Brogaard and Salerno (2008) argued that counter-examples to contraposition, strengthening the antecedent, and hypothetical syllogism involving subjunctive conditionals only seem to work because they involve a contextual fallacy where the context assumed in the premise(s) is illicitly shifted in the conclusion. To avoid such counter-examples they have proposed that the context must remain fixed when evaluating an argument for validity. That is the Brogaard-Salerno Stricture. Tristan Haze (2016), however, has recently objected that intuitively valid argumentative forms such as conjunction introduction (...) do not satisfy this constraint. This paper has two goals. First, it argues that the Brogaard-Salerno Stricture is not violated in Haze’s putative counter-example. Second, it argues that since this stricture blocks the usual counter-examples to instances of classical argumentative forms that involve indicative or subjunctive conditionals, it is reasonable to infer that indicative and subjunctive conditionals are material. (shrink)

This article discusses the precariousness of labor relations in Brazil, focusing on the concept of “Uberization”. To this end, an analysis is made of the Brazilian sociological reality concern-ing formal and informal work relationships, seeking to understand the said problem and its implications for the social subjects directly involved with this new form of work. Thus, a map-ping of specialized theoretical production is used to account for the discussion of recent transformations in capitalism and modes of production in a critical (...) and current way. (shrink)

It is usually accepted that deductions are non-informative and monotonic, inductions are informative and nonmonotonic, abductions create hypotheses but are epistemically irrelevant, and both deductions and inductions can’t provide new insights. In this article, I attempt to provide a more cohesive view of the subject with the following hypotheses: (1) the paradigmatic examples of deductions, such as modus ponens and hypothetical syllogism, are not inferential forms, but coherence requirements for inferences; (2) since any reasoner aims to be coherent, any inference (...) must be deductive; (3) a coherent inference is an intuitive process where the premises should be taken as sufficient evidence for the conclusion, which on its turn should be viewed as necessary evidence for the premises in some modal range; (4) inductions, properly understood, are abductions, but there are no abductions beyond the fact that in any inference the conclusion should be regarded as necessary evidence for the premises; (5) monotonicity is not only compatible with the retraction of past inferences given new information, but it is a requirement for it; (6) this explanation of inferences holds true for discovery processes, predictions and trivial inferences. (shrink)

According to the so-called ‘standard theory’ of conditions, the conditionship relation is converse, that is, if A is a sufficient condition for B, B is a necessary condition for A. This theory faces well-known counterexamples that appeal to both causal and other asymmetric considerations. I show that these counterexamples lose their plausibility once we clarify two key components of the standard theory: that to satisfy a condition is to instantiate a property, and that what is usually called ‘conditionship relation’ is (...) an inferential relation. Throughout the paper this way of interpreting the standard theory is compared favourably over an alternative interpretation that is outlined in causal terms, since it can be applied to all counterexamples without losing its intuitive appeal. (shrink)

Russell’s role in the controversy about the paradoxes of material implication is usually presented as a tale of how even the greatest minds can fall prey to basic conceptual confusions. Quine accused him of making a silly mistake in Principia Mathematica. He interpreted “if- then” as a version of “implies” and called it material implication. Quine’s accusation is that this decision involved a use-mention fallacy because the antecedent and consequent of “if-then” are used instead of being mentioned as the premise (...) and the conclusion of an implication relation. It was his opinion that the criticisms and alternatives to the material implication presented by C. I. Lewis and others would never be made in the first place if Russell simply called the Philonian construction “material conditional” instead of “material implication”. Quine’s interpretation of the topic became hugely influential if not universally accepted. This paper will present the following criticisms against this interpretation: (1) the notion of material implication does not involve a use-mention fallacy, since the components of “if-then” are mentioned and not used; (2) Quine’s belief that the components of “if-then” are used was motivated by a conditional-assertion view of conditionals that is widely controversial and faces numerous difficulties; (3) if anything, it was Quine who could be accused of fallacious reasoning: he ignored that in the assertion of a conditional is the whole proposition that is asserted and not its constituents; (4) the Philonian construction remains counter-intuitive even if it is called “material conditional”; (5) the Philonian construction is more plausible when it is interpreted as a material implication. (shrink)

This paper advances the following criticisms against the received view of implicatures: (1) implicatures are relations of pragmatic implication and not attempts to convey particular speaker meanings; (2) conversational implicatures are non-cancellable; (3) generalised conversational implicatures and conventional implicatures are necessary to preserve the cooperative assumption employing a conversational maxim of conveyability; (4) implicatures should be divided into utterance implicatures and assumption implicatures, not speaker implicatures and sentence implicatures; (5) trivial implicatures are genuine implicatures; (6) Grice’s theory of conversation cannot (...) explain most of his examples of particularised conversational implicatures; (7) the apparent attempts of explicit cancellation of implicatures are apologies, not attempts to avoid misunderstandings. (shrink)

There is a profound, but frequently ignored relationship between logical consequence (formal implication) and material implication. The first repeats the patterns of the latter, but with a wider modal reach. It is argued that this kinship between formal and material implication simply means that they express the same kind of implication, but differ in scope. Formal implication is unrestricted material implication. This apparently innocuous observation has some significant corollaries: (1) conditionals are not connectives, but arguments; (2) the traditional examples of (...) valid argumentative forms are metalogical principles that express the properties of logical consequence; (3) formal logic is not a useful guide to detect valid arguments in the real world; (4) it is incoherent to propose alternatives to the material implication while accepting the classical properties of formal implication; (5) some of the counter-examples to classical argumentative forms and known conditional puzzles are unsound. (shrink)

The material account proposes that indicative conditionals are material, but it is widely believed that this account cannot be applied to subjunctive conditionals. There are three reasons for this consensus: (1) the concern that most subjunctive conditionals would be vacuously true if they were material, which seems implausible; (2) the inconsistency with Adams pair, which suggests that indicative and subjunctive conditionals have different truth conditions; and (3) the belief that the possible world theories are a superior alternative to the material (...) account. In this paper, I will argue against (1) by showing that the counterintuitive aspects of vacuously true conditionals can be explained away in a consistent manner, regardless of whether they are indicative or subjunctive. I will support this argument by demonstrating that the positive arguments for the material account of indicatives also apply to subjunctives. I will counter (2) by explaining the Adams pair as logically equivalent conditionals that may be appropriate at different times, depending on the speaker’s epistemic situation. Finally, I will challenge (3) by arguing that the possible world account faces insurmountable issues and that a comprehensive material account of both indicatives and subjunctives is ultimately a more elegant solution. (shrink)

The material account of indicative conditionals faces a legion of counterexamples that are the bread and butter in any entry about the subject. For this reason, the material account is widely unpopular among conditional experts. I will argue that this consensus was not built on solid foundations, since these counterexamples are contextual fallacies. They ignore a basic tenet of semantics according to which when evaluating arguments for validity we need to maintain the context constant, otherwise any argumentative form can be (...) rendered invalid. If we maintain the context fixed, the counterexamples to the material account are disarmed. Throughout the paper I also consider the ramifications of this defence, make suggestions to prevent contextual fallacies, and anticipate some possible misunderstandings and objections. (shrink)

The prevailing viewpoint concerning conditionals asserts two claims: (1) conditionals featuring non-assertive acts in their consequents, such as commands and promises, cannot plausibly be construed as assertions of material implication; (2) the most promising hypothesis for such sentences is conditional-assertion theory, which defines a conditional as a conditional speech act, i.e., the performance of a speech act given the assumption of the antecedent. This hypothesis carries significant and far-reaching implications, as conditional speech acts are not synonymous with a proposition possessing (...) truth conditions. This paper opposes such a view in two steps. Firstly, it presents a battery of objections against conditional-assertion theory. Secondly, it advances the argument that such examples can indeed be convincingly construed as assertions of material implication. (shrink)

It is commonly accepted that unconditional statements are clearer and less problematic than conditional ones. This article challenges this belief by proposing that all unconditional statements can be reduced to conditional ones since epistemic justification is inherently conditional in nature. The distinction between unconditional and conditional statements is similar to the distinction between assumptions and premises, which is an idealization that results from our attempts to limit epistemic complexity. This has perplexing consequences: (1) since any ordinary statement can be viewed (...) as a disguised conditional, this sets off a chain of epistemic regress that results in a larger conditional that encompasses our entire belief systems; (2) this monster conditional can’t never be justified since it always expands in the process of justification; (3) since there is no such thing as unconditional statements, conditionals themselves become meaningless, which implies that arguments and even entire belief systems become meaningless as well; (4) the only way to avoid these disastrous results is to admit that the meaning of conditionals and, ultimately, of our belief systems is a matter of convention. (shrink)

Different logic systems are motivated by attempts to fix the counter-intuitive instances of classical argumentative forms, e.g., strengthening of the antecedent, contraposition and conditional negation. These counter-examples are regarded as evidence that classical logic should be rejected in favour of a new logic system in which these argumentative forms are considered invalid. It is argued that these logical revisions are ad hoc, because those controversial argumentative forms are implied by other argumentative forms we want to keep. It is impossible to (...) remove an argumentative form from a logical system without getting entangled in an intricate logical web, since these revisions imply the removal of other parts of a system we want to maintain. Consequently, these revisions are incoherent and unwarranted. At the very least, the usual approach in the analysis of counter-examples of argumentative forms must be seriously reconsidered. (shrink)

There is almost a consensus among conditional experts that indicative conditionals are not material. Their thought hinges on the idea that if indicative conditionals were material, A → B could be vacuously true when A is false, even if B would be false in a context where A is true. But since this consequence is implausible, the material account is usually regarded as false. It is argued that this point of view is motivated by the grammatical form of conditional sentences (...) and the symbols used to represent their logical form, which misleadingly suggest a one-way inferential direction from A to B. That conditional sentences mislead us into a directionality bias is a phenomenon that is well-documented in the literature about conditional reasoning. It is argued that this directional appearance is deceptive and does not reflect the underlying truth conditions of conditional sentences. This directional bias is responsible for both the unpopularity of the material account of conditionals and some of the main alternative principles and themes in conditional theory, including the Ramsey’s test, the Equation, Adams’ thesis, conditional-assertion and possible world theories. The directional mindset forgets a hard- earned lesson that made classical logic possible in the first place, namely, that grammatical form of sentences can mislead us about its truth conditions. There is a case to be made for a material account of indicative conditionals when we break the domination of words over the human mind. (shrink)

Adam Rieger (2013) has carried out a survey of arguments in favour of the material account of indicative conditionals. These arguments involve simple and direct demonstrations of the material account. I extend the survey with new arguments and clarify the logical connections among them. I also show that the main counter-examples against these arguments are not successful either because their premises are just as counter-intuitive as the conclusions, or because they depend on contextual fallacies. The conclusion is that the unpopularity (...) of the material account is unjustified and that a more systematic approach in the analysis of arguments is long overdue in our attempts to understand the nature of conditionals. (shrink)

It seems that the most common strategy to solve the liar paradox is to argue that liar sentences are meaningless and, consequently, truth-valueless. The other main option that has grown in recent years is the dialetheist view that treats liar sentences as meaningful, truth-apt and true. In this paper I will offer a new approach that does not belong in either camp. I hope to show that liar sentences can be interpreted as meaningful, truth-apt and false, but without engendering any (...) contradiction. This seemingly impossible task can be accomplished once the semantic structure of the liar sentence is unpacked by a quantified analysis. The paper will be divided in two sections. In the first section, I present the independent reasons that motivate the quantificational strategy and how it works in the liar sentence. In the second section, I explain how this quantificational analysis allows us to explain the truth teller sentence and a counter-example advanced against truthmaker maximalism, and deal with some potential objections. (shrink)

Intensional evidence is any reason to accept a proposition that is not the truth values of the proposition accepted or, if it is a complex proposition, is not the truth values of its propositional contents. Extensional evidence is non-intensional evidence. Someone can accept a complex proposition, but deny its logical consequences when her acceptance is based on intensional evidence, while the logical consequences of the proposition presuppose the acceptance of extensional evidence, e.g., she can refuse the logical consequence of a (...) proposition she accepts because she doesn’t know what are the truth-values of its propositional contents. This tension motivates counterexamples to the negation of conditionals, the propositional analysis of conditionals, hypothetical syllogism, contraposition and or-to-if. It is argued that these counterexamples are non-starters because they rely on a mix of intensionally based premises and extensionally based conclusions. Instead, a genuine counterexample to classical argumentative forms should present circumstances where an intuitively true and extensionally based premise leads to an intuitively false conclusion that is also extensionally based. The other point is that evidentiary concerns about intensionally based beliefs should be constrained by the truth conditions of propositions presented by classical logic, which are nothing more than requirements of coherence in distributions of truth value. It is argued that this restriction also dissolves some known puzzles such as conditional stand-offs, the Adams pair, the opt-out property and the burglar’s puzzle. (shrink)

Four intuitions are recurrent and influential in theories about conditionals: the Ramsey’s test, the Adams’ Thesis, the Equation, and the robustness requirement. For simplicity’s sake, I call these intuitions ‘the big four’. My aim is to show that: (1) the big four are interdependent; (2) they express our inferential dispositions to employ a conditional on a modus ponens; (3) the disposition to employ conditionals on a modus ponens doesn’t have the epistemic significance that is usually attributed to it, since the (...) acceptability or truth conditions of a conditional is not necessarily associated with its employability on a modus ponens. (shrink)

The Equation (TE) states that the probability of A → B is the probability of B given A. Lewis (1976) has shown that the acceptance of TE implies that the probability of A → B is the probability of B, which is implausible: the probability of a conditional cannot plausibly be the same as the probability of its consequent, e.g., the probability that the match will light given that is struck is not intuitively the same as the probability that it (...) will light. Here I want to counter Lewis’ claim. My aim is to argue that: (1) TE express the coherence requirements implicit in the probability distributions of a modus ponens inference (MP); (2) the triviality result is not implausible because it is a result from these requirements; (3) these coherence requirements measure MP employability, so TE significance is tied to it; (4) MP employability doesn’t provide either the acceptability or the truth conditions of conditionals, since MP employability depends on previous independent reasons to accept the conditional and some acceptable conditionals are not MP friendly. Consequently, TE doesn’t have the logical significance that is usually attributed to it. (shrink)

When a belief is self-fulfilling, having it guarantees its truth. When a belief is self-defeating, having it guarantees its falsity. These are the cases of “self-impacting” beliefs to be examined below. Scenarios of self-defeating beliefs can yield apparently dilemmatic situations in which we seem to lack sufficient reason to have any belief whatsoever. Scenarios of self-fulfilling beliefs can yield apparently dilemmatic situations in which we seem to lack reason to have any one belief over another. Both scenarios have been used (...) independently to challenge Evidentialism, on which what we may rationally believe is all and only what fits our current evidence. Here we tie the two scenarios together and explore what a knowledge-sensitive evidentialist approach to one implies for the other. (shrink)

Mechanisms play a crucial role in scientific research across various disciplines, and philosophers of science have devoted significant effort into understanding their ontology and epistemology. This paper examines the relationship between mechanisms and phenomena, highlighting the inherent dependence of mechanistic delineation on the characterization of phenomena. By acknowledging that characterizing phenomena is influenced by pragmatic considerations and research interests, the paper argues that mechanistic inquiry is inherently shaped by researchers’ perspectives. This dependence raises concerns about the possibility of a realist (...) view of mechanisms. To address these concerns, the paper explores how top-down constraints, rooted in researchers’ interests and pragmatic concerns, can be balanced by bottom-up constraints derived from empirical considerations. In conclusion, I argue that the interplay between these constraints forms an empirical and realist counterweight to the perspectival nature of top-down constraints. (shrink)

Conservatism about perceptual justification tells us that we cannot have perceptual justification to believe p unless we also have justification to believe that perceptual experiences are reliable. There are many ways to maintain this thesis, ways that have not been sufficiently appreciated. Most of these ways lead to at least one of two problems. The first is an over-intellectualization problem, whereas the second problem concerns the satisfaction of the epistemic basing requirement on justified belief. I argue that there is at (...) least one Conservative view that survives both difficulties, a view which has the further ability to undercut a crucial consideration that has supported Dogmatist views about perceptual justification. The final section explores a tension between Conservatism and the prospects of having a completely general account of propositional justification. Ironically, the problem is that Conservatives seem committed to making the acquisition of propositional justification too easy. My partial defense of Conservatism concludes by suggesting possible solutions to this problem. (shrink)

It seems plausible that successfully communicating with our peers requires entertaining the same thoughts as they do. We argue that this view is incompatible with other, independently plausible principles of thought individuation. Our argument is based on a puzzle inspired by the Kripkean story of Peter and Paderewski: having developed several variations of the original story, we conclude that understanding and communication cannot be modeled as a process of thought transfer between speaker and hearer. While we are not the first (...) to reach this conclusion, the significance of our argument lies in the fact that it only relies on widely accepted premises, without depending on any especially controversial theory of mental and linguistic content. We conclude by drawing out the implications of that conclusion: if communication and understanding do not require thought identity, then one important motivation for the postulation of inter-personally shared thoughts is undercut. (shrink)

In this paper, I assess whether indexical attitudes, e.g. beliefs and desires, have any special properties or present any special challenge to theories of propositional attitudes. I being by investigating the claim that allegedly problematic indexical cases are just instances of the familiar phenomenon of referential opacity. Regardless of endorsing that claim, I provide an argument to the effect that indexical attitudes do have a special property. My argument relies on the fact that one cannot account for what is it (...) to share someone else’s indexical attitudes without rejecting some plausible thesis about propositional attitudes. In the end, I assess Herman Cappelen and Josh Dever’s considerations on intentional action and extract an argument from them that could – if successful – neutralize my own. I finish by arguing that their argument has an important flaw, thus failing to convince us that indexical attitudes are just as ordinary as any other. (shrink)

This entry introduces the Lockean Thesis and sketches the ways in which the lottery paradox, the preface paradox, and the problem of merely statistical evidence can be used to put pressure on the Lockean Thesis.

I suggest a solution to a conflict between semantic internalism – according to which the concepts one expresses are determined by one's use of representations – and publicity – according to which, if two subjects successfully communicate or are in genuine agreement, then they entertain thoughts constituted by the same concepts. My solution rests on the thesis that there can be successful communication and genuine agreement between thinkers employing distinct concepts as long as there is a certain relation (of conceptually (...) guaranteed sameness of extension) between them. In section 2, I motivate semantic internalism and show how it conflicts with publicity. In section 3, I carve the logical space of possible solutions to the conflict into liberal and conservative solutions. Section 4 assesses Wikforss's conservative solution to Burge's arthritis thought‐experiment and concludes that it fails for more than one reason. Section 5 introduces a new case study involving a deferential concept. This case serves as the backdrop for my positive account offered in section 6. The conclusion of the article is preceded by a comparison of my view with another recently proposed by Recanati (section 7) and some replies to possible objections (section 8). (shrink)

We can be aware of particulars, properties, events, propositions, facts, skills, and qualia. We can also have knowledge of and be conscious of a similar range of objects. We can, furthermore, be ignorant of such objects. Awareness is quite clearly related to knowledge, consciousness, and ignorance. But how? This entry explores some of the ways that awareness is (not) related to knowledge, consciousness, and ignorance. It also explores some of the ways that awareness might be required by, and thus fundamental (...) to, these other relations. The emerging insight is that additional clarity on the nature of awareness stands poised to add clarity to a wide range of philosophical issues in both epistemology and the philosophy of mind. (shrink)

I discuss a criterion for successful communication between a speaker and a hearer put forward by Buchanan according to which there is communicative success only if the hearer entertains, as a result of interpreting the speaker's utterance, a thought that has the same truth conditions as the thought asserted by the speaker and, furthermore, does so in virtue of recognizing the speaker's communicative intentions. I argue, against Buchanan, that the data on which it is based are compatible with a view (...) involving Fregean modes of presentation. In the second part of the article I critically discuss Unnsteinsson's claim that communicative success depends on the absence of contextually salient false distinctness beliefs about the subject matter of the conversation. I argue that this thesis leads to clearly counterintuitive consequences and that no fundamental role must be given to the presence or absence of false distinctness beliefs in one's account of successful communication. The upshot is that we should stick with Buchanan's criterion. I conclude by employing Strawson and Recanati's concepts of linking and merging to show how the criterion I favour is compatible with the fact that, when subjects hold no relevant false distinctness beliefs, communicative success does not seem to be disrupted by the hearer seemingly failing to recognize the speaker's intentions. (shrink)

Focusing on Deleuze´s concept of becoming and on the way it embraces difference in the genesis of literary writing, we intend to put in dialogue the concept and the philosopher with the post-colonial criticism and its re-articulation of the subaltern´s issue, to make a reinterpretation of the becoming and its variations – becoming-woman, becoming-minor – for cultural and literary analysis.

Este artigo visa compreender o estado da arte do naturalismo contemporâneo a partir da discussão com posições não naturalistas, em especial as de Moore e Rawls. Parte-se da análise do argumento central destas abordagens no contexto formal da metaética contemporânea, buscando aferir a validade da falácia naturalista no contexto atual, bem como de seus limites na aplicação contra o naturalismo moral. Apresenta-se a discussão entre o naturalismo e o não-naturalismo moral como, respectivamente, estandartes das perspectivas descritivas e prescritivas da moralidade. (...) O objetivo com esta comparação é apresentar algumas posições em metaética a fim de melhor entender a situação contemporânea do debate moral no que tange à naturalização da ética, contrastando teorias da ação e do valor quanto ao tema da motivação e da normatividade morais. (shrink)

Ronald de Sousa is one of the few analytic philosophers to have explored the ineffability of emotion. Ineffability arises, for de Sousa, from attempts to translate experience, which involves non-conceptual content, into language, which involves conceptual content. As de Sousa himself rightly notes, such a characterization construes all perceptual experience as ineffable and does not explain what might set emotional ineffability apart. I build on de Sousa’s insights regarding what makes emotional ineffability distinctive by highlighting that in the case of (...) emotion the content in question is, crucially, evaluative. Evaluative content has normativity that makes the ineffability of emotion both particularly salient as well as particularly relevant, as the way in which an object is valuable is felt to be merited despite the experience’s ineffability. After proposing an improved working definition of emotional ineffability, I move to the question of how language and emotional experience interact, and whether these interactions can be evaluated in any systematic way. While de Sousa is pessimistic regarding the prospects of such an evaluation, I argue that if we move beyond an individual level of analysis it is possible to characterize cases where the ineffability of emotion leaves members of particular social groups vulnerable to a range of epistemic and affective injustices. I argue that we can similarly characterize cases where the ineffability of emotion holds radical potential to challenge and transform unjust social arrangements. I end by proposing that the representational content of emotion involves what I call ‘modal complexity’ and that this makes emotions particularly well-suited to play such radical roles. (shrink)

Traditionally, philosophers consider the question of whether episodic memory and imagination belong to the same kind (the (dis)continuism problem) as ultimately depending on the causality question - i.e., whether remembering requires a causal connection to the past event. In this framework, if memory is a simulation process (as claimed by simulationism) and does not require a causal connection, then it is sufficiently similar to imagination and, thus, continuism follows. On the other hand, if a causal connection is necessary for memory (...) (as defended by causalism), then there are fundamental differences between memory and imagination and, thus, discontinuism follows. In contrast with this framework, I will argue that such entanglement is due to a failure of clearly delineating issues of explanation and classification. By distinguishing these matters more explicitly, I conclude that continuism is the better alternative for classification purposes, while maintaining that causalism is still necessary for explaining how memory works. (shrink)

RELAÇÃO E EFEITOS BIOQUÍMICO-NUTRICIONAIS SOBRE A RETENÇÃO DE PLACENTA EM VACAS -/- Emanuel Isaque Cordeiro da Silva Departamento de Agropecuária – IFPE Campus Belo Jardim [email protected] ou [email protected] WhatsApp: (82)98143-8399 -/- •__1. Retenção de placenta -/- A retenção da placenta é uma anomalia reprodutiva de diferentes origens. Nos bovinos, caracteriza-se pela não expulsão dos anexos dos sacos placentários nas primeiras 12 horas após o parto. Os principais fatores que podem causar a retenção de placenta são: a) dificuldades no processo (...) normal do parto (distorcias, partos gêmeos, etc.), b) distúrbios hormonais, c) estresse intenso (subnutrição, falta de movimento, mau manejo do período de transição), d) doenças infecciosas, e) prolongamento do processo de gestação e f) fatores hereditários (KANKOFER, et al. 2005). Na apresentação das retenções de placenta considera-se a seguinte ordem: a primeira opção é de tipo infeccioso, portanto, deve-se descartar agentes indutores de aborto e de retenção infecciosa de placenta como: Brucella (principal causa de aborto), Leptospira, Neospora, etc. Logo, a causa mais frequente de retenções de placenta, corresponde a intervenções muito precoces na atenção do parto. Isto faz com que não haja descolamento normal da placenta, terminando o parto. Esta segunda causa seria de origem mecânica ou traumática ao induzir o rasgo incompleto da unidade cotilédone-caruncular. A terceira causa de retenção de placenta são desequilíbrios nutricionais (FRAZER, 2005; GORDON, 1996), entre os quais podemos citar: 1.1 Deficiência de energia Dentro do aspecto nutricional este é um dos fatores que tem grande importância devido à deficiência na dieta de energia, levando a um Balanço Energético Negativo (BEN), já que o animal se vê obrigado a mobilizar reservas (CONTRERAS, 1998). Alterações metabólicas que ocorrem, causam stress no animal, stress que é refletido em problemas reprodutivos como a retenção da placenta que é dada pelas alterações que levam ao não desprendimento do cotilédone das criptas carunculares ou por baixa resposta do endométrio que nos processos de contração produz isquemia temporária na carúncula. Outra razão associada é que quando têm-se uma baixa no consumo de energia também se reduz a produção de glicose, a médio prazo o colesterol não é sintetizado e, portanto, a produção de estrogénios diminui, uma vez que não haverá excedentes energéticos que possam sintetizar o precursor da hormona esteroide, que a mesma placenta segrega ocorrendo uma atonia uterina onde não haverá contratilidade do útero na hora do parto o que leva à retenção de placenta, como sequela imediata ao estresse do parto sob grave BEN. 1.2 Deficiências de minerais Uma das causas da retenção de placenta é o déficit de alguns nutrientes no pré-parto, dentro dos quais se encontram o iodo e o selênio. Por isso, um dos sinais que evidenciaria a deficiência de selênio seria a retenção da placenta. Talvez a forragem que se está oferecendo ao animal seja afetada pela estação do ano que determina os aumentos das deficiências nos meses de inverno, e a carência deve-se não só à disponibilidade na planta, mas também à disponibilidade e mobilidade do mineral no solo. A presença de altas concentrações de selênio em tecidos como o ovário, a placenta, a hipófise e as glândulas adrenais é uma manifestação da importância do conhecimento de uma possível deficiência do mesmo e suas consequências na área reprodutiva. A deficiência de selênio afeta a função da tireoide, uma vez que demonstrou-se que a concentração de tiroxina (T4), produzida pela tiroide em animais com deficiência de selênio, está aumentada no plasma enquanto a triiodotironina (T3) está diminuída. Isto deve-se à ação da enzima tipo I, iodotironina-5-deiodinase, que contém selênio na sua molécula, o que explica a diminuição da função hormonal da glândula tiroide que pode ser encontrada em animais com deficiência de selênio. Podem ser tomadas medidas preventivas para evitar problemas de retenção da placenta com a administração parentérica (IM) de 5 a 10 mg de selênio 1 mês antes do parto, podendo também evitar-se este fenômeno através da administração do selênio orgânico do tipo seleniometionina. Isto eleva o nível de enzima antioxidante glutationa peroxidase pelo menos por 3 meses, este tempo de proteção favorece a redução na retenção da placenta, uma vez que o parto é o momento de maior geração de radicais livres de oxigênio, cujo efeito nocivo é neutralizado pela glutationa peroxidase que é rica em selênio. A disponibilidade de selênio nas forrageiras brasileira é deficiente, uma vez que esse elemento encontrado no solo e em pouquíssimas quantidades é lixiviado pelas condições naturais. O selênio ainda possui funções essenciais no trato reprodutivo de touros e vacas, dentre as funções nós touros que mais se destacam estão a função antioxidante, que protege a membrana lipídica dos espermatozoides e também a função estrutural dos mesmos, uma vez que é estrutura fixa intermediária da membrana e das mitocôndrias dos espermatozoides. Quando há deficiência de selênio nos machos, a gametogênese fica comprometida e os espermatozoides apresentam-se com anormalidades em sua estrutura e elevam-se as porcentagens de oligozoospermia e de necrozoospermia. Nas vacas, a função do selênio também é antioxidante e sua ação evita o aparecimento dos cistos nós ovários, que são folículos que, por alguma intempérie, não ovularam naturalmente e normalmente. Estudos feitos por Julian et al., demonstraram que a inserção do selênio e a vitamina E na dieta das vacas gestantes reduziram indubitavelmente a incidência de retenção de placenta nas vacas (tabela 1). Foram testadas 193 vacas com quantidades variáveis de selênio divididas em grupo de controle e grupo tratado, os resultados demonstram que o selênio é essencial para que se reduza o número de placentas retidas por vacas. Tabela 1: Efeito do selênio e da vitamina E na prevenção de retenção de placenta -/- Selênio na dieta (mg/kg) Grupo de controle Grupo de tratamento* N° de vacas Placentas retidas % N° de vacas Placentas retidas % 0,04 39 16 41 53 6 11,3 0,02 23 12 52 37 4 10,8 0,035 9 7 77,7 14 0 0 — 9 6 66,7 9 0 0 Total 80 41 51,2 113 10 88 * Injeção IM de 50 mg de selenito de sódio e 600 UI de acetato de alfa-tocoferol. 40 – 20 dias ou 20 dias pré-parto. Fonte: JULIEN et al., 1976. Para oferecer alimentos ricos em selênio, basta que o criador utilize farelos/rações com ingredientes como a semente de girassol, o arroz ou o próprio trigo, desde que a quantidade presente na ração supra as necessidades e exigências dos animais para seus processos fisiológicos. Todavia, vale salientar que o selênio é um elemento químico encontrado no solo, e que a quantidade do mesmo nesses ingredientes implica no manejo correto do solo onde foram cultivados. Outro elemento muito importante é o iodo em si, já que sua deficiência influenciará sobre o comportamento sexual produzindo-se supressão ou depressão dos níveis de estrogênio, também pode diminuir a incidência de partos prolongados, cuja pior consequência é o aumento de placentas retidas. A importância de suplementar os animais com este mineral nas zonas afastadas do mar mostra uma notável melhoria nas taxas de concepção e redução da retenção de placenta. O iodo é efetivamente absorvido na circulação sanguínea, a partir do qual passa para a glândula tireoide ou é eliminado através da urina. A tireoide contém grande quantidade de iodo na forma de tiroglobulina. A partir das tironinas é sintetizado T3 e T4. A deficiência do mineral produz bócio que consiste em uma hipertrofia da tireoide, uma vez que o órgão tenta compensar a falta de iodo tornando mais eficiente seu mecanismo para captá-lo. A tireoide produz compostos hormonais que têm uma característica única no organismo, é que em sua composição entra o iodo. Isto é um fato importante, porque se o organismo não tiver iodo, a tireoide não pode produzir hormonas da tireóideas (T3 e T4). O iodo é um dos elementos essenciais. Poder-se-ia viver com um número limitado de elementos, é possível viver sem níquel, sem cádmio, mas impossível viver sem iodo. O iodo é um elemento químico encontrado no mar, sendo assim, os animais marinhos como peixes, moluscos, lulas, etc. são notadamente ricos em iodo. Para suprir as necessidades de iodo das vacas, bem como de quaisquer outra espécie doméstica, o criador poderá obter por oferecer uma ração industrial que contenha o iodo necessário que supra as necessidades e exigências das vacas, ou poderá optar pela utilização de farinha de peixe, por exemplo, como fonte de iodo sustentável e de baixo valor comercial. Uma deficiência de cobre e zinco nos níveis séricos pode causar a retenção de placenta, sendo assim, deve-se ter em conta a idade do animal, já que em menor idade há maior probabilidade de ocorrer o problema (AKAR, et al. 2005). Os hormônios da tireoide têm múltiplas funções. Atualmente sabe-se que a mais importante delas é intervir no desenvolvimento do sistema nervoso, participa na calorigênese e na regulação do consumo de oxigênio, por essa razão, processos de elevada troca de oxigênio requerem elevados níveis circulantes de hormonas tireóideas, tal como acontece no parto, onde o miométrio e a musculatura abdominal sofrem constantes contrações para a expulsão do feto e da placenta. Por esta razão, deficiências de iodo gerarão menor síntese de T3 e T4, dando lugar a menor regulação da troca de oxigênio e, com isso, a uma provável retenção de placenta por esgotamento após a contração muscular. O cobre usado em quantidades adequadas nas rações dos animais de produção, pode ser um ótimo promotor de crescimento, sendo assim, é indispensável na dieta das vacas e quaisquer outros animais de criação, ele é encontrado em diversos cereais, sendo a aveia o maior destaque que o produtor pode obter para oferecer a seus animais, ou mesmo com uma ração balanceada. O zinco é um microelemento imprescindível na vida da vaca, pode ser oferecido através de ração, em pasto ou por meio de cereais como o amendoim ou a castanha do caju. Esses minerais supracitados (selênio, iodo, cobre e zinco), podem ser oferecidos, além do método mais tradicional que é por meio de alimentos concentrados (ração), por meio dos alimentos volumosos que são as forrageiras como os capins. Para tanto, o criador deve optar por uma variedade que consiga, por meio da sua fisiologia vegetal, apresentar quantidades aceitáveis desses minerais em sua matéria verde ou seca. As vacas, bem como as demais espécies de produção, possuem exigências específicas de minerais, vitaminas, carboidratos, proteínas, etc. como já supracitado. As quantidades dos minerais (tabela 2) presentes no alimento fornecido devem ser respeitadas para que não haja problemas maiores como Intoxicações. Tabela 2: Exigências minerais para vacas de corte e leite -/- Mineral Vacas de corte em gestação (mg/kg) Vacas leiteiras em transição (mg/kg) Vacas leiteiras em lactação (mg/kg) Selênio 0,10 0,3 0,3 Iodo 0,50 0,4 – 0,5 0,34 – 0,88 Cobre 10 12 – 18 9 – 16 Zinco 30 21 – 30 43 – 73 Fonte: BARBOSA & SOUZA, 2003. 1.3 Fitoestrógenos Outra possível causa da retenção placentária é a manifestação do chamado "Síndrome Hiperestrogênico", que pode resultar no consumo de grandes quantidades de fitoestrogênios provenientes da alfafa, trevos e outras plantas ricas em estrogênios de origem vegetal. Os fitoestrogênios, tais como cumarinas e isoflavonas, são substâncias que têm a capacidade de ligar-se aos receptores endógenos de estrogênios, provocando nos animais que os ingerem em grandes quantidades, alterações reprodutivas por hiperestrogenização. Nos bovinos foram observados casos de ninfomania, hiperemia vulvar, quistos ováricos, hiperplasia das mas e do útero, prolapsos da vagina, relaxamento dos ligamentos pélvicos e até a esterilidade. O fitoestrogênio encontra-se presente em maior quantidade na alfafa (coumestrol), que é 30 a 100 vezes mais potente do que outros fitoestrogênios presentes em vegetais como as isoflavonas. Estas substâncias encontram-se naturalmente em pequenas quantidades nas forragens e possuem efeitos antimicrobianos e fungicidas. A diferença com os estrogênios provenientes de ervas ou fitoestrogênios, representados pela genisteína, genistina e coumestrol presentes em muitas plantas leguminosas, e estrogênio endógeno, como 17-beta estradiol, estrona e outros compostos esteroides, é que os estrogênios endógenos são eliminados através da urina, das fezes ou são biologicamente desativados e não são armazenados como os fitoestrogênios. O possível efeito direto dos fitoestrogênios sobre a retenção da placenta, seria o bloqueio dos receptores para os estrogênios naturais, perdendo esta fonte de estímulo contrátil que resulta na expulsão da placenta. -/- REFERÊNCIAS BIBLIOGRÁFICAS -/- AKAR, Yaşar; YILDIZ, Hamit. Concentrations of some minerals in cows with retained placenta and abortion. Turkish Journal of Veterinary and Animal Sciences, v. 29, n. 5, p. 1157-1162, 2005. BARBOSA, Fabiano Alvim; SOUZA, G. M. Efeito dos microminerais na reprodução de bovinos. Belo Horizonte: Portal Agronomia, 2009. BOLAND, M. P. Efectos nutricionales en la reproducción del ganado. XXXI Jornadas Uruguayas de Buiatría, 2003. CONTRERAS, Pedro A. Síndrome de movilización grasa en vacas lecheras al inicio de la lactancia y sus efectos en salud y producción de los rebaños. Archivos de medicina veterinaria, v. 30, n. 2, p. 17-27, 1998. DA SILVA, Emanuel Isaque Cordeiro. Reprodução Animal: Fisiologia do Parto e da Lactação Animal. Disponível em:-. Acesso em: Março de 2020. DE LUCA, Leonardo J. Nutrición y fertilidad en el ganado lechero. XXXVI Jornadas Uruguayas de Buiatría, 2008. FRAZER, Grant S. Bovine theriogenology. Veterinary Clinics: Food Animal Practice, v. 21, n. 2, p. xiii-xiv, 2005. GORDON, Ian. Controlled reproduction in farm animals series. Nova Iorque: CAB International, 1996. JULIEN, W. E.; CONRAD, H. R.; MOXON, A. L. Selenium and vitamin E and incidence of retained placenta in parturient dairy cows. II. Prevention in commercial herds with prepartum treatment. Journal of dairy science, v. 59, n. 11, p. 1960-1962, 1976. KANKOFER, M.; LIPKO, J.; ZDUNCZYK, S. Total antioxidant capacity of bovine spontaneously released and retained placenta. Pathophysiology, v. 11, n. 4, p. 215-219, 2005. -/- Emanuel Isaque Cordeiro da Silva Belo Jardim, 29 de março de 2020 . (shrink)

Given both the phenomenological and cognitive similarities between episodic memory and imagination, it’s difficult to say how we can reliably distinguish them at their moment of retrieval. Several memory markers have thus been proposed, which are characteristics that would reliably indicate to the subject that her mental state is an instance of memory. While the question of what exactly constitutes these memory markers is still an issue to be settled, there is also the more general question of whether they can (...) be reliable at all. In the present paper, I have identified two theses about the latter issue (the reliability and unreliability theses) and have argued that the main cause of disagreement between them lies on their different assumptions on how beliefs about our own mental states are formed, i.e. what are the underlying metacognitive mechanisms responsible for self-attribution of mental states. These different views on metacognition were then further investigated with regards to their use of metarepresentations and their general agreement with recent cognitive psychology research. These analyses corroborate the reliability of certain kinds of memory markers in distinguishing between memory and imagination. (shrink)

Today’s philosophers of memory are split between continuists, who claim that episodic memory (EM) and imagination (EI) belong to the same natural kind, and discontinuists, who defend that they don’t. This abstract considers how assumptions about which mechanisms are relevant for natural kindness shape this discussion. If the argument is in the right track, the (dis)continuism debate should be characterized as a verbal dispute about the important mechanisms for EM and EI.

No presente artigo, constata-se o modo como o ensino de filosofia no Brasil, visto como educação maior, é utilizado como ferramenta da inculcação de um arbitrário cultural a partir de uma análise bourdieuana do sistema de ensino. Chegou-se à conclusão que a prioridade conferida ao texto clássico de filosofia no ensino médio é um modo de reprodução das mesmas estruturas sociais que permitem a impossibilidade de ascensão social. Com isso, é proposta uma educação menor, cuja constituição fundamental é a relação (...) entre professor e aluno, capaz de subverter as características da educação maior. Para tanto, foram analisados os textos de Sílvio Gallo (2002; 2006), os quais apontam para a valorização do capital cultural dos alunos, o incentivo à criação autônoma de conceitos e escolha de autoras e autores não canônicos como ferramentas de subversão dos mecanismos da educação maior. (shrink)

The aim of the present paper is to show that presentism cannot answer the truthmaker objection in a satisfactory manner. For such, two main categories of presentist solutions were studied: the first kind states that truthmakers can’t provide any objection to presentism, while the second type tries to ground past truths by postulating new ontological categories, which were rejected, mainly because of their use of ad hoc ontologies. Also, I showed how the presentist should adopt antirealism about the past in (...) case she wants to maintain a simple ontology. Being that said, I conclude that presentism cannot offer satisfactory truthmakers to past truths. (shrink)

Agents know some but not all logical consequences of what they know. Agents seem to be neither logically omniscient nor logically incompetent. Yet finding an intermediate standard of minimal rationality has proven difficult. In this paper, I take suggestions found in the literature (Lewis, 1988; Hawke, Özgün and Berto, 2020; Plebani and Spolaore, 2021) and join the forces of subject matter and impossible worlds approaches to devise a new solution to this quandary. I do so by combining a space of (...) FDE worlds (Berto and Jago, 2019) with a Lewisian (1988) understanding of subject matters as partitions. By doing so, I show how subject matters impose some order in the anarchic space of FDE worlds, while the worlds allow for distinctions between contents which would not otherwise be available. Combining the two approaches, then, brings us closer to the desired closure principles for knowledge of minimally rational agents. (shrink)

Agents know some but not all logical consequences of what they know. Agents seem to be neither logically omniscient nor logically incompetent. Yet finding an intermediate standard of minimal rationality has proven difficult. In this paper, I take suggestions found in the literature (Lewis, 1988; Hawke, Özgün and Berto, 2020; Plebani and Spolaore, 2021) and join the forces of subject matter and impossible worlds approaches to devise a new solution to this quandary. I do so by combining a space of (...) FDE worlds (Berto and Jago, 2019) with a Lewisian (1988) understanding of subject matters as partitions. By doing so, I show how subject matters impose some order in the anarchic space of FDE worlds, while the worlds allow for distinctions between contents which would not otherwise be available. Combining the two approaches, then, brings us closer to the desired closure principles for knowledge of minimally rational agents. (shrink)

This monograph offers a fresh perspective on the applicability of mathematics in science. It explores what mathematics must be so that its applications to the empirical world do not constitute a mystery. In the process, readers are presented with a new version of mathematical structuralism. The author details a philosophy of mathematics in which the problem of its applicability, particularly in physics, in all its forms can be explained and justified. Chapters cover: mathematics as a formal science, mathematical ontology: what (...) does it mean to exist, mathematical structures: what are they and how do we know them, how different layers of mathematical structuring relate to each other and to perceptual structures, and how to use mathematics to find out how the world is. The book simultaneously develops along two lines, both inspired and enlightened by Edmund Husserl’s phenomenological philosophy. One line leads to the establishment of a particular version of mathematical structuralism, free of “naturalist” and empiricist bias. The other leads to a logical-epistemological explanation and justification of the applicability of mathematics carried out within a unique structuralist perspective. This second line points to the “unreasonable” effectiveness of mathematics in physics as a means of representation, a tool, and a source of not always logically justified but useful and effective heuristic strategies. (shrink)

ICTs, personal data, digital rights, the GDPR, data privacy, online security… these terms, and the concepts behind them, are increasingly common in our lives. Some of us may be familiar with them, but others are less aware of the growing role of ICTs and data in our lives - and the potential risks this creates. These risks are even more pronounced for vulnerable groups in society. People can be vulnerable in different, often overlapping, ways, which place them at a disadvantage (...) to the majority of citizens; Table 3 in this guide presents some of the many forms and causes of vulnerability. As a result, vulnerable people need greater support to navigate the digital world, and to ensure that they are able to exercise their rights. This guide explains where such support can be found, and also answers the following questions: - What are the main ethical and legal issues around ICTs for vulnerable citizens? - Who is vulnerable in Europe? - How do issues around ICTs affect vulnerable people in particular? This guide is a resource for members of vulnerable groups, people who work with vulnerable groups, and citizens more broadly. It is also useful for data controllers1 who collect data about vulnerable citizens. While focused on citizens in Europe, it may be of interest to people in other parts of the world. It forms part of the Citizens’ Information Pack produced by the PANELFIT project, and is available in English, French, German, Italian and Spanish. You are welcome to translate this guide into other languages. Please send us a link to online versions in other languages, so that we can add them to the project website. (shrink)

In a recent opinion paper, it was argued that individuals with multiple retractions or a record of academic misconduct should not serve as editors, including as editors-in-chief, on the editorial boards of scholarly or academic journals. As a first step towards appreciating how such a policy could be applied in practice, the presence of 30 individuals listed on the Retraction Watch Leaderboard on editorial boards was screened. Six cases are highlighted to gain an appreciation of the potential reputational risks that (...) journals and publishers might incur by including individuals with a tainted academic record on editorial boards. Given the reputational, legal and other risks associated with this type of assessment and decision, more formal positioning and guidance are needed by global ethics policy-related bodies such as COPE, the ICMJE, and the CSE, even more so in journals that claim to follow these organizations’ ethical guidelines. (shrink)

This paper aims to undertake an examination of the exposition made in the aristotelian treatise De Incessu Animalium about the directional orientations (above and below, right and left, front and behind) mostly from its extra, inter and intratextual context. These directional orientations seem to be directly related to the principles of movement, perception and growing. The treatise starts from the points of origin (archai) of these functions in the animals and, from these functions, distinguish them. Therefore, functionality is established as (...) the first value, because it is the prism through which Aristotle perceives and think the right, above and front in the animals. On that account, it is corroborated the great importance of functionality in the aristotelian philosophy. Afterwards, it will be searched if (or how) the primacy of the trinominal formed by right, above and front is related to aspects of the greek imaginary contemporaneous with the given text. (shrink)

We advance a theory of the representational role of Euclidean diagrams according to which they are samples of co-exact features. We contrast our theory with two other conceptions, the instantial conception and Macbeth’s iconic view, with respect to how well they accommodate three fundamental constraints on theories of the Euclidean diagrammatic practice— that Euclidean diagrams are used in proofs whose results are wholly general, that Euclidean diagrams indicate the co-exact features that the geometer is allowed to infer from them and (...) that Euclidean diagrams play the same role in both direct proofs and indirect proofs by reductio—and argue that our view is the one best suited to account for them. We conclude by illustrating the virtues of our conception of Euclidean diagrams as samples by means of an analysis of Saccheri’s quadrilateral. (shrink)

Em 27 de janeiro de 1937, o filósofo Ludwig Wittgenstein (1889-1951) anotou em seu diário, enquanto viajava para Skjolden, um vilarejo norueguês à beira do fiorde Sogne, onde havia construído em 1913 uma cabana para viver isolado: “Certamente sou singular em muitas coisas & por isso, muitas pessoas se comportam de maneira comum quando comparadas comigo; mas em que consiste minha singularidade?” De acordo com psiquiatras contemporâneos como Michael Fitzgerald, Christopher Gillberg e Yoshiki Ishisaka, a singularidade de Wittgenstein decorria de (...) ele ter autismo. Considerando-se o diagnóstico póstumo feito por esses especialistas em transtorno do espectro autista, este livro tem dois objetivos básicos: (1) detalhar como se refletem na obra de Wittgenstein tanto as suas particularidades comportamentais quanto as suas dificuldades cognitivas, inclusive aquelas relacionadas à linguagem, e (2) mostrar que Wittgenstein “dissolveu” em sua segunda filosofia, especialmente nas Investigações filosóficas, problemas que não são problemas para ninguém valendo-se de conhecimentos linguísticos e filosóficos básicos acumulados no Ocidente desde a Grécia Antiga que ele havia ignorado no Tractatus logico-philosophicus, livro de sua primeira filosofia. (shrink)