Aristotle: Eudemian Ethics

In the Eudemian Ethics II 1, 1219a34–b8, Aristotle defines happiness as ‘the activity of a complete life in accordance with complete virtue’. Most scholars interpret a complete life as a whole lifetime, which means that happiness involves virtuous activity over an entire life. This article argues against this common reading by using Aristotle’s notion of ‘activity’ (energeia) as a touchstone. It argues that happiness, according to the Eudemian Ethics, must be a complete activity that reaches its end at any and (...) every moment. The upshot of this reading is that life reaches completeness within a lifetime and that death cannot be the requirement for making life complete. (shrink)

This paper reconstructs the function argument of Aristotle’s Eudemian Ethics 2.1. The argument seeks to define happiness through the method of division; shows that the highest good is better than all four of the goods of the soul, not only two, as commentators have thought; and unlike the Nicomachean argument, makes the highest good definitionally independent of the human function.

In Eudemian Ethics I 6, Aristotle describes the progress of the ethical investigation as a drift from a) what is true but not clarifying to b) what is true and clarifying. The drift from a) to b) is usually interpreted as the overcome of a first obscure and confused grasp of the subject by a more accurate and reliable account. In this paper, I claim that the understanding of the methodological role of a) depends upon its dissociation from the notions (...) of obscurity and confusion. What is true but not clarifying should be rather understood as a first indistinct (but not confused) grasp of the subject. Its insuficiency as regards explanation is to be accounted on the base of its indistinctness and not on its supposed obscurity. (shrink)

I defend two main theses. First, I argue that Aristotle’s account of voluntary action focuses on the conditions under which one is the cause of one’s actions in virtue of being (qua) the individual one is. Aristotle contrasts voluntary action not only with involuntary action but also with cases in which one acts (or does something) due to one’s nature (for example, in virtue of being a member of a certain species) rather than due to one’s own desires (i.e. qua (...) individual). An action can be attributed to one qua individual in two distinct ways depending on whether one is a rational or a non-rational animal. One is responsible for one’s action in both cases, but only in the former case is one also responsible for being the sort of individual that performs it. Aristotle also distinguishes two ways in which an action can be compelled while still being an action of the agent. In the first case, one is compelled by (physically) external forces or circumstances to act against one’s internal impulse. In the second case, one is compelled to act on (internal) impulses that are fixed by one’s nature against one’s own individual impulse. This latter kind of compelled action is only possible in the case of rational agents. Secondly, I argue that Aristotle’s conception of what it is to be a cause of an action inevitably brings in certain normative features which support evaluative judgments and the practice of praise and blame. On Aristotle’s view, any goal-directed behavior that is properly attributable to an individual is (normally) subject to standards that pertain to behavior of that sort. At the most basic level, these standards establish what counts as a successful realization of the goal that one aims at. Thus even in the case of non-rational animals (or children), one can judge the success of what they are doing and encourage (or discourage) similar behavior by praise or blame. These standards are applicable to one’s conduct simply insofar as one is the controlling origin (or efficient cause) of one’s action qua individual. In the case of rational agents the practice of praise and blame can involve a further normative layer since they can be praised or blamed not only for acting in a certain way so as to encourage or discourage them with a view to the future, but also for being – and having become – individuals of a certain sort. Nevertheless, the applicability of such evaluative judgments and of praise and blame is still warranted by one’s being the controlling origin of one’s actions qua the individual one is (in this case, qua rational individual). (shrink)

Neste trabalho, pretendemos investigar como deve ser compreendida a questão “o que é o melhor?”, enunciada por Aristóteles no início de Ética Eudêmia I 8. Pretendemos, com isso, determinar quais são as suposições a partir das quais Aristóteles aborda essa pergunta em I 8, qual o tipo de resposta que a ela deve ser fornecida e como essa questão insere-se na investigação desenvolvida nos capítulos anteriores. Sustentaremos que, em I 8, Aristóteles pretende dar continuidade à tarefa que é iniciada em (...) I 7 e que consiste em tornar mais clara uma concepção geral de felicidade que não é posta em questão. Parte dessa concepção de felicidade consiste na ideia segundo a qual o melhor corresponde ao fim. A I 8 caberia tornar mais claro o que significa dizer do fim, que ele é aquilo que é o melhor. (shrink)