In 1949, the Department of Philosophy at the University of Manchester organized a symposium “Mind and Machine” with Michael Polanyi, the mathematicians Alan Turing and Max Newman, the neurologists Geoff rey Jeff erson and J. Z. Young, and others as participants. Th is event is known among Turing scholars, because it laid the seed for Turing’s famous paper on “Computing Machinery and Intelligence”, but it is scarcely documented. Here, the transcript of this event, together with Polanyi’s original statement and his (...) notes taken at a lecture by Jeff erson, are edited and commented for the fi rst time. Th e originals are in the Regenstein Library of the University of Chicago. Th e introduction highlights elements of the debate that included neurophysiology, mathematics, the mind-body-machine problem, and consciousness and shows that Turing’s approach, as documented here, does not lend itself to reductionism. (shrink)

Péter Pázmány taught philosophy at the Jesuit university of Graz, end of 16th century. This analyzes his interpretation of Aristotelian psychology.

Endurantists have recently faced a mereological puzzle in various forms. Here I argue that, instead of presenting a genuine worry, the puzzle actually reveals a common misunderstanding about the endurantist ontology. Furthermore, through this discussion of the alleged problem and the misunderstanding which motivates it, I reveal metaphysical commitments the endurantist has that may not be widely recognized. For instance, she is committed to interesting and perhaps controversial views about shape and location. I highlight these commitments and what they mean (...) for the endurantist. (shrink)

Here I defend the compatibility of presentism and time travel against a few objections. Keller and Nelson argue that, if presentism is at all plausible, presentism and time travel are as compatible as eternalism and time travel. But Miller and Sider are not convinced. I reply that for their concerns to have merit, Miller and Sider must assume presentists are committed to positions they need not be; I explain why presentists are not so committed and, in the process, defend Keller (...) and Nelson’s position that there is no roadblock to presentist time travel that does not also apply to eternalist time travel. (shrink)

Mereological challenges have recently been raised against the endurantist. For instance, Barker and Dowe (2003) have argued that eternalist endurantism entails (1) persisting objects are both 3D and 4D, and that (2) the lives of persisting objects last longer than they actually do. They also argue that presentist endurantism also entails, albeit in a tensed way, that (3) the lives of persisting objects last longer than they actually do. While they’ve further argued (2005) that the objections raised by McDaniel (2003) (...) and Beebee and Rush (2003) fail, here I show that such objections are tenable without requiring further significant metaphysical commitments; I argue that such endurantist defences are tenable, contra to prior analyses. (shrink)

I argue that, according to Just War Theory, those who work as administrative personnel in the private military industry can be permissibly harmed while at work by enemy combatants. That is, for better or worse, a Just War theorist should consider all those who work as administrative personnel in the private military industry either: (i) individuals who may be permissibly restrained with lethal force while at work, or (ii) individuals who may be harmed by permissible attacks against their workplace. In (...) doing so, I also provide some critical analysis of the relevant Just War concepts. (shrink)

In this chapter, we analyze the relationships between the Internet and its users in terms of situated cognition theory. We first argue that the Internet is a new kind of cognitive ecology, providing almost constant access to a vast amount of digital information that is increasingly more integrated into our cognitive routines. We then briefly introduce situated cognition theory and its species of embedded, embodied, extended, distributed and collective cognition. Having thus set the stage, we begin by taking an embedded (...) cognition view and analyze how the Internet aids certain cognitive tasks. After that, we conceptualize how the Internet enables new kinds of embodied interaction, extends certain aspects of our embodiment, and examine how wearable technologies that monitor physiological, behavioral and contextual states transform the embodied self. On the basis of the degree of cognitive integration between a user and Internet resource, we then look at how and when the Internet extends our cognitive processes. We end this chapter with a discussion of distributed and collective cognition as facilitated by the Internet. (shrink)

Alongside existing research into the social, political and economic impacts of the Web, there is a need to study the Web from a cognitive and epistemic perspective. This is particularly so as new and emerging technologies alter the nature of our interactive engagements with the Web, transforming the extent to which our thoughts and actions are shaped by the online environment. Situated and ecological approaches to cognition are relevant to understanding the cognitive significance of the Web because of the emphasis (...) they place on forces and factors that reside at the level of agent–world interactions. In particular, by adopting a situated or ecological approach to cognition, we are able to assess the significance of the Web from the perspective of research into embodied, extended, embedded, social and collective cognition. The results of this analysis help to reshape the interdisciplinary configuration of Web Science, expanding its theoretical and empirical remit to include the disciplines of both cognitive science and the philosophy of mind. (shrink)

Es ist wahr, die frühe Neuzeit hatte nur einen Descartes. Aber sie hatte hunderte schreibende Gelehrte. Auch solche, die Descartes und allen anderen zeigten, wer was wo schon geschrieben hatte. Solche Universal-Gelehrten dachten an den einzelnen Schreiber, sie halfen ihm absichtlich nicht, die Quellen zu verbergen, sondern sie zu finden. Keine Träumereien an französischen oder schwäbischen Kaminen, sondern effiziente Arbeit am Jesuitenkolleg waren Ziel und Inhalt z.B. der Bibliotheca selecta , in der Antonio Possevino SJ das Bildungsprogramm der Jesuiten mit (...) einem Literaturkanon und allgemeinen Erörterungen zur Bildung und Ausbildung versah. Dieses Handbuch stellt, entgegen gewissen Anzeichen, kein System der Wissenschaften dar, sondern konstruiert deren Gemeinsamkeit mittels der direkten Zwecksetzung zum Seelenheil der Menschen, woraus einerseits die Notwendigkeit einer Psychologie des Lernens, andererseits eine größere Unabhängigkeit der Wissenschaften von einander resultiert. Mit seiner Mischung von humanistischer Gelehrsamkeit, frommer Finalität, Kultur des Individuums und allgemeiner Nützlichkeit ist die Bibliotheca selecta ein Schnittpunkt von Humanismus und Schulweisheit. (shrink)

The ethical issues raised by cybersecurity practices and technologies are of critical importance. However, there is disagreement about what is the best ethical framework for understanding those issues. In this paper we seek to address this shortcoming through the introduction of a principlist ethical framework for cybersecurity that builds on existing work in adjacent fields of applied ethics, bioethics, and AI ethics. By redeploying the AI4People framework, we develop a domain-relevant specification of five ethical principles in cybersecurity: beneficence, non-maleficence, autonomy, (...) justice, and explicability. We then illustrate the advantages of this principlist framework by examining the ethical issues raised by four common cybersecurity contexts: penetration testing, distributed denial of service attacks (DDoS), ransomware, and system administration. These case analyses demonstrate the utility of this principlist framework as a basis for understanding cybersecurity ethics and for cultivating the ethical expertise and ethical sensitivity of cybersecurity professionals and other stakeholders. (shrink)

In this paper we explore the idea that Pentecostalism is best supported by conjoining it to a postmodern, narrative epistemology in which everything is a text requiring interpretation. On this view, truth doesn’t consist in a set of uninterpreted facts that make the claims of Christianity true; rather, as James K. A. Smith says, truth emerges when there is a “fit” or proportionality between the Christian story and one’s affective and emotional life. We argue that Pentecostals should reject this account (...) of truth, since it leads to either a self-refuting story-relativism or the equally problematic fallacy of story-ism: favoring one’s own story over others without legitimate reason. In either case, we contend, the gospel itself is placed at risk. (shrink)

In this paper, we attempt to show that if Plantinga’s free will defence succeeds, his O Felix Culpa theodicy fails. For if every creaturely essence suffers from transworld depravity, then given that Jesus has a creaturely essence (as we attempt to show), it follows that Incarnation and Atonement worlds cannot be actualized by God, in which case we have anything but a felix culpa.

Forms of Artificial Intelligence (AI) are already being deployed into clinical settings and research into its future healthcare uses is accelerating. Despite this trajectory, more research is needed regarding the impacts on patients of increasing AI decision making. In particular, the impersonal nature of AI means that its deployment in highly sensitive contexts-of-use, such as in healthcare, raises issues associated with patients’ perceptions of (un) dignified treatment. We explore this issue through an experimental vignette study comparing individuals’ perceptions of being (...) treated in a dignified and respectful way in various healthcare decision contexts. Participants were subject to a 2 (human or AI decision maker) x 2 (positive or negative decision outcome) x 2 (diagnostic or resource allocation healthcare scenario) factorial design. We found evidence of a “human bias” (i.e., a preference for human over AI decision makers) and an “outcome bias” (i.e., a preference for positive over negative outcomes). However, we found that for perceptions of respectful and dignified interpersonal treatment, it matters more who makes the decisions in diagnostic cases and it matters more what the outcomes are for resource allocation cases. We also found that humans were consistently viewed as appropriate decision makers and AI was viewed as dehumanizing, and that participants perceived they were treated better when subject to diagnostic as opposed to resource allocation decisions. Thematic coding of open-ended text responses supported these results. We also outline the theoretical and practical implications of these findings. (shrink)

In this paper we respond to three objections raised by Joshua Harris to our article, “Against a Postmodern Pentecostal Epistemology,” in which we express misgivings about the conjunction of Pentecostalism with James K. A. Smith’s postmodern, story-based epistemolo- gy. According to Harris, our critique: 1) problematically assumes a correspondence theory of truth, 2) invalidly concludes that “Derrida’s Axiom” conflicts with “Peter’s Axiom,” and 3) fails to consider an alternative account of the universality of Christian truth claims. We argue that Harris’s (...) objections either demonstrate a deficient interpretation of the relevant biblical pas- sages or are not directed at us at all. (shrink)

In this chapter, we attempt to show that J.P. Moreland's understanding of apologetics is beautifully positioned to counter resistance to a rationally defensible Christianity—resistance arising from the mistaken idea that any rational defense will fail to support or even undermine relationship. We look first at Paul Moser's complaint that since rational apologetics doesn’t prove the God of Christianity, it falls short of delivering what matters most—a personal agent worthy of worship and relationship. We then consider John Wilkinson's charge that (...) the use of reason and argument in evangelistic contexts is relationally futile. Since people aren’t looking for arguments, and logic is an arbitrary human invention, we should present Christianity to others as an irrational faith story. (shrink)

According to proponents of the extended mind, bio-external resources, such as a notebook or a smartphone, are candidate parts of the cognitive and mental machinery that realises cognitive states and processes. The present chapter discusses three areas of ethical concern associated with the extended mind, namely mental privacy, mental manipulation, and agency. We also examine the ethics of the extended mind from the standpoint of three general normative frameworks, namely, consequentialism, deontology, and virtue ethics.

C. Stephen Layman contends that an argument supporting theism over naturalism can be constructed based on three defensible, non–question-begging premises about the moral order. Previous critics of Layman’s argument have challenged the truth of these premises. We stipulate them arguendo but go on to show that there is a deeper problem: a fourth premise introduced to complete the argument—the “completion premise,” as we call it—is true only if we assume that God exists or we concede that there is no afterlife. (...) We close with suggestions for how Layman’s argument must be strengthened to meet with dialectical success. (shrink)

Using artificial intelligence (AI) to make decisions in human resource management (HRM) raises questions of how fair employees perceive these decisions to be and whether they experience respectful treatment (i.e., interactional justice). In this experimental survey study with open-ended qualitative questions, we examine decision making in six HRM functions and manipulate the decision maker (AI or human) and decision valence (positive or negative) to determine their impact on individuals’ experiences of interactional justice, trust, dehumanization, and perceptions of decision-maker role appropriate- (...) ness. In terms of decision makers, the use of human decision makers over AIs generally resulted in better perceptions of respectful treatment. In terms of decision valence, people experiencing positive over negative decisions generally resulted in better perceptions of respectful treatment. In instances where these cases conflict, on some indicators people preferred positive AI decisions over negative human decisions. Qualitative responses show how people identify justice concerns with both AI and human decision making. We outline implications for theory, practice, and future research. (shrink)

The argument and discussion in this paper begins from the premise that Hume was an atheist who denied the religious or theist hypothesis. However, even if it is agreed that that Hume was an atheist this does not tell us where he stood on the question concerning the value of religion. Some atheists, such as Spinoza, have argued that society needs to maintain and preserve a form of “true religion”, which is required for the support of our ethical life. Others, (...) such as D’Holbach have argued that religion is not only false it is pernicious and it should be eradicated. This paper argues that Hume rejected both these proposals, on the ground that they rest, in different ways, on excessively optimistic assumptions. The sensible, practical form of atheism that Hume defends has a more modest and realistic aim, which is simply to restrict and limit the most pernicious forms of religion. Understood this way, Hume’s practical atheism is very different from the forms of “old” atheism associated with Spinoza and D’Holbach, as well as from the “new atheism” of thinkers such as Dawkins and Dennett. -/- Reprinted in Paul Russell, "Recasting Hume and Early Modern Philosophy: Selected Essays" (New York: Oxford University Press, 2021): 340-383. (shrink)

to appear in Lambert, E. and J. Schwenkler (eds.) Transformative Experience (OUP) -/- L. A. Paul (2014, 2015) argues that the possibility of epistemically transformative experiences poses serious and novel problems for the orthodox theory of rational choice, namely, expected utility theory — I call her argument the Utility Ignorance Objection. In a pair of earlier papers, I responded to Paul’s challenge (Pettigrew 2015, 2016), and a number of other philosophers have responded in similar ways (Dougherty, et al. (...) 2015, Harman 2015) — I call our argument the Fine-Graining Response. Paul has her own reply to this response, which we might call the Authenticity Reply. But Sarah Moss has recently offered an alternative reply to the Fine-Graining Response on Paul’s behalf (Moss 2017) — we’ll call it the No Knowledge Reply. This appeals to the knowledge norm of action, together with Moss’ novel and intriguing account of probabilistic knowledge. In this paper, I consider Moss’ reply and argue that it fails. I argue first that it fails as a reply made on Paul’s behalf, since it forces us to abandon many of the features of Paul’s challenge that make it distinctive and with which Paul herself is particularly concerned. Then I argue that it fails as a reply independent of its fidelity to Paul’s intentions. (shrink)

This paper is part of a book symposium for L. A. Paul (2014) Transformative Experience (OUP).

Many including Judith Jarvis Thomson, Philippa Foot, Peter Geach, Richard Kraut, and Paul Ziff have argued for good simpliciter skepticism. According to good simpliciter skepticism, we should hold that there is no concept of being good simpliciter or that there is no property of being good simpliciter. I first show that prima facie we should not accept either form of good simpliciter skepticism. I then show that all of the arguments that good simpliciter skeptics have proposed for their (...) view fail to show that we have good reason to accept good simpliciter skepticism. So, I show that we do not have good reason to accept good simpliciter skepticism. (shrink)

In a recent publication in this journal, Asle Kiran and Peter-Paul Verbeek (hereafter K&V) argue that extension theory and the notion of trust it implies are flawed. In this commentary, I defend extension theory against their critique. I first briefly introduce extension theory, then reconstruct K&V’s five arguments against extension theory and demonstrate that four of their five arguments are misplaced.

In this chapter, Logan Paul Gage examines the only real attempt to disprove God’s existence by a New Atheist: Richard Dawkins’s “Ultimate 747 Gambit.” Central to Dawkins’s argument is the claim that God is more complex than what he is invoked to explain. Gage evaluates this claim using the main extant notions of simplicity in the literature. Gage concludes that on no reading does this claim survive scrutiny. Along the way, Dawkins claims that there are no good positive (...) arguments for God’s existence. Gage attempts to show that Dawkins’s argument depends upon distinctively philosophical assumptions that do not appear to withstand scrutiny. (shrink)

When is it legitimate for a government to ‘nudge’ its citizens, in the sense described by Thaler and Sunstein (2008)? In their original work on the topic, Thaler and Sunstein developed the _‘as judged by themselves’ (or AJBT) test_ to answer this question (Thaler and Sunstein 2008, p. 5). In a recent paper, Paul and Sunstein (2019) raised a concern about this test: it often seems to give the wrong answer in cases in which we are nudged to make (...) a decision that leads to what Paul calls a _personally transformative experience_, that is, one that results in our values changing (Paul 2014). In those cases, the nudgee will judge the nudge to be legitimate after it has taken place, but only because their values have changed as a result of the nudge. In this paper, I take up the challenge of finding an alternative test. I draw on my _aggregate utility account_ of how to choose in the face of what Ullmann-Margalit (2006) calls _big decisions_, that is, decisions that lead to these personally transformative experiences (Pettigrew 2019, Chapters 6 and 7). (shrink)

In a short exchange published in 2000, Richard Rorty and Robert Brandom differed over the status of “facts” in a world containing no speakers and, hence, no speech acts. While Brandom wanted to retain the meaningfulness of talk of “facts” or “truths” about things—in this case truths about photons —in a world in which there could be no claimings about such things, Rorty denied the existence of any such “worldly items” as “facts.” In this essay the difference between Rorty (...) and Brandom on this issue is used to explore their differing attitudes to modality. Brandom appeals to a Kantian approach of modal realism to support counterfactual claims. However, I argue that when his approach to modality is examined in the context of current debates over possible world semantics, his own “incompatibilist” semantics itself seems incompatible with a Kantian approach to modality. In turn, I suggest that this difference between Brandom and Rorty in their attitudes to modality reveals a difference in their respective attitudes to pragmatism’s relation to philosophy in general. (shrink)

In this article, we examine in detail the New Atheists' most serious argument for the conclusion that God does not exist, namely, Richard Dawkins's Ultimate 747 Gambit. Dawkins relies upon a strong explanatory principle involving simplicity. We systematically inspect the various kinds of simplicity that Dawkins may invoke. Finding his crucial premises false on any common conception of simplicity, we conclude that Dawkins has not given good reason to think God does not exist.

In the 1920s, David Hilbert proposed a research program with the aim of providing mathematics with a secure foundation. This was to be accomplished by first formalizing logic and mathematics in their entirety, and then showing---using only so-called finitistic principles---that these formalizations are free of contradictions. ;In the area of logic, the Hilbert school accomplished major advances both in introducing new systems of logic, and in developing central metalogical notions, such as completeness and decidability. The analysis of unpublished material presented (...) in Chapter 2 shows that a completeness proof for propositional logic was found by Hilbert and his assistant Paul Bernays already in 1917--18, and that Bernays's contribution was much greater than is commonly acknowledged. Aside from logic, the main technical contribution of Hilbert's Program are the development of formal mathematical theories and proof-theoretical investigations thereof, in particular, consistency proofs. In this respect Wilhelm Ackermann's 1924 dissertation is a milestone both in the development of the Program and in proof theory in general. Ackermann gives a consistency proof for a second-order version of primitive recursive arithmetic which, surprisingly, explicitly uses a finitistic version of transfinite induction up to www . He also gave a faulty consistency proof for a system of second-order arithmetic based on Hilbert's &egr;-substitution method. Detailed analyses of both proofs in Chapter 3 shed light on the development of finitism and proof theory in the 1920s as practiced in Hilbert's school. ;In a series of papers, Charles Parsons has attempted to map out a notion of mathematical intuition which he also brings to bear on Hilbert's finitism. According to him, mathematical intuition fails to be able to underwrite the kind of intuitive knowledge Hilbert thought was attainable by the finitist. It is argued in Chapter 4 that the extent of finitistic knowledge which intuition can provide is broader than Parsons supposes. According to another influential analysis of finitism due to W. W. Tait, finitist reasoning coincides with primitive recursive reasoning. The acceptance of non-primitive recursive methods in Ackermann's dissertation presented in Chapter 3, together with additional textual evidence presented in Chapter 4, shows that this identification is untenable as far as Hilbert's conception of finitism is concerned. Tait's conception, however, differs from Hilbert's in important respects, yet it is also open to criticisms leading to the conclusion that finitism encompasses more than just primitive recursive reasoning. (shrink)

In this paper I provide a comparative analysis of Augustine's and Paul Tillich's doctrines of Original Sin. I argue that Augustine's doctrine is deeply flawed in ways corrected for by Tillich.

In 'Necessity, Cause and Blame' (London: Duckworth, 1980) Richard Sorabji attempts to develop a notion of moral responsibility which does not get caught on either horn of a well known dilemma. One horn is the argument that if an action was caused then it must have been necessary and therefore could not be one for which the agent is responsible. The other horn is the argument that if the action was not caused then it is inexplicable and random and (...) therefore not something which the agent can be responsible for. Sorabji denies that what is caused is always necessitated. Causes are primarily explanatory rather than necessitating. This established, Sorabji hopes to show that action open to moral scrutiny may be caused without being necessitated and the dilemma collapses. I will argue that this strategy runs into serious difficulties. (shrink)

Moral violation often takes the form of material harm, which might lead us to suppose that it consists essentially in the harm done. And yet we might suffer the same harm through nature or accident without feeling morally offended. If a hurricane destroys my property, I suffer harm but no offense. If another person deliberately damages my property, I am offended. But why? Wherein lies the difference? My essay employs Arthur Schopenhauer’s ethic of egoism and Paul Tillich’s theology of (...) love to explore the ontological basis of moral offense. I argue that moral offense has its roots, not in a concern for material well-being, but in a fundamental drive for Unity, unity with others and with our own ontological ground. This drive is both conditioned by, and frustrated by, our ontological separateness as individual beings. (shrink)

Primarily a response to Paul Horwich's "Composition of Meanings", the paper attempts to refute his claim that compositionality—roughly, the idea that the meaning of a sentence is determined by the meanings of its parts and how they are there combined—imposes no substantial constraints on semantic theory or on our conception of the meanings of words or sentences. Show Abstract.

Error theories about morality often take as their starting point the supposed queerness of morality, and those resisting these arguments often try to argue by analogy that morality is no more queer than other unproblematic subject matters. Here, error theory (as exemplified primarily by the work of Richard Joyce) is resisted first by arguing that it assumes a common, modern, and peculiarly social conception of morality. Then error theorists point out that the social nature of morality requires one to (...) act against one's self-interest while insisting on the categorical, inescapable, or overriding status of moral considerations: they argue that morality requires magic, then (rightly) claim that there is no such thing as magic. An alternate eudaimonist conception of morality is introduced which itself has an older provenance than the social point of view, dating to the ancient Greeks. Eudaimonism answers to the normative requirements of morality, yet does not require magic. Thus, the initial motivation for error theory is removed. (shrink)

An assessment of the similarities and differences between space and time has played an important part in the development of the views of a number of philosophers about time. Examples of statements about time are compared with allegedly corresponding statements about space to give us analogies and disanalogies according to whether the statements have the same or different truth values. But what are the general principles on which such comparisons are based? In particular, according to what criteria are corresponding sentences (...) paired off? Are there any such general criteria? And if so, do they already presuppose a substantial commitment to one or other of the points of view at issue where analogies and disanalogies are discussed? This paper is concerned with two specific proposals for criteria of correspondence, one due to Richard Gale (1968, 1969) and James Garson (1969), which is rejected, and the other tentatively advanced in its place. (shrink)

contents -/- ONT vol 1 i. short review: Beyond the Black Rainbow ii. as you die, hold one thought iii. short review: LA JETÉE -/- ONT vol 2 i. maya means ii. short review: SANS SOLEIL iii. vocab iv. eros has an underside v. short review: In the Mood for Love -/- ONT vol 3 i. weed weakens / compels me ii. an Ender's Game after-party iii. playroom is a realm of the dead iv. a precise german History v. short (...) review: STATUES ALSO DIE vi. Kenneth Clark, curator for Fascism vii. a protest poem, in industry lit viii. Lawrence and the English Romance -/- ONT vol 4 i. short review: The Eyes of Tammy Faye ii. vR is efficient R iii. all thru Asia, robes for monks iv. same of God, and of the one God sent v. i thought of the Messiah / muse would be vi. conscience is strong vii. a monk's exalted end -/- ONT vol 5 -/- i. for Shakespeare's Richard the Third ii. the truth is i pass over so many words iii. the boori nazar / nadhar iv. i've awe for jihaad v. short review: Hail, Caesar! vi. a minute of Nothing, gone from YouTube vii. we were rivalrous friends, again viii. my bardo pdf ix. within i'm a weak old mandarin -/- ONT vol 6 i. short review: The Intern ii. the confusion of Chinatown iii. we'll remember water, in Theology iv. Respironics versus ResMed v. i'd bet my life for what vi. the Mad Max deity vii. they'd kill my rat, not heal him -/- ONT vol 7 i. Austen would eroticize all life ii. Merchant/Ivory, a name oddly right iii. Ellie Arroway / Agent Starling iv. abattoir / l’abattoir / laboratoire v. von Neumann's brain an anomaly vi. was terrified of death, delighted in the a-bomb vii. the Greatest Brain is variously named -/- ONT vol 8 i. the day they shot the sacrifice ii. Yay or Nay, on Animal Testing iii. an ought is an is / an is is an ought iv. Behaviorism is for zombies v. a finding from the neuro-lab, on empathy vi. i’ve never had discernible abs vii. a cowardice i'm assenting to perpetually -/- ONT vol 9 i. Day of the Locust / Triffids ii. we're wide on a Paramount soundstage iii. HOLLYWOOD, an ecologic history iv. yet one more site of end-time art v. he's "a bookworm with bulging lobes" vi. apartment is my state of being apart vii. enlightenment means a weight's release -/- ONT lates and xtras i. re Gödel's ontological argument ii. deep in pi's numeric noise iii. from Nothing, something iv. endless in the wrong direction, tragic v. they give you all Eternity to answer vi. what of God's mercy? vii. informed consent and prayer viii. i won't live on. a deed i've done may ix. my selective memory x. Janus means: in close-up foam, two faces xi. a liveable world is a readable world xii. what Supervenes from this? xiii. at each extreme our naming is anachronism xiv. Cat is a collapsing of the wave-function xv. diminishing returns in the history of Experiment xvi. all those undershared Nobels xvii. ice preserves the Cold from heat xviii. a desert spreads xix. Pinker's wit, on jokes xx. Rome surrounds St. Paul / Paul is now the center xxi. each is a gathering Ministry xxii. white boy shot execution-style xxiii. the McDonald's Statement of Claim xxiv. first & last: Don Quixote / Ulysses xxv. The Summer of Rave xxvi. this electro is intrinsically anonymous xxvii. all thru Asia, Drake-Rihanna xxviii. WHO IS BETTER: PLATON OR KANT? (shrink)

Review of The Nietzschean Self: Moral Psychology, Agency, and the Unconscious by Paul Katsafanas.

Pragmatism’s heartening recent revival (spearheaded by Richard Rorty’s bold intervention into analytic philosophy Philosophy and the Mirror of Nature) has coalesced into a distinctive philosophical movement frequently referred to as ‘neopragmatism’. This movement interprets the very meaning of pragmatism as rejection of metaphysical commitments: our words do not primarily serve to represent non-linguistic entities, but are tools to achieve a range of human purposes. A particularly thorough and consistent version of this position is Huw Price’s global expressivism. We here (...) critically appraise Price’s understanding of a commitment to pragmatism as a rejection of metaphysics, and argue that such rejection is not as easy or desirable as Price claims. First we argue that Price’s global expressivism itself draws on significant metaphysical assumptions (a ‘word-world’ dualism, and a nominalism concerning the meaning of general terms). Then we seek to resolve neopragmatist anxieties about metaphysics by arguing that metaphysics is indispensable for pragmatist philosophizing insofar as it seeks ways for human beings to realise themselves through practices of understanding reality and their place in it. If, as we argue, metaphysics consists in a maximally general inquiry into the nature and structure of reality, to try to block it seems a puzzling exercise in epistemic self-harm. (shrink)

Хорвич дает прекрасный анализ Витгенштейна (W) и является ведущим ученым W, но, на мойвзгляд, все они не дотягивают до полной оценки, как я подробно объяснить в этом обзоре и многие другие. Если одно не понимает W (и предпочтительно Searle также) после этого я не вижу как одно смогло иметь больше чем поверхностное вникание общего соображения и мысли более высокого заказа и таким образом всего сложного поведения (психология, социология, антропология, история, словесность, общество). В двух словах, W продемонстрировал, что, когда вы показали, (...) как предложение используется в контексте интересов, нет ничего более сказать. Я начну с нескольких заметных цитат, а затем дать то, что я думаю, являются минимальными соображениями, необходимыми для понимания Витгенштейна, философии и человеческого поведения. Во-первых, можно отметить, что положить "мета" перед любым словом должно быть подозреваемым. W заметил, например, что метаматематика математика, как и любой другой. Представление о том, что мы можем выйти за рамки философии (т.е. описательной психологии мысли высшего порядка), само по себе является глубокой путаницей. Еще одно раздражение здесь (и на протяжении академических письменной форме в течение последних 4 десятилетий) является постоянным обратным лингвистического сексизма "ее" и "ее" и "она" или "он / она" и т.д., где "они" и "свои" и "их" будет делать красиво. Аналогичнымобразом, использование французского слова "репертуар", где английский "репертуар" будет делать довольно хорошо. Основным недостатком является полный отказ (хотя и очень часто), чтобы использовать то, что я вижу, как чрезвычайно мощный и интуитивно понятный вид двух систем HOT и Карл рамки, которые я изложил выше. Это особенно остро в главе о значении p111 et seq. (особенно в сносках 2-7), где мы плаваем в очень мутной воде без рамки автоматизированной истинной только S1, пропозиционный диспозиционный S2, COS и т.д. Можно также получить лучшее представление о внутреннем и внешнем, читая, например, Джонстон или Бадд (см. мои отзывы). Хорвич однако делает много резких комментариев. Мне особенно понравилось его резюме импорта W анти-теоретической позиции на p65. Он должен уделять больше внимания "На определенности", в последнее время предметом много усилий Даниэле Мойал-Шаррок, Coliva и другие и кратко в моих последних статьях. Хорвич является первым курсом, и его работа стоит усилий. Хочется надеяться, что он (и все) изучат Сирла и некоторые современные психологии, а также Хатто, Рид, Хатчинсон, Стерн, Мойал-Шаррок, Прогулка, Хакер и Бейкер и т.д., чтобы достичь широкого современного взгляда на поведение. Большинство их работ на academia dot edu и philpapers dot org, но для PMS Хакер см. http colon //info dot sjc dot ox dot ac dot uk/scr/hacker/DownloadPapers dot html dot Он дает один из самых красивых резюме, где понимание Витгенштейна оставляет нам, что я когда-либо видел. "Не должно быть никаких попыток объяснить нашу лингвистическую/концептуальную деятельность (PI 126), как в уменьшении арифметики Фрейда к логике; не попытка дать ему эпистемологические основы (PI 124), как в смысле основанных счетов априори знаний; не попытка охарактеризовать идеализированные формы его (PI 130) как в логике чувства; никаких попыток реформировать его (PI 124, 132), как в теории ошибок Маки или интуиции Дамметт; никаких попыток упорядочить его (PI 133), как в рассказе Квина о существовании; не попытка сделать его более последовательным (PI 132), как в ответ Тарски на парадоксы лжецов; и не попытка сделать его более полным (PI 133), как в урегулировании вопросов личной идентичности для странных гипотетических сценариев "телепортации". Наконец, позвольте мне предположить, что с точки зрения я призвал здесь, W находится в центре современной философии и психологии и не является неясным, трудным или неуместным, но мерцающий, глубокий и кристально чистый и что пропустить его, чтобы пропустить один из величайших интеллектуальных приключений возможно. Те, кто желает всеобъемлющего до современных рамок для человеческого поведения из современных двух systEms зрения могут проконсультироваться с моей книгой"Логическая структура философии, психологии, Минd иязык в Людвиг Витгенштейн и Джон Сирл" второй ред (2019). Те, кто заинтересован в более моих сочинений могут увидеть "Говоря обезьян - Философия, психология, наука, религия и политика на обреченной планете - Статьи и обзоры 2006-2019 3-й ed (2019) и suicidal утопических заблуждений в 21-мst веке 4-й ed (2019) th и другие. (shrink)

Horwich는 Wittgenstein (W)의 미세한 분석을 제공하고 선도적 인 W 학자이지만, 내관점에서, 그들은 모두 내가이 리뷰와 많은 다른 사람의 길이에 설명으로, 전체 감사에 미치지. 하나는 W를 이해하지 않는 경우 (그리고 바람직하게는 Searle도) 나는 사람이 철학과 높은 질서 생각의 피상적 인 이해이상을 가질 수있는 방법을 볼 수 없습니다 따라서 모든 복잡한 행동 (심리학, 사회학, 인류학, 역사, 문학, 사회). 간단히 말해서 W는 문장이 관심의 맥락에서 어떻게 사용되는지 보여 주었을 때 더 이상 말할 것이 없다는 것을 보여주었습니다. 나는 몇 가지 주목할만한 따옴표로 시작하고 내가 (...) Wittgenstein, 철학과 인간의 행동을 이해하는 데 필요한 최소한의 고려 사항이라고 생각하는 것을 줄 것이다. 먼저 어떤 단어 앞에 "메타"를 두는 것은 의심되어야한다는 것을 주의할 수 있습니다. W는 예를 들어, 메타 수학은 다른 것과 같은 수학이라고 말했습니다. 우리가 외부 철학 (즉, 높은 질서 생각의 설명 심리학)을 밟을 수 있다는 개념은 그 자체로 심오한 혼란입니다. 여기에 또 다른 자극 (그리고 지난 4 년 동안 학술 쓰기를 통해) "그녀"와 "그녀"와 "그녀"또는 "그 / 그녀"등의 지속적인 역 언어 적 성차별이다, 여기서 "그들"과 "그들"과 "그들"잘 할 것입니다. 마찬가지로,, 영어 '레퍼토리'가 아주 잘 할 프랑스어 단어 '레퍼토리'의 사용. 주요 결핍은 내가 위에서 설명 한 HOT와 Searle의 프레임 워크의 매우 강력하고 직관적 인 두 시스템보기로 보는 것을 사용하는 완전한 실패 (매우 일반적임에도 불구하고)입니다. 이것은 우리가 자동화 된 진정한 만 S1, 제안 처분 S2, COS 등의 프레임 워크없이 매우 진흙 투성이의 물에서 수영 p111 et seq. (특히 각주 2-7)에 대한 장에서 특히 신랄합니다. 하나는 또한 예를 들어, 존스턴 이나 버드 (내 리뷰 참조)를 읽고 내부와 외부의 더 나은 보기를 얻을 수 있습니다. 그러나 호위치는 많은 절개 코멘트를합니다. 나는 특히 p65에 W의 반 이론적 입장의 수입에 대한 그의 요약을 좋아했다. 그는 '확실성에'에 더 중점을 줄 필요가, 최근 다니엘레 모얄 - 샤록, 콜리바 와 다른 사람에 의해 많은 노력의 주제와 내 최근 기사에서 요약. Horwich는 첫 번째 속도이며 그의 작품은 노력할 만한 가치가 있습니다. 하나는 그 (그리고 모든 사람)가 행동의 넓은 현대보기를 달성하기 위해 허트, 읽기, 허친슨, 스턴, 모얄 샤록, 산책, 해커와 베이커 등뿐만 아니라 Searle과 일부 현대 심리학을 공부할 수 있기를 바랍니다. 그들의 논문의 대부분은 academia dot edu philpapers dot org, 하지만 PMS 해커에 대 한 http dot //info dot sjc dot ox dot ac dot uk/scr/hacker/DownloadPapers dot html 참조. 그는 비트겐슈타인에 대한 이해가 내가 본 것을 우리에게 떠난 곳의 가장 아름다운 요약 중 하나를 제공합니다. (shrink)

霍维奇对维特根斯坦(W)进行了精妙的分析,是一位顶尖的W学者,但在我看来,他们都没有达到完全的欣赏,正如我在评论和许多其他评论中详细解释的那样。如果一个人不理解W(最好也是西尔),那么我看不出一个人怎 么会对哲学和更高层次的思想,从而对所有复杂的行为(心理学,社会学,人类学,历史,文学,社会)。简而言之,W 演示了当您演示了句子在感兴趣的上下文中的使用方式时,就没有什么可说的了。我将从几个值得注意的引言开始,然后给出我认为是理解维特根斯坦、哲学和人类行为所需的最低考虑因素。 首先,人们可能会注意到,把"元"放在任何单词前面都应该是值得怀疑的。例如,元数学和任何其他数学一样。我们可以走出哲学的概念(即更高层次思维的描述性心理学)本身就是一种深刻的困惑。这 里的另一个刺激(以及过去40年的学术写作)是"她"和"她"和"她"或"他/她"等不断的反向语言性别歧视,其中" 他们"和"他们"和"他们"会很好。同样,使用法语单词""汇编",其中英语的"汇编"将做得很好。主要的 不足是完全失败(虽然很常见),使用我所看到的浩浩特和西尔框架的非常强大和直观的两个系统视图,我已经概述了上面。这在关于含义 p111 及其 seq 的章节(特别是在脚注 2-7 中)中尤为尖锐,在非常泥泞的水中游泳,没有自动真正的 S1、命题处置 S2、COS 等框架。通过阅读约翰斯顿或巴德(见我的评论),还可以更好地了解内部和外部。然而,霍维奇却发表了许多尖锐的评论。我特别喜欢他关于W的反理论立场在第65页导入的总结。他需要更加强调"关于确定性& quot;,最近丹尼尔·莫亚尔-沙罗克、科利瓦等人努力的主题,并在我最近的文章中进行了总结。 霍维奇是一流的,他的工作非常值得付出努力。人们希望他(和每个人都)将学习西尔和一些现代心理学以及胡托,里德,哈钦森,斯特恩,莫亚尔-沙罗克,斯特罗,黑客和贝克等,以获得广泛的现代行为观。他们的大部分论 文都academia dot edu和philpapers dot org,但对于PMS黑客看http colon //info.sjc dortox dot ac dot uk/scr/hacker/DownloadPapers dot html。 他给出了一个最美丽的总结,其中对维特根斯坦的理解留给我们,我见过。 "绝不能像弗雷格将算术缩减为逻辑那样,试图解释我们的语言/概念活动 (PI 126);没有试图给它认识论基础(PI 124),如在基于意义的先验知识的帐户;没有试图将理想化的形式(PI 130)描述为感官逻辑;没有试图改革它(PI 124,132),如麦基的错误理论或杜梅特的直觉;没有试图精简它(PI 133),如在奎因的存在帐户;没有试图使它更一致(PI 132),如塔尔斯基对说谎悖论的反应;并且没有试图使它更完整 (PI 133), 在解决奇怪的假想"传送"场景的个人身份问题。 最后,让我建议,以我在这里鼓励的观点,W是当代哲学和心理学的中心,不是晦涩,困难或不相干,但闪烁,深刻和水晶般清晰,想念他是错过一个最伟大的智力冒险可能。 那些希望从现代两个系统的观点来看为人类行为建立一个全面的最新框架的人,可以查阅我的书《路德维希的哲学、心理学、Mind 和语言的逻辑结构》维特根斯坦和约翰·西尔的《第二部》(2019年)。那些对我更多的作品感兴趣的人可能会看到《会说话的猴子——一个末日星球上的哲学、心理学、科学、宗教和政治——文章和评论2006-201 9年第3次(2019 年)和自杀乌托邦幻想21篇世纪4日 (2019).

Horwichはウィトゲンシュタイン(W)の細かい分析を行い、Wの第一人者ですが、私の見解では、このレビューや他の多くの人が長々と説明しているように、それらはすべて完全な感謝に満ち不足しています。W( そして好ましくはサールも)を理解していないならば、私は哲学と高次思考、したがってすべての複雑な行動(心理学、社会学、人類学、歴史、文学、社会)の表面的な理解以上のものを持つことができる方法を見ません。 一言で言えば、Wは、あなたが興味のある文脈で文がどのように使用されているかを示したとき、これ以上言うことは何もあることを実証しました。私はいくつかの注目すべき引用から始め、その後、私はウィトゲンシュタ イン、哲学と人間の行動を理解するために必要な最小限の考慮事項であると思うものを与えます。 まず、単語の前に「meta」を置くことは疑わしいはずです。Wは、例えば、メタ数学は他の数学と同様に、言った。哲学の外に出ることができるという考え(すなわち、高次思考の記述心理学)は、それ自体が深い混乱 です。ここでのもう一つのいらだちは、「彼女」と「彼女」と「彼女」や「彼女/彼女」などの絶え間ない逆言語的性差別です。同様に、英語の「レパートリー」がうまくいくフランス語の「レパートリー」の使用もうまく いくでしょう。大きな欠陥は、私が上記で概説したHOTとサールのフレームワークの非常に強力で直感的な2つのシステムビューとして私が見ているものを採用する完全な失敗(非常に一般的ですが)です。これは、特に 意味p111 et seq.(特に脚注2-7)に関する章では、自動化された真のS1、命題の処分S2、COSなどの枠組みなしで非常に泥だらけの水の中で泳ぎます。ジョンストンやバッド(私のレビューを参照)などを読むことで、内 側と外側のより良いビューを得ることもできます。しかし、ホーウィッチは多くの切迫したコメントをします。私は特にp65に対するWの反理論的スタンスの輸入の彼の要約が好きでした。彼は最近、ダニエレ・モヤル・ シャーロック、コリバなどによる多くの努力の主題である「確実性について」にもっと重点を置く必要があり、私の最近の記事で要約されています。 ホーウィッチは一流であり、彼の仕事は努力の価値があります。彼(そして誰もが)サールといくつかの現代心理学だけでなく、ハット、リード、ハッチンソン、スターン、モヤアル・シャーロック、ストロール、ハッカー 、ベイカーなどを研究し、幅広い現代的な行動観を達成することを望んでいます。彼らの論文のほとんどはacademia dot eduとphilpapers dot orgにありますが、PMSハッカーにとってはhttp: slash slash info dot sjc dot ox dot ac dot uk slash scr slash hacker slash DownloadPapers dot htmlを参照してください。 彼はウィトゲンシュタインの理解が私が今まで見た私たちを残す場所の最も美しい要約の一つを与えます。 「フレージの論理への算術の削減のように、言語的/概念的な活動(PI 126)を説明する試みがあってはならない。それを認識論的基盤(PI 124)に与える試みはありません。.意味論理のように理想化された形式(PI 130)を特徴付けようとする試みはありません。マッキーの誤り理論やダメットの直感のように、それを改革する試み(PI 124、132)はありません。クインの存在のアカウントのようにそれを合理化する試みはありません (PI 133)。嘘つきのパラドックスに対するタルスキーの反応のように、それをより一貫させる試み(PI 132)を作る試みはありません。奇妙な仮説的な「テレポーテーション」シナリオのための個人的なアイデンティティの質問の解決のように、それをより完全に(PI 133)にしようとする試みはありません。 最後に、私がここで奨励した視点で、Wは現代哲学と心理学の中心にあり、あいまいで困難でも無関係でもありませんが、シンチレーション、深遠でクリスタルクリアであり、彼を見逃すのは可能な限り最大の知的冒険の1 つを逃すということです。 現代の2つのシス・エムスの見解から人間の行動のための包括的な最新の枠組みを望む人は、私の著書「ルートヴィヒ・ヴィトゲンシュタインとジョン・サールの第2回(2019)における哲学、心理学、ミンと言語の論 理的構造」を参照することができます。私の著作の多くにご興味がある人は、運命の惑星における「話す猿--哲学、心理学、科学、宗教、政治―記事とレビュー2006-2019 第3回(2019)」と21世紀4日(2019年)の自殺ユートピア妄想st Century 4th ed (2019)などを見ることができます。 .

Horwich gibt eine feine Analyse von Wittgenstein (W) und ist ein führender W-Stipendiat, aber meinerMeinung nach sind sie alle hinter einer vollen Wertschätzung zurück, wie ich in dieser Rezension und vielen anderen ausführlich erkläre. Wenn man W (und vorzugsweise auch Searle) nicht versteht, dann sehe ich nicht, wie man mehr als ein oberflächliches Verständnis von Philosophie und höherem Denken und damit von allem komplexen Verhalten (Psychologie, Soziologie, Anthropologie, Geschichte, Literatur, Gesellschaft) haben könnte. Kurz gesagt, W hat gezeigt, dass, wenn Sie (...) gezeigt haben, wie ein Satz im Zusammenhang mit Interesse verwendet wird, es nichts mehr zu sagen gibt. Ich beginne mit ein paar bemerkenswerten Zitaten und gebe dann, was ich denke, sind die minimalen Überlegungen notwendig, um Wittgenstein zu verstehen, Philosophie und menschliches Verhalten. Zunächst könnte man feststellen, dass es verdächtig sein sollte, "Meta" vor jedes Wort zu stellen. W bemerkte z.B., dass Metamathematik Mathematik wie jede andere ist. Die Vorstellung, dass wir aus der Philosophie austreten können (d.h. die beschreibende Psychologie des Denkens höherer Ordnung), ist selbst eine tiefe Verwirrung. Eine weitere Irritation hier (und während des akademischen Schreibens in den letzten 4 Jahrzehnten) ist der ständige umgekehrte sprachliche Sexismus von "ihrem" und "ihr" und "sie" oder "er/sie" usw., wo "sie" und "ihre" und "sie" gut machen würden. Ebenso, wird die Verwendung des französischen Wortes "Repertoire", bei dem das englische "Repertoire" recht gut funktioniert. Der größte Mangel ist das (wenn auch sehr häufige) völlige Versäumnis, das zu verwenden, was ich als die enorm leistungsfähige und intuitive Zwei-System-Ansicht von HOT und Searles Framework betrachte, die ich oben skizziert habe. Dies ist besonders ergreifend im Kapitel über die Bedeutung p111 ff. (besonders in den Fußnoten 2-7), wo wir in sehr schlammigem Wasser ohne den Rahmen von automatisierten echten nur S1, propositional DispositionS, COS usw. schwimmen. Man kann auch einen besseren Blick auf das Innere und das Äußere bekommen, indem man z.B. Johnston oder Budd liest (siehe meine Rezensionen). Horwich macht jedoch viele einschneidende Kommentare. Besonders gefiel mir seine Zusammenfassung der Bedeutung von Wes antitheoretischer Haltung auf P65. Er muss "On Certainty" stärker in den Vordergrund stellen, das kürzlich von Daniele Moyal- Sharrock, Coliva und anderen mit viel Aufwand beworfen und in meinen jüngsten Artikeln zusammengefasst wurde. Horwich ist erstklassig und seine Arbeit lohnt sich. Man hofft, dass er (und alle) Searle und einige moderne Psychologie sowie Hutto, Read, Hutchinson, Stern, Moyal-Sharrock, Stroll, Hacker und Baker etc. studieren werden, um eine breite moderne Sicht des Verhaltens zu erreichen. Die meisten ihrer Papiere sind auf academia dot edu und philpapers dot org, aber für PMS Hacker siehe http slash slash info dot sjc dot ox dot ac dot uk slash scr slash hacker slash DownloadPapers dot html Er gibt eine der schönsten Zusammenfassungen, wo uns ein Verständnis von Wittgenstein hinterlässt, das ich je gesehen habe. "Es darf keinen Versuch geben, unsere sprachliche/konzeptionelle Tätigkeit (PI 126) zu erklären, wie in Freges Reduktion der Arithmetik auf logik; kein Versuch, ihr erkenntnistheoretische Grundlagen zu geben (PI 124), wie sie auf der Grundlage von Berichten über ein vormethodikes Wissen beruhen; kein Versuch, idealisierte Formen davon (PI 130) als in gewissem Sinne Logiken zu charakterisieren; kein Reformversuch (PI 124, 132) wie in Mackies Fehlertheorie oder Dummetts Intuitionismus; kein Versuch, sie zu straffen (PI 133) wie in Quines Existenzbericht; kein Versuch, es konsistenter zu machen (PI 132) wie in Tarskis Antwort auf die Lügner-Paradoxien; und kein Versuch, es vollständiger zu machen (PI 133) wie bei der Klärung von Fragen der persönlichen Identität für bizarre hypothetische 'Teleportation'-Szenarien." Abschließend möchte ich vorschlagen, dass W mit der Perspektive, die ich hier gefördert habe, im Zentrum der zeitgenössischen Philosophie und Psychologie steht und nicht obskur, schwierig oder irrelevant ist, sondern schillernd, tiefgründig und kristallklar ist und dass es ist, eines der größten intellektuellen Abenteuer zu verpassen, das möglichist. Wer aus der modernen zweisystems-Sichteinen umfassenden, aktuellen Rahmen für menschliches Verhalten wünscht, kann mein Buch "The Logical Structure of Philosophy, Psychology, Mindand Language in Ludwig Wittgenstein and John Searle' 2nd ed (2019) konsultieren. Diejenigen,die sich für mehr meiner Schriften interessieren, können 'Talking Monkeys--Philosophie, Psychologie, Wissenschaft, Religion und Politik auf einem verdammten Planeten --Artikel und Rezensionen 2006-2019 3rd ed (2019) und Suicidal Utopian Delusions in the 21st Century 4th ed (2019) und andere sehen . (shrink)

Horwich donne une belle analyse de Wittgenstein (W) et est un érudit W de premier plan, mais à mon avis, ils sont tous en deçà d’une pleine appréciation, comme je l’explique longuement dans cet examen et beaucoup d’autres. Si l’on ne comprend pas W (et de préférence Searle aussi) alors je ne vois pas comment on pourrait avoir plus qu’une compréhension superficielle de la philosophie et de la pensée de l’ordre supérieur et donc de tout comportement complexe (psychologie, sociologie, anthropologie, (...) histoire, littérature, société). En un mot, W a démontré que lorsque vous avez montré comment une phrase est utilisée dans le contexte d’intérêt, il n’y a rien de plus à dire. Je vais commencer par quelques citations notables, puis donner ce que je pense sont les considérations minimales nécessaires pour comprendre Wittgenstein, la philosophie et le comportement humain. Tout d’abord, on pourrait noter que mettre "meta" en face de n’importe quel mot devrait être suspect. W a fait remarquer par exemple, que la métamathématique est mathématiques comme les autres. L’idée que nous pouvons sortir de la philosophie (c’est-à-dire la psychologie descriptive de la pensée de haut ordre) est elle-même une profonde confusion. Une autre irritation ici (et tout au long de l’écriture académique pour les 4 dernières décennies) est le sexisme linguistique inverse constant de «elle» et «la sienne» et «elle» ou «il / elle», etc, où «ils» et «leur» et «eux» ferait bien. De même, l’utilisation du mot Français «répertoire» où le «répertoire» anglais se portera plutôt bien. La lacune majeure est l’échec complet (bien que très commun) d’employer ce que je considère comme la vue extrêmement puissante et intuitive de deux systèmes de HOT et Searle cadre que j’ai décrit ci-dessus. C’est particulièrement poignant dans le chapitre sur le sens p111 et seq. (en particulier dans les notes de bas de page 2-7), où nous nageons dans l’eau très boueuse sans le cadre de l’automatisé vrai seul S1, propositionnelle dispositionnelle S2, COS etc. On peut également avoir une meilleure vue de l’intérieur et de l’extérieur en lisant par exemple, Johnston ou Budd (voir mes commentaires). Horwich fait cependant beaucoup de commentaires incisifs. J’ai particulièrement aimé son résumé de l’importation de la position anti-théorique de W sur p65. Il doit mettre davantage l’accent sur 'On Certainty', récemment l’objet de beaucoup d’efforts de Daniele Moyal- Sharrock, Coliva et d’autres et résumé dans mes récents articles. Horwich est de premier ordre et son travail vaut bien l’effort. On espère qu’il (et tout le monde) étudiera Searle et une certaine psychologie moderne ainsi que Hutto, Read, Hutchinson, Stern, Moyal-Sharrock, Stroll, Hacker et Baker, etc. pour atteindre une large vision moderne du comportement. La plupart de leurs papiers sont sur academia dot edu et philpapers dot org, mais pour PMS Hacker voir http : info dot sjc dot ox dot ac dot uk/ scr / hacker / DownloadPapers dot html. Il donne l’un des plus beaux résumés de l’endroit où une compréhension de Wittgenstein nous laisse que j’ai jamais vu. « Il ne doit y avoir aucune tentative d’expliquer notre activité linguistique/conceptuelle (PI 126) comme dans la réduction de l’arithmétique à la logique de Frege ; aucune tentative de lui donner des fondations épistémologiques (PI 124) comme dans les comptes basés sur le sens d’une connaissance a priori; aucune tentative de caractériser des formes idéalisées de celui-ci (PI 130) comme dans le sens logique; aucune tentative de réforme (PI 124, 132) comme dans la théorie de l’erreur de Mackie ou l’intuitionnisme de Dummett; aucune tentative de rationaliser (PI 133) comme dans le récit de Quine de l’existence; aucune tentative pour le rendre plus cohérent (PI 132) comme dans la réponse de Tarski aux paradoxes menteurs; et aucune tentative pour le rendre plus complet (PI 133) comme dans le règlement des questions d’identité personnelle pour des scénarios hypothétiques bizarres de « téléportation ». Enfin, permettez-moi de suggérer qu’avec la perspective que j’ai encouragée ici, W est au centre de la philosophie et de la psychologie contemporaines et n’est pas obscure, difficile ou non pertinente, mais scintillante, profonde et limpide et que de lui manquer est de manquer l’une des plus grandes aventures intellectuelles possibles. Ceux qui souhaitent un cadre complet à jour pour le comportement humain de la vue moderne de deuxemssyst peuvent consulter mon livre 'The Logical Structure of Philosophy, Psychology, Mind and Language in Ludwig Wittgenstein and John Searle' 2nd ed (2019). Ceux qui s’intéressent à plus de mes écrits peuvent voir «Talking Monkeys --Philosophie, Psychologie, Science, Religion et Politique sur une planète condamnée --Articles et revues 2006-2019 3e ed (2019) et Suicidal Utopian Delusions in the 21st Century 4th ed (2019) et autres. (shrink)

Horwich dà una bella analisi di Wittgenstein (W) ed è uno studioso W leader, ma a mio parere, tutti non sono al di sotto di un pieno apprezzamento, come spiego a lungo in questa recensione e molti altri. Se non si capisce W (e preferibilmente anche Searle) allora non vedo come si possa avere più di una comprensione superficiale della filosofia e del pensiero di ordine superiore e quindi di tutti i comportamenti complessi (psicologia, sociologia, antropologia, storia, letteratura, società). In (...) poche parole, W ha dimostrato che quando hai dimostrato come una frase viene usata nel contesto di interesse, non c'è più nulla da dire. Inizierò con alcune citazioni degne di nota e poi darò quelle che penso siano le considerazioni minime necessarie per capire Wittgenstein, la filosofia e il comportamento umano. La prima si potrebbe notare che mettere "meta" davanti a qualsiasi parola dovrebbe essere sospetto. W ha osservato ad esempio, che la metamatematica è matematica come qualsiasi altra. L'idea che possiamo uscire dalla filosofia (cioè la psicologia descrittiva del pensiero di ordine superiore) è di per sé una profonda confusione. Un'altra irritazione qui (e per tutta la scrittura accademica negli ultimi 4 decenni) è il costante sessismo linguistico inverso di "lei" e "suo" e "lei" o "lui/ lei" ecc., dove "loro" e "loro" e "loro" farebbero bene. Allo stessomodo, l'uso della parola francese "repertorio" in cui l'inglese "repertorio" farà abbastanza bene. La carenza principale è il fallimento completo (anche se molto comune) di impiegare quello che vedo come la vista di due sistemi estremamente potente e intuitiva del quadro di HOT e Searle che ho delineato sopra. Questo è particolarmente toccante nel capitolo sul significato p111 et seq. (soprattutto nelle note a piè di pagina 2-7), dove nuotiamo in acqua molto fangosa senza la struttura di vero automatizzato solo S1, proposizionale disposizionale S2, COS ecc. Si può anche ottenere una migliore vista dell'interno e dell'esterno leggendo ad esempio, Johnston o Budd (vedi le mie recensioni). Horwich però fa molti commenti incisivi. Mi è piaciuto soprattutto il suo riassunto dell'importazione della posizione anti-teorica di W su p65. Ha bisogno di dare più enfasi a 'On Certainty', recentemente oggetto di grande sforzo di Daniele Moyal- Sharrock, Coliva e altri e riassunto nei miei recenti articoli. Horwich è di prim'ordine e il suo lavoro vale la pena. Si spera che lui (e tutti) studierà Searle e un po 'di psicologia moderna così come Hutto, Read, Hutchinson, Stern, Moyal-Sharrock, Stroll, Hacker e Baker ecc per raggiungere una vasta visione moderna del comportamento. La maggior parte dei loro documenti sono su academia dot edu e philpapers dot org etc. Egli dà uno dei più bei riassunti di dove una comprensione di Wittgenstein ci lascia che io abbia mai visto. "Non ci deve essere alcun tentativo di spiegare la nostra attività linguistico/concettuale (PI 126) come nella riduzione dell'aritmetica di Frege alla logica; nessun tentativo di dargli basi epistemologiche (PI 124) come nei resoconti basati sul significato di una conoscenza a priori; nessun tentativo di caratterizzarne le forme idealizzate (PI 130) come nelle logiche del senso; nessun tentativo di riformarlo (PI 124, 132) come nella teoria degli errori di Mackie o nell'intuizione di Dummett; nessun tentativo di snellirla (PI 133) come nel racconto dell'esistenza di Quine; nessun tentativo di renderlo più coerente (PI 132) come nella risposta di Tarski ai paradossi bugiar; e nessun tentativo di renderlo più completo (PI 133) come nel sistemare le questioni di identità personale per bizzarri scenari ipotetici di 'teletrasporto'." Infine, lasciatemi suggerire che con la prospettiva che ho incoraggiato qui, W è al centro della filosofia contemporanea e della psicologia e non è oscura, difficile o irrilevante, ma scintillante, profonda e cristallina e che permane lo è mancare una delle più grandi avventure intellettualipossibili. Coloro che desiderano un quadro aggiornato completo per il comportamento umano dalla moderna vista a due systems possono consultare il mio libro 'La struttura logica dellafilosofia, psicologia, Mind e il linguaggio in Ludwig Wittgenstein e John Searle' 2nd ed (2019). Coloro che sono interessati a più dei miei scritti possono vedere 'TalkingMonkeys--Filosofia, Psicologia, Scienza, Religione e Politica su un Pianeta Condannato--Articoli e Recensioni 2006-2019 3rd ed (2019) e Suicidal Utopian Delusions nel 21st Century 4th ed (2019) . (shrink)

The first group of articles attempt to give some insight into how we behave that is reasonably free of theoretical delusions. In the next three groups I comment on three of the principal delusions preventing a sustainable world— technology, religion and politics (cooperative groups). People believe that society can be saved by them, so I provide some suggestions in the rest of the book as to why this is unlikely via short articles and reviews of recent books by well-known writers. (...) -/- America and the world are in the process of collapse from excessive population growth, most of it for the last century and now all of it due to 3rd world people. Consumption of resources and the addition of 4 billion more ca. 2100 will collapse industrial civilization and bring about starvation, disease, violence and war on a staggering scale. Billions will die and nuclear war is all but certain. In America this is being hugely accelerated by massive immigration and immigrant reproduction, combined with abuses made possible by democracy. Depraved human nature inexorably turns the dream of democracy and diversity into a nightmare of crime and poverty. The root cause of collapse is the inability of our innate psychology to adapt to the modern world, which leads people to treat unrelated persons as though they had common interests. This, plus ignorance of basic biology and psychology, leads to the social engineering delusions of the partially educated who control democratic societies. Few understand that if you help one person you harm someone else—there is no free lunch and every single item anyone consumes destroys the earth beyond repair. Consequently, social policies everywhere are unsustainable and one by one all societies without stringent controls on selfishness will collapse into anarchy or dictatorship. Without dramatic and immediate changes, there is no hope for preventing the collapse of America, or any country that follows a democratic system. Hence my essay “Suicide by Democracy”. It is also now clear that the seven sociopaths who rule China are winning world war 3, and so my concluding essay on them. The only greater threat is Artificial Intelligence which I comment on briefly in the last paragraph. (shrink)