What is it like to be me?

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# Abstract

No matter how many words/gestures one uses to describe his/her qualia, I won't be able to know what it was like for him/her to experience his/her qualia. I know what it was like for me to experience my qualia, simply because I can remember what it was like for me to experience my qualia.

So, to me, there is no evidence that anyone else can experience his/her qualia.

So, one can't prove to others that he/she can experience his/her qualia. One can’t (use any words/gestures to) prove to others that he/she can experience his/her qualia.

"What is it like to be a bat?" When I imagine what it is like to be a bat, I'm actually imagining that I am the bat. Or in other words, I’m imagining that the bat is me.

When I imagine that a bat is me, I’m actually imagining that a ghost/homunculus is sitting inside the bat’s body. What does this mean? What/who is that ghost/homunculus? That ghost/homunculus is a “clone” of me! That ghost/homunculus is another “me”!

So, when I imagine that a bat is me, I’m actually imagining that I am sitting inside the bat’s body.

So, the question “What is it like to be a bat?” is actually equivalent to the question “What is it like to be me?” or the question “If I sit inside a bat’s body (and control/feel the bat’s body) as the bat itself, what is it like to be me (under that situation)?”.

The question “What is it like to be me?” is actually equivalent to the question “If I sit inside a human’s body (and control/feel the human’s body) as the human himself, what is it like to be me (under that situation)?” or the question “If I sit inside my body (and control/feel my body) as myself, what is it like to be me (under that situation)?”.

Regarding its usage, the term “qualia” is equivalent to “(subjective) feeling” and “(subjective) experience”.

The term “qualia” draws our attention to the ontological question “What is the nature of (subjective) feeling/experience?”. The term “qualia” urges us to think about the ontological question “What is the nature of (subjective) feeling/experience?” endlessly.

I am a person/agent. I have subjective feelings/experiences. It’s a leap for me to assume/imagine that another person/agent also has subjective feelings/experiences. When I assume/imagine that another person/agent also has subjective feelings/experiences, I am actually imagining that person/agent to be me. However, that person/agent is not me. So, I have no way to know whether another person/agent has subjective feelings/experiences or not.

# Body

## A

Actually, I have a different physical body at every moment, so I become a different person/agent at every moment. I know what it is like to be the current me. I can remember what it was like to be me yesterday. But I don't know what it will be like to be me tomorrow.

I can imagine what it will be like to be me tomorrow.

I can imagine what it will be like to be me tomorrow -- if I win the Nobel prize tomorrow.

I can imagine what it will be like to be me tomorrow -- if I lost my wallet tomorrow.

Can I imagine what it is like for someone to win the Nobel prize? I can't imagine what it is like for someone else to win the Nobel prize. I can only imagine what it is like for me to win the Nobel prize.

I can imagine what it is like for the current me to win the Nobel prize.

I can imagine what it is like for the 18-years-old me to win the Nobel prize.

Can I imagine what it is like for someone to swim? I can't imagine what it is like for someone else to swim. I can only imagine what it is like for me to swim. Because I can remember what it was like for me to swim.

Can I imagine what it is like for someone to fly? I can't imagine what it is like for someone else to fly. I can only imagine what it is like for me to fly.

Can I imagine what it is like for someone to swim like a frog? I can't imagine what it is like for someone else to swim like a frog. I can only imagine what it is like for me to swim like a frog. (Because I can remember what it was like for me to swim like a frog.) I can't imagine what it is like for a frog to swim like a frog.

Can I imagine what it is like for someone to fly like a bat? I can't imagine what it is like for someone else to fly like a bat. I can only imagine what it is like for me to fly like a bat. I can't imagine what it is like for a bat to fly like a bat.

When I read someone else' article regarding what it was like for him to win the Nobel prize, can I imagine what it was like for him to win the Nobel prize? No. I can only imagine what it is like for me to win the Nobel prize.

If he said that "It felt like winning a lottery!", and if I have never won a lottery before, then I will not be able to understand his words.

If I have won a lottery before, then I know what it was like for me to win a lottery. I don't know what it was like for him to win a lottery.

Even if I believe that winning the Nobel prize is like winning a lottery, I still don't know what it was like for him to win a lottery. I will never know what it was like for him to win a lottery. So, I will never know what it was like for him to win the Nobel prize.

No matter how many details he gave in his article, I won't be able to know what it was like for him to win the Nobel prize.

No matter how many words/gestures one uses to describe his/her qualia, I won't be able to know what it was like for him/her to experience his/her qualia. I know what it was like for me to experience my qualia, simply because I can remember what it was like for me to experience my qualia.

So, to me, there is no evidence that anyone else can experience his/her qualia.

So, one can't prove to others that he/she can experience his/her qualia. One can’t (use any words/gestures to) prove to others that he/she can experience his/her qualia.

I can remember what it was like to be me yesterday. I can remember that by accessing my memories subjectively. My memory can store words and pictures. My memories are more than the words and pictures (being stored in my memory).

I will never be able to access your memories subjectively like I access my own memories, simply because you are not me. I will never be able to access the memories of another physical object/process subjectively like accessing my own memories, simply because another physical object/process is not me.

My memories are more than the words and pictures (being stored in my memory). But I can only use words/pictures/gestures to describe my memories to you. I can access my memories subjectively. But I can’t access your memories subjectively (like I access my own memories). I can only imagine your memories through the words/pictures/gestures used by you.

I can access my memories subjectively. Or in other words, I can access my memories in a subjective way. Or in other words, I can access my memories from a subjective perspective.

I can access my memories objectively too. Or in other words, I can access my memories in an objective way too. Or in other words, I can access my memories from an objective perspective too.

I can’t access your memories subjectively. Or in other words, I can’t access your memories in a subjective way. Or in other words, I can’t access your memories from a subjective perspective.

I can only access your memories objectively. Or in other words, I can only access your memories in an objective way. Or in other words, I can only access your memories from an objective perspective.

My memories are stored in my physical brain; your memories are stored in your physical brain. I have two ways to access my memories (in my physical brain); I have only one way to access your memories (in your physical brain). I can access my memories (in my physical brain) from two different perspectives; I can only access your memories (in your physical brain) from one perspective.

Can you access your memories (in your physical brain) from two different perspectives too? I have no way to know that. I don’t know. I know that you are not me. So, I know that I shouldn’t assume/imagine that you have the same capabilities as I have.

## B

"What is it like to be a bat? (Nagel, 1974)" When I imagine what it is like to be a bat, I'm actually imagining that I am the bat. Or in other words, I’m imagining that the bat is me.

When I imagine that a bat is me, I’m actually imagining that a ghost/homunculus is sitting inside the bat’s body. What does this mean? What/who is that ghost/homunculus? That ghost/homunculus is a “clone” of me! That ghost/homunculus is another “me”! (Yu, 2021)

So, when I imagine that a bat is me, I’m actually imagining that I am sitting inside the bat’s body.

So, the question “What is it like to be a bat?” is actually equivalent to the question “What is it like to be me?” or the question “If I sit inside a bat’s body (and control/feel the bat’s body) as the bat *itself*, what is it like to be me (under that situation)?”.

The question “What is it like to be me?” is actually equivalent to the question “If I sit inside a human’s body (and control/feel the human’s body) as the human *himself*, what is it like to be me (under that situation)?” or the question “If I sit inside my body (and control/feel my body) as *myself*, what is it like to be me (under that situation)?”.

I will never know what it is *actually* like to be a bat. I can only imagine what it is like to be a bat. In order to imagine what it is like to be a bat, I need to imagine what it is like if I am a bat. But I will never actually *be* a bat, so I will never know what it is actually like to be a bat.

I will never know what it is *actually* like to be another physical object/process. I can only imagine what it is like to be another physical object/process. In order to imagine what it is like to be another physical object/process, I need to imagine what it is like if I am that physical object/process. But I will never actually *be* that physical object/process, so I will never know what it is actually like to be that physical object/process.

After reading the present article, do you know what is it like to be me? You know what it is like to be you, but you don’t know what it is like to be me. No matter how well you know me, you will never know what it is like to be me, simply because you will never actually *be* me.

## C

What is it like to be me? I don’t think I can use words/pictures/gestures to describe it clearly. I don’t think I can use words/pictures/gestures to describe it (to myself) clearly.

Right now, I am sitting here, typing. I feel the existence of my physical body. I feel the existence of my environment. I feel the existence of my back, although I can’t see my back.

I feel a mood, which is a mixture of feelings, but I can’t describe it clearly immediately. It will take some time for me to study these feelings.

I feel some intentions, but I can’t describe them clearly without studying them further. I know that, if I study any intention of mine, I will meet some new intentions during the study.

I have a feeling. But when I try to study the feeling, I will meet some new feelings during the study.

When I try to study “myself”, “myself” becomes the object (to be studied), but myself is also the subject (who is studying) at the same time. The object and the subject are the same thing. I am both the subject and the object at the same time. It will be helpful if the object can be still during the study, but the subject can’t be still during the study. It makes studying difficult.

When I use my thoughts to analyze/study my thoughts, my thoughts/study will never stop, and I will never have a still picture of my thoughts. It’s like a dog who is running in a circle, trying to catch its own tail.

Right now, I am sitting here, typing. I feel the existence of my physical body. I feel the existence of my environment. Then, what are my qualia? Everything I feel/experience/access, is my qualia. Nothing I feel/experience/access, is not my qualia.

However, if you are sitting in the same room with me right now, you can’t feel/experience/access any of my qualia. If you are sitting in the same room with me right now, you are feeling/experiencing/accessing your own qualia. For example, you can see a flower in the room. When you see the flower in the room, you are feeling/experiencing/accessing your own qualia (regarding the image/smell of the flower). So, you can say “Hey! I’m feeling/experiencing/accessing my qualia (regarding the image/smell of the flower)! You can’t feel/experience/access my qualia (regarding the image/smell of the flower)! You will never feel/experience/access my qualia (regarding the image/smell of the flower)! Isn’t my qualia (regarding the image/smell of the flower) magical/mysterious/brilliant? You can only feel/experience/access your own qualia (regarding the image/smell of the flower).”. Obviously, regarding its usage, the term “qualia” is equivalent to “(subjective) feeling” and “(subjective) experience”.

The term “qualia” draws our attention to the ontological question “What is the nature of (subjective) feeling/experience?”. The term “qualia” urges us to think about the ontological question “What is the nature of (subjective) feeling/experience?” endlessly. We don’t feel such an urge if we use the term “(subjective) feeling/experience” instead of “qualia”. We don’t pay attention to the ontological question “What is the nature of (subjective) feeling/experience?” if we use the term “(subjective) feeling/experience” instead of “qualia”.

If everything I feel/experience/access is my qualia, then what is the ontological nature of my qualia?

If everything I feel/experience/access is my (subjective) feeling/experience, then what is the ontological nature of my (subjective) feeling/experience? What is the meaning of the term “ontological nature” under this context? I shouldn’t imagine that my (subjective) feeling/experience has an ontological nature.

For something to have an ontological nature, I should be able to distinguish/divide that thing from something else. But if everything (I have access to) is my (subjective) feeling/experience, how can I distinguish/divide my (subjective) feeling/experience from something else?

When I try to distinguish/divide my (subjective) feeling/experience from the cosmos, the cosmos is actually part of my (subjective) feeling/experience, although I imagine the cosmos to be “objective”.

When I try to distinguish/divide my (subjective) feeling/experience from the cosmos, it seems like that the cosmos has its ontological nature, and it seems like that my (subjective) feeling/experience has its ontological nature too. However, the cosmos is actually part of my (subjective) feeling/experience. Or in other words, the division is false/illegitimate. The material world is actually part of my mental world. It’s false/illegitimate to divide them ontologically. It’s false/illegitimate to divide the material world from my mental world ontologically.

After I divide my (subjective) feeling/experience from the cosmos, what is the difference between the cosmos and my (subjective) feeling/experience? The only difference (between them) is that -- they are different (from each other)!

After I divide my (subjective) feeling/experience from the cosmos, what another person/agent is thinking about “in its mind/consciousness”, is part of my (subjective) feeling/experience, not part of the cosmos.

After I divide my (subjective) feeling/experience from the cosmos, the cosmos is simply a state machine (Yu, 2021). After I divide my (subjective) feeling/experience from the cosmos, everything but the state machine is part of my (subjective) feeling/experience. The cosmos is simple and clean.

After I divide my (subjective) feeling/experience from the cosmos, the cosmos is simply a state machine, and a flower in my room is a part of the state machine. But actually, the flower is a part of my (subjective) feeling/experience. I (falsely/illegitimately) treat the flower as a part of the cosmos, because I (falsely/illegitimately) divided my (subjective) feeling/experience from the cosmos.

When I point my finger to a flower in my room, I know that you can see/smell/feel/experience/access the flower (which is a part of the cosmos), and I know that you can’t see/smell/feel/experience/access the flower (which is a part of my (subjective) feeling/experience).

When I assume a flower in my room to be a part of the cosmos, I assume that you can see/smell/feel/experience/access the flower, and I assume that your physical body is a part of the cosmos too.

When I assume a flower in my room to be a part of my (subjective) feeling/experience, I assume that you can’t see/smell/feel/experience/access the flower, and I assume that your physical body is a part of my (subjective) feeling/experience too.

When I assume a flower in my room to be a part of the cosmos, if I assume the flower to be a part of my (subjective) feeling/experience at the same time, then it’s a category error.

When I assume a flower in my room to be a part of my (subjective) feeling/experience, I assume that you can’t see/smell/feel/experience/access it. Under this context, I should assume that your physical body is a part of my (subjective) feeling/experience too. If I assume that your physical body is a part of the cosmos, then it’s a category error.

For a flower in my room, I should either assume the flower to be a part of the cosmos, or assume the flower to be a part of my (subjective) feeling/experience. I shouldn’t assume the flower to be both a part of the cosmos and a part of my (subjective) feeling/experience at the same time.

The flower is either a part of the cosmos, or a part of my (subjective) feeling/experience.

Is the flower both a part of the cosmos and a part of my (subjective) feeling/experience at the same time? No.

When David Chalmers assumed the flower to be both a part of the cosmos and a part of his (subjective) feeling/experience at the same time, he encountered the hard problem of consciousness [3].

The flower is actually a part of his (subjective) feeling/experience. The cosmos is actually a part of his (subjective) feeling/experience too.

## D

If everything I feel/experience/access is my (subjective) feeling/experience, then why does my (subjective) feeling/experience exist? I don’t have an answer for this question. I don’t know.

## E

When an observer thinks/imagines/assumes that an observee has aims/goals/plans/thoughts/ideas, actually the observee doesn't have any aim/goal/plan/thought/idea.

When an observer thinks/imagines/assumes that an observee’s words/gestures/movements have meanings, actually the observee’s words/gestures/movements don't have any meaning.

When an observer thinks/imagines/assumes that an observee's words/gestures/movements describe the observee's aims/goals/plans/thoughts/ideas, actually the words/gestures/movements don't have any meaning, and actually the observee doesn't have any aim/goal/plan/thought/idea.

The observee's words/gestures/movements are only caused by the Schrodinger equation (Yu, 2021).

The observer's thoughts/ideas/imaginations/assumptions (regarding the observee’s aims/goals/plans/thoughts/ideas) are only caused by the Schrodinger equation -- if I think/imagine/assume that the observer has thoughts/ideas/imaginations/assumptions.

The observee's aims/goals/plans/thoughts/ideas are only caused by the Schrodinger equation -- if I think/imagine/assume that the observee has aims/goals/plans/thoughts/ideas.

## F

Right now, I have subjective feelings/experiences. Did I have subjective feelings/experiences yesterday? I'm not sure. I have memories regarding my "subjective feelings/experiences" yesterday, but these memories are not as vivid/sharp as my current subjective feelings/experiences. Besides these memories, I have no evidence that I had subjective feelings/experiences yesterday.

Tomorrow, will I still have subjective feelings/experiences? I have no way to know that. I don’t know.

## G

If the 18-years-old me time travels to today by using a time machine, then there is a clone of me in the cosmos. The clone of me is 18 years old. The clone of me has a physical body. A physical body is a part of the cosmos.

To me, the clone of me is another person/agent. Because I can’t access his memories from a subjective perspective.

I am imagining the existence of a clone of me (in the cosmos).

If I had subjective feelings/experiences when I was 18 years old, then the clone of me (in the cosmos) should have subjective feelings/experiences.

The clone of me (in the cosmos) is me. I can imagine that the clone of me (in the cosmos) is me.

In the meantime, the clone of me (in the cosmos) is another person/agent. I can imagine that the clone of me (in the cosmos) is another person/agent.

So, I can imagine that another person/agent (in the cosmos) is me.

## H

My physical body is a part of the cosmos. If God makes a clone of the cosmos (let’s call the clone the second cosmos), then there is a clone of my physical body in the second cosmos.

The clone of my physical body is in the second cosmos. Am I in the second cosmos too? Or in other words, is the clone of my physical body (in the second cosmos) (a clone of) me?

I have subjective feelings/experiences. It’s a leap for me to assume/imagine that another person/agent (e.g., the clone of my physical body in the second cosmos) also has subjective feelings/experiences. When I assume/imagine that another person/agent also has subjective feelings/experiences, I am actually imagining that person/agent to be (a clone of) me. However, that person/agent is not (a clone of) me. So, I have no way to know whether another person/agent has subjective feelings/experiences or not.

I have no way to know whether another person/agent has subjective feelings/experiences or not, when I don’t imagine that person/agent to be me.

For example, if the clone of my physical body (in the second cosmos) is not me, then it doesn’t need to have subjective feelings/experiences. Or in other words, if the clone of my physical body (in the second cosmos) is not me, then I have no way to know whether it has subjective feelings/experiences or not.

Or in other words, if I don’t imagine the clone of my physical body (in the second cosmos) to be me, then I don’t need to assume/imagine that it has subjective feelings/experiences; if I imagine the clone of my physical body (in the second cosmos) to be me, then I need to assume/imagine that it has subjective feelings/experiences.

I can imagine that a clone of my physical body is not a clone of me.

If a clone of my physical body is not a clone of me, then my physical body is not me.

When I imagine that a clone of my physical body is not a clone of me, I am imagining that my physical body is not me.

Is my physical body me? I can imagine that my physical body is me. I can also imagine that my physical body is not me.

How can my physical body access my memories (in my physical brain) from a subjective perspective? I can’t imagine that.

How can I access my memories (in my physical brain) from a subjective perspective? I can imagine that.

My physical body is an object. I am a subject. I (as the subject) control my physical body (as the object). The subject controls the object.

Besides the "I", I can't find any other subject. Is the physical body of another person/agent a subject? No. Does another person/agent exist (besides the existence of its physical body)? I don't know. Does another person/agent exist (as a subject)? I don't know.

I can imagine another person/agent to be an object. I can imagine another person/agent to be a subject.

I can imagine another person/agent to be both an object and a subject.

I can imagine another person/agent to be an object only. I can imagine that another person/agent can't be a subject.

How can my physical body (as an object) access my memories (in my physical brain) from a subjective perspective? I can’t imagine that.

How can I (as a subject) access my memories (in my physical brain) from a subjective perspective? I can imagine that. When I imagine that, I am actually imagining the "I" as a ghost/homunculus. The ghost/homunculus is not a physical object. the ghost/homunculus doesn't really/objectively exist. But I can imagine the existence of the ghost/homunculus.

I don't imagine the effect of the ghost/homunculus, when I imagine the evolution of the state of the cosmos. Or in other words, I don't imagine the effect of the ghost/homunculus, when I imagine the evolution of the state of the physical objects (in the cosmos). Because I don't think/imagine that the ghost/homunculus has any effect on the evolution of the state of (any physical object in) the cosmos.

When I imagine that the ghost/homunculus is controlling my physical body, I know that it’s just an (unreal) imagination.

When I imagine that the ghost/homunculus has an effect on the evolution of the state of my physical body, I know that it’s just an (unreal) imagination.

When I imagine that the ghost/homunculus doesn’t have an effect on the evolution of the state of my physical body, I am actually imagining that the ghost/homunculus is ghostlike. When I imagine that the (ghostlike) ghost/homunculus doesn’t have an effect on the evolution of the state of my physical body, I am actually imagining that the evolution of the state of my physical body is autonomous.

When I imagine that the evolution of the state of my physical body is to be decided/chosen by the ghost/homunculus (or its decision/choice), I know that it’s just an (unreal) imagination.

Actually, the evolution of the state of my physical body is to be decided/chosen by the Schrodinger equation only.

I should imagine that the decision/choice of the ghost/homunculus is to be decided/chosen by the Schrodinger equation only. I shouldn't imagine that the decision/choice of the ghost/homunculus is to be decided/chosen by itself.

I should imagine that the decision/choice of the ghost/homunculus is to be decided/chosen by the evolution of the state of my physical body/brain (and the evolution of the state of my physical body/brain is to be decided/chosen by the Schrodinger equation). I shouldn’t imagine that the evolution of the state of my physical body/brain is to be decided/chosen by the decision/choice of the ghost/homunculus.

I should imagine that the decision/choice of the ghost/homunculus is actually the decision/choice of my physical body/brain, and the decision/choice of my physical body/brain is actually decided/chosen by the Schrodinger equation.

I should imagine that the decision/choice of my physical body/brain becomes/causes the decision/choice of the ghost/homunculus. I shouldn’t imagine that the decision/choice of the ghost/homunculus becomes/causes the decision/choice of my physical body/brain.

If the decision/choice of the ghost/homunculus becomes/causes the decision/choice of my physical body/brain, then what causes the decision/choice of the ghost/homunculus?

If the decision/choice of the ghost/homunculus becomes/causes the decision/choice of my physical body/brain, then it means that the ghost/homunculus can make the decision/choice without involving my physical body/brain. But how is that possible/imaginable? If the ghost/homunculus can make the decision/choice without involving my physical body/brain, then why do I need to have a physical body/brain? If the ghost/homunculus can make the decision/choice without involving my physical body/brain, then what does my brain’s neural network do?

It feels like the ghost/homunculus (i.e., the “I”) makes the decision/choice without involving my physical body/brain. But actually, my physical body/brain makes the decision/choice without involving the ghost/homunculus. I can imagine that the decision/choice is made by another person/agent (i.e., my physical body/brain) instead of me (i.e., the ghost/homunculus), if I imagine the ghost/homunculus as me, and imagine my physical body/brain as another person/agent. I can imagine that the decision/choice is made by another person/agent (i.e., the Schrodinger equation) instead of me (i.e., the ghost/homunculus), if I imagine the ghost/homunculus as me, and imagine the Schrodinger equation as another person/agent. Under this context, to me (i.e., the ghost/homunculus), there is no fundamental difference between my physical body/brain and *the physical body/brain of another person/agent (e.g., your physical body/brain)*, because the evolution of their states is decided/chosen by the Schrodinger equation only. Under this context, to me (i.e., the ghost/homunculus), there is no fundamental difference between my physical body/brain and any other physical object (e.g., a stone), because the evolution of their states is decided/chosen by the Schrodinger equation only. Under this context, to me (i.e., the ghost/homunculus), there is no fundamental difference between any two elementary particles in the cosmos, because the evolution of their states is decided/chosen by the Schrodinger equation only. Under this context, to me (i.e., the ghost/homunculus), all elementary particles in the cosmos are an indivisible whole, because the evolution of their states is decided/chosen by the Schrodinger equation only.

I can imagine the ghost/homunculus as me, and imagine the Schrodinger equation as another person/agent.

I can imagine the ghost/homunculus as me, and imagine the cosmos (as a whole) as another person/agent. Under this context, I shouldn’t imagine each human’s physical body as one individual person/agent; I should imagine the cosmos (as a whole) as one individual person/agent. In other words, I shouldn’t imagine all elementary particles in a human’s physical body (as a whole) as one individual person/agent; I should imagine all elementary particles in the cosmos (as a whole) as one individual person/agent. In other words, I shouldn’t imagine all elementary particles in a human’s physical body (as a whole) as one individual machine/automaton/puppet; I should imagine all elementary particles in the cosmos (as a whole) as one individual machine/automaton/puppet.

I know that I have an illusion/feeling that each human’s physical body is one individual person/agent/machine/automaton/puppet. Without this illusion/feeling, I can’t think/imagine/assume that each human’s physical body/brain has (its own individual) aims/goals/plans/thoughts/ideas. Actually, each human’s physical body/brain doesn’t really have (its own individual) aims/goals/plans/thoughts/ideas.

When I imagine each human’s physical body as one individual machine/automaton/puppet, I shouldn’t imagine that each human’s physical body has (its own individual) aims/goals/plans/thoughts/ideas, because an individual machine/automaton/puppet doesn’t really have (its own individual) aims/goals/plans/thoughts/ideas.

When I imagine each person/agent as one individual machine/automaton/puppet, I shouldn’t imagine that each person/agent has (its own individual) aims/goals/plans/thoughts/ideas, because an individual machine/automaton/puppet doesn’t really have (its own individual) aims/goals/plans/thoughts/ideas.

Actually, the evolution of the state of the cosmos is not decided/chosen by the aims/goals/plans/thoughts/ideas/decisions/choices of any individual person/agent/machine/automaton/puppet; the state evolution of the cosmos is only decided/chosen by the Schrodinger equation (as a person/agent).

When I imagine that the ghost/homunculus is accessing my memories (in my physical brain), I know that it’s just an (unreal) imagination.

When I imagine that the ghost/homunculus overlaps with my physical body, I know that it’s just an (unreal) imagination.

I imagine the ghost/homunculus to be me. I don’t imagine the ghost/homunculus as a physical object. I imagine my physical body as a physical object.

When I imagine the ghost/homunculus to be my physical body, I know that it’s just an (unreal) imagination.

When I imagine my physical body to be the ghost/homunculus, I know that it’s just an (unreal) imagination.

Right now, I am sitting here, typing. I feel the existence of my physical body. I feel the existence of my environment. It feels like I am a ghost/homunculus sitting inside my physical body, controlling my physical body. I know that this feeling is just an (unreal) imagination.

## I

When I fight with a system, I am a component of the system.

When I “fight with fate", it's part of fate (Yu, 2021).

## J

Q. “As I see it, a cost of positing my identity to some cloud of atoms is not only that this multiplies complexity (beyond necessity, it seems to me), but also makes me a puppet of mindless things, \*if\* those things are more fundamental than me…” (<https://twitter.com/worldviewdesign/status/1583892452624125952>)

A. \*If\* those things are more fundamental than you, and if you do not posit your identity to those things, then what is the relationship between you and those things?

Q. “Suppose x = you, and the ys = your atomic parts.

Four options:

1. There is no you.

2. x = ys, in which case you exist if and only if your atomic parts exist.

3. x ≠ the ys, and the ys are more fundamental than x.

4. x ≠ the ys, and the ys are not more fundamental.

I find it helpful to separate these options in analyzing the potential implications of various views.” (<https://twitter.com/worldviewdesign/status/1584286993298599936>)

A. From the viewpoint of another person/agent, there is no me (besides my atomic parts) -- option 1 is correct.

From the viewpoint of myself, I exist if and only if my atomic parts exist -- option 2 is correct.

## K

When you find a causality between the happening of one event and the happening of another event, this causality is a myth. When you find that the happening of one event causes the happening of another event, the former doesn’t actually *cause* the latter. There is no relationship between the former and the latter. The happening of one event doesn’t cause the happening of another event, because the happening of every event is caused by the Schrodinger equation only.

I shouldn’t imagine that the happening of one event has a local “force” to cause the happening of another event. Instead, I should imagine that the Schrodinger equation has a global “force” to cause the happening of every event. If I don’t want to imagine that the Schrodinger equation has a global “force” to cause the happening of every event, I can imagine that every event happens autonomously (without requiring any local/global “force” to cause it to happen) following the Schrodinger equation. In other words, if I don’t want to imagine that the happening of an event is caused by a local/global “force”, I can imagine that the event happens autonomously (without requiring any local/global “force” to cause it to happen) following the Schrodinger equation.

I shouldn’t imagine that an event has an internal “force” to cause itself to happen. Instead, I should imagine that the Schrodinger equation has an external “force” to cause every event to happen. If I don’t want to imagine that the Schrodinger equation has an external “force” to cause every event to happen, I can imagine that every event happens autonomously (without requiring any internal/external “force” to cause it to happen) following the Schrodinger equation. In other words, if I don’t want to imagine that the happening of an event is caused by an internal/external “force”, I can imagine that the event happens autonomously (without requiring any internal/external “force” to cause it to happen) following the Schrodinger equation.

The happening of an event is an evolution of the state of the event.

When you find a causality between the evolution of one event’s state and the evolution of another event’s state, this causality is a myth. When you find that the evolution of one event’s state causes the evolution of another event’s state, the former doesn’t actually *cause* the latter. There is no relationship between the former and the latter. The evolution of one event’s state doesn’t cause the evolution of another event’s state, because the evolution of every event’s state is caused by the Schrodinger equation only.

I shouldn’t imagine that the evolution of one event’s state has a local “force” to cause another event’s state to evolve. Instead, I should imagine that the Schrodinger equation has a global “force” to cause every event’s state to evolve. If I don’t want to imagine that the Schrodinger equation has a global “force” to cause every event’s state to evolve, I can imagine that every event's state evolves autonomously (without requiring any local/global “force” to cause it to evolve) following the Schrodinger equation. In other words, if I don’t want to imagine that the evolution of an event’s state is caused by a local/global “force”, I can imagine that the event’s state evolves autonomously (without requiring any local/global “force” to cause it to evolve) following the Schrodinger equation.

I shouldn’t imagine that an event has an internal “force” to cause its own state to evolve. Instead, I should imagine that the Schrodinger equation has an external “force” to cause the event’s state to evolve. If I don’t want to imagine that the Schrodinger equation has an external “force” to cause the event’s state to evolve, I can imagine that the event’s state evolves autonomously (without requiring any internal/external “force” to cause it to evolve) following the Schrodinger equation. In other words, if I don’t want to imagine that the evolution of an event’s state is caused by an internal/external “force”, I can imagine that the state of the event evolves autonomously (without requiring any internal/external “force” to cause it to evolve) following the Schrodinger equation.

The evolution of a physical object’s state is an event.

When you find a causality between the evolution of one physical object’s state and the evolution of another physical object’s state, this causality is a myth. When you find that the evolution of one physical object’s state causes the evolution of another physical object’s state, the former doesn’t actually *cause* the latter. There is no relationship between the former and the latter. The evolution of one physical object’s state doesn’t cause the evolution of another physical object’s state, because the evolution of every physical object’s state is caused by the Schrodinger equation only.

I shouldn’t imagine that the evolution of one physical object’s state has a local “force” to cause the evolution of another physical object’s state. Instead, I should imagine that the Schrodinger equation has a global “force” to cause every physical object’s state to evolve. If I don’t want to imagine that the Schrodinger equation has a global “force” to cause every physical object’s state to evolve, I can imagine that every physical object's state evolves autonomously (without requiring any local/global “force” to cause it to evolve) following the Schrodinger equation. In other words, if I don’t want to imagine that the evolution of an physical object’s state is caused by a local/global “force”, I can imagine that the physical object’s state evolves autonomously (without requiring any local/global “force” to cause it to evolve) following the Schrodinger equation.

I shouldn’t imagine that a physical object has an internal “force” to cause its own state to evolve. Instead, I should imagine that the Schrodinger equation has an external “force” to cause the physical object’s state to evolve. If I don’t want to imagine that the Schrodinger equation has an external “force” to cause the physical object’s state to evolve, I can imagine that the physical object’s state evolves autonomously (without requiring any internal/external “force” to cause it to evolve) following the Schrodinger equation. In other words, if I don’t want to imagine that the evolution of a physical object’s state is caused by an internal/external “force”, I can imagine that the state of the physical object evolves autonomously (without requiring any internal/external “force” to cause it to evolve) following the Schrodinger equation.

The movement of a physical object is an evolution of the physical object’s state.

When you find a causality between one physical object’s movement and another physical object’s movement, this causality is a myth. When you find that one physical object’s movement causes another physical object’s movement, the former doesn’t actually *cause* the latter. There is no relationship between the former and the latter. One physical object’s movement doesn’t cause another physical object’s movement, because every physical object’s movement is caused by the Schrodinger equation only.

I shouldn’t imagine that one physical object’s movement has a local “force” to cause another physical object’s movement. Instead, I should imagine that the Schrodinger equation has a global “force” to cause every physical object to move. If I don’t want to imagine that the Schrodinger equation has a global “force” to cause every physical object to move, I can imagine that every physical object moves autonomously (without requiring any local/global “force” to cause it to move) following the Schrodinger equation. In other words, if I don’t want to imagine that a physical object movement is caused by a local/global “force”, I can imagine that the physical object’s moves autonomously (without requiring any local/global “force” to cause it to move) following the Schrodinger equation.

I shouldn’t imagine that a physical object has an internal “force” to cause itself to move. Instead, I should imagine that the Schrodinger equation has an external “force” to cause the physical object to move. If I don’t want to imagine that the Schrodinger equation has an external “force” to cause the physical object to move, I can imagine that the physical object moves autonomously (without requiring any internal/external “force” to cause it to move) following the Schrodinger equation. In other words, if I don’t want to imagine that a physical object’s movement is caused by an internal/external “force”, I can imagine that the physical object moves autonomously (without requiring any internal/external “force” to cause it to move) following the Schrodinger equation.

I can imagine that the evolution of the state of the cosmos is predetermined (by something other than myself), and the predetermined evolution of the state of the cosmos does not conflict with the Schrodinger equation. The evolution of the state of the cosmos includes the evolution of the state of every physical object/event. So, I can imagine that the evolution of the state of every physical object/event is predetermined, and the predetermined evolution of the state of every physical object/event does not conflict with the Schrodinger equation. The cosmos (as a whole) itself is a physical object/event.

It’s possible that the evolution of the state of the cosmos is actually predetermined. I can’t exclude the possibility that the evolution of the state of the cosmos is actually predetermined, because scientists can’t exclude the possibility that the evolution of the state of the cosmos is actually predetermined.

If the evolution of the state of the cosmos is actually predetermined (by something other than myself), then (in theory) I can’t control/change my own fate. I can’t exclude the possibility that (in theory) I can’t control/change my own fate, because I can’t exclude the possibility that the evolution of the state of the cosmos is actually predetermined.

If I believe that (in theory) I can control/change my own fate, then I need to figure out how to actually control/change my own fate in my everyday life. If I believe that (in theory) I can control/change my own fate, and if I can’t figure out how to actually control/change my own fate in my everyday life, then I still can’t actually control/change my own fate in my everyday life.

I haven’t figured out how to actually control/change my own fate in my everyday life. So, I can’t actually control/change my own fate in my everyday life, even if (in theory) I can control/change my own fate.

What should I do to actually control/change my own fate in my everyday life?

If I want to actually control/change my own fate in my everyday life, it seems like the only thing I can do is to make decisions/choices. But am I sure that I can actually control/change my own fate (in my everyday life) by making a decision/choice? No, I’m not sure.

Am I sure that I can actually control/change my own fate (in my everyday life) by making a decision/choice to go to KFC (instead of McDonald’s) for dinner? No, I’m not sure.

If I am sure that I can actually control/change my own fate (in my everyday life) by making a decision/choice to go to KFC (instead of McDonald’s) for dinner, then I need to be sure that I can exclude the possibility that the evolution of the state of the cosmos is actually predetermined. Because, if I am not sure that I can exclude the possibility that the evolution of the state of the cosmos is actually predetermined, then I am not sure that I can actually control/change my own fate (in my everyday life) by making a decision/choice to go to KFC (instead of McDonald’s) for dinner.

Before I can accept the belief that I am sure that I can actually control/change my own fate (in my everyday life) by making a decision/choice to go to KFC (instead of McDonald’s) for dinner, I need to prove this belief first. This is the position of skepticism.

I haven’t been able to prove the belief that I am sure that I can actually control/change my own fate (in my everyday life) by making a decision/choice to go to KFC (instead of McDonald’s) for dinner, that’s why I can’t accept this belief.

Am I sure that I *can’t* actually control/change my own fate (in my everyday life) by making a decision/choice to go to KFC (instead of McDonald’s) for dinner? No, I’m not sure.

I *can* imagine that I *can’t* actually control/change my own fate (in my everyday life) by making a decision/choice to go to KFC (instead of McDonald’s) for dinner; I *can’t* imagine that I *can* actually control/change my own fate (in my everyday life) by making a decision/choice to go to KFC (instead of McDonald’s) for dinner.

As long as I imagine that my decision/choice (to go to KFC (instead of McDonald’s) for dinner) is part of my own fate, I can imagine that I *can’t* actually control/change my own fate (in my everyday life) by making the decision/choice to go to KFC (instead of McDonald’s) for dinner.

## L

If the evolution of the state of the cosmos was actually predetermined by myself yesterday, then yesterday’s I was controlling my own fate, but (in theory) today’s I can’t control/change my own fate.

## M

Right now, I am sitting here, typing. I am controlling my physical body. I am my mind. I am not my physical body. My physical body is a cloud of elementary particles. I can posit my identity to a cloud of elementary particles. Or I can posit my identity to something other than a cloud of elementary particles.

When I posit my identity to something other than a cloud of elementary particles, it feels like that I am a (ghostlike) ghost/homunculus.

When I posit my identity to something other than a cloud of elementary particles, my physical body is a cloud of elementary particles, but I am not the cloud of elementary particles. Under this context, if the evolution of the state of the elementary particles in my physical body follows the Schrodinger equation, do I have an impact on the evolution of the state of the elementary particles in my physical body? If I have an impact on the evolution of the state of the elementary particles in my physical body, then what’s that impact? If I believe that I have an impact on the evolution of the state of the elementary particles in my physical body, then how do I argue for this belief? If scientists can measure the evolution of the state of the elementary particles in my physical body, and if scientists can’t measure my impact (on the evolution of the state of the elementary particles in my physical body), then how can scientists/I know that I have an impact (on the evolution of the state of the elementary particles in my physical body)? If the evolution of the state of the elementary particles in my physical body is being controlled by myself, then how do I control the evolution of the state of the elementary particles in my physical body?

If I want to control the evolution of the state of the elementary particles in my physical body, it seems like the only thing I can do is to trigger my physical body’s movement.

If I want to have an impact on the evolution of the state of the elementary particles in my physical body, it seems like the only thing I can do is to trigger my physical body’s movement.

When I move my finger, does it mean that I have an impact on the evolution of the state of the elementary particles in my physical body?

When I move my finger, how can I know that it means that I have an impact on the evolution of the state of the elementary particles in my physical body?

If the evolution of the state of the elementary particles in my physical body includes my finger’s movement, then it means that (when I move my finger) I don’t have an impact on the evolution of the state of the elementary particles in my physical body.

If the evolution of the state of the elementary particles in my physical body doesn’t include my finger’s movement, then it means that (when I move my finger) I have an impact on the evolution of the state of the elementary particles in my physical body. However, under this context, how do I know that the evolution of the state of the elementary particles in my physical body doesn’t include my finger’s movement? In fact, the evolution of the state of the elementary particles in my physical body includes my finger’s movement.

“Before I trigger my finger’s movement, the evolution of the state of the elementary particles in my physical body doesn’t include my finger’s movement. After I trigger my finger’s movement, the evolution of the state of the elementary particles in my physical body includes my finger’s movement. So, when I trigger my finger’s movement, I change the evolution of the state of the elementary particles in my physical body.” – is that correct? No, my finger’s movement is actually part of the evolution of the state of the elementary particles in my physical body – the evolution of the state of the elementary particles in my physical body doesn’t change. I can’t change the evolution of the state of the elementary particles in my physical body by triggering my finger’s movement. If the evolution of the state of the elementary particles in my physical body is my fate, then I can’t change my fate by triggering my finger’s movement. My finger’s movement is actually part of my fate. If I (i.e., the (ghostlike) ghost/homunculus) can’t change the evolution of the state of the elementary particles in my physical body, then actually it is not me (i.e., the (ghostlike) ghost/homunculus) who triggers my finger’s movement. If I (i.e., the (ghostlike) ghost/homunculus) can’t change the evolution of the state of the elementary particles in my physical body, then it’s only my imagination that my finger’s movement is triggered by me (i.e., the (ghostlike) ghost/homunculus). I (i.e., the (ghostlike) ghost/homunculus) can’t trigger my finger’s movement – that’s why the “I” (i.e., the (ghostlike) ghost/homunculus) is ghostlike.

As long as I posit my identity to the (ghostlike) ghost/homunculus (instead of the elementary particles in my physical body), I have no impact on the evolution of the state of the elementary particles in my physical body, no matter the evolution of the state of the elementary particles follows any mathematical function/equation or not.

I can imagine that the (ghostlike) ghost/homunculus is controlling my physical body like a puppeteer controlling a puppet. But how can the (ghostlike) ghost/homunculus control my physical body like a puppeteer controlling a puppet? I can’t imagine that. So, the (ghostlike) ghost/homunculus isn’t actually controlling my physical body like a puppeteer controlling a puppet.

I can imagine that a physical object (inside my physical body) is controlling my physical body like a puppeteer controlling a puppet. I can imagine how this physical object can control my physical body like a puppeteer controlling a puppet. But the (ghostlike) ghost/homunculus is not a physical object. That’s why I can’t imagine how the (ghostlike) ghost/homunculus can control my physical body like a puppeteer controlling a puppet. (The physical body of) a puppeteer is a physical object.

I can imagine that my brain (as a physical object) is controlling my physical body like a puppeteer controlling a puppet. I can imagine how this physical object (i.e., my brain) can control my physical body like a puppeteer controlling a puppet. But the (ghostlike) ghost/homunculus is not a physical object — the (ghostlike) ghost/homunculus is not my brain.

I can imagine that the (ghostlike) ghost/homunculus is cooperating with my physical body/brain to make a joint decision/choice. But how can the (ghostlike) ghost/homunculus cooperate with my physical body/brain to make a joint decision/choice? I can’t imagine that. I can imagine two physical objects cooperating with each other to make a joint decision/choice, but the (ghostlike) ghost/homunculus is not a physical object.

When I imagine that the (ghostlike) ghost/homunculus is interacting with my physical body, it’s a category error. If the (ghostlike) ghost/homunculus can actually interact with my physical body, then it’s actually not ghostlike.

If I define the cosmos as a cloud of elementary particles, then my physical body is a part of the cosmos, but the (ghostlike) ghost/homunculus is not part of the cosmos, and the (ghostlike) ghost/homunculus can’t actually interact with any elementary particle in the cosmos. So, the evolution of the state of *the cosmos (i.e., the quantifiable reality)* actually has nothing to do with the (ghostlike) ghost/homunculus.

“Before the evolution of the state of *my brain (as a physical object)* triggers my finger’s movement, the evolution of the state of the elementary particles in my physical body doesn’t include my finger’s movement. After the evolution of the state of my brain triggers my finger’s movement, the evolution of the state of the elementary particles in my physical body includes my finger’s movement. So, when the evolution of the state of my brain triggers my finger’s movement, the evolution of the state of my brain changes the evolution of the state of the elementary particles in my physical body.” – is that correct? No, the evolution of the state of my finger/brain is actually part of the evolution of the state of the elementary particles in my physical body – the evolution of the state of the elementary particles in my physical body doesn’t change.

## N

Q. “If the space I see while I'm awake is categorically different from the mental space I see in dreams, then what does "space" mean?” (<https://twitter.com/worldviewdesign/status/1584240434133356545>)

A. If the space I see in dreams is my mental space, then the space I see while I'm awake is my mental space too.

## O

Q. “A universe proceeding from an infinite precession of physics allows for indeterminate circumstances wherever experience might exist.

"Free will" only seems like a mystery if you insist that reality must be quantifiable.” (<https://twitter.com/factishness/status/1584752253000642560>)

A. I think/assume/believe/imagine that there is a quantifiable reality. Is there a quantifiable reality? Or we don't know?

## P

The physical body of a person/agent changes/evolves at every moment. If the physical body is a person/agent, then the physical body should become a different person/agent at every moment. If we keep imagining the physical body as the same person/agent, then this imagination is false.

A physical object changes/evolves at every moment. If the physical object is a person/agent, then the physical object should become a different person/agent at every moment. If we keep imagining the physical object as the same person/agent, then this imagination is false.

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