This chapter delineates several distinct (and often problematically conflated) kinds of sexual exclusion: (1) lack of access to sexual gratification or pleasure, (2) lack of access to partnered sex, and (3) lack of social/psychological validation that comes from being seen as a sexual being. Liberman offers proposals about what our collective responses to these harms should be while weighing in on debates about whether there are rights to various kinds of sexual goods. She concludes that we ought to provide (...) mechanical assistance to those who are incapable of self-stimulation, enhance access to sexual education for everyone, and engage in a systematic effort to change the harmful social norms, stereotypes, and cultural ideals that drive exclusion from partnered sex and can lead to social invalidation. (shrink)

In Willing, Wanting, Waiting, Richard Holton lays out a detailed account of resolutions, arguing that they enable agents to resist temptation. Holton claims that temptation often leads to inappropriate shifts in judgment, and that resolutions are a special kind of first- and second-order intention pair that blocks such judgment shift. In this paper, I elaborate upon an intuitive but underdeveloped objection to Holton’s view – namely, that his view does not enable agents to successfully block the transmission of temptation in (...) the way that he claims, because the second-order intention is as equally susceptible to temptation as the first-order intention alone would be. I appeal to independently compelling principles – principles that Holton should accept, because they help fill an important explanatory gap in his account – to demonstrate why this objection succeeds. This argument both shows us where Holton’s view goes wrong and points us to the kind of solu-tion we need. In conclusion, I sketch an alternative account of resolutions as a first-order intention paired with a second-order desire. I argue that my account is not susceptible to the same objection because a temptation that cannot be blocked by an intention can be blocked by a desire. (shrink)

Most theories of promising are insufficiently broad, for they ground promissory obligation in some external or contingent feature of the promise. In this paper, I introduce a new kind of theory. The Mental States First (MSF) theory grounds promissory obligation in something internal and essential: the mental state expressed by promising, or the state that promisors purport to be in. My defense of MSF relies on three claims. First, promising to Φ expresses that you have resolved to Φ. Second, resolving (...) to Φ commits you to Φing, all else being equal. Third, the norms on speech acts are determined by the norms on the mental states they express, such that publicly expressing that you are in a state subjects you to whatever commitments are normally incurred by being in that state, regardless of whether you really are in it. I suggest that this general approach might also explain how the norms on other sorts of speech acts work. (shrink)

In this article, I address what kinds of claims are of the right kind to ground conscientious refusals. Specifically, I investigate what conceptions of moral responsibility and moral wrongness can be permissibly presumed by conscientious objectors. I argue that we must permit HCPs to come to their own subjective conclusions about what they take to be morally wrong and what they take themselves to be morally responsible for. However, these subjective assessments of wrongness and responsibility must be constrained in several (...) important ways: they cannot involve empirical falsehoods, objectionably discriminatory attitudes, or unreasonable normative beliefs. I argue that the sources of these constraints are the basic epistemic, relational, and normative competencies needed to function as a minimally decent health-care professional. Finally, I consider practical implications for my framework, and argue that it shows us that the objection raised by the plaintiffs in Zubik v. Burwell is of the wrong sort. (shrink)

I answer two questions: (1) what are people doing when they exchange conventional wedding vows? and (2) under what circumstances are these things morally and rationally permissible to do? I propose that wedding pledges are public proclamations that are simultaneously both private vows and interpersonal promises, and that they are often subject to uncertainty. I argue that the permissibility of uncertain wedding promises depends on whether the uncertainty stems from doubts about one’s own internal weakness of will and susceptibility to (...) temptation or from the expectation that external circumstances might change. I then explain why uncertainty is a prima facie challenge for unconditional wedding vows, and I offer a solution: rational wedding vows are unconditional in their content but implicitly conditional in their structure; the spouse pledges to act in certain ways unconditionally, so long as they remain in the spousal role. I respond to objections to my view (including Elizabeth Brake’s claim that the permissibility of unilateral divorce undermines an understanding of wedding vows as promises), and conclude with some suggestions about what marrying couples should do to ensure permissible pledges. (shrink)

I offer a philosophical account of vowing and the rationality of vow-making. I argue that vows are most productively understood as exceptionless resolutions that do not have any excusing conditions. I then articulate an apparent problem for exceptionless vow-making: how can it be rational to bind yourself unconditionally, when circumstances might change unexpectedly and make it the case that vow-keeping no longer makes sense for you? As a solution, I propose that vows can be rational to make only if they (...) are implicitly conditional on a personal identification or social role that is itself escapable. (shrink)

In response to three papers about sex and disability published in this journal, I offer a critique of existing arguments and a suggestion about how the debate should be reframed going forward. Jacob M. Appel argues that disabled individuals have a right to sex and should receive a special exemption to the general prohibition of prostitution. Ezio Di Nucci and Frej Klem Thomsen separately argue contra Appel that an appeal to sex rights cannot justify such an exemption. I argue that (...) Appel’s argument fails, but not for the reasons Di Nucci and Thomsen propose, as they have missed the most pressing objection to Appel’s argument: Appel falsely presumes that we never have good reasons to restrict someone’s sexual liberty rights. More importantly, there is a major flaw in the way that all three authors frame their positive accounts. They focus on disability as a proxy for sexual exclusion, when these categories should be pulled apart: some are sexually excluded who are not disabled, while some who are disabled are not sexually excluded. I conclude that it would be less socially harmful and more productive to focus directly on sexual exclusion per se rather than on disability as a proxy for sexual exclusion. (shrink)

I outline four conditions on permissible promise-making: the promise must be for a morally permissible end, must not be deceptive, must be in good faith, and must involve a realistic assessment of oneself. I then address whether promises that you are uncertain you can keep can meet these four criteria, with a focus on campaign promises as an illustrative example. I argue that uncertain promises can meet the first two criteria, but that whether they can meet the second two depends (...) on the source of the promisor's uncertainty. External uncertainty stemming from outside factors is unproblematic, but internal uncertainty stemming from the promisor's doubts about her own strength leads to promises that are in bad faith or unrealistic. I conclude that campaign promises are often subject to internal uncertainty and are therefore morally impermissible to make, all else being equal. (shrink)

I explore the debate about whether consequentialist theories can adequately accommodate the moral force of promissory obligation. I outline a straightforward act consequentialist account grounded in the value of satisfying expectations, and raise and assess three objections to this account: that it counterintuitively predicts that certain promises should be broken when commonsense morality insists that they should be kept, that the account is circular, and Michael Cholbi’s argument that this account problematically implies that promise-making is frequently obligatory. I then discuss (...) alternative act consequentialist accounts, including Philip Pettit’s suggestion that promise-keeping is an intrinsic good and Michael Smith’s agent-relative account. I outline Brad Hooker’s rule consequentialist account of promissory obligation and raise a challenge for it. I conclude that appeals to intuitions about cases will not settle the dispute, and that consequentialists and their critics must instead engage in substantive debate about the nature and stringency of promissory obligation. (shrink)

Many people presume that you can permissibly support the good features of a symbol, person, activity, or work of art while simultaneously denouncing its bad features. This chapter refines and assesses this commonsense (but undertheorized) moral justification for supporting problematic people, projects, and political symbols, and proposes an analogue of the Doctrine of Double Effect called the Doctrine of Double Endorsement (DDN). DDN proposes that when certain conditions are met, it is morally permissible to directly endorse some object in virtue (...) of its positive properties while standing against its negative properties, even though it would be morally impermissible to directly endorse those negative properties themselves. These conditions include separability (the good and bad features must not be inextricably linked), proportionality (the positive value of the good features must be significantly greater than the negative value of the bad features), and constrained choice (there must not be other things that the agent could endorse instead that share the same positive features but are not saddled with the negative ones). The chapter applies these constraints to a number of practical issues, including (among others) voting for morally troubling candidates, supporting Confederate monuments, and consuming sexist art. (shrink)

I aim to understand how the act of becoming an organ donor impacts whether it is permissible for a family veto to override an individual’s wish to donate. I argue that a Consent Model does not capture the right understanding of donor autonomy. I then assess a Gift Model and a Promise Model, arguing that both fail to capture important data about the ability to revoke one’s donor status. I then propose a Promise Acceptance Model, which construes becoming an organ (...) donor as accepting a promise the state makes to you to use your organs. This model, which implies that family vetoes are impermissible, captures the data other models struggle to accommodate. (shrink)

Larry Temkin draws on the work of Angus Deaton to argue that countries with poor governance sometimes rely on charitable giving and foreign aid in ways that enable them to avoid relying on their own citizens; this can cause them to be unresponsive to their citizens’ needs and thus prevent the long-term alleviation of poverty and other social problems. I argue that the implications of this “lack of government responsiveness argument” (or LOGRA) are both broader and narrower than they might (...) first appear. I explore how LOGRA applies more broadly to certain types of charitable giving in developed countries, with a focus on medical crowdfunding. I then highlight how LOGRA does not apply to charitable giving aimed at alleviating the suffering of the absolutely politically marginalized, or those especially vulnerable people to whom governments are never responsive. (shrink)

Revista Cunoașterea Științifică este o publicație trimestrială din domeniile științei și filosofiei, și domenii conexe de studiu și practică. -/- Cuprins: -/- EDITORIALE / EDITORIALS -/- Dan D. FARCAȘ Limite ale cunoașterii în cuvânt, logică, matematică și teorii Limits of knowledge in words, logic, mathematics and theories Nicolae SFETCU Cunoașterea științifică – Metodologii Scientific knowledge – Methodologies Nicolae SFETCU Știința schimbărilor climatice The science of climate change Nicolae SFETCU Știință sau pseudoștiință? Science or Pseudoscience? -/- ȘTIINȚE NATURALE / NATURAL SCIENCE (...) -/- Nicolae SFETCU Epistemologia gravitației cuantice Epistemology of Quantum Gravity Nicolae SFETCU Fabrica de apă grea Drobeta Turnu Severin: Construcția Drobeta Turnu Severin Heavy Water Plant: Construction Nicolae SFETCU Fabrica de apă grea Drobeta Turnu Severin: Funcționarea și oprirea Drobeta Turnu Severin Heavy Water Plant: Functioning and Shutting Down Albert TORMA PandemiA: Femei și polițiste Pandemia: Women and Policewomen Adrian KLEIN, Robert Neil BOYD Interacțiuni între creier, biocâmpuri și lumea fizică Interactions between the brain, the biofields, and the physical Adrian KLEIN Conectivitatea psiho-neuronală The Psycho-Neural Connectivity Nicolae SFETCU Probleme cu teoria corzilor din gravitația cuantică Problems with String Theory in Quantum Gravity -/- ȘTIINȚE SOCIALE / SOCIAL SCIENCE -/- Miriam MIRCEA Manipularea ca fenomen corelativ al puterii politice – o sinteză Manipulation as a correlative phenomenon of political power – a synthesis Daniela Georgiana GOLES, Oana Ștefania COȘA Repetabilitatea istorica a problemelor de securitate manageriale și noile cerințe in contextul economic actual The historical repeatability of managerial security issues and the new requirements in the current economic context Ionuț IORDACHE Reglementări internaționale privind falimentul International bankruptcy regulations Vlad BARBU, Ionuț IORDACHE, Adrian-Călin CUCULIS, Naciu Costin MERGEANE Rolul statului în relațiile de muncă The Role of the State in Labour Relations Tiberiu TĂNASE 24 Ianuarie, o zi cu dublă semnificație națională January 24, a day with double national significance Stan PETRESCU Iuliu Maniu – Lumini și umbre: O viață închinată Marii Uniri și propășirii României Mari Iuliu Maniu – Lights and shadows: A life devoted to the Great Union and the prosperity of Greater Romania Dumitru MAZILU Parohia în textul sfintelor canoane și în practică bisericească The parish in the text of the holy canons and in church practice Dumitru MAZILU Despre calitatea de paroh-administrator în funcționarea unei unități parohiale moderne About the quality of parish administrator in the operation of a modern parish unit Alexandra MOCANU Cultura anime în România Anime culture in Romania Alexandra MOCANU Abandonul școlar în România School dropout rate in Romania Emilian M. DOBRESCU Importanța pământurilor rare pentru economia mondială The Importance of the Rare Earths for the World Economy Nicolae SFETCU Modele ale inteligenței emoționale în cercetare și educație Models of Emotional Intelligence in Research and Education Nicolae SFETCU Aventurile lui Pinocchio – Educația The Adventures of Pinocchio – Education Dan D. FARCAȘ Câteva opinii privind etnogeneza românilor (1) Some opinions regarding the ethnogenesis of the Romanians (1) Denisa Oana PĂTRAȘCU Sancțiunile internaționale, măsură suprastatală de coerciție International sanctions, supra-state measure of coercion Tiberiu TĂNASE Puncte de vedere asupra proiectului de democratizare a Orientului Mijlociu Extins Viewpoints on the project of democratization of Middle East Extended -/- ȘTIINȚE FORMALE / FORMAL SCIENCE -/- Alida Monica Doriana BARBU Aplicații ale AI, machine learning, deep learning și big data în domeniul militar Applications of AI, machine learning, deep learning and big data in the military field Nicolae SFETCU Identitatea și inteligența artificială în Aventurile lui Pinocchio Identity and Artificial Intelligence in The Adventures of Pinocchio Sebastian BIDAȘCĂ Etica în inteligența artificială: provocări și perspective Ethics in Artificial Intelligence: Challenges and Prospects Nicolae SFETCU Măsurarea formei populației pentru înțelegerea tendințelor demografice Measuring population shape to understand demographic trends -/- FILOSOFIE / PHILOSOPHY -/- Adrian KLEIN Legea karmică – O abordare sinoptică Karmic Law – A Synoptic Approach Adrian KLEIN, Robert Neil BOYD Principiile subcuantice ale vieții și conștiinței Subquantum Principles of Life and Consciousness Silviu PETRE Pentru un realism al secolului XXI For a 21st century realism Dan D. FARCAȘ Câteva reflecții privind contactele extrasenzoriale Some reflections on extrasensory contacts Nicolae SFETCU Teorii cauzale ale referinței Causal theories of reference Nicolae SFETCU Filosofia inteligenței emoționale Philosophy of Emotional Intelligence -/- RECENZII CĂRȚI / BOOK REVIEWS -/- Traian OSTAHIE Nicolae Mavrocordat – disimulare și prudență la început de secol XVIII - Răgazurile lui Filotheu Nicolae Mavrocordat - concealment and prudence at the beginning of the 18th century - Răgazurile lui Filotheu Nicolae SFETCU Reconstrucția rațională a științei prin programe de cercetare The rational reconstruction of science through research programs Nicolae SFETCU Umanism, devenire și demiurgul în Aventurile lui Pinocchio Humanism, Becoming and the Demiurge in The Adventures of Pinocchio -/- ISSN 2971 – 9070 ISSN-L 2821 – 8086, DOI: 10.58679/CS49741. (shrink)