Results for 'Andy Clark'

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  1. How to Knit Your Own Markov Blanket.Andy Clark - 2017 - Philosophy and Predictive Processing.
    Hohwy (Hohwy 2016, Hohwy 2017) argues there is a tension between the free energy principle and leading depictions of mind as embodied, enactive, and extended (so-called ‘EEE1 cognition’). The tension is traced to the importance, in free energy formulations, of a conception of mind and agency that depends upon the presence of a ‘Markov blanket’ demarcating the agent from the surrounding world. In what follows I show that the Markov blanket considerations do not, in fact, lead to the kinds of (...)
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  2. How to situate cognition: Letting nature take its course.Robert A. Wilson & Andy Clark - 2008 - In Murat Aydede & P. Robbins (eds.), The Cambridge Handbook of Situated Cognition. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. pp. 55--77.
    1. The Situation in Cognition 2. Situated Cognition: A Potted Recent History 3. Extensions in Biology, Computation, and Cognition 4. Articulating the Idea of Cognitive Extension 5. Are Some Resources Intrinsically Non-Cognitive? 6. Is Cognition Extended or Only Embedded? 7. Letting Nature Take Its Course.
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  3. Cognitive disability and embodied, extended minds.Zoe Drayson & Andy Clark - 2020 - In Adam Cureton & David Wasserman (eds.), Oxford Handbook of Philosophy and Disability. Oxford University Press.
    Many models of cognitive ability and disability rely on the idea of cognition as abstract reasoning processes implemented in the brain. Research in cognitive science, however, emphasizes the way that our cognitive skills are embodied in our more basic capacities for sensing and moving, and the way that tools in the external environment can extend the cognitive abilities of our brains. This chapter addresses the implications of research in embodied cognition and extended cognition for how we think about cognitive impairment (...)
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  4. Augmentation, agency, and the spreading of the mental state.Zoe Drayson & Andy Clark - unknown
    This unpublished article was written around 2009 for a journal special issue of a journal which never materialized. In 2018, the article was rewritten and published in the Oxford Handbook of Philosophy and Disability. It can be found on PhilPapers as Drayson and Clark (2018), 'Cognitive Disability and the Embodied, Extended Mind'.
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  5. The Extended Mind Thesis.Kiverstein Julian, Mirko Farina & Andy Clark - forthcoming - Oxford Bibliographies Online.
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  6. Andy Clark and his Critics.Matteo Colombo, Elizabeth Irvine & Mog Stapleton (eds.) - 2019 - New York, NY: Oxford University Press.
    In this volume, a range of high-profile researchers in philosophy of mind, philosophy of cognitive science, and empirical cognitive science, critically engage with Clark's work across the themes of: Extended, Embodied, Embedded, Enactive, and Affective Minds; Natural Born Cyborgs; and Perception, Action, and Prediction. Daniel Dennett provides a foreword on the significance of Clark's work, and Clark replies to each section of the book, thus advancing current literature with original contributions that will form the basis for new (...)
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  7. The Extended Mind: A Dynamical Systems Perspective.Andy Forceno - manuscript
    Clark and Chalmers (2002) advance two hypotheses that both cognition and the mind extend into the environment. Both hypotheses are grounded in active externalism about mental content and the Parity Principle. Active externalism proposes that the external features of the environment in the present directly influence our mental contents and behavior. The Parity Principle states that a process or state in the environment is cognitive if it is functionally equivalent to a comparable intracranial cognitive process. This paper reviews two (...)
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  8. Review of Andy Clark, Being There: putting brain, body, and world together again. [REVIEW]John Sutton - 1998 - Metascience 7:90-95.
    A slow revolution in cognitive science is banishing this century's technological conception of mind as disembodied pure thought, namely a material symbol manipulation, and replacing it with next century's conception: mind as the organisation of bodily interaction, intelligent robotics.
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  9. Supersizing the Mind: Embodiment, Action and Cognitive Extension - Andy Clark[REVIEW]Mirko Farina - 2010 - Humana Mente 4 (14).
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  10. The Many Bubble Interpretation, externalism, the extended mind of David Chalmers and Andy Clark, and the work of Alva Noe in connection with Experimental Philosophy and Dreamwork.John Yates - unknown
    The idea of dreams being mere internal artifacts of the mind does not seem to be essential to externalism and extended mind theories, which seem as if they would function as well without this additional assumption. The Many Bubble Interpretation could allow a simpler rationale to externalist theories, which may be even simpler if the assumption that dreams have no worthwhile content outside the mind is omitted.
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  11. Perception as Guessing Versus Perception as Knowing: Replies to Clark and Peacocke.Susanna Siegel - 2018 - Res Philosophica 95 (4):761-784.
    A summary of The Rationality of Perception, and my replies to symposium papers on it by Andy Clark and Christopher Peacocke.
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  12. Superdupersizing the mind: Extended cognition and the persistence of cognitive bloat.Sean Allen-Hermanson - 2013 - Philosophical Studies 164 (3):791-806.
    Extended Cognition (EC) hypothesizes that there are parts of the world outside the head serving as cognitive vehicles. One criticism of this controversial view is the problem of “cognitive bloat” which says that EC is too permissive and fails to provide an adequate necessary criterion for cognition. It cannot, for instance, distinguish genuine cognitive vehicles from mere supports (e.g. the Yellow Pages). In response, Andy Clark and Mark Rowlands have independently suggested that genuine cognitive vehicles are distinguished from (...)
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  13. Dislocation, Not Dissociation: The Neuroanatomical Argument Against Visual Experience Driving Motor Action.Benjamin Kozuch - 2015 - Mind and Language 30 (5):572-602.
    Common sense suggests that visual consciousness is essential to skilled motor action, but Andy Clark—inspired by Milner and Goodale's dual visual systems theory—has appealed to a wide range of experimental dissociations to argue that such an assumption is false. Critics of Clark's argument contend that the content driving motor action is actually within subjects' experience, just not easily discovered. In this article, I argue that even if such content exists, it cannot be guiding motor action, since a (...)
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  14. What Is a Cognitive System? In Defense of the Conditional Probability of Co-contribution Account.Robert D. Rupert - 2019 - Cognitive Semantics 5 (2):175-200.
    A theory of cognitive systems individuation is presented and defended. The approach has some affinity with Leonard Talmy's Overlapping Systems Model of Cognitive Organization, and the paper's first section explores aspects of Talmy's view that are shared by the view developed herein. According to the view on offer -- the conditional probability of co-contribution account (CPC) -- a cognitive system is a collection of mechanisms that contribute, in overlapping subsets, to a wide variety of forms of intelligent behavior. Central to (...)
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  15. Dancing-with Cognitive Science: Three Therapeutic Provocations.Joshua M. Hall - forthcoming - Middle Voices.
    According to the “Embodied Cognition” entry in the Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy, the three landmark texts in the 4E cognitive science tradition are Lakoff and Johnson’s Metaphors We Live By, Varela, Thompson, and Rosch’s The Embodied Mind, and Andy Clark’s Being There. In my first section, I offer a phenomenological interpretation of these three texts, identifying recuring affirmations of the figure of dance alongside explicit marginalization of the practice of dance, perhaps in part due to cognitive science’s overemphasis (...)
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  16. The Parity Argument for Extended Consciousness.Karina Vold - 2015 - Journal of Consciousness Studies 22 (3-4):16-33.
    Andy Clark and David Chalmers (1998) argue that certain mental states and processes can be partially constituted by objects located beyond one’s brain and body: this is their extended mind thesis (EM). But they maintain that consciousness relies on processing that is too high in speed and bandwidth to be realized outside the body (see Chalmers, 2008, and Clark, 2009). I evaluate Clark’s and Chalmers’ reason for denying that consciousness extends while still supporting unconscious state extension. (...)
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  17. Can AI Mind Be Extended?Alice C. Helliwell - 2019 - Evental Aesthetics 8 (1):93-120.
    Andy Clark and David Chalmers’s theory of extended mind can be reevaluated in today’s world to include computational and Artificial Intelligence (AI) technology. This paper argues that AI can be an extension of human mind, and that if we agree that AI can have mind, it too can be extended. It goes on to explore the example of Ganbreeder, an image-making AI which utilizes human input to direct behavior. Ganbreeder represents one way in which AI extended mind could (...)
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  18. Mark Rowlands, The new science of the mind: from extended mind to embodied phenomenology: MIT Press, Bradford Books, 2010, 249 pages, ISBN 978-0-262-01455-7, £20.24. [REVIEW]Victor Loughlin - 2013 - Phenomenology and the Cognitive Sciences 12 (4):891-897.
    Andy Clark once remarked that we make the world smart so we don’t have to be (Clark, 1997). What he meant was that human beings (along with many other animals) alter and transform their environments in order to accomplish certain tasks that would prove difficult (or indeed impossible) without such transformations. This remarkable insight goes a long way towards explaining many aspects of human culture, ranging from linguistic notational systems to how we structure our cities. It also (...)
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  19. Online Intellectual Virtues and the Extended Mind.Lukas Schwengerer - 2021 - Social Epistemology 35 (3):312-322.
    The internet has become an ubiquitous epistemic source. However, it comes with several drawbacks. For instance, the world wide web seems to foster filter bubbles and echo chambers and includes search results that promote bias and spread misinformation. Richard Heersmink suggests online intellectual virtues to combat these epistemically detrimental effects . These are general epistemic virtues applied to the online environment based on our background knowledge of this online environment. I argue that these online intellectual virtues also demand a particular (...)
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  20. Naturalism’s maxims and its methods. Is naturalistic philosophy like science?Carin Robinson - 2018 - Principia: An International Journal of Epistemology 22 (3):371-391.
    This paper argues that naturalistic philosophy does not meet its own empiricist mandate. It argues from an empiricist perspective. Naturalists either claim that philosophy is like science in significant ways, or they claim that philosophy ought to be like science. This paper, being chiefly focused on the former claim, argues that naturalistic philosophy is nothing like science. Using Papineau’s markers for the similarities between naturalistic philosophy and science, I argue, counter Papineau, that the method employed in naturalistic philosophy is not (...)
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  21. Attention and perceptual adaptation.Ned Block & Susanna Siegel - 2013 - Behavioral and Brain Sciences 36 (3):205-206.
    Commentary on Andy Clark's target article on predictive coding.
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  22. Conscious vision guides motor action—rarely.Benjamin Kozuch - 2023 - Philosophical Psychology 36 (3):443-476.
    According to Milner and Goodale’s dual visual systems (DVS) theory, a division obtains between visual consciousness and motor action, in that the visual system producing conscious vision (the ventral stream) is distinct from the one guiding action (the dorsal stream). That there would be this division is often taken (by Andy Clark and others) to undermine the folk view on how consciousness and action relate. However, even if this division obtains, this leaves open the possibility that con- scious (...)
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  23. The body's predictive processor. [REVIEW]Zoe Drayson - 2023 - Science 380 (6650):1112.
    Review of Andy Clark (2023), The Experience Machine: How Our Minds Predict and Shape Reality.
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  24. In defense of picturing; Sellars’s philosophy of mind and cognitive neuroscience.Carl B. Sachs - 2019 - Phenomenology and the Cognitive Sciences 18 (4):669-689.
    I argue that Sellars’s distinction between signifying and picturing should be taken seriously by philosophers of mind, language, and cognition. I begin with interpretations of key Sellarsian texts in order to show that picturing is best understood as a theory of non-linguistic cognitive representations through which animals navigate their environments. This is distinct from the kind of discursive cognition that Sellars called ‘signifying’ and which is best understood in terms of socio-linguistic inferences. I argue that picturing is required because reflection (...)
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  25. Distributed memory, coupling, and history.John Sutton - 1999 - In R. Heath, B. Hayes, A. Heathcote & C. Hooker (eds.), Dynamical Cognitive Science: Proceedings of the Fourth Australasian Cognitive Science Conference. University of Newcastle.
    A case study in historical cognitive science, this paper addresses two claims made by radical proponents of new dynamical approaches. It queries their historical narrative, which sees embodied, situated cognition as correcting an individualist, atemporal framework originating in Descartes. In fact, new Descartes scholarship shows that 17th-century animal spirits neurophysiology realized a recognizably distributed model of memory; explicit representations are patterns of spirit flow, and memory traces are changes left by experience in connections between brain pores. This historical sketch supports (...)
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  26. Taking iPhone Seriously: Epistemic Technologies and the Extended Mind.Isaac Record & Boaz Miller - forthcoming - In Duncan Pritchard, Jesper Kallestrup‎, Orestis Palermos & J. Adam Carter‎ (eds.), Extended ‎Epistemology. Oxford University Press.
    David Chalmers thinks his iPhone exemplifies the extended mind thesis by meeting the criteria ‎that he and Andy Clark established in their well-known 1998 paper. Andy Clark agrees. We take ‎this proposal seriously, evaluating the case of the GPS-enabled smartphone as a potential mind ‎extender. We argue that the “trust and glue” criteria enumerated by Clark and Chalmers are ‎incompatible with both the epistemic responsibilities that accompany everyday activities and the ‎practices of trust that enable (...)
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  27. Thinking embodiment with genetics: epigenetics and postgenomic biology in embodied cognition and enactivism.Maurizio Meloni & Jack Reynolds - 2020 - Synthese 198 (11):10685-10708.
    The role of the body in cognition is acknowledged across a variety of disciplines, even if the precise nature and scope of that contribution remain contentious. As a result, most philosophers working on embodiment—e.g. those in embodied cognition, enactivism, and ‘4e’ cognition—interact with the life sciences as part of their interdisciplinary agenda. Despite this, a detailed engagement with emerging findings in epigenetics and post-genomic biology has been missing from proponents of this embodied turn. Surveying this research provides an opportunity to (...)
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  28. Framing the Predictive Mind: Why We Should Think Again About Dreyfus.Jack Reynolds - 2024 - Phenomenology and the Cognitive Sciences.
    In this paper I return to Hubert Dreyfus’ old but influential critique of artificial intelligence, redirecting it towards contemporary predictive processing models of the mind (PP). I focus on Dreyfus’ arguments about the “frame problem” for artificial cognitive systems, and his contrasting account of embodied human skills and expertise. The frame problem presents as a prima facie problem for practical work in AI and robotics, but also for computational views of the mind in general, including for PP. Indeed, some of (...)
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  29. Recruitment Revisited: Cognitive Extension and the Promise of Predictive Processing.Luke Kersten - 2024 - Thought: A Journal of Philosophy 12 (1):16-26.
    The extended mind thesis maintains that cognitive processes and systems can, on occasion, stretch to include parts of the brain, body, and world. One outstanding puzzle facing this view is the “recruitment puzzle.” The recruitment puzzle asks how cognisers are able to reliably recruit internal and external resources such that they form extended systems. Andy Clark has recently suggested that predictive processing helps to address this puzzle. I argue that, while promising, Clark’s proposal remains incomplete. I suggest (...)
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  30. Extended mental features.Katalin Farkas - 2019 - In Matteo Colombo, Elizabeth Irvine & Mog Stapleton (eds.), Andy Clark and his Critics. New York, NY: Oxford University Press. pp. 44-55.
    The focus of the original argument for the Extended Mind thesis was the case of beliefs. It may be asked what other types of mental features can be extended. Andy Clark has always held that consciousness cannot be extended. This paper revisits the question of extending consciousness.
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  31. Extended cognition and the explosion of knowledge.David Ludwig - 2014 - Philosophical Psychology (3):1-14.
    The aim of this article is to show that externalist accounts of cognition such as Clark and Chalmers' (1998) “active externalism” lead to an explosion of knowledge that is caused by online resources such as Wikipedia and Google. I argue that externalist accounts of cognition imply that subjects who integrate mobile Internet access in their cognitive routines have millions of standing beliefs on unexpected issues such as the birth dates of Moroccan politicians or the geographical coordinates of villages in (...)
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  32. Two Versions of the Extended Mind Thesis.Katalin Farkas - 2012 - Philosophia 40 (3):435-447.
    According to the Extended Mind thesis, the mind extends beyond the skull or the skin: mental processes can constitutively include external devices, like a computer or a notebook. The Extended Mind thesis has drawn both support and criticism. However, most discussions—including those by its original defenders, Andy Clark and David Chalmers—fail to distinguish between two very different interpretations of this thesis. The first version claims that the physical basis of mental features can be located spatially outside the body. (...)
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  33. Models, Brains, and Scientific Realism.Fabio Sterpetti - 2006 - In Lorenzo Magnani & Claudia Casadio (eds.), Model Based Reasoning in Science and Technology. Logical, Epistemological, and Cognitive Issues. Cham, Switzerland: Springer International Publishing. pp. 639-661.
    Prediction Error Minimization theory (PEM) is one of the most promising attempts to model perception in current science of mind, and it has recently been advocated by some prominent philosophers as Andy Clark and Jakob Hohwy. Briefly, PEM maintains that “the brain is an organ that on aver-age and over time continually minimizes the error between the sensory input it predicts on the basis of its model of the world and the actual sensory input” (Hohwy 2014, p. 2). (...)
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  34. Cognitive Ecology as a Framework for Shakespearean Studies.Evelyn Tribble & John Sutton - 2011 - Shakespeare Studies 39:94-103.
    ‘‘COGNITIVE ECOLOGY’’ is a fruitful model for Shakespearian studies, early modern literary and cultural history, and theatrical history more widely. Cognitive ecologies are the multidimensional contexts in which we remember, feel, think, sense, communicate, imagine, and act, often collaboratively, on the fly, and in rich ongoing interaction with our environments. Along with the anthropologist Edwin Hutchins,1 we use the term ‘‘cognitive ecology’’ to integrate a number of recent approaches to cultural cognition: we believe these approaches offer productive lines of engagement (...)
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  35. La identidad personal, el dialogo y la extensión: Por qué no existe el yo sin los otros.Ignacio Moya Arriagada - 2013 - Intus-Legere Filosofia 7 (1):59-77.
    (ENGLISH) In this paper I propose a concept of the self that allows us to address and solve some of the issues associated with problem of diachronic personal identity. That is, by virtue of what can we consider that I am today the same person I was yesterday? The problem of continuity in time of identity has a long history in analytic philosophy. I argue that the continuity of personal identity over time can be ensured by resorting to the concept (...)
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  36. Common-sense functionalism and the extended mind.Jack Wadham - 2016 - Philosophical Quarterly 66 (262):136-151.
    The main claim of this paper is that Andy Clark's most influential argument for ‘the extended mind thesis’ (EM henceforth) fails. Clark's argument for EM assumes that a certain form of common-sense functionalism is true. I argue, contra Clark, that the assumed brand of common-sense functionalism does not imply EM. Clark's argument also relies on an unspoken, undefended and optional assumption about the nature of mental kinds—an assumption denied by the very common-sense functionalists on whom (...)
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  37. (1 other version) النزعة الخارجية الدلالية Semantic externalism.Salah Ismail - 2020 - منصة معنى، 8 فبراير.
    Semantic externalism Are the meanings of natural kind words, such as “water” or “tiger,” in the head or in the world? This question is pressing and controversial in contemporary philosophy. The nature of the meaning related to propositional contents and words of the natural kind raises a fundamental disagreement between two groups of philosophers: defenders of internalism and defenders of externalism. The two groups differ on how to define meaning. Internalists say that meaning is determined entirely by aspects that are (...)
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  38. Procrastination and the extended will.Joseph Heath & Joel Anderson - 2010 - In Chrisoula Andreou & Mark D. White (eds.), The Thief of Time: Philosophical Essays on Procrastination. New York, US: Oxford University Press. pp. 233--253.
    What experimental game theorists may have demonstrated is not that people are systematically irrational but that human rationality is heavily scaffolded. Remove the scaffolding, and we do not do very well. People are able to get on because they “offload” an enormous amount of practical reasoning onto their environment. As a result, when they are put in novel or unfamiliar environments, they perform very poorly, even on apparently simple tasks. -/- This observation is supported by recent empirically informed shifts in (...)
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  39. Representation: Problems and Solutions.Nancy Salay - 2015 - In D. C. Noelle, R. Dale, A. S. Warlaumont, J. Yoshimi, T. Matlock, C. D. Jennings & P. P. Maglio (eds.), Proceedings of the 37th Annual Conference of the Cognitive Science Society. Cognitive Science Society.
    The current orthodoxy in cognitive science, what I describe as a commitment to deep representationalism, faces intractable problems. If we take these objections seriously, and I will argue that we should, there are two possible responses: 1. We are mistaken that representation is the locus of our cognitive capacities — we manage to be the successful cognitive agents in some other, non-representational, way; or, 2. Our representational capacities do give us critical cognitive advantages, but they are not fundamental to us (...)
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  40. Complex Systems Approach to the Hard Problem of Consciousness.Sahana Rajan - manuscript
    Consciousness has been the bone of contention for philosophers throughout centuries. Indian philosophy largely adopted lived experience as the starting point for its explorations of consciousness. For this reason, from the very beginning, experience was an integral way of grasping consciousness, whose validity as a tool was considered self-evident. Thus, in Indian philosophy, the question was not to move from the brain to mind but to understand experience of an individual and how such an experience is determined through mental structures (...)
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  41. Is a subpersonal epistemology possible? Re-evaluating cognitive integration for extended cognition.Hadeel Naeem - 2021 - Dissertation, University of Edinburgh
    Virtue reliabilism provides an account of epistemic integration that explains how a reliable-belief forming process can become a knowledge-conducive ability of one’s cognitive character. The univocal view suggests that this epistemic integration can also explain how an external process can extend one’s cognition into the environment. Andy Clark finds a problem with the univocal view. He claims that cognitive extension is a wholly subpersonal affair, whereas the epistemic integration that virtue reliabilism puts forward requires personal-level agential involvement. To (...)
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  42. Apperceptive patterning: Artefaction, extensional beliefs and cognitive scaffolding.Ekin Erkan - 2020 - Cosmos and History 16 (1):125-178.
    In “Psychopower and Ordinary Madness” my ambition, as it relates to Bernard Stiegler’s recent literature, was twofold: 1) critiquing Stiegler’s work on exosomatization and artefactual posthumanism—or, more specifically, nonhumanism—to problematize approaches to media archaeology that rely upon technical exteriorization; 2) challenging how Stiegler engages with Giuseppe Longo and Francis Bailly’s conception of negative entropy. These efforts were directed by a prevalent techno-cultural qualifier: the rise of Synthetic Intelligence (including neural nets, deep learning, predictive processing and Bayesian models of cognition). This (...)
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  43. Extending the Renaissance mind: 'Look what thy memory cannot contain'.Miranda Anderson - 2016 - In Peter Garratt (ed.), The Cognitive Humanities: Embodied Mind in Literature and Culture. Palgrave-Macmillan. pp. 95-112.
    The possibility that non-biological resources can act as part of the cognitive system is claimed by Andy Clark’s and David Chalmers’s seminal paper, ‘The Extended Mind’ (1998). This hypothesis holds parallels with the history of the book, an area of research that has long been considering the effect on culture and cognition of the technological changes from orality to literacy and from manuscripts to printing. M. T. Clanchy’s From Memory to Written Record describes literacy as a technology that (...)
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  44. A partial defense of extended knowledge.Berit Brogaard - 2014 - Philosophical Issues 24 (1):39-62.
    The paper starts out by distinguishing two closely related hypotheses about extended cognition. According to the strong hypothesis, there are no intrinsic representations in the brain. This is a version of the extended-mind view defended by Andy Clark and Richard Menary. On the weak hypothesis, there are intrinsic representations in the brain but some types of cognition, knowledge or memory are constituted by particular types of external devices or environmental factors that extend beyond the skull and perhaps beyond (...)
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  45. Improvisational Artistry in Live Dance Performance as Embodied and Extended Agency.Aili Bresnahan - 2014 - Dance Research Journal 46 (1):84-94.
    This paper provides an account of improvisational artistry in live dance performance that construes the contribution of the dance performer as a kind of agency. Andy Clark’s theory of the embodied and extended mind is used in order to consider how this account is supported by research on how a thinking-while-doing person navigates the world. I claim here that while a dance performer’s improvisational artistry does include embodied and extended features that occur outside of the brain and nervous (...)
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  46. Automata, man-machines and embodiment: deflating or inflating Life?Charles T. Wolfe - forthcoming - In A. Radman & H. Sohn (eds.), Critical and Clinical Cartographies: Architecture, Robotics, Medicine, Philosophy. Edinburgh University Press.
    Early modern automata, understood as efforts to ‘model’ life, to grasp its singular properties and/or to unveil and demystify its seeming inaccessibility and mystery, are not just fascinating liminal, boundary, hybrid, crossover or go-between objects, while they are all of those of course. They also pose a direct challenge to some of our common conceptions about mechanism and embodiment. They challenge the simplicity of the distinction between a purported ‘mechanistic’ worldpicture, its ontology and its goals, and on the other hand (...)
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  47. Simply Extended Mind.Alexander auf der Straße - 2012 - Philosophia 40 (3):449-458.
    For more than one decade, Andy Clark has defended the now-famous extended mind thesis, the idea that cognitive processes leak into the world. In this paper I analyse Clark’s theoretical justification for the thesis: explanatory simplicity. I argue that his way of justifying the thesis leads into contradiction, either at the level of propositional attitude ascriptions or at the theoretical level. I evaluate three possible strategies of dealing with this issue, concluding that they are all likely to (...)
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  48. Memory and the extended mind: embodiment, cognition, and culture.John Sutton - 2005 - Cognitive Processing 6:223-226.
    This special issue, which includes papers first presented at two workshops on ‘Memory, Mind, and Media’ in Sydney on November 29–30 and December 2–3, 2004, showcases some of the best interdisciplinary work in philosophy and psychology by memory researchers in Australasia (and by one expatriate Australian, Robert Wilson of the University of Alberta). The papers address memory in many contexts: in dance and under hypnosis, in social groups and with siblings, in early childhood and in the laboratory. Memory is taken (...)
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  49. The Boundaries Still Stand: A Reply to Fisher.Kenneth Aizawa - 2010 - Journal of Mind and Behavior 31 (1):37.
    In his recent critical notice of The Bounds of Cognition in this journal, Justin Fisher advances a set of concerns that favor the hypothesis that, under certain circumstances, cognitive processes span the brain, body, and world. One is that it is too much to require that representations in cognitive process must have non-derived content. A second is that it is possible that extended objects bear non-derived content. A third is that extended cognition might advocate the extension of certain general categories (...)
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  50. (1 other version)Supersizing the Mind: Embodiment, Action, and Cognitive Extension. [REVIEW]Robert D. Rupert - 2009 - Journal of Mind and Behavior 30 (4).
    For well over two decades, Andy Clark has been gleaning theoretical lessons from the leading edge of cognitive science, applying a combination of empirical savvy and philosophical instinct that few can match. Clark’s most recent book, Supersizing the Mind: Embodiment, Action, and Cognitive Extension, brilliantly expands his oeuvre. It offers a well-informed and focused survey of research in the burgeoning field of situated cognition, a field that emphasizes the contribution of environmental and non-neural bodily structures to the (...)
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