face gestures than facial expressions. Though also both expressive and representational, hand gestures, too, are bodily loci for the social construction of emotion.

In the course of the microanalysis of what was initially called body language (Fast 1977), kinesicists like Ray Birdwhistell got skeptical about subsuming gestures under the linguistic model. They went instead for a distinction between verbal and nonverbal communication (Birdwhistell 1970: 4). Sounds that were not words became part of the nonverbal repertoire. In order to retrieve aural but nonlinguistic phenomena like coughs, pauses, speech intonations, and the like into the verbal stream, the sociolinguist Michael Moerman proposed the category 'audible communication'. Kendon objected to relegating gestures to the residual category of 'inaudible communication' and proposed instead the matching term 'visible communication'. Audible and visible communication are current usage (Moerman, in Moerman and Nomura [eds.] 1990: 9–11). This transmutation causes a sea change in the way interaction presents itself for analysis: the visible ceases being either parasitic on the audible or a residual category for phenomena not captured in the verbal stream. Instead, gestures are understood to convey intelligence of their own.

In the case of gestures affiliated with talk, as Emmanuel Shegloff puts it, gestures create a 'space' into which subsequent talk is 'projected' (1984: 278; see also Kendon 1980). The effect of this is that the peak of the gesture, called the stroke, coincides with the segment of talk with which it is affiliated. This insight gives David McNeill grounds for claiming that words and gestures are co-expressive of thought and surface together in interaction (1992: 23). Nor is thought itself prior to words; rather they are dialogically related. Lev Vygotsky writes, 'The relation of thought to word is not a thing but a process, a continual movement back and forth from thought to word and from word to thought ... Thought is not merely expressed in words; it comes into existence with them' (1986: 218). As David Sudnow conceives it, thoughts and words are jointly aimed bodily improvisations that issue as speaking (1980: 25). So too are gestures, except that gesture provides an 'instantaneous, imagistic and global' image of the thought for which words provide a sequential, referential, and temporal expression (McNeill 1992: 11).

Gestures which spontaneously accompany narrative and other forms of talk must be distinguished, on the one hand, from signs (sometimes called emblems), which are arbitrary, pre-designed, conventional representations of culturally agreed upon meanings (McNeill 1992: 3) and constitute in themselves complete speech acts (Kendon, in Moerman and Nomura [eds.] 1990: 75), like the circle formed by the thumb and first finger as the sign for OK, and, on the other, from self-touching or instrumental gestures, like scratching an ear or picking up a cup of coffee, which are presumed to have no referential meaning at all (McNeill 1992: 78).4

With respect to gestures affiliated with narrative, McNeill, taking up the work of several linguists, proposes an elegant distinction between iconic and metaphoric gestures (1992). Iconic gestures conjure up the concrete object narrative mentions, like wrapping one hand above the other round an imaginary haft and moving the hands across the body, maintaining the apposition, to represent swinging an axe. Metaphoric gestures treat narrative as if it were concrete, for instance, a series of rapid flicks of the wrist slicing up the speech stream into staccato bits, accompanying the remark that someone talked rapidly (Kendon, in Moerman and Nomura [eds.] 1990: 57–58). The first is a visualization of what does not happen to be visible on the storytelling occasion; the second, a visualization of the inherently invisible, the difference between invoking and, as it were, inventing an object. Both are what McNeill calls 'pictorial', but iconic gestures, he writes, 'bear a close formal relationship to the semantic content of speech' (McNeill 1992: 12) whereas metaphorical gestures present an abstract idea rather than a concrete object or event. The gesture presents an image of the invisible — a image of an abstraction. The gesture depicts a concrete metaphor for a concept, a visual and kinesic image that we feel is, in some fashion, similar to the concept.5 Both objects and ideas have an imagery that can be represented gesturally just as both have meanings that can be articulated linguistically. Gestures flesh out words not merely by matching or illustrating them but by amplifying or even contradicting them. Thus, gestures and words can disclose different aspects of the thoughts they jointly surface.

As Victoria Lee and Geoffrey Beattie point out, 'surprisingly few researchers focused in detail on how people talk about emotional events or experiences in nontherapeutic, everyday situations' (1998: 42). This is the examination of one such nontherapeutic, though not everyday, situation. In a videotaped interview, a woman, Sharon Magee, now in her thirties, tells the story of her mother's death when she was four. The emotion with which the narrative is imbued for the narrator is grief or sadness, but her relationship to that emotion is constituted or reconstructed by the narrative. The narrative occurs as part of a longer interview by the
film makers, Barbara Attie, Janet Goldwater, and Diane Pontius, for 'Motherless', a film about people whose mothers died of abortions when they were children (1992). The interview begins with Sharon's description of Fishtown, the neighborhood of Philadelphia in which she, and her mother before her, grew up.

Face orientation and the realm of conversation

As the interview opens, the narrator's gaze is directed toward her interlocutor, positioned behind the camera. Its reciprocation by the film makers is apparent, though invisible, in the structure of the filming. Mutual gazing substantiates a condition of mutual engagement. The narrator keeps her face oriented toward her interlocutor throughout her description of Fishtown so that their mutual engagement holds across the interaction. Gaze direction is one of a constellation of bodily orientations that frame segments of interaction (Kendon 1990a: 11). Unless it is disturbed, this 'engagement framework', as Charles Goodwin describes it (1981: 10), becomes one of the background expectancies of the interaction.

Mutually oriented gazes establish the line of sight or conduit along which the story is metaphorically conducted between interlocutors. Talk is treated gesturally as a substance issuing from one body along a connecting pathway to the other. The conduit metaphor, first expounded linguistically by George Lakoff and Mark Johnson (1980), reappears gesturally, according to McNeill (1992: 386), as a representation of speech as a substance conveyed to hearers, for instance, in the hand as a container. My speculation is that this metaphor extends to face gestures. On this supposition, face gestures can also inflect the narrative production. Evidence of inflections of both the relationship between interlocutors and the production of narrative (or what McNeill [1992: 15] calls 'discourse pragmatics') appear as filming begins. In response to an unrecorded remark by the film makers, Sharon says, 'Um,' glancing upward and to the right, metaphorically collecting her thoughts from a space just above and to the right of her head, 'my mother', she nods and shifts her gaze back to the film makers, delivering the substance of her thought along a conduit to her perceivers, 'grew up in Philadelphia', she nods again, 'Um in a small neighborhood', on 'small', she holds her thumb just apart from the fingers of her right hand, displaying the smallness of it iconically, and glances sideways to her left, as if either situating her amplifying remark metaphorically just to the side of her primary description or situating the neighborhood iconically on the edge of Philadelphia, 'a- along', she returns her gaze to her interlocutors, 'the Delaware called Fishtown', she raises her right shoulder, then her left, and smiles, ending with both shoulders lifted up in a shrug. She glances down and then looks back up at the film makers, who ask their next question.

Of Sharon's three gaze disengagernents, only this third seems to close down the conduit, marking the end of her delivery, inflected with uncertainty by the shrug which is itself inflected with uncertainty by its asymmetrical and disarticulated production, as a gestural question about the appropriateness of her narrative for the film maker's purposes. Her first glance, upwards and to the right, holds the conduit in abeyance while Sharon metaphorically collects her thoughts from a space just outside and above her head in order to insert them into the narrative conduit (Plate 1). This face gesture often accompanies a hesitation in production, representing that hesitation metaphorically as a search for or retrieval of thoughts out of thin air. Presumably the conduit stays open both because the utterance is incomplete and the pause is occupied by the place-holder, 'um'. Her second glance, aside and to the left, is either a concrete metaphor for the aside she is uttering or a deictic gesture that points to the location of Fishtown with respect to Philadelphia. In either instance, it alludes to the secondary status of the neighborhood. Here, too, the incompleteness of the speech production holds open the conduit while it is being disattended. Both of these mid-sentence pauses produce a problem of production which the face gesture inflects as the search for a new thought. Filling the pause in this way discourages interruption. Both are assurances that the speaker is still engaged in the production of her speech, despite a hitch in the
Metaphoric gestures and the storyrealm

Gestures typically occur in the space in front of the body, called the gesture space or the narrative space. The gesture space is a flattened upended disk, its shallow depth roughly defined by the partial extension of the gesturer's arm forward, its width by the partial extension of the gesturer’s arms sideways, and its height by the space encompassable by the hand and eye from the top of the forehead to the top of the thighs. In the opening passage, iconic gestures materialize Fishtown in the gesture space in front of the narrator’s body: Sharon’s family’s houses, their neighborhood, its borders, corners, and streets, and directions and contingencies between places, are sketched in there. In the same space, metaphoric gestures materialize kin relationships: her mother’s relationship to her two brothers and to her parents, Sharon’s own relationship to her grandparents, her aunts, uncles, and cousins, will be given concrete representation in this space. By the end of this first passage, the kin have been located in the space so that gestures suggest both their geographical and personal relationships to each other. It is this capacity to stage the story that makes the gesture space a narrative space.

As the film makers ask her about her mother’s childhood and especially her brothers and sisters, Sharon begins to nod, glances to the left side and back, and says, ‘My mother had uh two brothers’, she extends the first two fingers of her right hand and pats down twice on a horizontal plane at her mid-chest level, at the same time raising an eyebrow at the film makers, ‘who were older than she’, she tilts her index finger up and at an angle to the right, ‘she was the youngest’, Sharon flattens her right hand and pats once downward at mid-chest just below the plane, ‘of three’, she circles the thumb and forefinger of her right hand and fans the outer three fingers upward at the initial mid-chest position. Thus ‘older’ is pushed off metaphorically to her right and ‘youngest’ is patted down both metaphorically and iconically in the center, representing both the lesser importance of the youngest sibling and her lesser stature.

The pair also position characters with respect to each other in symbolic space, not literal space, in the deictic gesture McNeill calls abstract pointing (1992: 173). The effect is to center the mother with respect to the siblings and to center the siblings with respect to the rest of the family. Metaphoric gestures provide concrete images of abstract ideas and in doing so clarify the narrator’s attitude toward those ideas. McNeill notes that metaphorics are affiliated with extranarrative or paranarrative clauses (1992: 93). Metaphorics typically construct and attend to the narrative discourse or ‘storyrealm’ (Young 1986).

Iconic gestures and the taleworld

With the next set of gestures, Sharon conjures up Fishtown in the gesture space in front of her body. She continues, glancing up and to the side, metaphorically collecting her thoughts again, ‘and um’, she shakes her head, ‘you know’, she shakes her head again, ‘they lived in Fishtown all their life’, she locates Fishtown with two flat-handed down-pats on the horizontal plane at her mid-chest level, transforming the metaphorical space for family relationships into the iconic site for Fishtown. She reconstitutes the horizontal plane as the metaphorical location of a time stream with two hand-swirls counterclockwise over the plane as she says ‘all their life’, and then reconstitutes it as a spatial location with two clockwise swirls that cluster the houses iconically on the ground just to the right of the first space as she says, ‘at different houses in the neighborhood’. The gesture serves to map the houses in the literal space in the gesture McNeill calls concrete pointing (1992: 173). She nods and continues, ‘and that’s the neighborhood where my grandparents also lived’, punctuated by five staccato down-points of her index finger over the plane, scattering the houses iconically around the neighborhood, ‘all their life’, she continues, ‘they were born and raised there too’. On ‘born and’, Sharon pats her chest twice with her open right palm and on ‘raised’, she lifts her hand outward, palm up-tilted, and fans it out over the horizontal plane, making her body metaphorically represent her grandparents as the source of the family and then dispersing their descendants iconically out into the space of the neighborhood. Iconic gestures spin out or elaborate the properties of the events the story is about. McNeill associates them with narrative clauses (1992: 93). Iconics typically construct and attend to the realm of events being narrated or ‘taleworld’ (Young 1986).

Once gestures inscribe the space, the gesturer can use deictic gestures to orient to the arrangement of either iconic or metaphorical images (McNeill 1992: 18). When Sharon pushes her mother’s brothers metaphorically off
to one side, in the gesture of abstract pointing, she is using the deictics of the gesture space to indicate the centrality of one character in her narrative. When she locates the family houses in Fishtown, Sharon is using the deictics of the gesture space iconically, in the gesture of concrete pointing, to indicate position in space. A fourth type of gesture, which McNeill calls 'beats' (1992: 15), introduces a rhythmic pulsing or beating of the hands or parts of the hands, or of the hand holding the shape of a gesture. Beats can either be initiated peripherally to the primary gestures or superimposed on one of the other three gesture types. The five down-points of the index finger that scatter the houses around the neighborhood are beats superimposed on a gesture that is already both iconic and deictic. McNeill associates beats with extranarrative clauses (1992: 93), aspects of the narrative that do not carry forward the plot. Neither deictics nor beats is prominent in this analysis; they complete McNeill's typology of affiliative gestures.

The gesture space and perspective

Narratologists note that the narrator can be either external or internal to the realm of events and within or without the body of a character (Rimmon-Kenan 1984: 94—96). From an external perspective, the realm of events appears as a microcosm of whose parts the perceiver has a simultaneous or panoramic view and of whose processes the perceiver has a transtemporal or atemporal awareness. The realm is seen from another space and time by a perceiver who has unrestricted access to its spaces and times. This perspective has been called in literary theory the omniscient narrator or the bird's eye or God's eye view. The external perspective is associated with omniscience, detachment, and objectivity.

From an internal perspective, by contrast, the taleworld adumbrates itself from around the perceiver's body as its centrality. The narrator's perceptions are bound by the horizons of the taleworld. This internal narrator can be either without the body, a sort of disembodied intelligence floating around the characters, or within the body of a character whose embodiment restricts the narrator's perceptions. These perspectives are known respectively in literary theory as the internal narrator or the narrator-as-character. The internal perspective is associated with restricted knowledge, emotional engagement, and subjectivity, these dispositions being most vivid in embodied narrators.

Gesturally, the external perspective is displayed by the containment of the taleworld in the gesture space in front of the narrator; the internal perspective is displayed by the enclosure of the narrator's body within the gesture space. Thus, writes McNeill, 'A given event may be portrayed as if it were being experienced, or as if it were being seen from a distance' (1992: 191). Since being embodied in the taleworld allows the access of emotion, the size of the narrator's body with respect to the gesture space is an index of emotional distance (McNeill 1992: 118—119).

As she continues her narrative, Sharon represents her family metaphorically as a sphere, modifying the gesture to inflect its import. 'There was an extended family', she nods, resting her chin against the inner edge of her left hand, 'uh yeah a very', she shakes her head, then draws both open curved hands together to form a sphere, 'close extended family', 'my father's sister', she counts the father and sister off on the last two fingers of her left hand, 'and her husband', she twists her hands clockwise to form a second slightly flattened sphere tilted just to the right of the first (Plate 2), 'and her children', she shapes another sphere to the right of that. As she goes on to explain, her grandmother's sister, she extends the fingers of both hands outward and pats them down as she says, 'never', she curls her hands into a soft sphere, 'had children', her fingers droop inward, 'she had lost a child actually', she shifts the soft sphere slightly to the right, 'and um', she continues, leaning her chin briefly on the back of her closed left hand, 'they were always close at hand', she rotates her hands contrapuntally around a sphere, 'you know, so at parties', she taps the sphere in lightly from all sides, 'or everyday life it was spent', she moves the sphere down slightly and tucks it in again, 'with either Aunt May, Aunt Sadie, or', she splits the sphere, reaching her cupped right hand leftward through the gesture space and planting it palm up on 'Aunt May', and then planting it again just to the right on 'Aunt Sadie', then she pulls her hand back into the gesture space on 'or' and continues, extending...
both hands palms down and fluttering her fingers over the central gesture space, 'you know somebody in the family', she pauses, resting her chin on her left hand, 'um looking after the children', she pats her left hand down to the right side of the gesture space, then tips it in an outward arc ending palm up, 'or being', she repeats the arc just to the right, 'with the cousins', she nods and then slips her hand behind her neck out of the gesture space. She inserts all of these metaphorics into the gesture space in front of her. The taleworld is miniaturized and her body is amplified with respect to it.

However, when in the course of this passage Sharon starts to talk about where her family lived her body drops down into the gesture space so that Fishtown rises up around her. Her gestures poke through the envelope of gesture space in front of her to a space beyond or lift up over her shoulder and extend to a space behind her back. When she says her father's sister's children 'grew up down the block', she lifts her right hand up above the level of her shoulder and throws it forward through the gesture space, 'and my grandmother's sister', she tosses her thumb backward over her right shoulder on 'grandmother', locating her grandmother in the space behind her (Plate 3), and then sweeps her arm outward and to the right as she continues, 'was around the corner', bisecting the gesture space and describing the curve around the corner with the back of her right hand through the broader space beyond it (Plate 4). In these instances, her body takes on the proportions it maintains as an inhabitant of the taleworld which encloses her. Technically, she is internal to the taleworld but not embodied as a character. It is clear that in these passages, she experiences herself as an inhabitant of Fishtown and a member of her family but not yet as an embodied self. 'Distance', writes McNeill, 'is least with the character voice, intermediate with the inside observer voice, and greatest with the outside observer voice. The effect of these changes is to classify events in terms of importance, and the more significant the event, the smaller the distance' (1992: 193).

Toward the end of this segment, she inserts herself gesturally into the taleworld as a character. When she says, 'I often think of being from Fishtown', she ducks to the left, hitching up her left shoulder and curving her spine so that she comes up into a space just left of her previous position, as if Fishtown were reconstituted there. When she goes on to talk about 'people who are Fishtowners', she points the fingers of both hands toward the middle of her chest on 'people who are', making her own body an iconic representation of all the inhabitants of Fishtown. Both of these gestures are produced from a perspective from within the taleworld. But on 'Fishtowners', Sharon makes the two-handed sign for 'quotes', pulling herself as narrator back outside the taleworld to comment on it for her interlocutors. She turns her attention back to the taleworld from an external perspective when she says that Fishtowners 'identify very strongly', she forms two fists as a metaphoric for 'identify', and taps the tops of them together as a metaphoric for 'very strongly', and finishes, 'with being from Fishtown'. She reconstitutes Fishtown as a space that contains her when she goes on to contrast Fishtown with 'the rest of the world — I — the rest of the world it seemed separate in a sense'. The phrase 'the rest of the world' in both iterations is affiliated with a gesture that curves along the front edge of the gesture space, cutting Fishtown off from the world beyond it. These two curved cuts serve as metaphorics for 'separate' and at the same time provide a deictic indication of the iconic edge of Fishtown.
Thus these last gestures issue from within the taleworld of Fishtown but not from the body of a specific character in it. The iconic distribution of Fishtown around her body throughout this last segment is also a metaphorical representation of Sharon’s sense of identity.

**Perspective and emotion**

Sharon goes on to describe some of her own memories of her mother leading up to her last memory, the night her mother went out and never came back again. She begins gesturing and narrating this memory as a story from the perspective of a fellow conversationalist, setting up the storyrealm as an extended turn at talk within the realm of conversation by accepting the film maker’s inquiry as an invitation to narrate rather than as a question requiring an answer, and orienting her interlocutors to the taleworld by indicating the time-frame of the story within her own life history, for instance, or explaining to them what she was thinking at the time. She continues from the perspective of an external narrator conjuring the taleworld both narratively in descriptions of thoughts, scenes, and acts and gesturally in representations of thoughts, scenes, and acts in the narrative space in front of her body. Sharon appears in the taleworld as a child. Initially she perceives herself, as she does the other characters, from an external perspective. Over the course of the story, she switches to the internal perspective of each of three characters, her mother, herself as a child, and briefly, her grandmother.

‘The last time that I saw my mother’, Sharon grazes her chin with the back two fingers of her left hand and then rests her jawbone on the palps, ‘was the night that she went out’, she brushes her left hand out and to the left, iconically representing her mother going away from her, inflected with a metaphorical suggestion of sweeping out, ‘and never came back again -’ she continues, ‘She was dressed to go out. I just thought she was going out on a date you know like she had done many times before again -’ she continues, ‘She was dressed to go out. I just thought she was going out on a date you know like she had done many times before again,’ she continues, ‘She was dressed to go out. I just thought she was going out on a date you know like she had done many times before again.9 She begins gesturing and narrating this memory as a story from the perspective of a fellow conversationalist, setting up the storyrealm as an extended turn at talk within the realm of conversation by accepting the film maker’s inquiry as an invitation to narrate rather than as a question requiring an answer, and orienting her interlocutors to the taleworld by indicating the time-frame of the story within her own life history, for instance, or explaining to them what she was thinking at the time. She continues from the perspective of an external narrator conjuring the taleworld both narratively in descriptions of thoughts, scenes, and acts and gesturally in representations of thoughts, scenes, and acts in the narrative space in front of her body. Sharon appears in the taleworld as a child. Initially she perceives herself, as she does the other characters, from an external perspective. Over the course of the story, she switches to the internal perspective of each of three characters, her mother, herself as a child, and briefly, her grandmother.

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the right to point outward again but softly, as if the gesture were fading. She adds, 'and not really understanding', opening her hand up to form an empty container as a metaphor for absence of understanding, 'fully', she turns her cupped hand over in a metaphor for full, '-I was only four', she pushes the exception diectically a notch to the right of her current gesture space with her finger, 'so I really didn't understand', she brings her finger back to the center, makes two taps out to the right and a third further out to the right, in three beats, abstractly pointing out this distinction, 'all the ramifications', she makes two loops inward around the metaphorical stream, 'but my grandmother said to me', she picks out her grandmother deictically in the narrative space, 'shortly after that', Sharon makes three taps with her index finger looping out on the metaphorical time stream and holds the point at the end while saying, 'she'll never come back again', she shakes her head, iconically representing her grandmother pointing her finger and shaking her head at her as a child, in a posture that echoes her mother's.

'And I cried. And then they- they had stopped crying by then', she raises her eyebrows to point to the separate conceptual space 'they' now inhabit, 'but uh I really cried hard and- But it was so upsetting to my grandparents- my crying- my upsetment', she nods deictically toward the concept, 'that I don't think that I cried much beyond maybe you know', she lifts out her right hand in the open gesture for absence, here of her absence of certainty about the timing, 'the first couple weeks after', she waves out to the right and in over the metaphorical time stream, 'or the initial days', she beats two side chops of her hand, 'after my mother's death I was very aware that it was hard on them. Hard enough- she shifts her head a notch to the left to place this qualification deictically. 'This was hard enough and uh I didn't want to make it harder', she pauses, 'for them'.

The phenomenology of emotion

In the first gesture the narrator makes in this story, a left-handed sweep outward and to the left, affiliated with 'she went out', the narrator's hand becomes her mother's body and its movement, sweeping out, her mother's movement (Plates 5, 6, and 7). With this gesture, the taleworld materializes briefly in the gesture space. The taleworld is miniaturized by the narrator and her body amplified with respect to it. In the second gesture the narrator makes during this story, an arc of the hand through the frontal plane to a vertical position with the back of her hand turned toward her body, affiliated with 'I have a- picture', the narrator's hand iconically represents a picture she is holding up in front of her face (Plate 8).
Here the narrator's body is reduced to the proportions it maintains as an inhabitant of the taleworld which now encloses her. She is implicated bodily in her own narrative space.

The picture, literalized by the iconic gesture, is not, it turns out, a literal picture but a metaphor for her memory as it presents itself to her on the storytelling occasion. It is, as she says, 'in my head' (Plates 9, 10, and 11). So the narrator's hand iconically represents a picture which in turn metaphorically represents a memory. And the memory possesses her. As she tells the story, the image of her mother standing before her comes to her as clearly — so her gesture implies — as a picture. The evidence of that possession is Sharon's engulfment by the gesture, her bodily enclosure in the world of memory. And later in the story, it becomes apparent that this gesture is itself a transparency to a deeper memory.

When she begins to tell the story of her mother's death, Sharon does not substantiate the taleworld gesturally. Her self-touching gestures suggest self-absorption and disengagement. As she continues, bits of the taleworld begin to appear in the gesture space and she reorients to that realm as an external narrator conjuring it up from outside. The taleworld remains miniature in a series of gestures in which Sharon's hand represents her mother's body 'standing', 'ready to go out', or 'turning' (Plates 12, 13, and 14), an underhand flip toward the narrator's body which transmutes into an overhand point away from her body. It is at this moment that Sharon becomes an internal narrator, gesturing and narrating from within the body of a character inside the taleworld. And the character she becomes is her mother, pointing her finger at her daughter and admonishing her, nodding, 'and you be good'. In her next utterance, she
switches from her mother’s body to her own body as a child, ducking into it as she says, ‘I was very cooperative’. It is the first time in the story that Sharon has been embodied in her own body.

Sharon pulls back out, not only of the taleworld as an internal narrator, but also of the storyrealm as an external narrator, with the quotative gesture with which she qualifies ‘good kid’. When she goes on to describe everybody crying, she moves back into the perspective of an external narrator containing the characters in the gesture space. Sharon maintains this exteriority to the taleworld until she comes to the utterance, ‘and they had told me that your mother died’. That utterance is affiliated with three beats which mark what McNeill (following Michael Silverstein 1984) calls ‘points of significant discontinuity in discourse’ (1992: 93). The utterance takes the form of free indirect discourse, the ‘linguistic combination of two voices’ (Rimmon-Kenan 1984: 110), the direct voice of quoted speech and the indirect voice of reported or described speech. Sharon starts the utterance in indirect discourse recounting what they had told her. If she had kept the utterance in indirect discourse, it would have finished ‘and they had told me that my mother had died’. Instead, in the middle of the utterance, Sharon switches to direct discourse, quoting them as saying to her, ‘your mother died’. If the utterance had been produced in direct discourse throughout it would have taken the form, ‘and they told me, “Your mother died”’. The effect of free indirect discourse is to shift Sharon, with the transformation of the expected ‘me’ into ‘your’, from an external narrator recounting one of the characters’ remarks to the internal character to whom the remark was addressed.10 At the moment she recounts being told of her mother’s death, the narrator turns into herself as a child. Her next utterance issues gesturally from within the child’s body, ‘That’s the thing that came into my head again’ (Plates 15, 16, and 17). What has come to her is the realization that that memory of her mother will now be the last one she will ever have. So the memory she narrates is not just a memory, the memory of the moment her mother turned to her just before going out, but also the memory of a memory, the memory that came to her as her last memory on hearing of her mother’s death. The temporal locus of memory transmutes, anchoring itself in a Joycean vein at two temporal junctures: the moment in the past when she last saw her mother; and the moment in the past when she realized that that was the last time she would ever see her. The single ‘picture’ is an aperture into two memories.

Sharon continues gesturing from within her own body as a character as she says, ‘I remember looking out and the tears being at the bottom of my eyes’ (Plates 18 and 19).11 As she touches her lower lids with the tip of her finger, it becomes evident that in fact she does have tears in her eyes.
Once Sharon is enclosed in the taleworld as a character, she shifts among embodiments, gesturing not only from within her own body but also from within the body of her mother and her grandmother. But after the moment she is told of her mother's death, she never gestures from within her own body as a character again in this story.

Notice that it is at the moment that Sharon is in the body of herself as a child that she cries. The narrative of her mother's death is not for her inherently inflected with emotion. Rather the narrative takes on emotional inflections as she invests herself bodily in the taleworld. And over this investment narrators have some measure of control. To a certain
extent, narrators can choose whether to stand outside the taleworld, staging it in the gesture space in front of them, or to enter into it bodily, letting the gesture space surround them. Narrative constructs the relationship between emotion and memory. Two aspects of memory are sketched by Sharon’s metaphoric gesture for memory as a picture. One is that it arises unbidden, it pops into our head. In the case of visual memory, it occurs as an image or picture in the mind. And two, memory has the capacity to engage the body, evidenced by the enclosure of the body in the gesture space, that is, to involve the body in the experience the memory is of. When it does this, we experience the memory as emotion.

Carol Worthman holds that the emotion recruits the memory (in press), that is, that when the memory arises unbidden, what has brought it to mind is the emotion state. She describes emotions as ‘transducers’ between social experience and physical states, ways the body becomes aware of itself by bringing physical states forward as personal experience (in press). Narrative provides a chance to perceive the past as either memory or experience. As memory, the past appears as if it were a microcosm seen from a distance so that the narrator contains the past in the present and at the same time seals off the past from the present. In this rendering, the narrator is a split subject, a second narrative self encompassing her previous self as a character. As experience, the past engages the narrator as reality perceived from the inside so that the narrator experiences the taleworld, not from her anchorage in the present as narrator, but from her anchorage in the past as a character. In this rendering, the character is the self. Narrative neither pulls emotion from the past into the present nor draws it up from the depths of the psyche. Rather sometimes during the storytelling, either the taleworld envelopes the narrator as a character or the narrator enters into the taleworld as a character so that she is transported bodily to the realm in which the emotion transpires. Emotion is constructed by the way narrative assimilates memory to meaning on the occasion of the telling, not by making the past present to the narrator imaginatively, but by making the narrator present to the past corporeally.

Metaphors of emotion

McNeill notes that whereas iconic gestures are universally recognizable, metaphoric gestures tend to be culture-specific (1992: 151). We depict concrete objects in mutually intelligible ways but the way we think about abstract ideas is distinctive to a philosophical history. For instance, Westerners often use a metaphoric of hands radiating away from the head in beams to mean ‘wondering why’, Japanese gesturers depict ‘beams that radiate out from the stomach. This corresponds to the traditional Japanese metaphoric locus in the gut for feelings, thoughts, and mental activity in general’ (McNeill 1992: 158). By contrast, it is because of the residual iconicity of signs, Oliver Sacks remarks, that Deaf signers from different cultures are able to communicate with each other far more quickly than speakers from those cultures (1990). But as Lakoff and Johnson suggest, the disposition to understand the abstract in terms of the concrete appears to be universal (1980: 324). Though they dispute that metaphors are purely linguistic phenomena (1980: 287), Lakoff and Johnson nonetheless trace out the metaphors they examine through language. They note that physical metaphors, for instance, confer entity or object status on phenomena that are inherently insubstantial (1980: 295). Johnson goes on to argue that metaphors arise out of embodied experience: ‘human bodily movement, manipulations of objects, and perceptual interactions involve recurring patterns’ — he calls them ‘image schemata’ — which structure abstract understanding (1987: xii). ‘[W]hat is typically regarded as the “bodily” works its way up into the “conceptual” and the “rational” by means of imagination’ (1987: xi). This bodily basis of understanding, exquisitely deciphered out of language, is much more directly apprehensible in metaphoric gestures. McNeill’s work makes the corporeal transformation of the concrete into the conceptual visible as gesture.

Metaphors, including metaphoric gestures, provide us with the power to think of the abstract in concrete terms — in images of space, forms, and movement that are not just concrete images but that become abstract concepts. This fact explains why metaphors are such a common accompaniment of speech in narrations and conversation and why apparently all cultures provide schemata for constructing homologies between abstract content and concrete imagery. Metaphoric images are the culture’s way of influencing individuals’ thought. (1992: 178–179)

Toward the end of the interview, the film makers give Sharon copies of contemporaneous newspaper accounts of the death of her mother. She has never seen these stories before, and as she reads them, she cries. She does not narrate, and she does not make metaphoric or iconic gestures and yet the gestures she does make intimate a metaphor for emotion. As she reads, Sharon touches her lips with the back of her hand; presses her index finger to her lips; catches her breath in her throat and raises her hand, trembling, to her forehead, partially shielding her eyes, then she brushes her hand across her forehead, closes it, and rests her temple against her knuckles. She now has tears in her eyes. She blows out her breath and shields her eyes again; brushes her forehead with the tips of her fingers. Once she says, ‘Oh God’, and drops her forehead into her hand. Another time she drops the paper, presses her fingertips against her eyes and then
draws them over her temples, ‘She came out on the highway’, her voice breaks and she covers her eyes again, moving her hand up to rest her forehead on it as she continues reading.

Kendon speculates that emotion breaks through whenever a narrator is processing new, and to her painful, information about her mother’s death (personal communication, 1993), and indeed it is these new discoveries that she sometimes announces as she reads on, ‘I didn’t know it was the third time’, or ‘a lethal injection of pine oil’. But it is the gestures of touching, covering, or pressing her lips, her nose, or her eyes with the back of her hand, the tips, backs, or fronts of her fingers, her palm, the side of her index finger, the ball of her thumb, which continue throughout this phase of the interview, whether the information is new or not, that embody the metaphor. Later in the interview, Sharon reads aloud from the newspaper. The film makers have asked her if she would like to quit and she has declined. She begins, her face now wet with tears, ‘A young woman, who apparently died in an abortion attempt, was identified at the county morgue by her parents shortly before dawn...’, her voice breaks. She continues reading aloud in a tearful voice till she comes to the sentence, ‘A man said he had found a woman lying on the highway’, her face crumples, and she begins sobbing too hard to continue. Her face is now unconcealed. Averting her eyes and interposing self-touching gestures between her eyes or mouth and her interlocutors, take her face out of engagement by dismantling the conduit between them. But these gestures may not be just self-touching, they may be a rare instance of metaphoric gestures involving the whole body (McNeill 1992: 151). In such gestures, the body is not an iconic representation of another body or of itself at another time but a metaphoric representation of an abstract idea. And the abstract idea Sharon’s body represents is the humoral idea of emotion as contained in the body under pressure until it ruptures through the skin. ‘Some... gestures’, McNeill notes, ‘embody ancient physical theories which continue to live on secretly in gesture form’ (1992: 157). In medieval humoral theory, emotion causes a turbulence of the interior called the flux which either breaks through the surface in the form of various bodily issues or is drawn off by such practices as emetics, sudorifics, purgatives, abortifacients, diuretics, or bloodletting (Duden 1991: 11, 130, 144–145). The continent modern body requires the suppression of these bodily flows in the interests of preserving its propriety. Sharon holds in, presses back, pats down these emotional overflows by the gestures that initially appear to be self-touching. Once the fluid emotional humor has broken through, of course, there is no point in continuing to try to close off the apertures of her body. Arguably, Sharon embodies metaphorically the very theory of emotion that I have been concerned to dismantle intellectually.

Metaphoricity does not necessarily lift emotion away from the body into the domain of abstract thought; it can also return thought to the body as emotion. The abstract metaphors in terms of which we conceive emotion are at root corporeal. As McNeill interprets Vygotsky, ‘Thought itself is the formation of contrasts from the preceding context, and it is this contrast, visible each time Sharon announces a new thought, that generates what Vygotsky calls ‘psychological predicates’, ‘the novel, discontinuous, unpredictable component of the current thought’ (McNeill 1992: 127–128).

We come now to the last step in our analysis of the inner planes of verbal thought. Thought is not the superior authority in this process. Thought is not begotten by thought; it is engendered by motivation, i.e., by our desires and needs, our interests and emotions. Behind every thought there is an affective-volitional tendency, which holds the answer to the last ‘why’ in the analysis of thinking. (Vygotsky 1992: 252).

We are witness in this phase of the interview to the moment thought differentiates itself from its context, what McNeill calls ‘the breaking edge of an inner discourse’ (1992: 2), just before thought makes its appearance as gesture or as word.

### Appendix I: Transcription conventions

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Capital letters</th>
<th>Start of utterance</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Down intonation</td>
<td>at end of utterance</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Up intonation</td>
<td>Correction phenomena</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Adapted from James Schenken (1978).

### Appendix II: Narrative transcription

**Transcript**

The last time that I saw my mother was the night that she went out and never came back again...

Attie et al. 1992

**Perspective audibles**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Co-con</th>
<th>The last time</th>
</tr>
</thead>
</table>

**Visibles**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Self-touching Gesture</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>(S-t): Grazes chin with back two fingers of left hand</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Adapted from James Schenken (1978).
that I saw my mother was the night that she went out and never came back again um.
She was dressed to go out. I just thought she was going out on a date you know like she had done many times before um.
And uh she always gave me a hug and a kiss before she left but I have a picture of her standing -in my head I have a picture of her standing at the door ready to go out and turning back to me and saying and you be good and I was very cooperative I was a good kid you know um
but that moment is frozen in my head because- and the next morning when I woke up and everybody was crying-
My aunts were there -my two aunts that I had said before my grandmother and my grandfather and they had told me that your mother died.
That's the thing that came into my head again.
I remember looking out and the tears being at the bottom of my eyes and watching everybody how upset they were and that was what I remembered in my head was her saying that you be good and not really understanding fully so I really didn't understand all the ramifications but my grandmother said to me shortly after that
N-as-C  she'll never come back again.

Ext.N  And I cried.
And then they- they had stopped
criying by then
but uh
I really cried hard and-
But it was so upsetting to
my grandparents
-my crying -my upsetment
that I don't think that I
cried much
beyond maybe you know
the first couple weeks after
or the initial days after
my mother's death I
was very aware that it was
hard on them.
Hard enough-
This was hard enough
and uh
I didn't want to make it harder
for them.

Co-con  But it was so upsetting to
my grandparents
-I don't think that I
cried much
beyond maybe you know
the first couple weeks after
or the initial days after
my mother's death I
was very aware that it was
hard on them.
Hard enough-
This was hard enough
and uh
I didn't want to make it harder
for them.

Key to transcription in Appendix

First column: Ontological status of communication

Indicates narrator's orientation to her discourse as:
- a fellow conversationalist or co-conversationalist (Co-con),
- a storyteller or external narrator (Ext.N),
- an internal narrator who is not a character (Int.N),
- or a narrator as a character (N-as-C).

Second column: Audible communication

Represents the audible aspect of communication.
Italics indicate words with which gestures are affiliated.
Line ends indicate breath pauses;
Indentations mark continuous lines.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Gesture Description</th>
<th>Narrative Text</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>M/Beat: Two side cuts of hand.</td>
<td>fine by then</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>D: Shifts head to leftward sector.</td>
<td>eyefroes gesture to separate space 'they' now inhabit.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>M/D: Waves hand out to right and in.</td>
<td>And I cried.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>M: Shrugs and sweeps right hand out, palm open.</td>
<td>And then they- they had stopped</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>D: Nods toward concept.</td>
<td>crying by then</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>M/D: Eyebrows gesture to separate space 'they' now inhabit.</td>
<td>but uh</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
| | I really cried hard and-

Third column: Visible communication

Represents the visible aspect of communication.

- Signs: Conventional gestures with agreed upon meanings (Signs).
- Metalinguistic gestures: Gestures affiliated with words.
- Iconic gestures: Gestures which conjure up concrete objects (I).
- Metaphoric gestures: Gestures which concretize abstract ideas (M).
- Deictic gestures: Gestures which point (D).
- Beats: Rhythmic gestures which punctuate discourse (B).
- Self-touching gestures: Gestures that touch the body (S-t).
- Instrumental gestures: Gestures that manipulate objects (Ins).

Notes

- Aspects of this work were presented at the Inquiries into Social Construction Conference, Durham, NH, 1993; the American Folklore Society Meetings, Eugene, OR, 1993; the Society For Visual Anthropology Meetings, Washington, DC, 1993; the Modern Language Association Meetings, San Diego, CA, 1994; and the Fifth Congress of the International Association for Semiotic Studies Meetings, Berkeley, CA, 1994.

1. According to Robyn Warhol, such emotion effects include alliteration; apostrophes to the reader/hearer; what Gerald Prince calls 'unnarrating', that is, invoking as undescribable; Gerard Genette's 'internal focalization', direct address; plot reversals; contradictory characters; and repeated moments (1992: 116–120).


2. This is a matter of what Gerard Genette calls 'internal focalization', the presentation of events from the perspective of the character who experiences them (1980: 189).

3. The narrator, the implied reader or hearer of the story, as Shlomith Rimmon-Kenan points out, 'is situated at the same narrative level as the narrator' (1984: 104) so that, Warhol notes, Genette's internal focalization, which 'limits narrative perspective ... to one character's consciousness, ... invites the reader [or hearer] to participate emotionally from the subject-position of the [character]' (1992: 117).

4. The signs used by signers, as opposed to the act of spelling out a spoken language in sign language, retain traces of the iconicity of gestures but can also be concatenated like talk to produce complete speech acts (Kendon, in Moerman and Nomura 1990: 75). In American Sign Language, for instance, the root signs are themselves inflected spatially for durational aspects as well as juxtaposed to each other spatially to indicate relationship. As Oliver Sacks notes, the face and other parts of the body 'converge upon the root signs, fuse with them, and modify them, compacting an enormous amount of information into the resulting signs' (1990: 87). According to William Stokoe, this compaction is intensified by the fact that signs, unlike either spatial representations such as writing or models, or temporal representations like speech, have 'the three spatial dimensions accessible to
a signer's body, as well as the dimension of time' (Sacks 1990: 90). Though gestures partake of this four-dimensionality, the 'linguistic use of space', as Sacks describes it, distinguishes Sign from both language and gesture (1990: 88).

5. Metaphoric gestures were first pointed out to McNeill by George Lakoff (McNeill 1992: 14).

6. Sociolinguists generally and Adam Kendon in particular agitate for films of both participants in an interaction in order to be able to decipher their mutual orientation. This film precludes that possibility but the narrator's bodily practices evidently orient her invisible interlocutors even though it is not evident to us precisely what evokes them.

7. For transcription conventions, see appendix.

8. I would like to thank Barbara Attie, Janet Goldwater, and Diane Pontius for permission to analyze a videotape of their interview of Sharon Magee for their film, 'Motherless', and to use frame grabs from it to illustrate this article.

9. See appendices for transcription conventions and complete transcription.

10. This is an instance of what Deborah Kapchan calls 'hybridity', at the utterance level serving as a locus of transformation (1996).

11. Narratively speaking, the laminator verb 'remember', in Goffman's term (1974: 505), indicates a narrator laminated outside the taleworld but gesturally, Sharon is still inside.

References


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