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  1. Epistemological solipsism as a route to external world skepticism.Grace Helton - 2021 - Philosophical Perspectives 35 (1):229-250.
    I show that some of the most initially attractive routes of refuting epistemological solipsism face serious obstacles. I also argue that for creatures like ourselves, solipsism is a genuine form of external world skepticism. I suggest that together these claims suggest the following morals: No proposed solution to external world skepticism can succeed which does not also solve the problem of epistemological solipsism. And, more tentatively: In assessing proposed solutions to external world skepticism, epistemologists should explicitly consider whether those solutions (...)
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  2. On Whether we Can See Intentions.Shannon Spaulding - 2017 - Pacific Philosophical Quarterly 98 (2):150-170.
    Direct Perception is the view that we can see others' mental states, i.e. that we perceive others' mental states with the same immediacy and directness that we perceive ordinary objects in the world. I evaluate Direct Perception by considering whether we can see intentions, a particularly promising candidate for Direct Perception. I argue that the view equivocates on the notion of intention. Disambiguating the Direct Perception claim reveals a troubling dilemma for the view: either it is banal or highly implausible.
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  3. Presuppositions as Cancellable Inferences.Fabrizio Macagno - 2016 - In Keith Allan, Alessandro Capone & Istvan Kecskes (eds.), Pragmemes and Theories of Language Use. Cham, Switzerland: pp. 45-68.
    The phenomenon of presupposition suspension can be analyzed in terms of explicatures and the corresponding non-presumptive interpretative reasoning underlying it. On the view presented in this paper, the polyphonic articulation of an utterance at different levels can be used to explain cases in which presuppositions are suspended. Presuppositional suspensions indicate that the presumptive reading does not hold and a different interpretation is needed. Utterances can display various types of polyphonic structures, accounting for the speaker’s and the hearer’s commitments. A speaker (...)
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  4. Cartesianism, the Embodied Mind, and the Future of Cognitive Research.Philippe Gagnon - 2015 - In Dirk Evers, Michael Fuller, Anne Runehov & Knut-Willy Sæther (eds.), Do Emotions Shape the World? Biennial Yearbook of the European Society for the Study of Science and Theology 2015-2016. "Studies in Science and Theology" Vol. 15. Martin-Luther-Universität. pp. 225-244.
    In his oft-cited book Descartes' Error, Antonio Damasio claims that Descartes is responsible for having stifled the development of modern neurobiological science, in particular as regards the objective study of the physical and physiological bases for emotive and socially-conditioned cognition. Most of Damasio’s book would stand without reference to Descartes, so it is intriguing to ask why he launched this attack. What seems to fuel such claims is a desire for a more holistic understanding of the mind, the brain and (...)
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  5. Testimony and Other Minds.Anil Gomes - 2015 - Erkenntnis 80 (1):173-183.
    In this paper I defend the claim that testimony can serve as a basic source of knowledge of other people’s mental lives against the objection that testimonial knowledge presupposes knowledge of other people’s mental lives and therefore can’t be used to explain it.
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  6. Abduction as the Mother of All Argumentation.Priyedarshi Jetli - manuscript
    Abduction* is the genus with deduction and induction as species. Modus tollens is backward reasoning as an unknown proposition is inferred from a known proposition. Reductio ad absurdum is abductive because the conclusion is inferred by deriving a contradiction from an assumption. Inductive reasoning from effect to cause is also backward reasoning. But abduction* consists of forward reasoning as well. The generic structure of abductive* argumentation is universal among all cultures, occupations and disciplines.
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