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  1. Why Aristotle Isn’t a Virtue Ethicist. Living Well and Virtuously in Aristotelian and Contemporary Aretaic Ethics.Deniz A. Kaya - 2024 - Topoi 1:1-12.
    Drawing on Anscombe, in this essay I argue that we should not take Aristotle to be a moral philosopher, nor a virtue ethicist. This is because contemporary virtue ethics has little to do with Aristotelian ethics. While contemporary virtue ethics (or aretaic moral theory, as one may call it) operates on the level of moral and thus categorical norms, Aristotelian ethics—an aretaic life ethics—is primarily concerned with pragmatic norms. The main question for Aristotle is what a good general conduct of (...)
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  2. Virtuous actions in the Mengzi.Waldemar Brys - 2023 - British Journal for the History of Philosophy 31 (1):2-22.
    Many anglophone scholars take the early Confucians to be virtue ethicists of one kind or another. A common virtue ethical reading of one of the most influential early Confucians, namely Mengzi, ascribes to him the view that moral actions are partly (or entirely) moral because of the state from which they are performed, be it the agent’s motives, emotions, or their character traits. I consider whether such a reading of the Mengzi is justified and I argue that it is not. (...)
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  3. Foundations of an Ethical Framework for AI Entities: the Ethics of Systems.Andrej Dameski - 2020 - Dissertation, University of Luxembourg
    The field of AI ethics during the current and previous decade is receiving an increasing amount of attention from all involved stakeholders: the public, science, philosophy, religious organizations, enterprises, governments, and various organizations. However, this field currently lacks consensus on scope, ethico-philosophical foundations, or common methodology. This thesis aims to contribute towards filling this gap by providing an answer to the two main research questions: first, what theory can explain moral scenarios in which AI entities are participants?; and second, what (...)
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  4. Acting with Good Intentions: Virtue Ethics and the Principle that Ought Implies Can.Charles K. Fink - 2020 - Journal of Philosophical Research 45:79-95.
    In Morals from Motives, Michael Slote proposed an agent-based approach to virtue ethics in which the morality of an action derives solely from the agent’s motives. Among the many objections that have been raised against Slote’s account, this article addresses two problems associated with the Kantian principle that ought implies can. These are the problems of “deficient” and “inferior” motivation. These problems arise because people cannot freely choose their motives. We cannot always choose to act from good motives; nor can (...)
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  5. Nietzsche's Moral Psychology.Mark Alfano - 2019 - New York: Cambridge University Press.
    Introduction -/- 1 Précis -/- 2 Methodology: Introducing digital humanities to the history of philosophy 2.1 Introduction 2.2 Core constructs 2.3 Operationalizing the constructs 2.4 Querying the Nietzsche Source 2.5 Cleaning the data 2.6 Visualizations and preliminary analysis 2.6.1 Visualization of the whole corpus 2.6.2 Book visualizations 2.7 Summary -/- Nietzsche’s Socio-Moral Framework -/- 3 From instincts and drives to types 3.1 Introduction 3.2 The state of the art on drives, instincts, and types 3.2.1 Drives 3.2.2 Instincts 3.2.3 Types 3.3 (...)
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  6. Sepárame de mí. Amor y alteridad en Rousseau.Pablo Pavesi - 2019 - Disputatio. Philosophical Research Bulletin 8 (11):445-467.
    Divide me from Myself. Love and Alterity in Rousseau Rousseau affirms that love is the extension of self-love to the others. This theory confronts with a tradition that considers the loved person as «another self», an alterity of selfness that the notion of extension—as we maintain—suppresses. Our thesis is that extended self-love is a form of amour-propre directed to a chimera embodied by means of a plastic imagination that adorns, embellishes the real beings with imaginary beings, rendering them loveable. Thus (...)
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  7. An Enchanting Abundance of Types: Nietzsche’s Modest Unity of Virtue Thesis.Mark Alfano - 2015 - Journal of Value Inquiry 49 (3):417-435.
    Although Nietzsche accepted a distant cousin of Brian Leiter’s “Doctrine of Types,” according to which, “Each person has a fixed psycho-physical constitution, which defines him as a particular type of person,” the details of his actual view are quite different from the flat-footed position Leiter attributes to him. Leiter argues that Nietzsche thought that type-facts partially explain the beliefs and actions, including moral beliefs and actions, of the person whom those type-facts characterize. With this much, I agree. However, the Doctrine (...)
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  8. Qualified agent and agent-based virtue ethics and the problems of right action.Jason Kawall - 2014 - In Stan van Hooft & Nafsika Athanassoulis (eds.), The Handbook of Virtue Ethics. Acumen Publishing.
    An on-going question for virtue ethics is whether it stands as a truly distinctive approach to ethics. In particular, there has been much discussion of whether virtue ethics can provide a viable understanding of right action, one that is a genuine rival to familiar consequentialist and deontological accounts. In this chapter I examine two prominent approaches to virtue ethics, (i) qualified agent and (ii) agent-based virtue ethics, and consider whether either can provide an adequate account of right action. I begin (...)
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  9. Taking Seriously the Challenges of Agent-Centered Morality.Hye-Ryoung Kang - 2011 - JOURNAL OF INTERNATIONAL WONKWANG CULTURE 2 (1):43-56.
    Agent-centered morality has been a serious challenge to ethical theories based on agent-neutral morality in defining what is the moral point of view. In this paper, my concern is to examine whether arguments for agent-centered morality, in particular, arguments for agent-centered option, can be justified. -/- After critically examining three main arguments for agent-centered morality, I will contend that although there is a ring of truth in the demands of agent-centered morality, agent-centered morality is more problematic than agent-neutral morality. Nevertheless, (...)
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  10. Common-Sense Virtue Ethics and Moral Luck.Nafsika Athanassoulis - 2005 - Ethical Theory and Moral Practice 8 (3):265-276.
    Moral luck poses a problem for out conception of responsibility because it highlights a tension between morality and lack of control. Michael Slote’s common-sense virtue ethics claims to avoid this problem. However there are a number of objections to this claim. Firstly, it is not clear that Slote fully appreciates the problem posed by moral luck. Secondly, Slote’s move from the moral to the ethical is problematic. Thirdly it is not clear why we should want to abandon judgements of moral (...)
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  11. Renewing the Moral Life: Some Recent Work in Virtue Theory.Craig Paterson - 2000 - New Blackfriars 81 (952):238-44.
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