Hinge epistemology has to dispel the worry that disagreeing over hinges is rationally inert. Building on a companion piece (Coliva and Palmira 2020), this paper offers a constitutivist solution to the problem of rational inertia by maintaining that a Humean sceptic and a hinge epistemologist disagree over the correct explication of the concept of epistemic rationality. The paper explores the implications of such a solution. First, it clarifies in what sense a disagreement over hinges would be a conceptual disagreement. (...) Secondly, it uses considerations about the (alleged) rational inertia of hinge disagreement to offer a test whereby to demarcate genuine hinges from merely entrenched beliefs. Thirdly, it offers a response to the challenge of explaining why we have reason to engage in the epistemic practices that hinges are constitutive of in the first place. Fourthly, it argues that the constitutivist approach to hinge disagreement does not result in a relativist view. (shrink)

This chapter serves as an opinionated introduction to the problem of convergence (that there is no clear convergence to the truth in philosophy) and the problem of peer disagreement (that disagreement with a peer rationally demands suspending one’s beliefs), and some of the issues they give rise to, namely, philosophical skepticism and progress in philosophy. After introducing both topics and surveying the various positions in the literature we explore the prospects of an alternative, hinge-theoretic account.

Philosophers disagree. A lot. Pervasive disagreement is part of the territory; consensus is hard to find. Some think this should lead us to embrace philosophical skepticism: skepticism about the extent to which we can know, or justifiably believe, the philosophical views we defend and advance. Most philosophers in the literature fall into one camp or the other: philosophical skepticism or philosophical anti-skepticism. Drawing on the insights of hinge epistemology, this paper proposes another way forward, an intermediate position that appeals both (...) to skeptical and anti-skeptical intuitions concerning the possibility and scope of philosophical knowledge. The main advantage of our account is that it’s able to recover some philosophical knowledge while also being compatible with philosophical skepticism. (shrink)

A long historiographical tradition has claimed that the famous Pietro Pomponazzi’s Tractatus de immortalitate animae had been inspired by Tommaso de Vio’s Commentary on De anima – whose basic thesis was that, according to the principles of Aristotelian philosophy, the human soul was mortal – even though Pomponazzi in his entire work never mentioned Caietanus as a model. Firstly, this article frames the status quaestionis focusing on affinities and divergences between the two books and on the possible relationship and exchange (...) between the two authors, especially on the topic of the Aristotelian psychology. Secondly, the present study shows what emerges from a cross-reading of the sources which includes the collection of the Opuscula published in 1519 by the Dominican friar Bartolomeo Spina, who explicitly accused Caietanus of having paved the way for the scandalous and anti-Christian Pomponazzi’s position. The important gain of this collation of texts is the discovery of an unseen moment of debate with Caietanus inside Pomponazzi’s Tractatus. (shrink)

The aim of this work is to focus on the most unusual application of the Lateran bull Apostolici regiminis, the founding document of the inquisitorial legislation which regulated the teaching activity of philosophy professors by forcing them to refute any heterodox theory and to teach the doctrine of faith. In 1519, the inquisitor of Bologna Giovanni de’ Torfanni censored the book Defensorium, in which the secular Aristotelian philosopher Pietro Pomponazzi developed against his colleague Agostino Nifo a long series of arguments (...) in favor of the mortality of the human soul without match them with their respective Christian refutations, as prescribed by the papal bull. Nevertheless, as a result of a not well documented negotiation with the competent authorities, Pomponazzi was relieved of all obligations, provided that he submitted his book to the emendations of the Dominican theologian Crisostomo Javelli. Pomponazzi accepted the agreement and Javelli drew up a list of forty-two solutions to as many mortalistic arguments found in Defensorium. Javelli’s list – titled Solutiones rationum animi mortalitatem probantium quae in Defensorio contra Niphum excellentissimi Petri Pomponatii formantur – was then attached to Defensorium and in this way Pomponazzi gained permission to print and sell his book. After a short reconstruction of the key steps of this affair, the present work provides a critical edition of Javelli’s Solutiones, based upon both the sixteenth-century editions of the text, the first one contained in Defensorium, the other included in Pomponazzi’s Tractatus acutissimi, utillimi, et mere peripatetici. (shrink)

The condition of precariousness not only provides insights into a segment of the world of work or of a particular subject group, but is also a privileged standpoint for an overview of the condition of the social on a global scale. Because precariousness is multidimensional and polysemantic, it traverses contemporary society and multiple contexts, from industrial to class, gender, family relations as well as political participation, citizenship and migration. This book maps the differences and similarities in the ways precariousness and (...) insecurity in employment unfold and are subjectively experienced in regions and sectors that are confronted with different labour histories, legislations and economic priorities. Establishing a constructive dialogue amongst different global regions and across disciplines, the chapters explore the shift from precariousness to precariat and collective subjects as it is being articulated in the current global crisis. This edited collection aims to continue a process of mapping experiences by means of ethnographies, fieldwork, interviews, content analysis, where the precarious define their condition and explain how they try to withdraw from, cope with or embrace it. (shrink)

According to MODERATISM, perceptual justification requires that one independently takes for granted propositional hinges like <There is an external world>, <I am not a brain in a vat (BIV)>, and so on. This view faces the truth problem: to offer an account of truth for hinges that is not threatened by skepticism. Annalisa Coliva has tried to solve the truth problem by combining the claim that external world propositions have a substantive truth property like correspondence with the claim (...) that hinges have a deflationary truth property. I argue that the resulting view cannot offer a coherent characterization of ‘skeptical switch scenarios’ while providing an effective anti-skeptical strategy. In a more positive vein, I defend an approach that combines a correspondence conception of truth with epistemological disjunctivism. (shrink)

Tradition has it that first-person thought is somehow special. It is also commonplace to maintain that the first-person concept obeys a rule of reference to the effect that any token first-person thought is about the thinker of that thought. Following Annalisa Coliva and, more recently, Santiago Echeverri, I take the specialness claim to be the claim that thinking a first-person thought comes with a certain guarantee of its pattern of reference. Echeverri maintains that such a guarantee is explained (...) by a fairly flatfooted interpretation of the thinker-reflexive rule. I argue, however, that the explanatory aspirations of the thinker-reflexive rule are fulfilled only if we accept an epistemically loaded gloss on the notion of a thinker of a thought featuring the rule. That gloss is unpacked in terms of the subject’s ability to be acquainted with the phenomenal character of their thoughts. (shrink)

In her book Extended Rationality: A Hinge Epistemology (2015), Annalisa Coliva puts forward an anti-sceptical proposal based on the idea that the notion of rationality extends to the unwarrantable presuppositions “that make the acquisition of perceptual warrants possible” (2015: 150). These presuppositions are commonly the target of sceptical arguments, and by showing that they are on the one hand unwarrantable, but on the other are constitutive components of rationality itself, she reveals that they are beyond rational doubt and (...) thus avoids scepticism. Part of Coliva’s defence of using extended rationality in this way involves distancing it from relativist interpretations, which she describes as “devastating” (2015: 120). She proposes two ways that someone might attempt to formulate epistemic relativism from her extended rationality view, and argues that both would be unsuccessful because they require describing alternative conceptions of rationality which are “unintelligible” (in the first case), or “inconceivable” (in the second). The superficial claim of this chapter is that Coliva’s arguments, as they stand, are insufficient to dismiss relativism. She fails to show that the conception of rationality needed for the first formulation of relativism is unintelligible, and overestimates the significance of the second formulation’s conception turning out to be inconceivable. But I also highlight a deeper problem: neither formulation follows a realistic blueprint for relativism, and so these were the wrong possibilities to consider in the first place. To address this issue, I propose a third, more plausible, way in which someone might attempt to formulate relativism on the basis of Coliva’s account. I leave open whether this strategy is successful, or whether a version of Coliva’s criticisms apply to it too. (shrink)

Philosophical literature has focused on the concept of trust, but often considers distrust merely as an afterthought. Distrust however, because of its pervasive role in our everyday lives, can be quite damaging. Thus, understanding the rationality of distrust is crucial for understanding our testimonial practices. In this paper I analyze whether it is rational or irrational to distrust an informant on the basis of identity bias. My aim is to show that distrust is irrational when based on negative identity bias. (...) First, I adopt Annalisa Coliva’s account of social hinge epistemology where it is rationally required to assume certain basic presuppositions, such that people are generally reliable informants, to obtain propositional justification and participate in the testimonial practice. Secondly, I show how distrust based on negative identity bias can spread across other domains of interaction and jeopardize the testimonial practice as we fail to assume that people are generally reliable informants. Thirdly, I argue that considering bias as a defeater is beneficial to maintain the claim that bias-based distrust is irrational, as it prevents the acquisition of propositional justification. Finally, I show that distrust is rational when based on evidence and reason that the speaker is not reliable or sincere. (shrink)

This is a critical notice of Christos Kyriacou and Kevin Wallbridge (eds.), Skeptical Invariantism Reconsidered. New York and London: Routledge, 2021. Pp. x + 324. ISBN 978-0-367-37018-3. It discusses in some detail contributions by Nevin Climenhaga, Christos Kyriacou, Michael Hannon, Kevin Wallbridge, Annalisa Coliva, and Genia Schönbaumsfeld.

According to Danièle Moyal-Sharrock, Wittgenstein’s On Certainty presents a theory of hinges, and hinges have a role to play in a foundationalist epistemology (2013). Michael Williams (2005) and Annalisa Coliva (2013 ) have claimed that the hinges are not suitable to play such a role as they are not shared universally. Moyal-Sharrock has replied that a subset of the hinges is suitable to play such a role: the “universal” hinges. I argue that for Moyal-Sharrock’s reply to be sustained, (...) she must construe the set of universal hinges much more narrowly than she does currently. For instance, Moyal-Sharrock claims that “I have a brain” is a universal hinge, which consigns people who know nothing about brains to stand outside the bounds of sense. I also provide a novel way of thinking about the universal hinges, which I argue is better textually motivated than Moyal-Sharrock’s own way, and which provides a set of hinges more suitable to play a role in foundationalist epistemology. (shrink)

Overall Johnston has done a phenomenal job and this book should be required reading for all those interested in behavior. -/- It is quite striking that although W’s observations are fundamental to all study of behavior—linguistics, philosophy, psychology, history, anthropology, politics, sociology, and art, he is not even mentioned in most books and articles, with even the exceptions having little to say, and most of that distorted or flat wrong. There is a flurry of recent interest, at least in philosophy, (...) and possibly this preposterous situation will change, especially due to the continuing efforts of Peter Hacker, Daniele Moyal-Sharrock and more recently Annalisa Coliva. I will first offer some comments on philosophy (descriptive psychology) and its relationship to contemporary psychological research as exemplified in the works of Searle (S) and Wittgenstein from the modern two systems of thought perspective as W did 60 years ago. -/- Those wishing a comprehensive up to date framework for human behavior from the modern two systems view may consult my book ‘The Logical Structure of Philosophy, Psychology, Mind and Language in Ludwig Wittgenstein and John Searle’ 2nd ed (2019). Those interested in more of my writings may see ‘Talking Monkeys--Philosophy, Psychology, Science, Religion and Politics on a Doomed Planet--Articles and Reviews 2006-2019 3rd ed (2019), The Logical Structure of Human Behavior (2019), and Suicidal Utopian Delusions in the 21st Century 4th ed (2019) . (shrink)

This is the introduction to Moretti, Luca and Nikolaj Pedersen (eds), Non-Evidentialist Epistemology. Brill. Contributors: N. Ashton, A. Coliva, J. Kim, K. McCain, A. Meylan, L. Moretti, S. Moruzzi, J. Ohlorst, N. Pedersen, T. Piazza, L. Zanetti.

I argue that a standard formulation of hinge epistemology is host to epistemic relativism and show that two leading hinge approaches (Coliva’s acceptance account and Pritchard’s nondoxastic account) are vulnerable to a form of incommensurability that leads to relativism. Building on both accounts, I introduce a new, minimally epistemic conception of hinges that avoids epistemic relativism and rationally resolves hinge disagreements. According to my proposed account, putative cases of epistemic incommensurability are rationally resolvable: hinges are propositions that are the (...) objects of our belief-like attitudes and are rationally revisable in virtue of our overarching commitment to avoid systematic deception in our epistemic practices. (shrink)

The paper explores the idea that some singular judgements about the natural numbers are immune to error through misidentification by pursuing a comparison between arithmetic judgements and first-person judgements. By doing so, the first part of the paper offers a conciliatory resolution of the Coliva-Pryor dispute about so-called “de re” and “which-object” misidentification. The second part of the paper draws some lessons about what it takes to explain immunity to error through misidentification. The lessons are: First, the so-called Simple (...) Account of which-object immunity to error through misidentification to the effect that a judgement is immune to this kind of error just in case its grounds do not feature any identification component fails. Secondly, wh-immunity can be explained by a Reference-Fixing Account to the effect that a judgement is immune to this kind of error just in case its grounds are constituted by the facts whereby the reference of the concept of the object which the judgement concerns is fixed. Thirdly, a suitable revision of the Simple Account explains the de re immunity of those arithmetic judgements which are not wh-immune. These three lessons point towards the general conclusion that there is no unifying explanation of de re and wh-immunity. (shrink)

Хорвич дает прекрасный анализ Витгенштейна (W) и является ведущим ученым W, но, на мойвзгляд, все они не дотягивают до полной оценки, как я подробно объяснить в этом обзоре и многие другие. Если одно не понимает W (и предпочтительно Searle также) после этого я не вижу как одно смогло иметь больше чем поверхностное вникание общего соображения и мысли более высокого заказа и таким образом всего сложного поведения (психология, социология, антропология, история, словесность, общество). В двух словах, W продемонстрировал, что, когда вы показали, (...) как предложение используется в контексте интересов, нет ничего более сказать. Я начну с нескольких заметных цитат, а затем дать то, что я думаю, являются минимальными соображениями, необходимыми для понимания Витгенштейна, философии и человеческого поведения. Во-первых, можно отметить, что положить "мета" перед любым словом должно быть подозреваемым. W заметил, например, что метаматематика математика, как и любой другой. Представление о том, что мы можем выйти за рамки философии (т.е. описательной психологии мысли высшего порядка), само по себе является глубокой путаницей. Еще одно раздражение здесь (и на протяжении академических письменной форме в течение последних 4 десятилетий) является постоянным обратным лингвистического сексизма "ее" и "ее" и "она" или "он / она" и т.д., где "они" и "свои" и "их" будет делать красиво. Аналогичнымобразом, использование французского слова "репертуар", где английский "репертуар" будет делать довольно хорошо. Основным недостатком является полный отказ (хотя и очень часто), чтобы использовать то, что я вижу, как чрезвычайно мощный и интуитивно понятный вид двух систем HOT и Карл рамки, которые я изложил выше. Это особенно остро в главе о значении p111 et seq. (особенно в сносках 2-7), где мы плаваем в очень мутной воде без рамки автоматизированной истинной только S1, пропозиционный диспозиционный S2, COS и т.д. Можно также получить лучшее представление о внутреннем и внешнем, читая, например, Джонстон или Бадд (см. мои отзывы). Хорвич однако делает много резких комментариев. Мне особенно понравилось его резюме импорта W анти-теоретической позиции на p65. Он должен уделять больше внимания "На определенности", в последнее время предметом много усилий Даниэле Мойал-Шаррок, Coliva и другие и кратко в моих последних статьях. Хорвич является первым курсом, и его работа стоит усилий. Хочется надеяться, что он (и все) изучат Сирла и некоторые современные психологии, а также Хатто, Рид, Хатчинсон, Стерн, Мойал-Шаррок, Прогулка, Хакер и Бейкер и т.д., чтобы достичь широкого современного взгляда на поведение. Большинство их работ на academia dot edu и philpapers dot org, но для PMS Хакер см. http colon //info dot sjc dot ox dot ac dot uk/scr/hacker/DownloadPapers dot html dot Он дает один из самых красивых резюме, где понимание Витгенштейна оставляет нам, что я когда-либо видел. "Не должно быть никаких попыток объяснить нашу лингвистическую/концептуальную деятельность (PI 126), как в уменьшении арифметики Фрейда к логике; не попытка дать ему эпистемологические основы (PI 124), как в смысле основанных счетов априори знаний; не попытка охарактеризовать идеализированные формы его (PI 130) как в логике чувства; никаких попыток реформировать его (PI 124, 132), как в теории ошибок Маки или интуиции Дамметт; никаких попыток упорядочить его (PI 133), как в рассказе Квина о существовании; не попытка сделать его более последовательным (PI 132), как в ответ Тарски на парадоксы лжецов; и не попытка сделать его более полным (PI 133), как в урегулировании вопросов личной идентичности для странных гипотетических сценариев "телепортации". Наконец, позвольте мне предположить, что с точки зрения я призвал здесь, W находится в центре современной философии и психологии и не является неясным, трудным или неуместным, но мерцающий, глубокий и кристально чистый и что пропустить его, чтобы пропустить один из величайших интеллектуальных приключений возможно. Те, кто желает всеобъемлющего до современных рамок для человеческого поведения из современных двух systEms зрения могут проконсультироваться с моей книгой"Логическая структура философии, психологии, Минd иязык в Людвиг Витгенштейн и Джон Сирл" второй ред (2019). Те, кто заинтересован в более моих сочинений могут увидеть "Говоря обезьян - Философия, психология, наука, религия и политика на обреченной планете - Статьи и обзоры 2006-2019 3-й ed (2019) и suicidal утопических заблуждений в 21-мst веке 4-й ed (2019) th и другие. (shrink)

Despre moarte, durere, doliu, viaţa de după moarte şi nemurire. De ce trebuie să murim ca oameni pentru a trăi ca specie. "Nimeni nu vrea să moară. Chiar și cei care doresc să ajungă în cer, nu ar vrea să moară pentru a ajunge acolo. Și totuși, moartea este destinația pe care o împărtășim cu toții. Nimeni nu a scăpat vreodată. Și aşa şi trebuie, pentru că Moartea este foarte probabil cea mai bună invenție a Vieții. Este agentul de schimbare (...) a Vieţii. Ea şterge pe cele vechi pentru a face loc celor noi. În momentul ăsta noul eşti tu, dar într-o zi, nu peste mult timp, vei deveni treptat vechi, și vei fi şters la rândul tău. Îmi pare rău că sună aşa de dramatic, dar este cât se poate de adevărat. Timpul tau este limitat, așa că nu-l irosi trăind viața altcuiva. Ai grijă să nu fii prins în dogme - trăind prin rezultatele gândirii altor oameni. Nu lăsa zgomotul opiniilor altora să înece propria ta voce interioară. Și cel mai important, ai curajul să urmezi inima și intuiția ta. Ele știu cumva deja ce îți dorești tu cu adevărat să devii. Orice altceva este de importanţă secundară." (Steve Jobs) CUPRINS: Moartea - Termeni asociaţi - Senectutea - Semne de moarte biologică - Conceptul de moarte - Moartea în societate şi cultură - Uitarea veşnică - - Uitarea şi Subiectivitatea - - În filosofie Moartea programată a celulelor - Istorie - Tipuri - - Apoptoza - - Autofagia - - Alte tipuri - Originea evolutivă Obiceiuri mortuare - Înmormântarea - - Istorie - - Motivaţii pentru înmormântare umană - Cimitire - - Obiceiuri şi practici în cimitire - - - Flori - - - Pietre - - - Cruci - - Cimitire şi superstiţie - Preotulsul în religia ortodoxă - - Serviciul religios - - Coliva - - Când se practică parastasul - - Litate Doliul - Procesul de doliu - Reacţii - Cinci identităţi ale persoanelor în doliu - Ştiinţa durerii - - Cele patru traiectorii Bonanno ale durerii - Teoria celor cinci etape - Procese fiziologice şi neurologice - Teorii evolutive ale doliului - - Riscuri - - Complicaţii ale doiului Experienţe aproape de moarte - Caracteristici - Studii - - Varianţa în studiile EAM - - Analiza neurobiologică şi psihologică - - Starea REM - - Visul lucid - - Psihologia computaţională - - Efecte - - Cercetarea inter-culturală - - Studiile Van Lommel - - Studiul AWARE Nemurirea - Abordări ştiinţifice - Abordări religioase - Nemurirea biologică - - Specii biologice nemuritoare - - Evoluţia îmbătrânirii - Speranţe privind nemurirea biologică umană - - Substanţe care prelungesc durata de viaţă - - Nemurirea tehnologică - - Crionica - - Încărcarea minţii la calculator - - Cibernetica - - Nemurirea evoluţionară - Puncte de vedere religioase - - Religia greacă antică - - Marii maeştri - - Budism - - Creştinism - Etica nemuririi - - Indezirabilitatea nemuririi - Sufletul - - Abordări filosofice - - - Socrate şi Platon - - - Aristotel - - - Avicenna şi Ibn al-Nafis - - - Toma de Aquino - - - Immanuel Kant - - - James Hillman - - - Filosofia minţii - Scientologia Viaţa de Apoi (Viaţa de după moarte) - Filozofia vieţii de Apoi - - Filozofia modernă - - Filozofia procesului - Ştiinţa despre viaţa de Apoi - Modele metafizice ale Vieţii de Apoi - - Reîncarnarea - - Raiul şi iadul - - Limbo - - Purgatoriul - Religiile abrahamice - - Iudaism - - Olam Haba - - Reîncarnarea în tradiţia evreiască - - Creştinismul - Istoricitatea şi originea Învierii lui Isus - - Contextul istoric - - Învierea lui Iisus Nemorţi - Fantome - - Tipologia - - - Context antropologic - - Fantomele şi viaţa de apoi - - Teama de fantome - - Atribute comune - - Locaţii - Moroi - Scheleţi - - Mit şi folclor - Strigoi - - Etimologie - - Istorie - - Diferite tipuri de strigoi - - Cum ajunge cineva strigoi - - Prevenţie - - În cultura populară - Vampiri - - Etimologie - - Credinţe populare - - - Descriere şi caracteristicile comune - - - Credinţe non-europene - - Vampiri psihici - - - Vampiri energetici - Vârcolaci - - Caracteristici - - Apotropaice - - Vârcolacul şi Occidentul - Zombi - - Apocalipsa zombi - - - Ideea - - - Elementele arhetipale Aspecte culturale ale morţii - Înmormântarea în diferite culturi - Durerea şi doliul - Tradiţii mortuare - - Sacrificii umane şi animale - - Filozofia, religia şi mitologia morţii - - Personificări ale morţii - - Simbolismul numeric în Asia de Est - - Glorificarea şi fascinaţia morţii - Mitul originii morţii - - Africa - - Oceania - - - Polinezia - - Civilizaţia occidentală - - - Mitologia greacă - Moartea pe Internet - - E-mail - - Facebook - - Dropbox - - Google - - MySpace - - Twitter - - Wikipedia - - YouTube - - Moştenirea digitală Dispariţia omului ca specie - Percepţia riscului de extincţie umană - Soluţii propuse - În cultura populară Arta - Sculptura - - Gisant - - Îngerul durerii - Picturi - - Moartea lui Sardanapal - Poezii - - Alexandru Vlahuţã, "Din prag..." - - George Bacovia, “Decor” - - George Coşbuc, “Moartea lui Fulger” - - Lucian Blaga, “Omule” - - Mihai Eminescu, “Cu mâine zilele-ţi adaogi” - - Ştefan Augustin Doinaş, “Moartea Ofeliei” Citate Referinţe Despre autor - Nicolae Sfetcu - - De același autor - - Contact Editura - MultiMedia Publishing . 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Horwich gibt eine feine Analyse von Wittgenstein (W) und ist ein führender W-Stipendiat, aber meinerMeinung nach sind sie alle hinter einer vollen Wertschätzung zurück, wie ich in dieser Rezension und vielen anderen ausführlich erkläre. Wenn man W (und vorzugsweise auch Searle) nicht versteht, dann sehe ich nicht, wie man mehr als ein oberflächliches Verständnis von Philosophie und höherem Denken und damit von allem komplexen Verhalten (Psychologie, Soziologie, Anthropologie, Geschichte, Literatur, Gesellschaft) haben könnte. Kurz gesagt, W hat gezeigt, dass, wenn Sie (...) gezeigt haben, wie ein Satz im Zusammenhang mit Interesse verwendet wird, es nichts mehr zu sagen gibt. Ich beginne mit ein paar bemerkenswerten Zitaten und gebe dann, was ich denke, sind die minimalen Überlegungen notwendig, um Wittgenstein zu verstehen, Philosophie und menschliches Verhalten. Zunächst könnte man feststellen, dass es verdächtig sein sollte, "Meta" vor jedes Wort zu stellen. W bemerkte z.B., dass Metamathematik Mathematik wie jede andere ist. Die Vorstellung, dass wir aus der Philosophie austreten können (d.h. die beschreibende Psychologie des Denkens höherer Ordnung), ist selbst eine tiefe Verwirrung. Eine weitere Irritation hier (und während des akademischen Schreibens in den letzten 4 Jahrzehnten) ist der ständige umgekehrte sprachliche Sexismus von "ihrem" und "ihr" und "sie" oder "er/sie" usw., wo "sie" und "ihre" und "sie" gut machen würden. Ebenso, wird die Verwendung des französischen Wortes "Repertoire", bei dem das englische "Repertoire" recht gut funktioniert. Der größte Mangel ist das (wenn auch sehr häufige) völlige Versäumnis, das zu verwenden, was ich als die enorm leistungsfähige und intuitive Zwei-System-Ansicht von HOT und Searles Framework betrachte, die ich oben skizziert habe. Dies ist besonders ergreifend im Kapitel über die Bedeutung p111 ff. (besonders in den Fußnoten 2-7), wo wir in sehr schlammigem Wasser ohne den Rahmen von automatisierten echten nur S1, propositional DispositionS, COS usw. schwimmen. Man kann auch einen besseren Blick auf das Innere und das Äußere bekommen, indem man z.B. Johnston oder Budd liest (siehe meine Rezensionen). Horwich macht jedoch viele einschneidende Kommentare. Besonders gefiel mir seine Zusammenfassung der Bedeutung von Wes antitheoretischer Haltung auf P65. Er muss "On Certainty" stärker in den Vordergrund stellen, das kürzlich von Daniele Moyal- Sharrock, Coliva und anderen mit viel Aufwand beworfen und in meinen jüngsten Artikeln zusammengefasst wurde. Horwich ist erstklassig und seine Arbeit lohnt sich. Man hofft, dass er (und alle) Searle und einige moderne Psychologie sowie Hutto, Read, Hutchinson, Stern, Moyal-Sharrock, Stroll, Hacker und Baker etc. studieren werden, um eine breite moderne Sicht des Verhaltens zu erreichen. Die meisten ihrer Papiere sind auf academia dot edu und philpapers dot org, aber für PMS Hacker siehe http slash slash info dot sjc dot ox dot ac dot uk slash scr slash hacker slash DownloadPapers dot html Er gibt eine der schönsten Zusammenfassungen, wo uns ein Verständnis von Wittgenstein hinterlässt, das ich je gesehen habe. "Es darf keinen Versuch geben, unsere sprachliche/konzeptionelle Tätigkeit (PI 126) zu erklären, wie in Freges Reduktion der Arithmetik auf logik; kein Versuch, ihr erkenntnistheoretische Grundlagen zu geben (PI 124), wie sie auf der Grundlage von Berichten über ein vormethodikes Wissen beruhen; kein Versuch, idealisierte Formen davon (PI 130) als in gewissem Sinne Logiken zu charakterisieren; kein Reformversuch (PI 124, 132) wie in Mackies Fehlertheorie oder Dummetts Intuitionismus; kein Versuch, sie zu straffen (PI 133) wie in Quines Existenzbericht; kein Versuch, es konsistenter zu machen (PI 132) wie in Tarskis Antwort auf die Lügner-Paradoxien; und kein Versuch, es vollständiger zu machen (PI 133) wie bei der Klärung von Fragen der persönlichen Identität für bizarre hypothetische 'Teleportation'-Szenarien." Abschließend möchte ich vorschlagen, dass W mit der Perspektive, die ich hier gefördert habe, im Zentrum der zeitgenössischen Philosophie und Psychologie steht und nicht obskur, schwierig oder irrelevant ist, sondern schillernd, tiefgründig und kristallklar ist und dass es ist, eines der größten intellektuellen Abenteuer zu verpassen, das möglichist. Wer aus der modernen zweisystems-Sichteinen umfassenden, aktuellen Rahmen für menschliches Verhalten wünscht, kann mein Buch "The Logical Structure of Philosophy, Psychology, Mindand Language in Ludwig Wittgenstein and John Searle' 2nd ed (2019) konsultieren. Diejenigen,die sich für mehr meiner Schriften interessieren, können 'Talking Monkeys--Philosophie, Psychologie, Wissenschaft, Religion und Politik auf einem verdammten Planeten --Artikel und Rezensionen 2006-2019 3rd ed (2019) und Suicidal Utopian Delusions in the 21st Century 4th ed (2019) und andere sehen . (shrink)

Horwich donne une belle analyse de Wittgenstein (W) et est un érudit W de premier plan, mais à mon avis, ils sont tous en deçà d’une pleine appréciation, comme je l’explique longuement dans cet examen et beaucoup d’autres. Si l’on ne comprend pas W (et de préférence Searle aussi) alors je ne vois pas comment on pourrait avoir plus qu’une compréhension superficielle de la philosophie et de la pensée de l’ordre supérieur et donc de tout comportement complexe (psychologie, sociologie, anthropologie, (...) histoire, littérature, société). En un mot, W a démontré que lorsque vous avez montré comment une phrase est utilisée dans le contexte d’intérêt, il n’y a rien de plus à dire. Je vais commencer par quelques citations notables, puis donner ce que je pense sont les considérations minimales nécessaires pour comprendre Wittgenstein, la philosophie et le comportement humain. Tout d’abord, on pourrait noter que mettre "meta" en face de n’importe quel mot devrait être suspect. W a fait remarquer par exemple, que la métamathématique est mathématiques comme les autres. L’idée que nous pouvons sortir de la philosophie (c’est-à-dire la psychologie descriptive de la pensée de haut ordre) est elle-même une profonde confusion. Une autre irritation ici (et tout au long de l’écriture académique pour les 4 dernières décennies) est le sexisme linguistique inverse constant de «elle» et «la sienne» et «elle» ou «il / elle», etc, où «ils» et «leur» et «eux» ferait bien. De même, l’utilisation du mot Français «répertoire» où le «répertoire» anglais se portera plutôt bien. La lacune majeure est l’échec complet (bien que très commun) d’employer ce que je considère comme la vue extrêmement puissante et intuitive de deux systèmes de HOT et Searle cadre que j’ai décrit ci-dessus. C’est particulièrement poignant dans le chapitre sur le sens p111 et seq. (en particulier dans les notes de bas de page 2-7), où nous nageons dans l’eau très boueuse sans le cadre de l’automatisé vrai seul S1, propositionnelle dispositionnelle S2, COS etc. On peut également avoir une meilleure vue de l’intérieur et de l’extérieur en lisant par exemple, Johnston ou Budd (voir mes commentaires). Horwich fait cependant beaucoup de commentaires incisifs. J’ai particulièrement aimé son résumé de l’importation de la position anti-théorique de W sur p65. Il doit mettre davantage l’accent sur 'On Certainty', récemment l’objet de beaucoup d’efforts de Daniele Moyal- Sharrock, Coliva et d’autres et résumé dans mes récents articles. Horwich est de premier ordre et son travail vaut bien l’effort. On espère qu’il (et tout le monde) étudiera Searle et une certaine psychologie moderne ainsi que Hutto, Read, Hutchinson, Stern, Moyal-Sharrock, Stroll, Hacker et Baker, etc. pour atteindre une large vision moderne du comportement. La plupart de leurs papiers sont sur academia dot edu et philpapers dot org, mais pour PMS Hacker voir http : info dot sjc dot ox dot ac dot uk/ scr / hacker / DownloadPapers dot html. Il donne l’un des plus beaux résumés de l’endroit où une compréhension de Wittgenstein nous laisse que j’ai jamais vu. « Il ne doit y avoir aucune tentative d’expliquer notre activité linguistique/conceptuelle (PI 126) comme dans la réduction de l’arithmétique à la logique de Frege ; aucune tentative de lui donner des fondations épistémologiques (PI 124) comme dans les comptes basés sur le sens d’une connaissance a priori; aucune tentative de caractériser des formes idéalisées de celui-ci (PI 130) comme dans le sens logique; aucune tentative de réforme (PI 124, 132) comme dans la théorie de l’erreur de Mackie ou l’intuitionnisme de Dummett; aucune tentative de rationaliser (PI 133) comme dans le récit de Quine de l’existence; aucune tentative pour le rendre plus cohérent (PI 132) comme dans la réponse de Tarski aux paradoxes menteurs; et aucune tentative pour le rendre plus complet (PI 133) comme dans le règlement des questions d’identité personnelle pour des scénarios hypothétiques bizarres de « téléportation ». Enfin, permettez-moi de suggérer qu’avec la perspective que j’ai encouragée ici, W est au centre de la philosophie et de la psychologie contemporaines et n’est pas obscure, difficile ou non pertinente, mais scintillante, profonde et limpide et que de lui manquer est de manquer l’une des plus grandes aventures intellectuelles possibles. Ceux qui souhaitent un cadre complet à jour pour le comportement humain de la vue moderne de deuxemssyst peuvent consulter mon livre 'The Logical Structure of Philosophy, Psychology, Mind and Language in Ludwig Wittgenstein and John Searle' 2nd ed (2019). Ceux qui s’intéressent à plus de mes écrits peuvent voir «Talking Monkeys --Philosophie, Psychologie, Science, Religion et Politique sur une planète condamnée --Articles et revues 2006-2019 3e ed (2019) et Suicidal Utopian Delusions in the 21st Century 4th ed (2019) et autres. (shrink)

Horwich dà una bella analisi di Wittgenstein (W) ed è uno studioso W leader, ma a mio parere, tutti non sono al di sotto di un pieno apprezzamento, come spiego a lungo in questa recensione e molti altri. Se non si capisce W (e preferibilmente anche Searle) allora non vedo come si possa avere più di una comprensione superficiale della filosofia e del pensiero di ordine superiore e quindi di tutti i comportamenti complessi (psicologia, sociologia, antropologia, storia, letteratura, società). In (...) poche parole, W ha dimostrato che quando hai dimostrato come una frase viene usata nel contesto di interesse, non c'è più nulla da dire. Inizierò con alcune citazioni degne di nota e poi darò quelle che penso siano le considerazioni minime necessarie per capire Wittgenstein, la filosofia e il comportamento umano. La prima si potrebbe notare che mettere "meta" davanti a qualsiasi parola dovrebbe essere sospetto. W ha osservato ad esempio, che la metamatematica è matematica come qualsiasi altra. L'idea che possiamo uscire dalla filosofia (cioè la psicologia descrittiva del pensiero di ordine superiore) è di per sé una profonda confusione. Un'altra irritazione qui (e per tutta la scrittura accademica negli ultimi 4 decenni) è il costante sessismo linguistico inverso di "lei" e "suo" e "lei" o "lui/ lei" ecc., dove "loro" e "loro" e "loro" farebbero bene. Allo stessomodo, l'uso della parola francese "repertorio" in cui l'inglese "repertorio" farà abbastanza bene. La carenza principale è il fallimento completo (anche se molto comune) di impiegare quello che vedo come la vista di due sistemi estremamente potente e intuitiva del quadro di HOT e Searle che ho delineato sopra. Questo è particolarmente toccante nel capitolo sul significato p111 et seq. (soprattutto nelle note a piè di pagina 2-7), dove nuotiamo in acqua molto fangosa senza la struttura di vero automatizzato solo S1, proposizionale disposizionale S2, COS ecc. Si può anche ottenere una migliore vista dell'interno e dell'esterno leggendo ad esempio, Johnston o Budd (vedi le mie recensioni). Horwich però fa molti commenti incisivi. Mi è piaciuto soprattutto il suo riassunto dell'importazione della posizione anti-teorica di W su p65. Ha bisogno di dare più enfasi a 'On Certainty', recentemente oggetto di grande sforzo di Daniele Moyal- Sharrock, Coliva e altri e riassunto nei miei recenti articoli. Horwich è di prim'ordine e il suo lavoro vale la pena. Si spera che lui (e tutti) studierà Searle e un po 'di psicologia moderna così come Hutto, Read, Hutchinson, Stern, Moyal-Sharrock, Stroll, Hacker e Baker ecc per raggiungere una vasta visione moderna del comportamento. La maggior parte dei loro documenti sono su academia dot edu e philpapers dot org etc. Egli dà uno dei più bei riassunti di dove una comprensione di Wittgenstein ci lascia che io abbia mai visto. "Non ci deve essere alcun tentativo di spiegare la nostra attività linguistico/concettuale (PI 126) come nella riduzione dell'aritmetica di Frege alla logica; nessun tentativo di dargli basi epistemologiche (PI 124) come nei resoconti basati sul significato di una conoscenza a priori; nessun tentativo di caratterizzarne le forme idealizzate (PI 130) come nelle logiche del senso; nessun tentativo di riformarlo (PI 124, 132) come nella teoria degli errori di Mackie o nell'intuizione di Dummett; nessun tentativo di snellirla (PI 133) come nel racconto dell'esistenza di Quine; nessun tentativo di renderlo più coerente (PI 132) come nella risposta di Tarski ai paradossi bugiar; e nessun tentativo di renderlo più completo (PI 133) come nel sistemare le questioni di identità personale per bizzarri scenari ipotetici di 'teletrasporto'." Infine, lasciatemi suggerire che con la prospettiva che ho incoraggiato qui, W è al centro della filosofia contemporanea e della psicologia e non è oscura, difficile o irrilevante, ma scintillante, profonda e cristallina e che permane lo è mancare una delle più grandi avventure intellettualipossibili. Coloro che desiderano un quadro aggiornato completo per il comportamento umano dalla moderna vista a due systems possono consultare il mio libro 'La struttura logica dellafilosofia, psicologia, Mind e il linguaggio in Ludwig Wittgenstein e John Searle' 2nd ed (2019). Coloro che sono interessati a più dei miei scritti possono vedere 'TalkingMonkeys--Filosofia, Psicologia, Scienza, Religione e Politica su un Pianeta Condannato--Articoli e Recensioni 2006-2019 3rd ed (2019) e Suicidal Utopian Delusions nel 21st Century 4th ed (2019) . (shrink)

Horwich dá uma boa análise de Wittgenstein (W) e é um estudioso w líder, mas na minha opinião, todos eles estão aquém de uma apreciação plena, como eu explicar em comprimento nesta revisão e muitos outros. Se um não compreende W (e preferivelmente Searle também) então eu não ver como um poderia ter mais do que uma compreensão superficial da filosofia e do pensamento mais elevado da ordem e assim de todo o comportamento complexo (psychologia, sociologia, antropologia, história, literatura, sociedade (...) civil). Em poucas palavras, W demonstrou que quando você tem mostrado como uma sentença é usada no contexto de interesse, não há nada mais a dizer. Vou começar com algumas citações notáveis e, em seguida, dar o que eu acho que são as considerações mínimas necessárias para entender Wittgenstein, filosofia e comportamento humano. Primeiro pode-se notar que colocar "meta" na frente de qualquer palavra deve ser suspeito. W comentou, por exemplo, que a metamatemática é matemática como qualquer outra. A noção de que podemos pisar fora da filosofia (ou seja, a psicologia descritiva do pensamento de ordem superior) é em si uma profunda confusão. Outra irritação aqui (e ao longo da escrita acadêmica para as últimas 4 décadas) é o sexismo linguístico reverso constante de "ela" e "dela" e "ela" ou "ele/ela", etc, onde "eles" e "deles" e "eles" faria bem. Da mesma forma, o uso da palavra francesa ' repertório ', onde o repertório Inglês ' vai fazer muito bem. A maior deficiência é a falha completa (embora muito comum) para empregar o que eu vejo como a visão de dois sistemas extremamente poderoso e intuitivo de HOT e Searle ' s estructura que eu esboçou aqui. Isto é especialmente comovente no capítulo sobre o significado P111 et seq (especialmente nas notas de rodapé 2-7), onde nadamos em água muito enlameada, sem o quadro de automatizado verdadeiro apenas S1, proposicional mudança de caráter S2, cos etc. Um pode igualmente começ uma vista melhor do interno e do exterior lendo por exemplo, Johnston ou Budd (veja meus comentários). Horwich, no entanto, faz muitos comentários incisivos. Eu gostei especialmente de seu resumo da importação da postura antiteórica de W em p65. Ele precisa dar mais ênfase a "on certeza", recentemente o tema de muito esforço por Daniele Moyal-Sharrock, Coliva e outros e resumidos em meus artigos recentes. Aqueles que desejam um quadro até à data detalhado para o comportamento humano da opinião moderna dos dois sistemas consultar meu livros Falando Macacos 3ª Ed (2019), A Estrutura Lógica da Filosofia, Psicologia, Mente e Linguagem em Ludwig Wittgenstein e John Searle 2a Ed (2019), Suicídio Pela Democracia,4aEd(2019), Entendendo as Conexões entre Ciência, Filosofia, Psicologia, Religião, Política e Economia Artigos e Análises 2006-2019 (2019), Ilusões Utópicas Suicidas no 21St século 5a Ed (2019), A Estrutura Lógica do Comportamento Humano (2019), e A Estrutura Lógica da Consciência (2019) y outras. (shrink)

Horwich Wittgenstein (डब्ल्यू) का एक अच्छा विश्लेषण देता है और एक अग्रणी डब्ल्यू विद्वान है, लेकिन मेरे विचार में, वे सब एक पूर्ण प्रशंसा की कमी है, के रूप में मैं इस समीक्षा में लंबाई में समझा और कई अन्य. यदि एक डब्ल्यू समझ में नहीं आता (और अधिमानतः Searle भी) तो मुझे नहीं लगता कि कैसे एक दर्शन की एक सतही समझ से अधिक हो सकता है और उच्च आदेश सोचा और इस प्रकार सभी जटिल व्यवहार (मनोविज्ञान, समाजशास्त्र, मानव (...) विज्ञान, इतिहास, साहित्य, समाज) संक्षेप में, डब्ल्यू प्रदर्शन किया है कि जब आप दिखाया है कि कैसे एक वाक्य ब्याज के संदर्भ में प्रयोग किया जाता है, वहाँ और कुछ नहीं कहना है. मैं कुछ उल्लेखनीय उद्धरण के साथ शुरू होगा और फिर दे क्या मुझे लगता है कि कम से कम विचार Wittgenstein, दर्शन और मानव व्यवहार को समझने के लिए आवश्यक हैं. पहले एक ध्यान दें कि किसी भी शब्द के सामने "मेटा" डाल संदिग्ध होना चाहिए हो सकता है. डब्ल्यू टिप्पणी की, जैसे, कि metamathematics किसी भी अन्य की तरह गणित है. धारणा है कि हम दर्शन के बाहर कदम कर सकते हैं (यानी, उच्च आदेश सोचा के वर्णनात्मक मनोविज्ञान) अपने आप में एक गहरा भ्रम है. एक और जलन यहाँ (और पिछले 4 दशकों के लिए शैक्षिक लेखन भर में) "उसके" और "उसके" और "वह" या "वह" आदि, जहां "वे" और "उनकी" और "उन्हें" अच्छी तरह से करना होगा की लगातार रिवर्स भाषाई sexism है. इसीतरह, फ्रेंच शब्द 'रिपर्टोयर' का उपयोग जहां अंग्रेजी 'रिपर्टरी' काफी अच्छा प्रदर्शन करेगा। प्रमुख कमी पूरी विफलता है (हालांकि बहुत आम) को रोजगार क्या मैं बेहद शक्तिशाली और सहज ज्ञान युक्त दो हॉट और Searle रूपरेखा है जो मैं ऊपर उल्लिखित है के रूप में देखते हैं. यह विशेष रूप से अर्थ p111 एट सेक पर अध्याय में मार्मिक है (विशेष रूप से फ़ुटनोट 2-7 में), जहां हम स्वचालित सच केवल S1, प्रस्तावात्मक स्वभाविक S2, COS आदि के ढांचे के बिना बहुत गंदा पानी में तैरना. एक भी पढ़ने के द्वारा आंतरिक और बाहरी का एक बेहतर दृश्य प्राप्त कर सकते हैं उदा., Johnston या Budd (मेरी समीक्षा देखें). Horwich हालांकि कई तीक्ष्ण टिप्पणी करता है. मैं विशेष रूप से p65 पर डब्ल्यू विरोधी सैद्धांतिक रुख के आयात के अपने सारांश पसंद आया. वह 'पर कुछ' को और अधिक जोर देने की जरूरत है, हाल ही में डेनिएल Moyal-Sharrock, Coliva और दूसरों द्वारा बहुत प्रयास के विषय और मेरे हाल के लेख में संक्षेप. Horwich पहली दर और अपने काम के लायक अच्छी तरह से प्रयास है. एक उम्मीद है कि वह (और हर कोई) Searle और कुछ आधुनिक मनोविज्ञान के रूप में के रूप में अच्छी तरह से हट्टो, पढ़ें, Hatchinson, स्टर्न, Moyal-Sharrock, टहलने, हैकर और बेकर आदि का अध्ययन करने के व्यवहार का एक व्यापक आधुनिक दृश्य प्राप्त करेंगे. उनके कागजात के अधिकांश academia dot edu और philpapers dot org पर हैं, लेकिन पीएमएस हैकर के लिए देखते हैं. वह जहां Wittgenstein की समझ हमें छोड़ देता है कि मैंने कभी देखा है की सबसे सुंदर सारांश में से एक देता है. "हमारे भाषाई/ संकल्पनात्मक गतिविधि (पीआई 126) की व्याख्या करने का कोई प्रयास नहीं होना चाहिए जैसा कि फ्रेज के तर्क के लिए गणित में कमी; यह epistemological नींव देने के लिए कोई प्रयास (पीआई 124) के रूप में एक प्राथमिकता ज्ञान के अर्थ आधारित खातों में; यह (PI 130) के रूप में अर्थ तर्क में आदर्शरूप रूपों की विशेषता के लिए कोई प्रयास; यह सुधार करने के लिए कोई प्रयास (पीआई 124, 132) के रूप में है Mackie त्रुटि सिद्धांत या Dummett अंतर्ज्ञान में; इसे कारगर बनाने का कोई प्रयास नहीं (पीआई 133) के रूप में Quine के अस्तित्व के खाते में; इसे और अधिक सुसंगत बनाने का कोई प्रयास नहीं (PI 132) झूठा विरोधाभासों के लिए Tarski की प्रतिक्रिया में के रूप में; और इसे और अधिक पूर्ण बनाने का कोई प्रयास नहीं (पीआई 133) विचित्र काल्पनिक 'टेलीपोर्टेशन' परिदृश्यों के लिए व्यक्तिगत पहचान के प्रश्नों के निपटान में। अंत में, मुझे सुझाव है कि परिप्रेक्ष्य मैं यहाँ प्रोत्साहित किया है के साथ, डब्ल्यू समकालीन दर्शन और मनोविज्ञान के केंद्र में है और अस्पष्ट, मुश्किल या अप्रासंगिक नहीं है, लेकिन scintillating, गहरा और क्रिस्टल स्पष्ट है और उसे याद करने के लिए है कि उसे याद आती है में से एक है सबसे बड़ी बौद्धिक रोमांच संभव| आधुनिक दो systems दृश्यसे मानव व्यवहार के लिए एक व्यापक अप करने के लिए तारीख रूपरेखा इच्छुक लोगों को मेरी पुस्तक 'दर्शन, मनोविज्ञान, मिनडी और लुडविगमें भाषा की तार्किक संरचना से परामर्श कर सकते हैं Wittgenstein और जॉन Searle '2 एड (2019). मेरे लेखन के अधिक में रुचि रखने वालों को देख सकते हैं 'बात कर रहेबंदर- दर्शन, मनोविज्ञान, विज्ञान, धर्म और राजनीति पर एक बर्बाद ग्रह --लेख और समीक्षा 2006-2019 3 एड (2019) और आत्मघाती यूटोपियान भ्रम 21st मेंसदी 4वें एड (2019) . (shrink)

Horwich gives a fine analysis of Wittgenstein (W) and is a leading W scholar, but in my view, they all fall short of a full appreciation, as I explain at length in this review and many others. If one does not understand W (and preferably Searle also) then I don't see how one could have more than a superficial understanding of philosophy and of higher order thought and thus of all complex behavior (psychology, sociology, anthropology, history, literature, society). In a (...) nutshell, W demonstrated that when you have shown how a sentence is used in the context of interest, there is nothing more to say. I will start with a few notable quotes and then give what I think are the minimum considerations necessary to understand Wittgenstein, philosophy and human behavior. -/- First one might note that putting “meta” in front of any word should be suspect. W remarked e.g., that metamathematics is mathematics like any other. The notion that we can step outside philosophy (i.e., the descriptive psychology of higher order thought) is itself a profound confusion. Another irritation here (and throughout academic writing for the last 4 decades) is the constant reverse linguistic sexism of “her” and “hers” and “she” or “he/she” etc., where “they” and “theirs” and “them” would do nicely. Likewise, the use of the French word 'repertoire' where the English 'repertory' will do quite well. The major deficiency is the complete failure (though very common) to employ what I see as the hugely powerful and intuitive two systems view of HOT and Searle’s framework which I have outlined above. This is especially poignant in the chapter on meaning p111 et seq. (especially in footnotes 2-7), where we swim in very muddy water without the framework of automated true only S1, propositional dispositional S2, COS etc. One can also get a better view of the inner and the outer by reading e.g., Johnston or Budd (see my reviews). Horwich however makes many incisive comments. I especially liked his summary of the import of W’s anti-theoretical stance on p65. He needs to give more emphasis to ‘On Certainty’, recently the subject of much effort by Daniele Moyal- Sharrock, Coliva and others and summarized in my recent articles. -/- Horwich is first rate and his work well worth the effort. One hopes that he (and everyone) will study Searle and some modern psychology as well as Hutto, Read, Hutchinson, Stern, Moyal-Sharrock, Stroll, Hacker and Baker etc. to attain a broad modern view of behavior. Most of their papers are on academia dot edu and philpapers dot org , but for PMS Hacker see his papers on his Oxford page. -/- He gives one of the most beautiful summaries of where an understanding of Wittgenstein leaves us that I have ever seen. -/- “There must be no attempt to explain our linguistic/conceptual activity (PI 126) as in Frege’s reduction of arithmetic to logic; no attempt to give it epistemological foundations (PI 124) as in meaning based accounts of a priori knowledge; no attempt to characterize idealized forms of it (PI 130) as in sense logics; no attempt to reform it (PI 124, 132) as in Mackie’s error theory or Dummett’s intuitionism; no attempt to streamline it (PI 133) as in Quine’s account of existence; no attempt to make it more consistent (PI 132) as in Tarski’s response to the liar paradoxes; and no attempt to make it more complete (PI 133) as in the settling of questions of personal identity for bizarre hypothetical ‘teleportation’ scenarios.” -/- Finally, let me suggest that with the perspective I have encouraged here, W is at the center of contemporary philosophy and psychology and is not obscure, difficult or irrelevant, but scintillating, profound and crystal clear and that to miss him is to miss one of the greatest intellectual adventures possible. -/- Those wishing a comprehensive up to date framework for human behavior from the modern two systems view may consult my book ‘The Logical Structure of Philosophy, Psychology, Mind and Language in Ludwig Wittgenstein and John Searle’ 2nd ed (2019). Those interested in more of my writings may see ‘Talking Monkeys--Philosophy, Psychology, Science, Religion and Politics on a Doomed Planet--Articles and Reviews 2006-2019 3rd ed (2019), The Logical Structure of Human Behavior (2019), and Suicidal Utopian Delusions in the 21st Century 4th ed (2019) . (shrink)

The aim of the 17 original papers here is to summarize and analyze Wittgenstein's thought. At the time these were being written, the Oxford/Intelex CDROM ($2040 on Amazon but available thru interlibrary loan and steeply discounted on the net) with 20,000 some pages of W's nachlass, as well as the various online versions of the nachlass, were not yet available, and only those fluent in German and willing to find and slog thru the incomplete Cornell microfilm were able to examine (...) it. To this day, much of it remains untranslated from the German typescripts and handwritten manuscripts. I note this at the outset as W's untranslated or unpublished writings often shed crucial light on his thought and few to this day have made substantial use of them. In addition, there are huge problems with translation of his early 20th century Viennese German into modern English. One must be a master of English, German, and Wittgenstein in order to do this and very few are up to it. Several of the current authors note unfortunate translation errors in the only available English editions and I have seen similar comments countless times. -/- As is well known, W's thought changed dramatically between the publication of the Tractatus (TLP) in 1922 and the Philosophical Investigations (1953). The continuity or lack thereof between his early and late work is the subject of a vast literature and is taken up here by several authors. Ishiguro on the picture theory and Mounce on the logical system in TLP are good, but for me the endless discussions of exactly how he was mistaken in his early work is of as little interest as the mistakes in most previous philosophy. Ammereller on Intentionality is a good, if prosaic, summary of (mostly) the early and middle W on belief and interpretation which, like virtually everyone, totally fails to give an adequate overview of W's pioneering work. In giving the general outline of our innate evolutionary psychology (i.e., roughly our personality) and showing how this describes behavior, W represents a major milestone in human thought. There are unmistakeable indications of this even in his early writings (e.g., see p 40, 49-58 here) and it has been documented by Hacker (e.g., see his paper in The New Wittgenstein) and others but without any comprehensive account in book form to date (but see the many recent writings of Daniele Moyal-Sharrock, Coliva etc.). Overall a good book for introducing W to a general philosophical audience but now very dated by the recent work of Hacker, Daniele Moyal-Sharrock, Coliva, Hutto, Read and others. -/- Those wishing a comprehensive up to date framework for human behavior from the modern two systems view may consult my book ‘The Logical Structure of Philosophy, Psychology, Mind and Language in Ludwig Wittgenstein and John Searle’ 2nd ed (2019). Those interested in more of my writings may see ‘Talking Monkeys--Philosophy, Psychology, Science, Religion and Politics on a Doomed Planet--Articles and Reviews 2006-2019 3rd ed (2019), The Logical Structure of Human Behavior (2019), and Suicidal Utopian Delusions in the 21st Century 4th ed (2019) . (shrink)

A critical review of Wittgenstein's 'On Certainty' which he wrote in 1950-51 and was first published in 1969. Most of the review is spent presenting a modern framework for philosophy(the descriptive psychology of higher order thought) and positioning the work of Wittgenstein and John Searle in this framework and relative to the work of others. It is suggested that this book can be regarded as the foundation stone of psychology and philosophy as it was the first to describe the two (...) systems of thought and shows how our unshakable grasp of the world derives from our innate axiomatic System 1 and how this interacts with System 2. -/- Those wishing a comprehensive up to date framework for human behavior from the modern two systems view may consult my book ‘The Logical Structure of Philosophy, Psychology, Mind and Language in Ludwig Wittgenstein and John Searle’ 2nd ed (2019). Those interested in more of my writings may see ‘Talking Monkeys--Philosophy, Psychology, Science, Religion and Politics on a Doomed Planet--Articles and Reviews 2006-2019 3rd ed (2019), The Logical Structure of Human Behavior (2019), and Suicidal Utopian Delusions in the 21st Century 4th ed (2019). (shrink)

Horwich memberikan analisis baik Wittgenstein (w) dan merupakan sarjana W terkemuka, tetapi dalam pandangan saya, mereka semua jatuh pendek dari apresiasi penuh, seperti yang saya jelaskan di length dalam tinjauan ini dan banyak lainnya. Jika seseorang tidak mengerti W (dan sebaiknya Searle juga) maka saya tidak melihat bagaimana seseorang bisa memiliki lebih dari pemahaman yang dangkal filsafat dan urutan yang lebih tinggi berpikir dan dengan demikian dari semua perilaku kompleks (psikologi, Sosiologi, antropologi, sejarah, sastra, masyarakat). Singkatnya, W menunjukkan bahwa ketika (...) Anda telah menunjukkan bagaimana kalimat digunakan dalam konteks kepentingan, tidak ada lagi yang dapat dikatakan. Saya akan mulai dengan beberapa kutipan penting dan kemudian memberikan apa yang saya pikir adalah pertimbangan minimum yang diperlukan untuk memahami Wittgenstein, filsafat dan perilaku manusia. -/- Pertama mungkin dicatat bahwa menempatkan "meta" di depan kata apapun harus tersangka. W berkomentar misalnya, bahwa metamathematics adalah matematika seperti yang lain. Gagasan bahwa kita dapat melangkah keluar filsafat (yaitu, psikologi deskriptif pemikiran yang lebih tinggi) adalah dirinya sendiri kebingungan yang mendalam. Iritasi lain di sini (dan di seluruh akademik menulis selama 4 dekade terakhir) adalah bahasa yang konstan sebaliknya seksisme dari "dia" dan "miliknya" dan "dia" atau "dia/dia" dll, di mana "mereka" dan "mereka" dan "mereka" akan melakukan dengan baik. Demikian pula, penggunaan kata Perancis ' repertoar ' di mana bahasa Inggris ' Repertory ' akan cukup baik. Kekurangan utama adalah kegagalan lengkap (meskipun sangat umum) untuk mempekerjakan apa yang saya lihat sebagai sangat kuat dan intuitif dua sistem pandangan HOT dan Searle's kerangka yang telah saya diuraikan di atas. Hal ini terutama pedih dalam bab tentang makna p111 et seq. (terutama di catatan kaki 2-7), di mana kita berenang di air yang sangat berlumpur tanpa kerangka benar otomatis hanya S1, disposisional proposisional S2, cos dll Satu juga bisa mendapatkan pandangan yang lebih baik dari dalam dan luar dengan membaca misalnya, Johnston atau Budd (Lihat ulasan saya). Horwich namun membuat banyak komentar tajam. Saya terutama menyukai ringkasan nya dari impor w's anti-teoritis sikap pada P65. Dia perlu memberikan penekanan lebih untuk ' pada kepastian ', baru-baru ini subjek banyak usaha oleh Daniele Moyal-Sharrock, Coliva dan lain-lain dan diringkas dalam artikel baru-baru ini. -/- Horwich adalah tingkat pertama dan pekerjaannya layak usaha. Satu harapan bahwa ia (dan semua orang) akan mempelajari Searle dan beberapa psikologi modern serta Hutto, baca, Hutchinson, Stern, Moyal-Sharrock, berjalan, hacker dan Baker dll untuk mencapai pandangan modern yang luas perilaku. Sebagian besar kertas mereka berada di academia dot edu dan philpapers dot org, tetapi untuk PMS Hacker. -/- Dia memberikan salah satu ringkasan yang paling indah di mana pemahaman Wittgenstein meninggalkan kita yang pernah saya lihat. -/- "Tidak boleh ada upaya untuk menjelaskan linguistik/kegiatan konseptual kita (PI 126) seperti Frege pengurangan aritmatika untuk logika; tidak ada upaya untuk memberikan fondasi epistemologis (PI 124) seperti dalam arti rekening berdasarkan pengetahuan apriori; tidak ada upaya untuk mencirikan bentuk ideal itu (PI 130) seperti dalam pengertian Logics; tidak ada usaha untuk mereformasi (PI 124, 132) seperti teori kesalahan Mackie atau intuisi Dummett; tidak ada upaya untuk merampingkan itu (PI 133) seperti dalam laporan quine keberadaan; tidak ada usaha untuk membuatnya lebih konsisten (PI 132) seperti dalam tanggapan Tarski terhadap paradoks pembohong; dan tidak ada upaya untuk membuatnya lebih lengkap (PI 133) seperti dalam penyelesaian pertanyaan identitas pribadi untuk skenario aneh ' teleportasi '. -/- Akhirnya, izinkan saya menyarankan bahwa dengan perspektif saya telah mendorong di sini, W adalah di pusat filsafat dan psikologi kontemporer dan tidak jelas, sulit atau tidak relevan, tapi gemilang, mendalam dan jernih dan bahwa untuk merindukannya adalah untuk melewatkan salah satu petualangan intelektual terbesar mungkin. -/- Mereka yang ingin komprehensif up to date kerangka perilaku manusia dari dua systems tampilan modern dapat berkonsultasi buku saya 'struktur Logis filsafat, psikologi, mind dan bahasa dalam Ludwig wittgenstein dan John Searle ' 2nd Ed (2019). Mereka yang tertarik pada tulisan saya lebih mungkin melihat 'berbicara monyet--filsafat, psikologi, ilmu, agama dan politik di planet yang ditakdirkan--artikel dan review 2006-2019 3rd ed (2019) dan bunuh diri utopian delusi di 21st Century 4th Ed (2019) . (shrink)