

ZHANG Wei

The foundation of phenomenological ethics: Intentional feelings

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Abstract E. Husserl's reflections in *Logical Investigations* on “intentional feelings” and “non-intentional feelings” are significant in both his later ethical explorations and M. Scheler's thought on ethics. Through the incorporation of the views of Husserl and Scheler, we find that the phenomenology of the intentional feeling-acts is not only the foundation of the non-formal ethics of values in Scheler's phenomenology, but also at least the constitutive foundation of the ethics of Husserl's first orientation.

Keywords phenomenology, ethics, intentional feelings, value, Husserl, Scheler

摘要 胡塞尔在《逻辑研究》中对“意向感受”和“非意向感受”的思考，无论是在他后来的伦理学探讨中，还是在舍勒的伦理学思想中，都具有重要的意义。通过将胡塞尔与舍勒的视域融合，可以发现，意向感受行为现象学不仅是舍勒现象学的质料的价值伦理学基础，而且至少可以是胡塞尔第一个方向上的伦理学的建构基础。

关键词 现象学，伦理学，意向感受，价值，胡塞尔，舍勒

1 Introduction

E. Husserl once said, “My *Logical Investigations* were my ‘break-through’, not an end but rather a beginning” (Husserl 2001a, p. 3). *Logical Investigations* not only presented Husserl's phenomenology of consciousness for the first time, but also became the source of M. Heidegger's phenomenology as “ontology” and M. Scheler's phenomenological “non-formal ethics of values.” In this essay,

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ZHANG Wei (✉)

Department of Philosophy, Sun Yat-sen University, Guangzhou 510275, China

E-mail: renzhizhangen@gmail.com

beginning with the compartmentalization of intentional feelings and non-intentional feelings that Husserl made in *Logical Investigations*, I seek to show the significance of intentional feeling-acts for the possible development of a phenomenological ethics through the incorporation of the views of Husserl and Scheler. I then point out that the phenomenology of the intentional feeling-acts is not only the foundation of Scheler's phenomenological ethics, but also the constitutive foundation of phenomenological ethics in Husserl's first orientation.

2 Intentional feelings and non-intentional feelings

The issue of intentional feelings and non-intentional feelings proposed by Husserl in section 15 of investigation V in *Logical Investigations* may be not tremendously important in the context of the whole work, but it is extremely significant in Husserl's own investigation of ethics and in Scheler's investigation of phenomenological ethics. As Ni Liangkang once properly pointed out, "we even may say that Scheler's ethics is a phenomenology of value-feelings" (Ni 2004, p. 148).¹ We will later see the construction of phenomenological ethics in the first orientation of Husserl must also be founded on an analysis of the intentional feeling-acts.

Husserl made an explicit distinction between non-intentional feelings (nicht-intentionale Gefühle) and intentional feelings (intentionale Gefühle) in *Logical Investigations*. Non-intentional feelings basically mean "feeling-sensations" (Gefühlsempfindungen) or "sensible feelings" (sinnlichen Gefühle), such as some sensible pain or pleasure which is homomorphic with other types of senses, and therefore is regarded as the stuff (Stoff) or hyle (hyle) of sense, which we can also call apprehensional content in Husserl's static and descriptive phenomenology. Hence, non-intentional feeling itself is not an act, but only a factor or a real (reell) content of an apprehensional act, and is non-intentional. On the contrary, intentional feeling in itself is an act of consciousness and is bound to have an intentional character. Husserl then began to doubt if these two kinds of feelings belong to the same genus, since the former just is a factor of the act, while the latter is an act itself. Of course, this is not the crucial problem that we must focus on here. The most important thing is to discuss and analyze the intentional character of the intentional feeling-acts as such.

Ni Liangkang clearly dichotomized the concept of "intentionality": In the

¹ Ni 2004 is a very important breakthrough. The author collates the relation between Husserl and Scheler and even the relation between theoretical philosophy and practical philosophy from an inquiry into the phenomenology of feeling.

narrower sense, “intentionality” always means that the consciousness is “constructing” the object, so it is characteristic of an objectifying act; “intentionality” in the broad sense implies that the consciousness always “directs toward” or “contains” objects, so it becomes characteristic of all acts of consciousness including the non-objectifying acts (Ni 2007, p. 69 ff.). Thus, we can say that Husserl in fact made dichotomies on two levels in *Logical Investigations*. The first is the dichotomy of intentional experience and non-intentional experience. In this distinction, “intentional” is used in the broad sense, which means an act is “intentional” and “contains objects” as long as it becomes an experiencing one. Here “non-intentional” basically indicates the characteristics of factors or contents (sensible stuff) of an act, and so called “non-intentional feeling” must be understood in this sense. Secondly, in the intentional experience, we can differentiate intentional experience in the narrower sense (an objectifying act) and intentional experience in the broad sense (all acts of consciousness including non-objectifying acts) according to the narrow and broad definitions of “intentionality.” The “intentional feelings” discussed here belong to the objectifying acts in intentional experience in the broad sense (Husserl more often termed them acts of emotion and acts of will). What is more, there is a foundational relationship between these two acts of different qualitative genera: “Each intentional experience is either an objectifying act or has its basis in such an act, i.e., it must, in the latter case, contain an objectifying act among its constituents” (Husserl 2001b, p. 167).

Now, it seems very clear that the intentional feeling-acts were ranked among the objectifying acts by Husserl in *Logical Investigations*, and the intentionality they take on mainly manifest themselves in “directing toward” or “containing” objects, but not in “constructing” objects. As such it must be founded on the acts which are able to construct objects, that is, on objectifying acts. “They (non-objectifying acts) all ‘owe’ (verdanken) their intentional relation to certain underlying presentations” (Ibid., p. 108). The non-intentional feeling is only a factor of the act. The intentional feelings belong to the genus of act, while the non-intentional feelings belong to the genus of “stuff”. For example, in the structural analysis of the feeling-act of “loving a segment of tone”, we need to differentiate three levels: First is the sense of tone or feeling-tone (Gefühlston), which is taken as “non-intentional feeling” or “materials of sense”; second is the objectifying act of “hearing” or “imaging” “the sense of tone”; third is the intentional feeling-act of “loving” this segment of tone. It is a structural analysis rather than an analysis in the order of time, which means there must be “hearing” or “imaging” first, and then “loving”. It means that “loving” has no object to be directed toward without the object constructed by the objectifying act of “hearing” or “imaging”, and “loving” cannot exist without such directing-toward,

and “loving” then must be founded on “hearing” or “imaging”.

However, here hides an extremely difficult problem: it seems that the objectifying act of “hearing” or “imaging” in itself “directs toward” the object indirectly, because it only constructs an object of “a segment of tone” by “sense of tone”; whereas on the contrary, the non-objectifying act of “loving” directly directs toward the object of “a segment of tone”. Husserl was aware of this problem in his lectures on ethics in 1908/09, and he even considered it would do harm to the unity of the concept of “act” and “intentionality” in phenomenology (Husserl 1988, S. 332–334). Just reflection on this problem can bring us different comprehensions of “intentional feeling-acts,” and it will become the entrance to Husserl’s phenomenological ethics in his first orientation.

It may be helpful to go deeper into this problem using Scheler’s thoughts. The discrimination among “feelings” is a crucial subject in Scheler’s phenomenological research. Scheler at first drew a distinction between the intentional “feeling-act (Fühlen) of something” and pure feeling-states (Gefühlszustände) or “feeling content” (Gefühl). The latter only belongs to the content and appearance, while the former belongs to the functions which accept them (Scheler 1980a, p. 255 ff.).² For example, for the feeling content (state) of the same “pain”, I can “endure” it, “tolerate” it, “suffer” it, or even “enjoy” it and so on. All these words indicate different kinds of feelings (Scheler 1986, p. 37). The acting modes or functions of these feelings can be founded on the pure feeling-states in variously changeable ways. The distinction here basically is similar to Husserl’s distinction between “intentional feelings” and “non-intentional feelings”. The former is act and function, while the latter is the content and factors of the act. Furthermore, Scheler differentiated the intentional feeling-acts in themselves: the feeling-acts of “feeling-content in sense of state” and the feeling-acts of “value”. For instance, the feeling of pain belongs to the former (the feeling modes are “enduring”, “tolerating”, or “enjoying”, etc.), while the feelings of truth, beauty, and goodness belong to the latter. Thus we can see there are distinctions on two levels in Scheler, too. Firstly, there is a distinction between intentional feeling-acts and pure feeling-content. This distinction has nothing to do with such a problem, i.e. to what extent intentional feeling-acts are the functions for grasping the value. Secondly, there is a distinction in the intentional feeling-acts themselves (the non-objectifying acts in Husserl’s sense): the feeling-acts of feeling-content and the feeling-acts of value. The latter is the foundation of the whole phenomenological ethics of Scheler, as it were, because the feeling-act “gains a cognitive function in addition to its

² What need to be noted is, Scheler drew a distinction between the German words *Fühlen* and *Gefühl*, but Husserl used the latter more often and did not distinguish between them.

intentional nature” only in the latter (Scheler 1980a, p. 257).³

The relationship of such feeling-act of value and its value-correlates is precisely equivalent to the relationship of “presentation” and its “object”. The feeling-act of value does not need to be associated with the field of objects by the mediation of objectifying acts such as presenting or judging. Rather, it originally directs toward a special object — value, and hence the acts as such can “be fulfilled” or “not be fulfilled”. Let us go back to the structural analysis of the act of “loving a segment of tone” mentioned above: now we find that the problem turns out to be more complicated. It is not a separate act but a complex of acts, and in it we must at least differentiate the “presentational content” of “the sense of tone”, the objectifying act (hearing or imaging) of “a segment of tone”, the object of “a segment of tone”, the feeling-state or feeling content of “loving”, some value, and the feeling-act of “loving” itself, and so on. Scheler would say that “loving” itself already could constitute a separate feeling-act, and it originally directed toward its own object — a certain value. This feeling-act and the objectifying act of “a segment of tone” are two acts which are independent of each other. At the same time, such feeling content as “loving” is not necessarily associated with the object of “a segment of tone” by virtue of “the presentational content” of “the sense of tone”. What is more, once the association happens, it must be indirect throughout. Hence, “loving a segment of tone” indicates a combination of several acts; that is, the feeling act of “loving” is associated with the objectifying act of “a segment of tone”, as if “the segment of tone” initiates the “loving”. Such association is a secondary or not essentially necessary act. So, the analysis of the intentionality of the value-feeling-acts itself must be differentiated from the analysis of the cause or the motivation of feeling. For instance, I feel some value even in inexplicable sadness.

The difficulty Husserl was confronted with seems then not to exist any more. The objectifying acts and feeling-acts are intentionally directed toward their respective objects, and the feeling-acts do not originally direct toward the object which is constructed by the objectifying acts. Therefore, the unity of the concept of “act” and “intentionality” is guaranteed. There is however a new problem: Scheler specifically claimed “(value-) feeling originally is an ‘objectifying act’

³ In fact, here hides a difficult problem, that is, the problem of the means of givenness of feeling content or feeling-states. In Husserl, the feeling content was “experienced” but was not “perceived” non-intentionally. However, there were two cases in Scheler: on the one hand, the feeling content could be “evidently caught (fassen)” or was “observation (konstatierbar)”; on the other hand, there was the intentional “feeling of” the feeling content in the sense of state. Does it mean the former is similar with the “non-intentional experience” Husserl talked about, while the latter is similar with the intentional acts in Husserl’s narrower sense — the objectifying acts? Certainly, we will not go into the details of this question. At the same time, we also give up the detailed analysis of Scheler on “sensation” per se.

that does not require the mediation of presentation” (Ibid., p. 259, quotation is modified), so the radical distinction between objectifying acts and feeling-acts (non-objectifying acts) drawn by Husserl was written-off by Scheler. Is such writing-off legitimate after all?

3 Objectifying acts and non-objectifying acts

The distinction between objectifying acts and non-objectifying acts is Husserl’s distinction of the acts of consciousness in the mass. There had been a distinction between psychological acts and acts of consciousness in ancient time. In the view of Brentano, the threefold distinction of psychological acts can trace back to Plato, but the most influential distinction is Aristotle’s between “thought” and “desire”. Descartes completely and precisely trisected the *cogito* or psychological phenomenon into “idea”, “judgment”, and “willing or emotion” for the first time in “Meditation III”. In Kant, the acts of “thinking”, which was divided into “idea” and “judgment” by Descartes, were combined into one act once more, that is, “cognition”, while the act of “desire” or “willing or emotion” was clearly demarcated as “emotion” and “willing or desire”. Thus, Kant completed his trisection of psychological phenomenon differently from Descartes. As for Brentano, he kept consistent with Descartes on the whole, and trisected the psychological phenomenon into the acts of “presentation”, “judgment”, and “emotion (including love and hate, interest, willing etc)” (Brentano 1969, pp. 14–16; 50–55). The compartmentalization of Husserl’s acts of consciousness is closer to Aristotle’s: The acts of “presentation” and “judgment” together constitute the qualitative genus of the “objectifying acts”, while the acts of “emotion (including love and hate, interest, willing, desire, etc)” are ranked in the qualitative genus of “the non-objectifying acts”.

Husserl not only dichotomized the acts of consciousness in the mass, but also particularly finely divided objectifying acts into several levels, and described the relation of the foundations of various levels in *Logical Investigations*. At first, we must focus on the dichotomy in the mass and the relation of foundations of them.

To be brief, the objectifying act is an act which constitutes the object, while the non-objectifying act is incapable of constituting the object, so we can discuss the intentional essence of an act within the objectifying act: matter (*Materie*) and quality (*Qualität*). “The matter, therefore, must be that element in an act which gives it reference to an object” (Husserl 2001b, p. 121), while the quality mainly indicates whether an act has a “position” (*Setzung*) (it mainly means “Being-belief (*Seinsglaube*)” in *Logical Investigations*), that is, whether position-taking (*Stellungnahmen*) is an act. Each objectifying act has its own matter and quality, but the non-objectifying act has no matter of its own, so it has

no direct relation with an object. However, if only an act of consciousness is an act, it has the feature of intentionality, and it is always a consciousness about something. Thus the non-objectifying act must get matter and get the relation with an object, thereby become an act of consciousness by virtue of an objectifying act. It is the sticking point that the objectifying acts are the foundation of the non-objectifying acts. In principle, the feeling-act of “loving a segment of tone” (a non-objectifying act) must ground itself on the presenting act of “hearing or imaging a segment of tone” (an objectifying act).

However, Husserl’s dichotomy of the acts of consciousness in the mass was not accepted by Scheler. Scheler took the feeling-acts (the non-objectifying acts in Husserl’s sense) as also being objectifying acts, because in Scheler feeling-act originally had a direct relationship with its proper object — value. It then satisfied Husserl’s definition in terms of the features of the objectifying acts. The divergence of Husserl and Scheler on the understanding of the intentional feeling-acts (or the compartmentalization of the objectifying acts and the non-objectifying acts) mainly lies in the understanding of value, as it were.

Husserl repeatedly referred to the distinction between “intentional feelings” and “non-intentional feelings” made by himself in *Logical Investigations*. In his manuscript, this distinction was also expressed as the distinction between “object-feeling (loving)” and “sense-feeling (feeling tone)” (Husserl, MS. M III 3 II 1, 29. qtd. in Lotz 2002, p. 36). What demands particular attention is that Husserl called such emotive acts (or the non-objectifying acts) as the “object-feeling” of “loving” “valuing acts” (wertende Akte) (Husserl 1984, p. 7). Thus “value” comes into the discussion about the acts of consciousness. Like Scheler’s, Husserl’s phenomenological ethics are always closely connected with axiology.

Husserl claimed that “this world is there for me not only as a world of mere things, but also with the same immediacy as a *world of objects with values, a world of goods, a practical world*. I simply find the physical things in front of me furnished not only with merely material determinations but also with value-characteristics, as beautiful and ugly, pleasant and unpleasant, agreeable and disagreeable, and the like” (Husserl 1983, p. 53). We can say, presenting acts are directed toward “mere thing”, while the valuing acts are directed toward the “thing which has value”; in other words, value is the fully (voll) intentional correlate of valuing acts. Hence, in the kind of acts which are similar to valuing acts, we have an “intentional object” in two senses: the object of the mere thing and the fully intentional object, and accordingly we have a dual intention and dual directedness (Ibid., pp. 76–78). Hereupon, we clearly see the obvious difference between Husserl and Scheler. Scheler took value as an object which an act originally and independently possesses, and as such the value-feeling-act was an independent act in Scheler. Husserl however always connected value with

thing (in Scheler's view, such connection was secondary and nonessential). Husserl believed that we always pointed to a thing which has value in valuing acts or feeling-acts. Pointing to this thing is to grasp (Erfassen) it, but the "pointing to" value is not done in the manner of grasping. Although both the presentation of the thing (Sachvorstellen) and the valuing of the thing (Sachwerten) have the modes of actuality (Aktualität), the valuing of the thing always necessarily embodies the presentation of the thing. That is to say, value is not possessed as a grasped object; hence, the kind of acts similar to valuing acts can only ever be non-objectifying acts, and must be grounded upon objectifying acts all along (Husserl 1988, p. 72).

However, Husserl reminded us immediately that we must pay attention to possible confusions. The loving of beauty (the valuing act) is distinct from the judgment of beauty (the act of value-judgment). In the latter, value itself becomes the object of judging cognition, and therefore is objectified. That is to say, the act of value-judgment is an objectifying act. At the same time, "a judging-act can only be founded on the emotive act of valuing beauty and good" (Ibid., p. 72, 60, translated by the English translator of this essay). Does it mean that an objectifying act of value-judgment must be grounded on the non-objectifying act of a valuing act? It is a hot potato in the sphere of Husserl's static, descriptive phenomenology. In fact, many times Husserl himself was aware that it turned out to be extremely complicated and difficult once the problem extended to the field of the non-objectifying act, although he had made many convincing conclusions on the description of objectifying act.

Of course, from the viewpoint of Scheler, the problem is very simple, and we can resolve it without deviation from the achievements of Husserl's analysis of the objectifying act. Such a valuing act as "loving of beauty" itself is an objectifying act, and it is similar to the presenting act (or we can call it the nominal objectifying act) in the field of intellectual acts. The act of value-judgment is also an objectifying act, but it is similar to the propositional objectifying act. The foundational relationship between nominal and propositional objectifying acts was revealed in Husserl's analysis of intentionality. Similarly, there is a foundational relationship between the valuing act and the act of value-judgment. However, such explanation certainly will be at the cost of writing off the distinction between objectifying act and non-objectifying act. According to my reading at present, I find no conclusive reason to say that Husserl himself wrote off this distinction, but there is still some vague evidence of it, or at least there is an inclination to analogize the feeling act or valuing act with the objectifying act in Husserl.

In *Ideas I*, Husserl repeatedly placed quotation marks around the words "apprehension" and "objectified", which were specially used to describe the features of objectifying acts. He used them to portray non-objectifying acts such

as emotion, willing, and so on (Husserl 1983, p. 277 ff., 281 ff.). And in his manuscript, the concept of “value-apperception” (Wertapperzeption) repeatedly appeared, for example, in the manuscript on the phenomenology of intersubjectivity and in manuscript M, and so on. It seems that Husserl wanted to analyze the intentional structure of such an act as value-apperception too. “Just like we will not differentiate between the sense of tone and the datum of tone itself in our natural attitude toward the subjective experience in datum of sense, we will not differentiate between feelings and the felt values of data of tone. We do not talk about value at all, we only have this word, i.e. the sensible pleasurable character of tone. Just like the sensible data are the material of experience..., the content of sensible feelings is the material of our value-apperception that is a material of experience in which we grasp in valuing (wertend erfassen) and enjoy a segment of music, symphony and a poem, and the like in an unity of the synthetical feelings” (Husserl 2004, p. 326).⁴ Analogous to the analysis of the structure of perceptive experience, we can almost compartmentalize the value-apperception into stuff (hyle) — the content of sensible feeling, the matter of act — value and the quality of act — valuing or value-position. Of course, it is the conclusion of neither Husserl nor Scheler, because on the one hand Scheler did not pay much attention to the structural analysis of the value-feeling act, while on the other hand, although the act of value-apperception has its own stuff, matter, and quality, it is always in “a unity of the synthetical feelings”. Thus, it is still a question whether the connection of the acts of value-apperception and the presenting acts is essentially necessary in Husserl.

4 Possible development of phenomenological ethics

In fact, the difference between Husserl and Scheler is not only embodied in the analysis of the intentionality of feeling-acts, but also in their understanding of the position of intentional feeling-acts themselves and the relationship it has with presenting acts, which relate to the position of a phenomenological ethics.

The differentiation made by Husserl of non-objectifying acts such as feeling acts and objectifying acts such as presenting acts obviously bears the intent to

⁴ “Wie wir in der natürlichen Blickstellung auf unsere subjektiven Erlebnisse bei Empfindungsdaten nicht scheiden zwischen einem Empfinden <des> Tons und dem Tondatum selbst, so scheiden wir auch nicht zwischen einem Fühlen und dem gefühlten Wert des Tondatums. Wir sprechen überhaupt nicht von Wert, wir haben hier nur ein Wort, sinnliche Lustcharakter des Tons. Wie die Sinnesdaten das Material sind für das Erlebnis,...so sind die sinnlichen Gefühle das Material für unsere Wertapperzeption, für die Erlebnisse, in denen wir etaw eine Melodie oder Symphonie, ein Geducht usw. wertend erfassen und genießen in der Einheit eines synthetischen Gefühls” (translated by the English translator of this essay).

differentiate theoretical reason from practical reason. Objectifying acts mostly stay within the sphere of epistemology, while the non-objectifying act relates to the field of ethics. At the same time, the feeling-acts have no matter of their own, so they must be grounded on the presenting acts all along. Thus, although Husserl was very interested in the problems of ethics, it only has a secondary position in his inchoate construction. Nevertheless, in Theo de Boer's view, however Husserl's thought changed, there was always one unchangeable ethical motivation in his entire philosophy, that "philosophy must become a rigorous science, because we must live a serious life in an ethical sense" (Boer 1994, p. 35, translated by the English translator of this essay).

It is clear that Husserl developed his ethical thinking in his first orientation by developing and reconstructing the thoughts of Brentano. With the analogy of value-practical reason and theoretical reason, Husserl tried to develop a formal axiology (as the principle theory of valuing acts) and formal praxis (as the principle theory of willing acts), and then laid the foundation for a scientific ethics. Hence, like Scheler, Husserl in fact intended to differentiate philosophical ethics (or pure ethics) from practical ethics, and considered that the latter would always be founded on the former. Although Husserl at last followed the categorical imperative of "Do the best that is attainable! (Tue das Beste unter dem Erreichbaren!)" (Husserl 1988, p. 221) stressed by Brentano in the construction of ethics in this direction, to conquer the subjectivism and relativism in ethics, he held that "each normative proposition presupposes a certain sort of valuation or approval through which the concept of a 'good' or 'bad' (a value or disvalue) arises in connection with a certain class of object" (Husserl 2001a, p. 35), just as he stressed as early as 1900. Therefore, the analysis of intentional feeling-acts (valuing acts, valuing-behaviour⁵) (Husserl 2004, p. 315 ff., p. 359 ff.) can at least be the foundation or entry point for Husserl's ethical thinking in this first orientation.

Scheler definitely would agree with Husserl: Men almost cannot talk about "good" and "evil" if they abstract them from feelings; objects arouse our emotion or desire by virtue of value, while value is given to us originally by means of feeling-value (Husserl 1988, p. 394 ff.). In brief, in Husserl, "pure ethics as axiology is a quasi-theoretical science, it becomes norms only in practice" (Funke 1980, p. 36), and pure ethics must be based on value-feeling phenomenology. Therefore, Scheler would not oppose on the whole, for he exactly expressed, "all oughtness must have its foundation in values" (Scheler 1980a, p. 82). The matter however is that Husserl's phenomenology of value-feeling must be based on the phenomenology of presentation, and

⁵ Husserl believed that the first meaning of "valuing" was "valuing-behaviour (Werthalten)," was "the acts of emotion or willing (Verhalten des Gemüt bzw. Willens)."

quasi-theoretical science (pure ethics) always need to be based on theoretical science. Scheler would in no way accept this fact.

If the feeling act itself has a special relation with the object, it per se can be an independent act, and the foundational relationship between feeling-act and presenting act cannot be set up. So Scheler not only totally rejected the relationship in which the “presenting act lay foundation in matter (Materie) for feeling-act,” but even overturned it, arguing “any *intellectual* comprehension of *what something is presupposes an emotive value* experience of the object... *Value-ception* (Wertnehmung) always precedes *perception* (Wahrnehmung)” (Scheler 1980b, p. 116). Actually, the foundational relationship shown here is not an accepted foundation in static, descriptive phenomenology, but mostly is similar to the genetic foundation between two different kinds of acts or two different qualities of acts, and was explained later by Husserl’s research into genetic phenomenology.

In *Ideas I* and “The Lectures on Ethics” in 1914, Husserl had pointed out that there was a position or position-taking which was similar to “Being-belief” (such a position as “*perceiving*”) in emotional acts or valuing acts, such as “*beauty-ception*”, and “*value-ception*”. Perhaps we can also call it a quality of the acts of value-apperception. From this point until his last work *Experience and Judgment*, Husserl revealed an idea that the act of perception always must begin with “feeling” and “interest,” and that such “feeling” and “interest” are active feeling in which the transcendental ego is not only the ego of cognition but also the ego of feeling; in which there appears an attention that is not attention in the usual sense, but rather is a new mode of attention parallel with the usual one (Husserl 1983, pp. 276–282; Husserl 1973, Section 15–21; Husserl 2000, pp. 4–10⁶). In the sense of genetic phenomenology, there is a foundational relationship between the feeling-act and the act of perception in quality (Qualität). Such a change establishes a methodological basis for Husserl to develop his ethics in his second orientation (i.e. an ethics of absolute responsibility related to the value of love of the individual or a theory of “ethical demand”) (Melle 2002; Donohoe 2004).

Compared with Husserl, Scheler went further (and deeper). In his opinion, if we have no interest in something, we are unable to “perceive” and “present” it at all. The direction of our perception and presentation (even the direction of reflection and memory) always follows our act of interest. What is more important is that such interest itself needs the direction of love (or hate) to this object. Loving goes before perceiving. The object of perception must be first loved or hated before it is cogitated, analyzed, and judged by intelligence. Love

⁶ In Husserl 2000, Husserl still differentiated active feeling, feeling per se and positive feeling, so the problem is going to be more complicated, and it must be the theme of another treatise.

and hate are the most primeval modes of action. They embody all other acts and ground them. We can say that the formation of any possible image of the world is determined by the construction, orientation, and structure of love and interest. The extension and deepening of the constructed image of our world must depend on the previous extension and on deepening of the scope of our interest and love. The acts of love and hate are not only prior to perception and cognition but also prior to interest and willing, thus they can be regarded as the unique basic acts which are able to eventually unify practical reason and theoretical reason (Scheler 1968, p. 83; Scheler 1986, p. 96). In fact, the objectifying acts and the non-objectifying acts of Husserl were at last unified in the act of love or hate by Scheler, so in Scheler the phenomenological ethics thereby won a primary position (relative to epistemology).

In brief, although we do not fully resolve the difficulties that appear in the analysis of the intentionality of such intentional feeling-acts as the acts of value-feeling or value-apperception in the fusion of the views of Husserl and Scheler, we can clearly present two trains of thought of the static and descriptive foundation of acceptedness (Geltung) and genesis, and therefore can show the significance of the intentional feeling-acts for the possible development of a phenomenological ethics. I totally agree with Klaus Held, who regarded the principle of correlation as the basic principle which a phenomenological ethics must take on, and that the phenomenological ethics ought to be known to the world in the appearance of intentional ethics. Held also accounted for the ethics in the second orientation of Husserl, and for the possible approach of Heidegger's ethics in aspects of intentionality and fulfilling in the fusion of the views of Husserl and Heidegger (Held 1993). Through this essay, I have tried to show the intentional characters of Husserl's ethics in his first orientation and in Scheler's non-formal ethics of values by the fusion of the views of Husserl and Scheler. In other words, the phenomenological ethics can at least develop in these two ways, and the investigation of the phenomenology of intentional feeling-value at least can be the entry point for the first.

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