

Asher Zachman

Dr. Lauren Nuckols

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Clothed in Excellence:

Why Plato's *Republic* is a Feminist Text by its Own Lights

Introduction:

Hermeneutics as Mortics

Interpreting a thinker's corpus is quite the same as investigating their corpse. Defining and preserving a thinker's legacy is to hermeneutics as embalming and preserving their *legs to see* is to mortuary science. Just as a physical body can be mishandled and even desecrated, a conceptual immortality can be twisted into all forms of shameful display. As philosopher Natalie Bluestone powerfully explicates in her 1988 essay *Why Women Cannot Rule: Sexism in Plato Scholarship*, the mortuary of Platonic hermeneutics has been inextricably stained by the "tendency to misread, misquote, and suspend the usual standards of evidence" when concerned with dissecting, analyzing, and portraying Plato's views on gender equality (54). Leaving the details of this complicated history to Bluestone's studied expertise, in this paper I will enter Plato's highly decorated yet historically abused tomb and discover for myself if the feminist city I hope to see truly is smiling from

beneath its historically misapplied wraps. The telos standing behind this hermeneutic necrocraft is to secure a consistent answer to the following query: In what ways, if any, can Plato's *Republic* be considered a feminist text? Although the label of *feminist* is arguably an anachronism when applied to most thinkers pre-dating Mary Wollstonecraft,¹ it is not only useful to apply our contemporary frameworks to ancient ideas, but psychologically necessary at a certain point.² Assumptions about labeling aside, Plato's *Republic* is a feminist text wherein his Socrates establishes female nature as human nature, employs proprietary language as an unfortunate pragmatic necessity rather than an indication of normative truth, and does extend his emancipation of the female guardians to the working class. After identifying two central premises of feminist theory, I shall support this thesis in light of the *Republic's* macro-level political implications, regretfully allocating the vastness of polis psychology to the keyboard of another hermeneutic tomb raider. Before I begin to unravel my philosophical hero's tattered shroud, it is necessary to outline three further preliminary notes. For the purposes of this discovery, I will be leaving the question of the *Republic's* egalitarianism behind me, as it is a much broader concept that requires significantly more ink in its interrogation. The question of Plato's personal feminism will also be left outside

¹ There do exist thinkers such as Christine de Pizan who are arguable exceptions to this rule, yet the origin of modern feminist theory is largely attributed to Wollstonecraft.

² In the sense that one cannot escape the application of one's contemporaneously available concepts when engaging with novel concepts of any kind, including concepts that exist within previous historical contexts.

his tomb, as I have yet to dive into all of the dialogues, and I see this as a prerequisite to the formation of a stance in either direction. For these reasons, I shall focus on the *Republic* as a standalone text, and demonstrate that it is feminist by its own lights. I will also be assuming the validity of the constructivist elenchos, as a non-constructivist approach would arguably have nothing determinate to contribute to this kind of investigation.

Two Central Premises of Feminist Theory:³

1. Women either do not possess any inherent traits that differentiate them from men, or the distinguishing traits they do possess are not of a nature that justifies the differing treatment and subjugation inherent to traditional, patriarchal gender relations. Wollstonecraft, alongside the *Republic's* Socrates, affirms the latter option {(*Vindication*, 6) and (*Republic*, 454ce)}.

2. Traditional, patriarchal gender relations are thus inherently unjust, harmful to women, and ought to be either modified to a certain degree or abolished outright with the emancipatory interests of subjugated women in mind.

Wollstonecraft, alongside the *Republic's* Socrates, holds this to be the case

³This is by no means a comprehensive list. In a previous draft I included the following third premise: "Gender equality is a just and valuable end in and of itself, and the burden of proof ought to fall on its opponents, even if this position has historically been inverse," but the burden of proof component is arguably a later development that is impossible to track onto trailblazing feminists who did not necessarily hold this principle, due to the outrageously uphill curvature of their battle. Nevertheless, it is more than plausible to believe that the *Republic's* Socrates held this premise as well given passages like 367c-d. I have also intentionally omitted any mention of the suffering that men experience under patriarchal gender relations, although Socrates does indeed highlight this in 462c-d.

{(*Vindication*, 13-15) and (*Republic*, 433a-435b)}.

Demonstration:

Female Nature as Human Nature and Premise 1

The *Republic* satisfies premises **1** and **2** to a degree worthy of its feminist characterization, so I will begin by demonstrating the textual evidence for its alignment with premise **1**. Socrates' identification of female nature as human nature in *Republic V* arises in response to the so called *first wave* hurled at him by Adiemantus and *the crew* (449d). The three waves of Book V each demand that Socrates clarify both the possibility and the logical consistency of a different element of the city's contemporaneous stage of construction. The first and most crucial wave in the *Republic's* divisive claim to feminism regards Socrates earlier proposition that "the acquisition of women, marriages, and procreation of children . . . should be conducted, as much as possible, so as to make all things in common to friends [the male guardians]" (Book IV, 423e-424a). Reflecting on the fact that his previous account "attempted . . . to establish the men as guardians of a herd," Socrates opines that "for people whose nature and education are as we have described it, there is not another correct way of possessing and dealing with children and women, besides proceeding in the direction in which we first sent them" (451c).

We must take note here that this affirmation of proprietary gender relations is strictly confined to "the people whose nature and education are as we have

described it," a description that Socrates explicitly recognizes as incomplete when he says "we need to go back over this [male and female drama]⁴ once more, and say now . . . whatever we probably should have said at the time" (451b-c). It is immediately after this exchange in 451d, that Socrates espouses a subtle yet powerful line, "Well, let us follow this up by assigning them the *relevant* birth and upbringing, and consider whether that is appropriate for our purposes or not" (my emphasis). The Greek word translated as *birth* here is γένεσις (génésis), meaning origin, manner of birth, or creation. Socrates is not merely orchestrating his guardian's conditions of birth and then assigning them an education after they've been born, he is *creating* their natures by those self-same means. The generative and formative qualities of education, more accurately translated as *socialization* given the all-encompassing implications of the original Greek παιδεία (paideia), are further supported in the throes of Book IV, which is primarily focused on building a justice-conducive socialization program for the then exclusively male guardians (424a-425c). Painting his male and now female guardians as "guard dogs" who would not be separated and disbarred from being counted as guardians on the basis of which sex "bear(s) the puppies," Socrates and Adeimantus agree that this would be ridiculous and that "[the guardians] should share in everything, except that we should employ the females as weaker and the

⁴The original Greek translated as *drama* here is δράμα, (drâma), meaning deed or act. *Nature* is translated from φύσις (phúsis), and means origin, birth, quality, type or kind.

males as stronger" (451d). The female guardians' *weaker employment* is predicated on the state of physical weakness that a woman experiences during pregnancy, as this is the *only* natural difference that Socrates has mentioned at this point in the argument. Despite the historically prevailing notion that a woman's capacity for pregnancy justifies her patriarchal subjugation, Socrates doesn't see this minor sexual difference as significant enough to warrant any alternate treatment aside from its consideration in the extent to which pregnant women are assigned physically demanding tasks (451d and 455e).

After indicating that female nature is originally identical to male nature save who has the capacity for pregnancy, Socrates claims that "women should be taught the same . . . music⁵ and gymnastics . . . along with anything related to warfare, and they should be employed in the same ways" (452a). This move to equalize pedagogical conditions and consequently instantiate gender equality among the guardians is followed by a brief digression on socially conservative reactionary comedy, which Socrates profoundly concludes with "we should not be afraid of whatever jokes . . . especially in relation to women bearing arms or riding horses" (452b-c). After this discussion and just prior to delineating between dialectic and mere argumentation (454a), Socrates sets up his imagined polemicists' objection that differing sexual natures cannot "perform the same

⁵ Along with the performance arts, the Greek concept of music encompassed every kind of study one would today call the Liberal Arts.

functions . . . [and] engage in the same activities” without a logical contradiction arising (453c-e). Dialectically investigating the meanings of his terms, Socrates equates “the kind of different [sexual] nature we were distinguishing when we assigned . . . the same [pursuits] to the same [nature]” to the kind of difference between a bald and a hairy shoemaker—an inconsequential aesthetic difference which Adeimantus confirms “would be ridiculous indeed” should it have any effect on the administration of one’s pursuits (454b-c). Past this point in the dialogue, Socrates extends gender equality to the working class, an argument which will be returned to later on in **Working Class Women**.

Structural Outline

Now that the critical structure of the *Republic’s* gender neutral qualification of human nature has been revealed, it is possible to draw up an outline of said structure:

a. Aside from one’s sexual physicality determining whether one “bears” or “begets” (454d), a person’s nature is exclusively created and formed by musical and gymnastic education, or in anachronistic phrasing, one’s nature is *exclusively a product of socialization* save the largely inconsequential influence of one’s sexual physicality.

b. The original natures of men and women are therefore identically empty save their largely inconsequential sexual difference in capacity for pregnancy, making

them equally capable of engaging in all pursuits (including leadership) according to their personal, learned dispositions towards functional roles, and are thus capable of becoming the same kinds of people with the same natures if provided with identical pedagogical conditions.

c. Since one's largely non-sexual nature and consequent non-sexual role in society is solely determined by one's pedagogical conditions, these conditions ought to be equalized among men and women of the guardian class, consequently allowing for guardians of both sexes to function in accordance with their equal proclivity towards natural excellence.

d. The only exception to this pedagogical equalization concerns the administration of physically demanding tasks, which are extended in consideration of women's capacity for pregnancy.

Female Nature as Human Nature and Premise 2

This argument clearly satisfies the latter option within premise 1,⁶ but what about 2? One of the primary aims of the *Republic* as a philosophical project is to essentially define the concepts of justice, goodness, and beauty, among others. Contrary to characterizing how these concepts *operate* in the world as it *appears*, which is the frequent and idiosyncratic task of his trusted crew (and sometimes his

⁶Being that the distinguishing traits women possess are not of a nature that justifies the differing treatment and subjugation inherent to traditional, patriarchal gender relations.

own imagination), Socrates is concerned with what these concepts truly *are* in the transcendent world as it truly *is*. Although the *Republic* details the phenomenology of ascending to and descending from absolute being, direct apprehension of the Good (transcendent qualia) is not transmutable through language (apparent concepts) (517b-518a). Therefore, the *Republic* itself, being a construal of ultimately inadequate language, is Plato's discursive attempt to reason about how justice as it truly *is* would appear to us if it was possible for those with direct apprehension of the Good (philosophers) to rule over a city (473c-d). The construction of this ideal-, norm-defining city is Socrates' gradual mapping of justice as it appears through reason, leaving anything that falls outside of its *moderately constrained* perimeter to be considered injustice. Although Socrates does not explicitly demarcate the patriarchal gender relations of his day as an example of injustice, the fact that his emancipation of the female guardians is a determinate facet of the city's unity necessitates by exclusion that the alternative is unjust (462a-b).

Commenting on the unequivocally unjust Athenian practices, Socrates decisively states in 456b-c that "it is not contrary to [human] nature to prescribe music and gymnastics to our women guardians . . . Rather our present-day practices that run counter to this are, it seems, more opposed to [human] nature." Further supporting his ideological castigation of the unjust Athenian gender relations, is the Socratic image of justice, which is summarized in Book IV as "having or doing

what is one's own, and what belongs to oneself" (433e-434a). This image is diametrically opposed to the idea of male guardians owning women, for the guardians "have no private property, apart from their body" (464d). Although the emancipatory interest of the female guardian is not directly cited as a reason for her emancipation, it follows from the *Republic's* instantiation of gender equality among the guardian class that gender equality is just, patriarchal subjugation is unjust, and since justice aligns with one's true interest in every case, the emancipatory interest of female guardians are implicitly accounted for. Alongside his declaration of the patriarchy's injustice and attention to the interests of its victims, Socrates is also clear about the harm resulting from such divided conditions. According to his epistemic account of ethics, the denial of just pedagogical conditions inherent to the pedagogical and political oppression of his female guardians are undeniably harmful to the states of their souls (367d, 514a, and 517b-c).

It has now been established that patriarchal gender relations are necessarily unjust given the *Republic's* moral framework and that their abolition within the guardian class does, in fact, consider the interests of the subjugated women who are "inclined towards gymnastics" (456a). Working within this same framework, it has been shown by the *Republic's* lights that the contemporaneous Athenian practices were harmful to women, and that Socrates considered this harm in the emancipation of his female guardians. Premise 2 is thus fulfilled.

Objections:

Trifold List of Confounds

At this point, there are numerous confounds that have arisen in the mind of the skeptical reader, but for the sake of eventually ending this ~2,372 year old autopsy, our scalpel scope will be limited to the following three objections.

1. It is excellent that Socrates emancipates the female guardians (a class that includes the auxiliaries), but what about the *Republic's* **working class women**? Instantiating gender equality among specific classes while leaving the majority of the city's women to the patriarchal dogs isn't gender equality at all.

2. Why does Socrates' continue to use **proprietary language**, even after his characterization of female nature as human nature and consequent emancipation of women among the guardian, auxiliary, and working classes alike? This doesn't seem feminist in any respect.

3. What about all of the other **problematic quotes** in Book V? Surely Socrates' comments about the feminine reputation for cooking and weaving, along with other comments like it, prevent the *Republic* from being a feminist text (455c)?

Working Class Women

It has now been shown that Socrates and the crew have irrevocably emancipated the women who have "the qualities of a guardian" and that they saw this proposal to be "for the best" (456a-c). Instantiating gender equality among

the city's warriors and potential leaders is severely feminist, but what do they have to say about the city's working class women? Following closely after his claim that "natures are distributed in like manner among both creatures, and a woman by nature shares in *all* the pursuits" (455c, my emphasis), Socrates takes the contemporaneously radical stance that "one woman is by nature inclined to be a physician while another is not, one is musical while another is unmusical . . . one woman [is] inclined towards gymnastics and warfare, while another [is not] . . . [one will] be a lover of wisdom, while another hates it . . . [and one will] be spirited, while another is devoid of it" (455e-456a). It is right after this explicit announcement of women's ability to inhabit the natures of all three of the *Republic's* classes (435b), moving from the tradesperson, to the warrior, and then to the philosopher, that Socrates reminds us of the singularity mentioned sexual difference of weakness during pregnancy. What is crucial to note about this mention of pregnancy in 456a, as well as every other time it is brought up (such as in 451d, 455e, and 457a), is that this largely inconsequential aesthetic difference is only considered in relation to female guardians and their capacity to physically and dialectically perform during the process of "bear[ing] the puppies" (451d). Socrates crucially has nothing to say about the comparative weakness of "a woman with the soul of a physician" (454d) or the "shoemakers that have been educated in shoemaking" (456d). Even "official posts [] are presumably shared between women and men" although being philosopher queens and female generals in the

guardian class, Socrates does think that pregnancy will have a present yet insignificant effect on these official roles (460b). Having demonstrated that Socrates not only extends emancipation to the women of his working class, but subtly makes no claim about pregnancy's effect on their ability to excel in the trades, it is time to account for his continued use of proprietary language.

Proprietary Language

Socrates' proprietary language is initially startling to the egalitarian reader, especially if said reader is under the impression that the *Republic* promotes feminist ideals. Socrates refers to women as "shared" property even after he "escap[es] the first wave," which seems antithetical to the feminist project (457b-d). I will demonstrate that although this proprietary framing of gender relations is definitively problematic in isolation, it was not only inescapable in the ancient context of women's emancipation, but consequently highlights the genius in Socrates' gradual construction of a gender neutral human nature.

The transition from private to common ownership of women and children is ironically the first step Socrates takes to release them from their oppressive pedagogical conditions, although they are literally still the property of the male guardians at this point in the dialectical process (424a). While Socrates could have began Books IV and V by explicitly stating his conclusion that there is no such thing as a distinct female nature and therefore no justifiable grounds for

proprietary gender relations (455d), this would not only be uncharacteristic of the constructivist elenchos, but most probably ineffable to his doubly ignorant audience of Athenian men.⁷ Assuming that the *Republic's* Socrates did posit a radical notion of gender equality, which his arguments clearly display (see **Female Nature as Human Nature 1-2**), it would be both anachronistic and Herculean to require him to employ gender-neutral language in his dialogues in order to prove as much. This just wasn't a conceivable linguistic option in ancient Athens, and wouldn't be for thousands of years to the majority of human beings, women included. In addition to making casual conversation impossible with nearly every interlocutor Socrates would have encountered, the absence of proprietary language and initial patriarchal framing, in exchange for blatantly feminist framing, would have severely diminished if not nullified the dialectical strategy of the Socratic method, given the linguistic and educational context he was engaging in. As explained in Book VII, the essential function of dialectic is enlightenment, or the guiding of one out from a dark state of ignorance into a bright state of knowledge. Considering just how ingrained the systemic oppression of women was in prevailing ancient thought (from mythology, to practiced political reality, to

⁷This brutal quote from Demosthenes is widely held to accurately represent the prevailing male gaze and consequent gender relations of Athens in ~340 BCE, "For this is what living with a woman as one's wife means—to have children by her and to introduce the sons to the members of the clan and of the deme, and to betroth the daughters to husbands as one's own. Mistresses we keep for the sake of pleasure, concubines for the daily care of our persons, but wives to bear us legitimate children and to be faithful guardians of our households. If, therefore, Stephanus had previously married an Athenian woman, and these children are hers and not Neaera's, he could have shown it by the most certain evidence, by delivering up these women-servants for the torture" (*Against Neaera*, section 122, page 59).

language itself),⁸ it is absurd to imagine that the pragmatic confines of dialectic, which Socrates exclusively deals in, would allow for any linguistic strategy aside from what we find throughout the *Republic*. Although the *Republic's* Socrates is by no means concerned with the reactive violence he would eventually face for his willingness to recount his experiences with noesis, Books VI and VII necessitate his recognition that certain manifestations of dianoia⁹ can only be grasped by the *gradual ascent* from eikasia and pistis, terminating in his attempt to enlighten his ignorant cave-mates on the dianoetic truth of gender equality *being built up* from within their ignorant and opinionated conceptual frameworks. If you are trying to convince someone of the mathematical truth that $1 \cdot 1 = 1$ (wherein the lefthand 1s represent male and female nature respectively and the righthand 1 represents equalized human nature), but they are convinced that $1 \cdot 0.5 = 1$, you are going to have to clarify the definitional and qualitative nature of the equation's components before you can even begin to engage with them in a manner that is truly mathematical. This someone is clearly confused about the essential definitions of

⁸In an example that is by no means unique to the Greek language, γυναικεῖος (gynaecios), which is the adjective for *pertaining to female*, could also mean insignificant, stupid, or weak depending on its respective suffix (*Wiktionary*). Although similar to how words like *effeminate* can be misogynistically employed in the English language, the potentially sexist meanings of γυναικεῖος were literally built into the grammar of the word, as opposed to the context-dependence of *effeminate's* potentially sexist semantics.

⁹John Uebersax describes this lower level of Platonic knowledge as “conceptual representations of moral truths” (*Psychology, Philosophy, and Plato's Divided Line*). In an etymological sense, dianoia literally means *across or through noesis*, like a line going through a circle. This line can be seen as one's line of higher perceptual focus towards the sun, one's singular dialectic path trekked through the ouroboric completion of unity, or meta-apprehension of the divided line itself.

the ideas¹⁰ residing behind their symbols, either regarding the constants, the operators, or both. The essential definitions of these composite ideas must be revealed to them through dialectic before any direct apprehension of the mathematical truth becomes possible. The numerical constants in question consist of two coefficients and a product. The coefficients are the “male drama” and the “female drama” (451c), while the product of the two is “human nature” (452e). The operations in question are multiplication and equation, which represent conversation manifesting as either rhetoric or dialectic depending on the mathematical consistency of their deployment in dialogue. This is the essential structure of *Republic V*'s discussion of human nature, which positions Socrates' dianoetic comprehension of the feminist “upper world” in contrast with the doubly ignorant patriarchal world inhabited by his near-exclusively¹¹ male Athenian audience (517b). As Socrates descends “back down into that cave,” he must maneuver within the unjust and inaccurate symbolic frameworks traded in by the unenlightened prisoners in order to even begin to turn them towards the fire. Returning to the analogy of the conflicting equations, Socrates has a practical, pedagogical incentive to frame his dialogue in the incorrect symbology of $1 \cdot 0.5 = 1$ in order to clarify its logical inconsistencies and lead his confused audience

¹⁰I went back and forth on whether to use *ideas* or *meanings*, but landed on the former.

¹¹Plato was known to have had at least two female students at his academy.

towards the mathematically consistent and ethically true equation of $1 \cdot 1 = 1$.

This *argument by pragmatics* has similar explanative value for Socrates' all-encompassing use of the word *man*, as well as his initial positioning of *man* as the human standard. These were, and still are in the caves of many, deeply ingrained aspects of the historically patriarchal and thus doubly ignorant unicode,¹² and it would be absurd to require Socrates to pull his hands out of the patriarchal shadows when this was required for any concept of gender equality to take root. In summary, Socrates' engagement with proprietary language, even after his first stab at displaying the feminist truth, was a pragmatic component of his attempt to enlighten the imprisoned patriarchs through the dialectic process. While this *argument by pragmatics* is a charitable reading of Socrates' evidently misogynistic language, the alternative reading leads to a conflict between *Republic V's* well-supported feminist conclusion and its less frequent casually misogynistic framing, the former of which wins out in relevancy to its overall characterization.

Problematic Quotes

There are multiple passages within the *Republic* that apply the concept of femininity in a derogatory way, most of which can be explained by Socrates' account of original nature as distinguished from socialized, personal nature. As has

¹²Meaning *universal structures within all languages* in this context.

been developed in great detail in **Female Nature as Human Nature**, Socrates' take on original human nature is expressly feminist, terminating in Glaucon wrapping up Book VII by telling him "You are like a sculptor Socrates . . . fashioning rulers who are absolutely beautiful," leading Socrates to remind him about their inclusion of "female rulers too" (540c). Now, this royal appreciation for women as they originally are *and could be* given just pedagogical conditions, does not extend to women as they were given their oppressive prevention of education and consequent inability to attain excellence within the Socratic model. The following quotes display this accounted for yet still problematic misogyny towards women as they *were socialized* as opposed to how they *inherently are* (387e, 398e, 395d-e, 431c, 433d, 455b-d, and 579b). For the sake of brevity, I will focus on Socrates' comments regarding home-making in Book V, as well as a confounding portion from Book VIII's outline of democracy where Socrates appears to contradict the entirety of Books V through VII.

In 455c, Socrates asks "are we to go on at length about weaving, and attending to pancakes and stews, in which the female sex does have a reputation, and where it is utterly laughable for them to lose out to a man?" Although it is not clearly signposted, Socrates has to be speaking of women as they *were socialized* as opposed to as they *inherently are*, or else the rest of Book V becomes nullified. While it is possible that the inconsistency of Socrates' humanity caught up to him here, the idea that this passage was included for an aporic purpose carries more

explanative power. On this reading, Socrates is further pulling at the distinction between sex and gender, and while he is undoubtedly being misogynistic towards women participating in traditional gender roles, he is successfully forcing his audience to question why originally equal women have such devalued gendered reputations. The fact that Socrates says "female sex" here instead of *woman* ironically has no play on his subtle distinction between sex and gender, as to my knowledge, he was one of the first thinkers to posit this concept.

Now onto Book VIII, where after describing the vast upheaval of traditional social norms that are prone to arise in a democracy, Socrates says "freedom in such a city reaches its extreme when slaves, male or female, are just as free as those who buy them. And I almost forgot to mention how much equality and freedom there is among women in relation to men, and among men in relation to women" (563b). Although Socrates is wary of excessive democratic freedom, due to its individualistic and disunifying potential, it is clear from his arguments as demonstrated in **Female Nature as Human Nature** that emancipatory freedom is required for a city's unification, and that any other patriarchal states of affairs are decidedly unjust. Therefore, this passage would actually be praising this facet of democracy, as if it were Glaucon's "own dream" (563d).

While it could be argued that the *Republic's* sometimes repulsive cases of casual misogyny, directed towards women as they *were*, disbar it from its feminist

characterization, the bulk of its engagement with women's issues are starkly progressive and even unexpectedly heart-warming at times (457a). That being said, the weight of these unfortunate and prima facie confounding quotes pales in comparison to the *Republic's* core argumentation, allowing for its feminist characterization after all.

Conclusion:

Because of trailblazing thinkers like Socrates who advanced notions of gender equality to the extent that was pragmatically possible in their limited pedagogical and linguistic contexts, the contemporary thinker is blessedly privy to an academic context where feminist notions are more commonly taken for granted, at least on an ideological level.¹³ Whether or not this paper has convinced you of the *Republic's* feminist reading, I hope you can at least agree that in a culture whose beauty standards were largely predicated on freshman-age men, it is shockingly beautiful to hear Socrates describe the female body as being "clothed in excellence" (457a) as her corresponding soul flourishes in the palaestra alongside her naturally equal citizens.

With Peace,

-Asher

¹³There is still an expansive range of misogynistic existents in contemporary academia, both practical and ideological, but the feminist progression within prevailing ideology even in the last twenty years is striking.

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