Temporal ontology is the philosophical debate on the existence of the past and the future. It features a three-way confrontation between supporters of presentism (the present exists, the past and the future do not), pastism (the past and the present exist, the future does not), and eternalism (the past, the present, and the future all exist). Most philosophers engaged in this debate believe that presentism is much more in agreement with common sense than the rival views; moreover, most of them (...) believe that being in agreement with common sense is epistemically valuable for a philosophical view. We studied experimentally non-experts’ ideas pertaining to the domain of temporal ontology, i.e., as we called it, common-sense temporal ontology, focusing on the Italian population. We found that a non-overwhelming majority of participants (~64%) favoured presentism, while two significant minorities favoured pastism (~19%) and eternalism (~17%). We think that our findings provide some support, albeit weaker than expected, for the view that presentism is more in agreement with common sense than the rival positions. (shrink)

The Dead Past Growing Block theory of time—DPGB-theory—is the metaphysical view that the past and the present tenselessly exist, whereas the future does not, and that only the present hosts mentality, whereas the past lacks it and is, in this sense, dead. One main reason in favour of this view is that it is immune to the now-now objection or epistemic objection (which aims at undermining the certainty, within an A-theoretical universe, of being currently experiencing the objective present time). In (...) this paper, I examine the additional arguments offered by P. Forrest and G. A. Forbes to back the DPGB-theory and show that they do not work. I also examine a proposal to rescue the DPGB-theory suggested by an anonymous reviewer for this journal and argue that it does not work either. Moreover, in line with D. Braddon-Mitchell and against Forbes, I argue that the DPGB-theory is indeed committed to the existence of zombies in the past. Being ad hoc and burdened by a very odd and counterintuitive ontological commitment, the DPGB-theory turns out to be rather unpalatable. (shrink)

Presentism is, roughly, the ontological view that only the present exists. Among the philosophers engaged in the metaphysics of time there is wide agreement that presentism is intuitive (or commonsensical) and that its intuitiveness counts as evidence in its favour. My contribution has two purposes: first, defending the view that presentism is intuitive from some recent criticisms; second, putting forth a genealogical (or debunking) argument aimed at depriving presentism’s intuitiveness of the evidential value commonly granted to it.

In a series of recent papers Francesco Orilia has presented an argument for the moral desirability of presentism. It goes, in brief, as follows: since the existence of painful events is morally undesirable, presentism, which denies that past painful events (tenselessly) exist, is morally more desirable than non-presentism, which instead affirms that past painful events (tenselessly) exist. An objection against this argument, which has already been taken into consideration by Orilia, is the ugly history objection or radical objection: what really (...) matters in the moral appraisal of a world is the history of it, and since the presentist and the non-presentist versions of our world share the same ugly history, they are morally on a par. This paper aims at corroborating this objection and defending it from Orilia’s criticisms. This will be done by bringing into play various thought experiments and a distinction between relevance (of an event or a fact about the occurrence of an event) to the moral evaluation of a world and moral (and psychological) involvement (in an event or in a fact about the occurrence of an event). (shrink)

In filosofia spesso si segue un metodo stando al quale una tesi o teoria che sia più in sintonia con il senso comune deve essere preferita alle posizioni meno in sintonia con esso, per lo meno fino a quando non si mostri che quella tesi o teoria è inadeguata e che una delle posizioni avverse costituisce un adeguato sostituto. Nel presente contributo si vuole offrire una caratterizzazione della nozione di senso comune generalmente in uso nei dibattiti filosofici contemporanei; illustrare criticamente (...) i principali metodi impiegabili per determinare contenuti filosoficamente rilevanti del senso comune; chiarire e giustificare il metodo filosofico dell'appello al senso comune; presentare, d'altro canto, alcune delle strategie argomentative attuabili da chi si trovi a sostenere una tesi o teoria contrastante con il senso comune. (shrink)

Presentism is the view that only present temporal entities (tenselessly) exist. A widely-discussed problem for presentism concerns causation and, more specifically, the supposed cross-temporally relational character of it. I think that the best reply to this problem can already be found in the literature on temporal ontology: it consists, roughly, in showing that (at least) some of the main approaches to causation can be rephrased so as to avoid commitment to any cross-temporal relation, including the causal relation itself. The main (...) purpose of this paper is to extend this reply to the process view, an approach to causation that has not been considered within this debate until now. I shall do this by taking into account Dowe’s conserved quantity theory—a recent and prominent theory of this sort— and employing it as a proxy for the other major process theories of causation. In dealing with Dowe’s process theory of causation, however, two additional problems must be faced: one concerns the four-dimensional spacetime framework on which its formulation relies; the other concerns the very notion of causal process (and the companion notion of causal interaction). While the presentistic account of Dowe’s theory (and, virtually, of the process view of causation in general) put forth in this paper is intended primarily as a contribution to the mentioned paraphrase- based enterprise of reconciliation between presentism and causation, I shall also offer some reasons for presentists to prefer the process view of causation to the other views of causation that have already been reconciled with presentism. (shrink)

L'ontologia temporale è la riflessione sullo statuto ontologico delle entità meramente passate o future. In questo contributo intendo chiarire il significato di questa questione, presentare le principali opzioni teoriche che si delineano rispetto ad essa e, concentrandomi sulle due principali teorie contendenti, B-eternismo e presentismo, illustrare gli argomenti più rilevanti formulati a favore dell'una e dell'altra.

*Runner-up for the 2021 Royal Institute for Philosophy Essay Prize*: What should we think about ‘acts of conscience’, viz., cases where our personal judgments and public authority come into conflict such that principled resistance to the latter seems necessary? Philosophers mainly debate two issues: the Accommodation Question, i.e., ‘When, if ever, should public authority accommodate claims of conscience?’ and the Justification Question, i.e., ‘When, if ever, are we justified in engaging in acts of conscience – and why?’. By contrast, a (...) third important topic – the Conduct Question, i.e., ‘How should we act, morally speaking, when engaging in acts of conscience?’ – has been mostly neglected. This paper aims to offer concrete guidance for persons wishing to engage in acts of conscience in morally virtuous ways. I argue that such agents are subject to two basic prima facie duties: duties to oneself related to demands of integrity and duties to others related to demands of civility. I explain both duties in detail, arguing with regard to, that in light of what I call ‘the paradox of conscience’, we need to rethink our views about both ‘conscience’ and ‘integrity’; and with regard to, that, building upon Rawls’ ‘duty of civility’, we should embrace at least seven general principles for undertaking acts of conscience in a morally conscientious manner. (shrink)

*Honorable Mention for the 2024 American Association of Philosophy Teachers (AAPT) Lenssen Prize*: In recent years, ‘philosophy as a way of life’ [PWOL] courses have emerged as an exciting new pedagogical approach. I explain what a PWOL-course is. Next, I argue that the standard method for teaching such courses—what I call the ‘Smorgasbord Model’—presents us with a basic problem: viz., the challenge of how to enable students in the context of the modern university to truly experience what a PWOL even (...) is. I propose a solution to this problem by exploring a PWOL that most teachers and students alike already find themselves immersed in, what I describe as political liberalism applied to the university classroom context. I show how this overlooked fact not only offers us a novel resource for teaching PWOL-courses. It also helps philosophy teachers—in a meta-pedagogical sense—to become more self-reflective about and appreciative of our fundamental ethical commitments when teaching philosophy. (shrink)

Kant’s metaphilosophy has three main parts: (1) an essentialist project (“What is philosophy?”); (2) a methodological project (“How do we do philosophy?”); and (3) a taxonomic project (“What are the different parts of philosophy, and how are they related?”). This paper focuses on the third project. In particular, it explores one of the most intriguing yet puzzling aspects of Kant’s philosophy, viz. the relationship between what Kant calls ‘pure’ philosophy vs. ‘applied’, ‘empirical’ or what we can broadly refer to as (...) ‘impure’ philosophy. (As we shall see, in order to be able to address this third project, we shall also need to examine the other two projects in detail.) My plan is as follows. First, I discuss four main areas of pure vs. impure philosophy: (i) ‘pure logic’ vs. ‘applied logic’; (ii) ‘rational psychology’ vs. ‘empirical psychology’; (iii) ‘pure metaphysics of nature’ vs. ‘physics’ and (iv) ‘pure morality’ or a ‘metaphysics of morals’ vs. ‘moral anthropology’, ‘practical anthropology’ or ‘applied moral philosophy’. Based on this, I identify four key differences between pure and impure philosophy. Second, I critically examine four different readings of Kant’s views about the status of ‘impure’ philosophy: (a) that it is not genuine philosophy; (b) that it is bad or inferior philosophy; (c) that it is instrumentally valuable; and (d) that it constitutes an indispensable part of Kant’s philosophy, both in a theoretical and practical sense. I argue that Kant is best interpreted as endorsing readings (c) and (d). Third, I offer some concluding remarks. (shrink)

La storia della nascita, utilizzo e declino delle notazioni scientifiche costituisce un’area di indagine importante che può aiutare le nostre analisi del pensiero scientifico e la sua evoluzione. […] this history constitutes a mirror of past and present conditions in mathematics which can be made to bear on the notational problems now confronting mathematics. The successes and failures of the past will contribute to a more speedy solutions of the notational problems of the present times.Questa storia, ovviamente, coinvolge anche le (...) notazioni della logica. Il presente contributo intende proporre un nuovo insieme di simboli per una particolare teoria logica: la Mereologia Formale, in considerazione del fatto che questa teoria, pur avendo avuto trattazioni sistematiche, non ha allo stato attuale ancora raggiunto un sistema di notazioni condiviso dagli studiosi. Tale stato dell’arte è espressione, da un lato, di un legame della teoria al suo nascere con la notazione polacca, e del suo confronto con la Teoria Assiomatica degli Insiemi; dall’altro, del fatto che essa ha ricevuto solo in tempi recenti sistematiche applicazioni alle scienze.94 In tale prospettiva ho ritenuto necessario definire in primo luogo dei criteri attraverso cui procedere alla costruzione del sistema di simboli. Criteri desunti in parte dalla storia delle notazioni scientifiche nella loro evoluzione, in parte dalla pratica personale nell’uso di strumenti formali. (shrink)

We provide here irrefutable facts that prove the falsehood of the claims published in [1] by Dehmer and Mowshowitz (DM) against our paper published in [2]. We first prove that Dehmer’s definition of node probability [3] is flawed. In addition, we show that it was not Dehmer in [3] who proposed this definition for the first time. We continue by proving how the use of Dehmer’s definition does not reveal all the physico-mathematical richness of the walk entropy of graphs. Finally, (...) we show a few facts about the failure of DM themselves to cite properly the relevant literature in their field. We also show here how the Editors of Complexity have failed to manage the publication of [1] in an appropriate way according to the accepted guidelines given in the Code of Conduct and Best Practice Guidelines for Journal Editors, published by the Committee on Publication Ethics (COPE). (shrink)

The study of complex systems, although an interdisciplinary endeavor, it is considered as an integrating part of physical sciences. Contrary to the historical fact that the eld is already mature, it still lacks a clear and unambiguous denition of its main object of study. Here, I propose a denition of complex systems based on the conceptual clarications made by Edgar Morin about the bidirectional non-separability of parts and whole produced by the nature of interactions. The concept to which I arrived (...) here is clear, not circular, neither too cryptic nor to explicit, and does not include any accompanying features of the own system dened. It allows, as shown in the paper, to derive some of the main properties that such systems must have as well as to propose its mathematical formalization. (shrink)

Is there any interesting sense in which we can speak of an act as 'evil', in contrast to simply "morally bad' or "immoral"? In ordinary language, we typically judge actions as evil that somehow differ significantly, in terms of degree or intensity, from commonplace wrongdoing. If taken to an extreme, however, this view simply reduces the difference between evil and immoral acts to a mere quantitative analysis. At worst, it leads to a wholly trivial account of evil as just those (...) actions we tend to regard as "really bad". In this paper, I outline a distinctively Kantian theory of evil that instead defends a fundamental qualitative difference between evil and more ordinary immoral actions, locating the main distinction in terms of the structure of the agent's will itself Broadly understood, this strategy endorses a Kantian account of "evil as dehumanization" in which a "material" -- as opposed to purely "formal" -- difference exists between the respective maxims of the immoral and the evil agent. In such instances, unlike typical cases of Kantian immoral actions, direct violation of another person's humanity qua human somehow comprises a necessary part of the "material object" of an evil agent's will. (shrink)

This paper explores the idea of authenticity, both what it is and why it’s valuable. First, I identify and criticize three popular approaches to authenticity: Individual Authenticity, Natural Authenticity, and Truthful Authenticity. Second, I defend a fourth approach to authenticity – what I call Existential Authenticity (EA) – which is comprised of three basic elements: (a) self- understanding, (b) self-expression, and (c) self-concern – in particular, concern about what kind of person one is and what type of life one lead. (...) Third, I explore why EA is valuable in both instrumental and non-instrumental ways. (shrink)

In this paper, I attempt to synthesize the two most influential contemporary ethical approaches that appeal to moral intuitions, viz., Rawlsian reflective equilibrium and Audi’s moderate intuitionism. This paper has two parts. First, building upon the work of Audi and Gaut, I provide a more detailed and nuanced account of how these two approaches are compatible. Second, I show how this novel synthesis can both (1) fully address the main objections to reflective equilibrium, viz., that it provides neither necessary nor (...) sufficient conditions for the justification of our moral beliefs and (2) help ethical intuitionism to deal with the fundamental problem of peer disagreement over our basic moral intuitions. In doing so, I sketch out a novel and attractive diachronic way of thinking about peer disagreement more generally. (shrink)

In order to make some headway on the debate about whether Kant was a constructivist, nonconstructivist, or instead defends a hybrid view that somehow entirely sidesteps these categories, I attempt to clarify the terms of the debate more carefully than is usually done. First, I discuss the overall relationship between realism and constructivism. Second, I identify four main features of Kantian constructivism in general. Third, I examine three rival versions of metanormative Kantian constructivism, what I’ll call axiological, constitutivist, and rationalist (...) constructivist. I argue that Kant is best seen as a rationalist constructivist. I conclude by arguing that although it’s a constructivist view, this reading avoids the main pitfalls of traditional Kantian constructivism. In doing so, it helps us to achieve a satisfying rapprochement between constructivist and non-constructivist readings of Kant. (shrink)

Most scholars describe Kant’s idea of dignity as what I term his “vertical” account—that is, our human dignity insofar as we rise above heteronomous natural inclinations and realize human freedom by obeying the moral law. In this paper, I attempt to supplement this traditional view by exploring Kant’s neglected “horizontal” account of dignity—that is, our human dignity insofar as we exist in relationship with others. First, I examine the negative aspect of this horizontal account of dignity, found in Kant’s discussion (...) of public heteronomy perpetuated by unjust social institutions. Second, I explore Kant’s idea of public dignity realized via social interaction: both (1) at the interpersonal level of education and friendship, and (2) at the societal level, in terms of moral education in the public sphere and a communal moral striving towards the highest good. I argue that we cannot realize our full human dignity for Kant outside of the context of concrete social relations with other moral agents. (shrink)

This paper shows how an efficient and parallel algorithm for inference in Bayesian Networks (BNs) can be built and implemented combining sparse matrix factorization methods with variable elimination algorithms for BNs. This entails a complete separation between a first symbolic phase, and a second numerical phase.

El presente artículo tiene como propósito criticar y reformular la teoría de valores del autor y filósofo argentino Risieri Frondizi. Para ello, se someterán a falsacionismo las tesis según las cuales la cualidad estructural es, primero, estructuralista y no analítica y, segundo, empírica, de acuerdo con la metodología holista de la ciencia. La crítica, así, se desarrollará a partir de los siguientes interrogantes. Inicialmente, ¿el autor acude al holismo o al reduccionismo como enfoques metodológicos de desarrollo? Finalmente, ¿cuál es la (...) distinción lógica entre el valor como cualidad sui géneris y el valor como cualidad estructural? (shrink)

Fitch's Paradox and the Paradox of the Knower both make use of the Factivity Principle. The latter also makes use of a second principle, namely the Knowledge-of-Factivity Principle. Both the principle of factivity and the knowledge thereof have been the subject of various discussions, often in conjunction with a third principle known as Closure. In this paper, we examine the well-known Surprise Examination paradox considering both the principles on which this paradox rests and some formal characterisations of the surprise notion, (...) crucial in this paradox. Standard formalizations of the Surprise Examination paradox in modal logic do not seem, at first glance, to depend on either factivity or knowledge-of-factivity, but we will argue that both factivity and knowledge-of-factivity play a key implicit role in the paradox. Namely, they are implicitly, perhaps unintentionally, used in order to simplify the definition of surprise. We analyze modal logical formalizations of three versions of the paradox concluding that the Surprise Examination paradox is the result of two flaws: the assumption of knowledge-of-factivity, and the over-simplification of the definition of "surprise" accordingly. By fixing these two flaws, the Surprise Examination paradox vanishes. (shrink)

El presente artículo tiene como objeto llevar a cabo un estudio pragmático y analítico sobre la acción de valoración, el valor y los valores a la luz de la ciencia semiótica y de la ciencia cibernética. Por ello, se desarrollará un proceso axiológico que ilustre cómo sucede el ingreso, la transición y la salida de códigos morales en función de un esquema cognitivo. Así pues, el proceso axiológico se postula, primero, en fundamento de tres sistemas: de mentalidad, de valores y (...) de biomoralidad y, segundo, conforme a la teoría de la información y de la teoría general de sistemas. (shrink)

El propósito central del presente artículo, es formular un enfoque sistémico-jurídico para el análisis de los sistemas sociales. Para esto, se proponen tres tipologías de consensos denominados límites del sistema social: consenso normal, consenso normativo y consenso legítimo. La función de estas tipologías es, primero elaborar una explicación sobre la constitucionalización y democratización del poder político, con base en la regla de reconocimiento y la norma fundamental de un Estado; segundo postular dos metodologías normativas, un registro positivo y una demarcación (...) positiva, que desplieguen, tanto sobre las conductas sociales como sobre la estructura del sistema social, un proceso de legalidad emergente, cuya función sea, tercero regular, realimentar y optimizar el funcionamiento de la constitución política. Finalmente, se analizan los conceptos de completitud y de legitimidad del sistema normativo, con el fin de definir el alcance institucional que debe poseer un sistema jurídico sobre los subsistemas culturales del sistema social. (shrink)

À primeira vista, pode-se pensar que toda restrição à dúvida é contrária à progressão do conhecimento e antidemocrática. Este argumento é utilizado por diferentes sabores de negacionismo. No entanto, um exame do modo como funcionam dúvidas nos mostra que existem exigências epistêmicas para a legitimidade da dúvida que não são satisfeitas pelos negacionismos. Uma consequência deste argumento é que a normatividade epistêmica não é absorvida pela normatividade política. A especificidade da normatividade epistêmica, que explica porque a dúvida de negacionistas não (...) é legítima, desaparece em teorias construtivistas. Teses construtivistas resultam de uma confusão entre o fato de teorias serem construtos sociais e a tese que elas constroem os fatos sobre os quais portam a teoria ela mesma. A legitimidade da dúvida depende de processos sociais de filtragem epistêmica. Os filtros epistêmicos socialmente construídos refletem um fato profundo da evolução da cultura humana: a produção cumulativa, social e assimétrica do conhecimento. (shrink)

Achille Varzi è uno dei maggiori metafisici viventi. Nel corso degli anni ha scritto testi fondamentali di logica, metafisica, mereologia, filosofia del linguaggio. Ha sconfinato nella topologia, nella geografia, nella matematica, ha ragionato di mostri e confini, percezione e buchi, viaggi nel tempo, nicchie, eventi e ciambelle; e non ha disdegnato di dialogare con gli abitanti di Flatlandia, con Neo e con Terminator. Tra le sue opere principali: Holes and Other Superficialities e Parts and Places. The Structures of Spatial Representation, (...) entrambi scritti insieme a R. Casati per MIT Press; Il mondo messo a fuoco, Laterza; e il suo libro più recente: Le tribolazioni del filosofare, con C. Calosi, per Laterza. -/- Da una giornata all’Università di Urbino nasce questa conversazione a molte voci sulla e con la filosofia di Achille C. Varzi. In un dialogo critico al quale l’Autore si presta con generosità e onestà intellettuale, Andrea Borghini, Francesco Calemi, Claudio Calosi, Elena Casetta, Valeria Giardino, Pierluigi Graziani, Patrizia Pedrini, Daniele Santoro e Giuliano Torrengo lo interrogano e mettono alla prova sui temi affrontati, nel corso degli anni, in campi diversi. Il risultato è un percorso che si snoda attraverso molti mondi, dalla logica alla metafisica, dalla filosofia del linguaggio alla filosofia della matematica, dalla mereologia alla filosofia del tempo, spingendosi in qualche caso oltre i confini del saggio filosofico. (shrink)

Algumas soluções medievais para o sofisma ´omnis homo de necessitate est animal´ postulam um tipo especial de ser, o ser da essência (esse essentiae), que explica como uma predicação necessária pode ser verdadeira sobre seres cuja existência é contingente. O ser da essência, distinto do ser efetivo (esse actuale), admite apenas propriedades necessárias. Deste traço se seguem duas diferenças em relação a teorias meinonguianas acerca do não ser. Inicialmente, segundo Meinong, o tipo de propriedade de um objeto é independente de (...) ele existir – o chamado ´Princípio da Independência´. Além disto, o ser da essência não é parte da explicação da intencionalidade. Teorias medievais que julgam dever explicar a intencionalidade pela postulação de um tipo especial de ser não o fazem pela postulação do esse essentiae. Objetos meinoinguianos, por seu vez, servem para explicar tanto a intencionalidade quanto a distribuição intuitiva de valores de verdade para sentenças sobre inexistentes. (shrink)

En un formato de texto reconcentrado y ensayı́stico, llega hasta nosotros el nuevo libro del sociólogo Carlos Ruiz Encina, Octubre chileno. La irrupción de un nuevo pueblo (Santiago, Taurus, 2020). El libro arranca con una detallada bitácora de los dı́as previos al 18 de octubre de 2019, del estallido social mismo y de los acontecimientos inmediatamente posteriores. Queda la impresión de esos raros momentos cuando la historia se acelera y libera energı́as largamente acumuladas. Si bien los hechos por su masividad (...) y fuerza son inéditos, Ruiz Encina toma distancia de esa afirmación que se instala sobre lo sucedido hasta el dı́a de hoy en el mundo polı́tico y en parte de la intelectualidad: no lo vimos venir. (shrink)

The distinction between semantics and pragmatics is often seen as a discussion about where to place pragmatic inferences: while minimalists think that they only come into play after the proposition is grasped, for contextualists, there are already pragmatic processes in the very determination of what is said, leading to ad hoc conceptual adjustments. There is, however, another way to look at this matter: we may keep a sensitive truth-distribution across contexts without ad hoc conceptual manoeuvres. An intuitive distribution of truth-values (...) may be explained as a variation in (kaplanian) circumstances, without any tampering with sentence constituents. This way of understanding the debate connects, maybe surprisingly, a first reaction to the semantics-pragmatics divide, in Cavell, and Predelli’s original stance on this debate. (shrink)

A principal crítica do internismo a teorias externistas é que elas parecem fazer o conhecimento o resultado de processos que permanecem inacessíveis ao sujeito. Epistemologias externistas buscaram acomodar esta exigência, como é o caso da epistemologia de Sosa. A incorporação das exigências internistas não se faz sem tensões – no caso de Sosa, os mecanismos reflexivos podem ser inacessíveis ao sujeito. Na medida em que buscamos compreender como podemos conhecer e refletir sobre nossas próprias crenças, encontramos mecanismos externos ao sujeito (...) que não podem ser internalizados: a dinâmica conversacional e o conhecimento científico dos mecanismos de funcionamento da cognição. A externalização do saber se estende para o conhecimento cientifico de maneira muito ampla. Uma pessoa que só tomasse como verdadeiro aquilo que pode provar (ou mesmo que pode compreender) seria alguém que recusaria boa parte do saber humano. Para todo leigo – isto é, para todo mundo, num ou noutro domínio –, assumir o que é produzido pela cultura é tomar como verdadeiras crenças cujo conteúdo resta opaco. Como exige um internista, o funcionamento interacional da razão não envolve mecanismos cegos à perspectiva do sujeito e não conceitualizados, mas, ao contrário, leva precisamente à articulação e à tomada de consciência das teses apresentadas. Este conhecimento não pode, contudo, ser internalizado. A externalização do conhecimento é um traço profundo do conhecimento e, mais geralmente, da cultura humana. No contexto de uma teoria evolutiva da cultura, muitos autores defendem, de diferentes modos, que a cultura humana é essencialmente social. O que talvez não seja tão usual seja conectar teorias mais gerais da evolução da cultura com preocupações tradicionais da epistemologia. Espero mostrar que este é um caminho frutífero. (shrink)

A linguagem mental explica o caráter significativo das linguagens falada e escrita: seus elementos e estrutura são identificados através de critérios teóricos que servem a este fim. Estes critérios parecem manter uma certa indeterminação em relação aos elementos e estruturas da linguagem mental, se se espera que eles decidam entre diferentes formas de apresentação possíveis. Esta expectativa, contudo, não é razoável dentro da filosofia ockhamiana. A teoria da linguagem mental pode desempenhar os papéis teóricos a ela destinados sem determinar a (...) forma que deveria ter uma linguagem canônica que a apresentasse. Há no entanto uma outra indeterminação na forma da proposição mental, relativa a ocorrências de proposições, que efetivamente ocorre nos textos ockhamianos : proposições mentais podem ser atos mentais simples e ter uma semântica composicional. Esta tese surpreendente nos lembra que embora a análise semântica que identifica estruturas da linguagem mental descreva algo que tem uma realidade psicológica, a descrição psicológica ela mesma deve recorrer a outros elementos da filosofia ockhamiana, e em particular, sua teoria dos atos mentais. (shrink)

Na semântica ockhamiana, o predicado ‘verdadeiro’ deriva de uma outra relação semântica mais fundamental, a relação de suposição. O autor mostra como esta relação de dependência entre dois predicados semânticos figura na análise das condições de verdade de proposições passadas, um modelo que pode ser estendido a proposições futuras e possíveis. O texto procura indicar como a explicação das condições de verdade de proposições possíveis situa a semântica das modalidades aléticas em continuidade com a semântica de proposições não presentes. Este (...) último ponto ganha em interesse se o colocarmos ao lado de um outro aspecto da teoria modal ockhamiana, a saber, o fato de modalidades serem definidas como todo termo que pode ser predicado de proposições inteiras. Como conclusão, o autor expõe os diferentes níveis de análise de modalidades aléticas, dentro do quadro teórico ockhamiano. (shrink)

In this paper, I argue against the thesis suggested by Cappelen and Lepore, according to which if contextualism were true, communication would require many items, and therefore would be fragile; communication is not fragile, and therefore, communication does not demand a large number of conditions, and contextualism is false. While we should grant the robustness of communication, it is not guaranteed by some unchanging conditions, but by different flexible mechanisms that enhance the chances of mutual understanding at a relatively low (...) cost –– this is true, in particular, of different feedback mechanisms and of alternative ways to make the same information mutually available. Communication is not a series of successive, individual and independent actions; dialogues are a kind of joint activity in which misunderstandings are jointly repaired by participants as part of the very activity they are engaged in. Moreover, as we consider the roles of hearers in a conversation, we see that no construal makes Cappelen and Lepore’’s argument both plausible and relevant. The hearer can either be overhearer or a certified participant. If the hearer is an overhearer, it may be the case that he easily misunderstands what is said, but it has no consequence to the understanding of what takes place in a dialogue, since, ex hypothesi, he is not a party to it. If the hearer is a participant, many of the conditions of mutual understanding will be assured in the dialogical activity itself, and both he and the speaker will make efforts to assure that mutual understanding do take place, as part of their responsibilities as parties to a dialogue –– and their argument is not plausible. (shrink)

The enormous increasing of connections between people and the noteworthy enlargement of domains and methods in sciences have augmented extraordinarily the cardinality of the set of meaningful human symbols. We know that complexity is always on the way to become complication, i.e. a non-tractable topic. For this reason scholars engage themselves more and more in attempting to tame plurality and chaos. In this book distinguished scientists, philosophers and historians of science reflect on the topic from a multidisciplinary point of view. (...) Is it possible to dominate complexity through reductionism? Are there other conceptual instruments useful to take account of complexity? What is complexity in biology, mathematics, physics and philosophy of mind? These are some of the questions which are faced in this volume. (shrink)

One of the main motivations for having a compositional semantics is the account of the productivity of natural languages. Formal languages are often part of the account of productivity, i.e., of how beings with finite capaci- ties are able to produce and understand a potentially infinite number of sen- tences, by offering a model of this process. This account of productivity con- sists in the generation of proofs in a formal system, that is taken to represent the way speakers grasp (...) the meaning of an indefinite number of sentences. The informational basis is restricted to what is represented in the lexicon. This constraint is considered as a requirement for the account of productivity, or at least of an important feature of productivity, namely, that we can grasp auto- matically the meaning of a huge number of complex expressions, far beyond what can be memorized. However, empirical results in psycholinguistics, and especially particular patterns of ERP, show that the brain integrates informa- tion of different sources very fast, without any felt effort on the part of the speaker. This shows that formal procedures do not explain productivity. How- ever, formal models are still useful in the account of how we get at the seman- tic value of a complex expression, once we have the meanings of its parts, even if there is no formal explanation of how we get at those meanings. A practice-oriented view of modeling gives an adequate interpretation of this re- sult: formal compositional semantics may be a useful model for some ex- planatory purposes concerning natural languages, without being a good model for dealing with other explananda. (shrink)

¿De qué hablamos cuando decimos Diseño Sustentable? El diseño sustentable podría definirse como el diseño que tiene en cuenta los aspectos ambientales en todos los niveles de producción. Así mismo, persigue el objetivo de fabricar productos que aporten el menor impacto posible en el ecosistema a lo largo de todo el ciclo de vida. Es muy difícil encontrar productos de consumo que cumplan puntualmente con los Preceptos del eco diseño y que sean exitosos en el mercado. Ante esta situación es (...) necesario revisar los aspectos involucrados en la concepción de un nuevo producto: ¿El rol del diseñador es el adecuado?, ¿Existe una seria y responsable conciencia por parte de los empresarios para llevar adelante un proyecto de eco diseño?, ¿Son los productos eco lo suficientemente atractivos para captar la atención de los consumidores? (shrink)

El trabajo cuestiona críticamente cierta visión extrema y unilateral apreciable en Adorno y Horkheimer al juzgar la relación de la industria cultural con la música. Es cierto que hoy prácticamente toda actividad humana se encuentra condiciona¬da por el mercado y que la música no es una excepción. Ella también es portadora de valor de cambio que tiende a ser dominante en los marcos de la industrial cultural. Pero es plausible que dentro de las industrias culturales mismas se empezara a hacer (...) una distinción entre los bienes culturales producidos por razones meramente comerciales y aquellos producidos por razones más artísticas. Un público demandante de obras de valor artístico, aun cuando pueda ser minoritario y estar inmerso también él en el mercado, condiciona de cierta manera la propia producción cultural, o, al menos, un segmento de ella. Esta posibilidad real no era muy reconocida por los autores de la “La industria cultural”. Según su lógica, como nada puede sustraerse a la industria cultural y como ésta compulsa a la prevalencia del valor de cambio o comercial y a la casi supresión de cualquier otro valor, entonces el arte, el verdadero arte, terminaría por desaparecer, sucumbiendo ante una lógica no interesada en su conservación o crecimiento, sino sólo en la maximización de ganancias a toda costa. Los hechos han contradicho esta conclusión. La relación de la música con la industria cultural, igual que las monedas, tiene dos caras. No basta con reconocer sólo la parte negativa, la que busca alienar las obras con tal de convertirlas en sólo mercancías. Es imprescindible tomar en cuenta también la posibilidad más que comprobable de que piezas con excelente factura estética surjan también en los marcos de esta industria. El asunto radicaría en develar las condiciones que lo posibilitan. El mercado, si bien puede favorecer la generación de productos pseudoculturales de escaso o nulo valor artístico, también se constituye en la única vía, dentro de la sociedad de consumo, por medio de la cual lo genuinamente valioso se convierte en patrimonio común. (shrink)

Con una metodología analítico-sintética, el propósito del presente artículo es ofrecer un fundamento teórico sobre la legitimidad de los actos y las decisiones morales. Por consiguiente, se resolverá la siguiente cuestión: ¿cuál es la función ética del derecho, en el marco del ejercicio de una conciencia y consciencia construidas por agentes morales? Se concluye que la coacción legítima debe fundarse en la protección universal de toda persona y en el sometimiento a objeciones por parte de los ciudadanos, con el propósito (...) de revisar la legitimidad y legalidad de las normas jurídicas. (shrink)

When and why do we need the indexical ‘I’? Perry (1979) thinks that ‘I’ is an essential ingredient to the explanation and prediction of action. We need ‘I’ to classify the kind of belief that causes an agent to produce a new action. In his view, classifying the agent’s belief in terms of ‘I’ makes sense because, when asked to explain her behavior, the agent will be disposed to say ‘I’. Here, we argue that this dispositional assumption is problematic. The (...) disposition to act according to an essential indexical and the disposition to make a speech act that contains ‘I’ are two very different things that are not always related. The most common circumstances in which we need to say ‘I’ to explain ourselves involve other agents: when we coordinate in joint actions or when we engage in self-talk to save face before the eyes of potential witnesses. Finally, we revisit Perry’s famous messy shopper anecdote to offer a better story about why its main character is disposed to say ‘I’. (shrink)

Este trabajo de campo, se produce dentro de un acuerdo interinstitucional, el que tiene como objetivo aportar a la permanencia y desarrollo sustentable de la quesería artesanal de la región oeste, sur y este del Uruguay. La mayoría de estos productores agropecuarios familiares se encuentran en un proceso de formalización de su producción y comercialización. Cuentan con escasa información que dificulta introducir la gestión de costos en los establecimientos. Es así que se seleccionaron 9 establecimientos como una fase piloto, con (...) el propósito analizar el costo de la producción de queso artesanal en la etapa “previa a la maduración”. Entendiendo que el objetivo de este trabajo es facilitar al productor la toma de decisiones relativas a precios y dada la escasa o nula información de períodos anteriores, se optó por un modelo de costo variable resultante, aunque de forma híbrida ya que ciertos datos se basaron en la especificación técnica y el periodo observado es de solamente una elaboración y no de la totalidad de elaboraciones realizadas en el mes, como es usual en la práctica de cálculo de costos resultantes. A efecto de cumplir con el objetivo del trabajo se realizaron las siguientes actividades en cada establecimiento: 1. Se visitó la quesería artesanal. 2. Se mantuvo una entrevista personal con el propietario del establecimiento con el objetivo de relevar información relacionada al proceso, y los factores productivos intervinientes en el mismo. 3. Se trabajó con la Información histórica obtenida de registros que aportó el productor. 4. Asimismo, se consideraron especificaciones técnicas proporcionadas por los especialistas. Es así que, mediante esta metodología de costeo aplicado en cada uno de los establecimientos, el productor estaría en condiciones de conocer el precio mínimo al que puede vender un kg de queso, no es conveniente hacerlo por debajo del costo variable. No obstante, el productor debe tener presente que la diferencia entre el precio pactado de venta menos su costo variable (denominado contribución marginal), va en primera instancia a cubrir los costos fijos. Dado que se relevó solo un día, en todos los establecimientos el único supuesto razonable es que la producción sea relativamente constante en los 30 días, si fuera ese caso, la producción mensual seria aproximadamente el monto del kg a la venta. Como limitación al alcance de este trabajo, es que lo anterior es adecuado cuando no existe un proceso de maduración, en el caso de que el mismo existiera deberá adicionarse el costo variable de dicho proceso, que consiste básicamente en la cuantificación del valor tiempo del dinero o costo de la inmovilización del capital, así como las mermas que se incurren en el proceso de maduración. (shrink)

Journal bearings play an important role on many rotating machines placed on industrial environments, especially in steam turbines of thermoelectric power plants. Babbitt damage (BD) and excessive clearance (C) are usual faults of steam turbine journal bearings. This paper is focused on achieving an effective identification of these faults through an intelligent recognition approach. The work was carried out through the processing of real data obtained from an industrial environment. In this work, a feature selection procedure was applied in order (...) to choose the features more suitable to identify the faults. This feature selection procedure was performed through the computation of typical testors, which allows working with both quantitative and qualitative features. The classification tasks were carried out by using Nearest Neighbors, Voting Algorithm, Naïve Associative Classifier and Assisted Classification for Imbalance Data techniques. Several performance measures were computed and used in order to assess the classification effectiveness. The achieved results (e.g., six performance measures were above 0.998) showed the convenience of applying pattern recognition techniques to the automatic identification of BD and C. (shrink)

Ernesto Genoni (1885-1975) pioneered biodynamic agriculture in Australia. In 1928 he was the first of (ultimately) twelve Australians to join Rudolf Steiner’s Experimental Circle of Anthroposophical Farmers and Gardeners (ECAFG) which was based at the Goetheanum, Dornach, Switzerland. Ernesto trained as an artist for five years at Milan’s prestigious Brera Academy. He visited his brothers in Australia, broad-acre immigrant farmers in Western Australia, in 1912 and 1914 and during these visits he worked on their, and other’s, farms. In (...) 1916 he enlisted in the Australian Imperial Force (AIF) and served as a stretcher bearer on the battlefields of the Somme, France, before being conscripted into the Italian Army and serving jail-time in Italy as a draft resister and conscientious objector. Ernesto joined the Anthroposophical Society in Milan in 1919. He first met Rudolf Steiner in 1920 at the Goetheanum, the Anthroposophy headquarters in Switzerland. Ernesto left the Goetheanum in 1924 when Steiner retired from public life. He migrated to Australia in 1926 with aspirations for establishing a career as an artist in Australia. Instead, having arrived in Australia, he was again drawn into farm management and agricultural work. Ernesto was a champion for biodynamic agriculture, Anthroposophy, and the Austrian New Age philosopher, Rudolf Steiner - causes to which he devoted the rest of his life. In 1928 he initiated the first Anthroposophy meetings in Melbourne. In 1930 Ernesto made a grand tour of biodynamic enterprises in Europe and met the leading biodynamics advocates and practitioners of the day in Germany, Switzerland and England, including Ehrenfried Pfeiffer, Erika Riese, Ernst Stegemann, and Carl Mirbt. In 1935 Ernesto and his partner, Ileen Macpherson, who was also an anthroposophist and a member of the ECAFG, began their biodynamic farm called Demeter Biological Farm in Dandenong, Victoria. Ernesto was a founder of the Anthroposophical Society Victoria Michael Group in 1932, and he became its leader in 1962. (shrink)

César Ernesto Arenas Ulloa nació el 15 de septiembre de 1988 en Chiclayo (Lambayeque, Perú). Realizó estudios literarios en la Universidad Nacional Mayor de San Marcos, hasta obtener el grado de licenciado. En el 2012, obtuvo un reconocimiento académico por ocupar el primer puesto a nivel de toda la escuela de Literatura. En el 2018, presentó su tesis titulada Autonomía y especificidad de la obra dramática: una lectura semiológica de El sistema Solar de Mariana de Althaus. Asimismo, tiene intereses (...) en el teatro peruano, el psicoanálisis y la escritura. Ha sido docente de Lenguaje en diversas universidades privadas de Lima. Ha publicado en revistas indexadas, así como ha participado en congresos y proyectos financiados. Actualmente, vive y estudia en Italia. (shrink)

El objetivo del artículo es exponerla evolución de Ernesto Laclau del marxismo al posmarxismo entendida como transición de una categoría de totalidad marxista-althusseriana a la de totalidad como práctica discursiva. Esta interpretación se sostiene en la recuperación de la obra temprana de Laclau (aquella ubicada entre Política e ideología en la teoría marxista y Hegemonía y estrategia socialista), lo que permite apreciar rupturas y continuidad es en su obra y problematizarla periodización de su biografía intelectual.