Results for 'Katherine Puddifoot'

(not author) ( search as author name )
104 found
Order:
  1. Epistemic Agency and the Generalisation of Fear.Puddifoot Katherine & Trakas Marina - 2023 - Synthese 202 (1):1-23.
    Fear generalisation is a psychological phenomenon that occurs when fear that is elicited in response to a frightening stimulus spreads to similar or related stimuli. The practical harms of pathological fear generalisation related to trauma are well-documented, but little or no attention has been given so far to its epistemic harms. This paper fills this gap in the literature. It shows how the psychological phenomenon, when it becomes pathological, substantially curbs the epistemic agency of those who experience the fear that (...)
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   1 citation  
  2. Mnemonic Justice.Katherine Puddifoot - forthcoming - In Memory and Testimony. OUP.
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   1 citation  
  3. Epistemic innocence and the production of false memory beliefs.Katherine Puddifoot & Lisa Bortolotti - 2018 - Philosophical Studies:1-26.
    Findings from the cognitive sciences suggest that the cognitive mechanisms responsible for some memory errors are adaptive, bringing benefits to the organism. In this paper we argue that the same cognitive mechanisms also bring a suite of significant epistemic benefits, increasing the chance of an agent obtaining epistemic goods like true belief and knowledge. This result provides a significant challenge to the folk conception of memory beliefs that are false, according to which they are a sign of cognitive frailty, indicating (...)
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   8 citations  
  4. Fear Generalization and Mnemonic Injustice.Katherine Puddifoot & Marina Trakas - 2024 - Episteme:1-27.
    This paper focuses on how experiences of trauma can lead to generalized fear of people, objects and places that are similar or contextually or conceptually related to those that produced the initial fear, causing epistemic, affective, and practical harms to those who are unduly feared and those who are intimates of the victim of trauma. We argue that cases of fear generalization that bring harm to other people constitute examples of injustice closely akin to testimonial injustice, specifically, mnemonic injustice. Mnemonic (...)
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark  
  5. .Katherine Brading & Marius Stan - 2023 - New York: Oxford University Press USA.
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   1 citation  
  6. Disagreement and Religious Practice.Katherine Dormandy - forthcoming - In Maria Baghramian, Adam Carter & R. Rowland (eds.), Routledge Handbook of Disagreement. Routledge.
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark  
  7. Religious Disagreement.Dormandy Katherine - 2023 - In John Greco, Tyler Dalton McNabb & Jonathan Fuqua (eds.), The Cambridge Handbook of Religious Epistemology. Cambridge University Press. pp. 208-223.
    Religious disagreement describes the fact that religious and secular beliefs exhibit massive variety, and cannot all be perfectly accurate. It yields a problem and an opportunity. The problem is that, especially given the apparent epistemic parity of many who hold other beliefs, you cannot suppose that your beliefs are accurate. This arguably puts pressure on you to weaken or abandon your beliefs. Responses include denying the parity of those who disa- gree, or denying that religious disagreement speaks strongly against your (...)
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   1 citation  
  8. Cut the Pie Any Way You Like? Cotnoir on General Identity.Katherine Hawley - 2013 - Oxford Studies in Metaphysics 8:323-30.
    This is a short response to Aaron Cotnoir's 'Composition as General Identity', in which I suggest some further applications of his ideas, and try to press the question of why we should think of his 'general identity relation' as a genuine identity relation.
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   4 citations  
  9. Implicit Bias and Prejudice.Jules Holroyd & Kathy Puddifoot - 2019 - In M. Fricker, N. J. L. L. Pedersen, D. Henderson & P. J. Graham (eds.), Routledge Handbook of Social Epistemology. Routledge.
    Recent empirical research has substantiated the finding that very many of us harbour implicit biases: fast, automatic, and difficult to control processes that encode stereotypes and evaluative content, and influence how we think and behave. Since it is difficult to be aware of these processes - they have sometimes been referred to as operating 'unconsciously' - we may not know that we harbour them, nor be alert to their influence on our cognition and action. And since they are difficult to (...)
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   6 citations  
  10. Four Faces of Fair Subject Selection.Katherine Witte Saylor & Douglas MacKay - 2020 - American Journal of Bioethics 20 (2):5-19.
    Although the principle of fair subject selection is a widely recognized requirement of ethical clinical research, it often yields conflicting imperatives, thus raising major ethical dilemmas regarding participant selection. In this paper, we diagnose the source of this problem, arguing that the principle of fair subject selection is best understood as a bundle of four distinct sub-principles, each with normative force and each yielding distinct imperatives: (1) fair inclusion; (2) fair burden sharing; (3) fair opportunity; and (4) fair distribution of (...)
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   22 citations  
  11. The epistemic benefits of religious disagreement.Katherine Dormandy - 2020 - Religious Studies 56 (3):390-408.
    Scientific researchers welcome disagreement as a way of furthering epistemic aims. Religious communities, by contrast, tend to regard it as a potential threat to their beliefs. But I argue that religious disagreement can help achieve religious epistemic aims. I do not argue this by comparing science and religion, however. For scientific hypotheses are ideally held with a scholarly neutrality, and my aim is to persuade those who arecommittedto religious beliefs that religious disagreement can be epistemically beneficial for them too.
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   14 citations  
  12. Exploitative Epistemic Trust.Katherine Dormandy - 2020 - In Trust in Epistemology. New York City, New York, Vereinigte Staaten: pp. 241-264.
    Where there is trust, there is also vulnerability, and vulnerability can be exploited. Epistemic trust is no exception. This chapter maps the phenomenon of the exploitation of epistemic trust. I start with a discussion of how trust in general can be exploited; a key observation is that trust incurs vulnerabilities not just for the party doing the trusting, but also for the trustee (after all, trust can be burdensome), so either party can exploit the other. I apply these considerations to (...)
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   10 citations  
  13. Resolving Religious Disagreements.Katherine Dormandy - 2018 - Faith and Philosophy 35 (1):56-83.
    Resolving religious disagreements is difficult, for beliefs about religion tend to come with strong biases against other views and the people who hold them. Evidence can help, but there is no agreed-upon policy for weighting it, and moreover bias affects the content of our evidence itself. Another complicating factor is that some biases are reliable and others unreliable. What we need is an evidence-weighting policy geared toward negotiating the effects of bias. I consider three evidence-weighting policies in the philosophy of (...)
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   14 citations  
  14. Introduction: An Overview of Trust and Some Key Epistemological Applications.Katherine Dormandy - 2020 - In Trust in Epistemology. New York: Routledge. pp. 1-40.
    I give an overview of the trust literature and then of six central issues concerning epistemic trust. The survey of trust zeroes in on the kinds of expectations that trust involves, trust’s characteristic psychology, and what makes trust rational. The discussion of epistemic trust focuses on its role in testimony, the epistemic goods that we trust for, the significance of epistemic trust in contrast to reliance, what makes epistemic trust rational, and epistemic self-trust.
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   5 citations  
  15. Emotions and Distrust in Science.Katherine Furman - 2020 - International Journal of Philosophical Studies 28 (5):713-730.
    In our interactions with science, we are often vulnerable; we do not have complete control of the situation and there is a risk that we, or those we love, might be harmed. This is not an emotionall...
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   4 citations  
  16. Intersectionality as a Regulative Ideal.Katherine Gasdaglis & Alex Madva - 2019 - Ergo: An Open Access Journal of Philosophy 6.
    Appeals to intersectionality serve to remind us that social categories like race and gender cannot be adequately understood independently from each other. But what, exactly, is the intersectional thesis a thesis about? Answers to this question are remarkably diverse. Intersectionality is variously understood as a claim about the nature of social kinds, oppression, or experience ; about the limits of antidiscrimination law or identity politics ; or about the importance of fuzzy sets, multifactor analysis, or causal modeling in social science.
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   4 citations  
  17. Disagreement from the Religious Margins.Katherine Dormandy - 2018 - Res Philosophica 95 (3):371-395.
    Religious communities often discourage disagreement with religious authorities, on the grounds that allowing it would be epistemically detrimental. I argue that this attitude is mistaken, because any social position in a community—including religious authority—comes with epistemic advantages as well as epistemic limitations. I argue that religious communities stand to benefit epistemically by engaging in disagreement with people occupying other social positions. I focus on those at the community’s margins and argue that religious marginalization is apt to yield religiously important insights; (...)
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   10 citations  
  18. Relative Significance Controversies in Evolutionary Biology.Katherine Deaven - forthcoming - British Journal for the Philosophy of Science.
    Several prominent debates in biology, such as those surrounding adaptationism, group selection, and punctuated equilibrium, have focused on disagreements about the relative importance of a cause in producing a phenomenon of interest. Some philosophers, such as John Beatty have expressed scepticism about the scientific value of engaging in these controversies, and Karen Kovaka has suggested that their value might be limited. In this paper, I challenge that scepticism by giving a novel analysis of relative significance controversies, showing that there are (...)
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark  
  19. Evidence-Seeking as an Expression of Faith.Katherine Dormandy - 2018 - American Catholic Philosophical Quarterly 92 (3):409-428.
    Faith is often regarded as having a fraught relationship with evidence. Lara Buchak even argues that it entails foregoing evidence, at least when this evidence would influence your decision to act on the proposition in which you have faith. I present a counterexample inspired by the book of Job, in which seeking evidence for the sake of deciding whether to worship God is not only compatible with faith, but is in fact an expression of great faith. One might still think (...)
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   8 citations  
  20. Does Epistemic Humility Threaten Religious Beliefs?Katherine Dormandy - 2018 - Journal of Psychology and Theology 46 (4):292– 304.
    In a fallen world fraught with evidence against religious beliefs, it is tempting to think that, on the assumption that those beliefs are true, the best way to protect them is to hold them dogmatically. Dogmatic belief, which is highly confident and resistant to counterevidence, may fail to exhibit epistemic virtues such as humility and may instead manifest epistemic vices such as arrogance or servility, but if this is the price of secure belief in religious truths, so be it. I (...)
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   6 citations  
  21. Applied Ontology: An Introduction.Katherine Munn & Barry Smith (eds.) - 2008 - Frankfurt: ontos.
    Ontology is the philosophical discipline which aims to understand how things in the world are divided into categories and how these categories are related together. This is exactly what information scientists aim for in creating structured, automated representations, called 'ontologies,' for managing information in fields such as science, government, industry, and healthcare. Currently, these systems are designed in a variety of different ways, so they cannot share data with one another. They are often idiosyncratically structured, accessible only to those who (...)
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   11 citations  
  22. Introduction: What is Ontology for?Katherine Munn - 2008 - In Katherine Munn & Barry Smith (eds.), Applied Ontology: An Introduction. Walter de Gruyter. pp. 7-19.
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   10 citations  
  23. Epistemic Self-Trust: It's Personal.Katherine Dormandy - forthcoming - Episteme:1-16.
    What is epistemic self-trust? There is a tension in the way in which prominent accounts answer this question. Many construe epistemic trust in oneself as no more than reliance on our sub-personal cognitive faculties. Yet many accounts – often the same ones – construe epistemic trust in others as a normatively laden attitude directed at persons whom we expect to care about our epistemic needs. Is epistemic self-trust really so different from epistemic trust in others? I argue that it is (...)
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   2 citations  
  24. Loving truly: An epistemic approach to the doxastic norms of love.Katherine Dormandy - 2022 - Synthese 200 (3):1-23.
    If you love someone, is it good to believe better of her than epistemic norms allow? The partiality view says that it is: love, on this view, issues norms of belief that clash with epistemic norms. The partiality view is supposedly supported by an analogy between beliefs and actions, by the phenomenology of love, and by the idea that love commits us to the loved one’s good character. I argue that the partiality view is false, and defend what I call (...)
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   1 citation  
  25. Essentializing Language and the Prospects for Ameliorative Projects.Katherine Ritchie - 2021 - Ethics 131 (3):460-488.
    Some language encourages essentialist thinking. While philosophers have largely focused on generics and essentialism, I argue that nouns as a category are poised to refer to kinds and to promote representational essentializing. Our psychological propensity to essentialize when nouns are used reveals a limitation for anti-essentialist ameliorative projects. Even ameliorated nouns can continue to underpin essentialist thinking. I conclude by arguing that representational essentialism does not doom anti-essentialist ameliorative projects. Rather it reveals that would-be ameliorators ought to attend to the (...)
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   6 citations  
  26. Ontological Innocence.Katherine Hawley - 2014 - In A. J. Cotnoir & Donald L. M. Baxter (eds.), Composition as Identity. Oxford University Press. pp. 70-89.
    In this chapter, I examine Lewis's ideas about ontological innocence, ontological commitment and double-counting, in his discussion of composition as identity in Parts of Classes. I attempt to understand these primarily as epistemic or methodological claims: how far can we get down this route without adopting radical metaphysical theses about composition as identity?
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   18 citations  
  27. Der Dialog im Buch Hiob: Perspektiven für einen gelingenden religiösen Dialog.Katherine Dormandy - forthcoming - In Andreas Koritensky, Margit Wasmaier-Sailer & Veronika Weidner (eds.), Epistemische Verantwortung im Dialog. Herder Verlag.
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark  
  28. "In Abundance of Counsellors there Is Victory": Reasoning about Public Policy from a Religious Worldview.Katherine Dormandy - 2019 - In Peter Jonkers & Oliver J. Wiertz (eds.), Religious Truth and Identity in an Age of Plurality. Routledge. pp. 162-181.
    Some religious communities argue that public policy is best decided by their own members, on the grounds that collaborating with those reasoning from secular or “worldly” perspectives will only foment error about how society should be run. But I argue that epistemology instead recommends fostering disagreement among a plurality of religious and secular worldviews. Inter-worldview disagreement over public policy can challenge our unquestioned assumptions, deliver evidence we would likely have missed, and expose us to new epistemic alternatives; when done respectfully, (...)
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   2 citations  
  29. Intellectual Humility and Epistemic Trust.Katherine Dormandy - 2021 - In Mark Alfano, Michael Patrick Lynch & Alessandra Tanesini (eds.), The Routledge Handbook of the Philosophy of Humility. New York, NY: Routledge.
    Intellectual humility has something important in common with trust: both, independently, help secure knowledge. But they also do so in tandem, and this chapter discusses how. Intellectual humility is a virtue of a person’s cognitive character; this means that it disposes her to perceive and think in certain ways that help promote knowledge. Trust is a form of cooperation, in which one person depends on another (or on herself) for some end, in a way that is governed by certain norms. (...)
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   1 citation  
  30. The Loyalty of Religious Disagreement.Katherine Dormandy - 2021 - In Matthew A. Benton & Jonathan L. Kvanvig (eds.), Religious Disagreement and Pluralism. Oxford: Oxford University Press. pp. 238-270.
    Religious disagreement, like disagreement in science, stands to deliver important epistemic benefits. But religious communities tend to frown on it. A salient reason is that, whereas scientists should be neutral toward the topics they discuss, religious believers should be loyal to God; and religious disagreement, they argue, is disloyal. For it often involves discussion with people who believe more negatively about God than you do, putting you at risk of forming negative beliefs yourself. And forming negative beliefs about someone, or (...)
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   1 citation  
  31. How physics flew the philosophers' nest.Katherine Brading - 2021 - Studies in History and Philosophy of Science Part A 88 (C):312-20.
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   1 citation  
  32. Rational Faith: How Faith Construed as Trust Does, and Does Not, Go Beyond Our Evidence.Katherine Dormandy - 2023 - The Monist 106 (1):72-82.
    I argue that faith is a type of trust. It is also part of a relationship in which both parties are called on to be faithful, where faithfulness is a type of trustworthiness. What distinguishes faith relationships from trust relationships is that both parties value the faith relationship intrinsically. I discuss how faith on this account can, and cannot, be rational when it goes beyond a person’s evidence. It turns out that faith has the same rationality conditions as trust, differing (...)
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark  
  33. Argument from Personal Narrative: A Case Study of Rachel Moran's Paid For: My Journey Through Prostitution.Katherine Dormandy - 2016 - Res Philosophica 93 (3):601-620.
    Personal narratives can let us in on aspects of reality which we have not experienced for ourselves, and are thus important sources for philosophical reflection. Yet a venerable tradition in mainstream philosophy has little room for arguments which rely on personal narrative, on the grounds that narratives are particular and testimonial, whereas philosophical arguments should be systematic and transparent. I argue that narrative arguments are an important form of philosophical argument. Their testimonial aspects witness to novel facets of reality, but (...)
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   2 citations  
  34. The Global Forum for Bioethics in Research: Past present and future.Katherine Littler, Joseph Millum & Douglas Richard Wassenaar - 2014 - South African Journal of Bioethics and Law 7 (1):5.
    The Global Forum on Bioethics in Research (GFBR) served as a global platform for debate on ethical issues in international health research between 1999 and 2008, bringing together research ethics experts, researchers, policy makers and community members from developing and developed countries. In total, nine GFBR meetings were held on six continents. Work is currently underway to revive the GFBR. This paper describes the purpose and history of the GFBR and presents key elements for its reinstatement, future functioning and sustainability. (...)
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark  
  35. Religious Evidentialism.Katherine Dormandy - 2013 - European Journal for Philosophy of Religion 5 (2):63--86.
    Should religious believers proportion their religious beliefs to their evidence? They should: Religious faith is better, ceteris paribus, when the beliefs accompanying it are evidence-proportioned. I offer two philosophical arguments and a biblical argument. The philosophical arguments conclude that love and trust, two attitudes belonging to faith, are better, ceteris paribus, when accompanied by evidence-proportioned belief, and that so too is the faith in question. The biblical argument concludes that beliefs associated with faith, portrayed in the Hebrew Bible and the (...)
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   2 citations  
  36. Metaphysical and Historical Claims in The Birth of Tragedy.Katherine Harloe - 2008 - In Manuel Dries (ed.), Nietzsche on Time and History. Walter de Gruyter. pp. 275.
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   3 citations  
  37. Does Identity Politics Reinforce Oppression?Katherine Ritchie - 2021 - Philosophers' Imprint 21 (4):1-15.
    Identity politics has been critiqued in various ways. One central problem—the Reinforcement Problem—claims that identity politics reinforces groups rooted in oppression thereby undermining its own liberatory aims. Here I consider two versions of the problem—one psychological and one metaphysical. I defang the first by drawing on work in social psychology. I then argue that careful consideration of the metaphysics of social groups and of the practice of identity politics provides resources to dissolve the second version. Identity politics involves the creation (...)
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   2 citations  
  38. Minimal Cooperation and Group Roles.Katherine Ritchie - 2020 - In Anika Fiebich (ed.), Minimal Cooperation and Shared Agency.
    Cooperation has been analyzed primarily in the context of theories of collective intentionality. These discussions have primarily focused on interactions between pairs or small groups of agents who know one another personally. Cooperative game theory has also been used to argue for a form of cooperation in large unorganized groups. Here I consider a form of minimal cooperation that can arise among members of potentially large organized groups (e.g., corporate teams, committees, governmental bodies). I argue that members of organized groups (...)
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   2 citations  
  39. Die Rationalität religiöser Überzeugungen.Katherine Dormandy - 2017 - In Georg Gasser, Ludwig Jaskolla & Thomas Schärtl (eds.), Handbuch zur Analytischen Theologie. Münster: Aschendorff.
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark  
  40. Introduction to Part II: The Epistemic Consequences of Religious Diversity.Katherine Dormandy & Oliver J. Wiertz - 2019 - In Peter Jonkers & Oliver J. Wiertz (eds.), Religious Truth and Identity in an Age of Plurality. Routledge.
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark  
  41. Evidentialismus.Katherine Dormandy - 2019 - In Martin Grajner & Guido Melchior (eds.), Handbuch Erkenntnistheorie. Stuttgart: Metzler. pp. 178-186.
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark  
  42. Review of Social Goodness: On the Ontology of Social Norms, by Charlotte Witt. [REVIEW]Daniel Kelly & Katherine Ritchie - forthcoming - Mind.
    Charlotte Witt covers a remarkable amount of ground in this concise and elegantly written book. Coming in at under 150 pages, she artfully weaves together Aristotle’s theory of functions with contemporary work on cultural transmission and apprenticeship, ideas about self-creation with theories of aspiration and transformative experience, and reflections on the relationships among social norms and games with thoughts about social roles and the nature of hierarchy. At the heart of it is an elaboration and defense of a thoroughly externalist (...)
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark  
  43. Responsible for Destiny: Historizing, Historicality, and Community.Katherine Ward - 2021 - Gatherings: The Heidegger Circle Annual 11:198–226.
    Historizing is the way Dasein takes up possibilities and roles to project itself into the future. It is why we experience continuity throughout our lives, and it is the basis for historicality – our sense of a more general continuity of “history.” In Being and Time,Heidegger identifies both inauthentic and authentic modes of historizing that give rise, respectively, to inauthentic and authentic modes of histori-cality. He focuses on historizing at the individual level but gestures at a communal form of historizing. (...)
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark  
  44. Ein Zugang zum Problem des Leids.Katherine Dormandy - 2019 - In Peter Schulte & Romy Jaster (eds.), Glaube und Rationalität - Gibt es gute Gründe für den (A)theismus? Mentis. pp. 31-60.
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark  
  45. Die Erkenntnistheorie der religiösen Vielfalt und des religiösen Dissenses.Katherine Dormandy - 2019 - In Klaus Viertbauer & Georg Gasser (eds.), Handbuch Analytische Religionsphilosophie. Akteure – Diskurse – Perspektiven. Stuttgart: Metzler. pp. 331-344.
    Wir leben in einem Zeitalter der religiösen Vielfalt. Es gibt viele unterschiedliche und scheinbar inkompatible religiöse und säkulare Glaubensformen, die einander mit einer erstaunlichen Intensität und Geschwindigkeit dank Globalisierung und sozialen Medien begegnen. Damit wächst die Einsicht, dass das eigene Überzeugungssystem nicht mehr einfach als gegeben und plausibel anzunehmen ist. Aufgrund dieser neuen Entwicklungen haben sich in den letzten Jahren intensive philosophische Diskussionen ergeben.
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark  
  46. Doktrin oder Diskurs? Fördern religiöse Verschiedenheiten die Erkenntnis der Wahrheit? [Doctrine or Discours: Does Religious Disagreement Promote Religious Knowledge?].Katherine Dormandy - 2017 - In Glaube und Politik in einer pluralen Welt.
    Wegen der Globalisierung und der Säkularisierung ist heute nicht mehr selbstverständlich davon auszugehen, dass die eigenen religiösen Überzeugungen richtig sind. Wie können Gläubige darauf reagieren? Eine nachvollziehbare Reaktion wäre zu versuchen, das eigene religiöse Glaubenssystem vor aller scheinbaren Konkurrenz zu schützen, indem man religiösen Dissens innerhalb oder außerhalb der Glaubensgemeinschaft unterbindet oder unterdrückt. Die Autorin argumentiert jedoch dafür, dass die Förderung von solchem Dissens die religiöse Erkenntnis eigentlich begünstigt und zwar selbst für diejenigen, die ihr eigenes religiöses Glaubenssystem möglichst bewahren (...)
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark  
  47. Social Ontology.Rebecca Mason & Katherine Ritchie - 2020 - In Ricki Bliss & James Miller (eds.), The Routledge Handbook of Metametaphysics. New York, NY: Routledge.
    Traditionally, social entities (i.e., social properties, facts, kinds, groups, institutions, and structures) have not fallen within the purview of mainstream metaphysics. In this chapter, we consider whether the exclusion of social entities from mainstream metaphysics is philosophically warranted or if it instead rests on historical accident or bias. We examine three ways one might attempt to justify excluding social metaphysics from the domain of metaphysical inquiry and argue that each fails. Thus, we conclude that social entities are not justifiably excluded (...)
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   6 citations  
  48.  99
    Epistemic phariseeism.Dormandy Katherine - 2023 - Religious Studies 59 (3):515-532.
    A prominent view in religious epistemology, which I call divine-help epistemology, says that people of faith are epistemically gifted by God, whereas non-believers are subject to the noetic effects of a fallen world. This view aims to show how religious beliefs for people of faith can be epistemically justified. But I argue that it makes such people prone to a cluster of epistemic vices that I call epistemic phariseeism. Divine-help epistemology is especially apt to promote these vices because its normativity (...)
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark  
  49. No “Easy” Answers to Ontological Category Questions.Vera Flocke & Katherine Ritchie - 2023 - Philosophical Perspectives 36 (1):78-94.
    Easy Ontologists, most notably Thomasson (2015), argue that ontological questions are shallow. They think that these questions can either be answered by using our ordinary conceptual competence—of course tables exist!—or are meaningless, or else should be answered through conceptual re-engineering. Ontology thus is “easy”, requiring no distinctively metaphysical investigation. This paper raises a two-stage objection to Easy Ontology. We first argue that questions concerning which entities exist are inextricably bound up with “ontological category questions”, which are questions concerning the identity (...)
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   1 citation  
  50. Tapping the wellsprings of action: Aristotle's birth of tragedy as a mimesis of poetic praxis.Katherine Kretler - 2018 - In Lillian Doherty & Bruce M. King (eds.), Thinking the Greeks: A Volume in Honour of James M. Redfield. Routledge. pp. 70-90.
    This essay offers an interpretation of Aristotle’s account of the birth of tragedy (Poetics 1448b18–1449a15) as a mimesis of poetic praxis. The workings of this passage emerge when read in connection with ring composition in Homeric speeches, and further unfold through a comparison with the Shield of Achilles and with an ode from Euripides’ Heracles. Aristotle appears to draw upon a traditional pattern enacting cyclical rebirth or revitalization. It is suggested that his puzzling insistence on “one complete action” in plot (...)
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark  
1 — 50 / 104