Aristotle: First Philosophy

I argue that the famous discussion of substance and essence in Aristotle's Metaphysics Z offers a direct and positive response to the central question of 'first philosophy' or "metaphysics" as to the first principles and causes of being qua being: Z is designed to establish that essences are the first principles and causes of composite substances insofar as they are. Two moves are crucial to my argument: First, I argue that the goal of the final chapter of Z (that is, (...) Z.17) is to give an account of essences as the first causes of being of composite substances. Second, I argue that the guiding question of Z 'What is substance?' should be understood as a causal question that seeks the 'what it is' of composite substances. Overall, contrary to prominent interpretations, it emerges that Z is neither an independent treatise on substance nor a negative aporetic contribution to first philosophy but rather a core part of Aristotle's positive first-philosophical project. I also argue that this reading of Z is compatible with Aristotle's characterization of first philosophy as 'theology'. (shrink)

In this second part of a 2-part survey of Aristotle's epistemology, I present an overview of Aristotle's views on technē (craft or excellent productive reason) and phronēsis (practical wisdom or excellent practical reason). For Aristotle, attaining the truth in practical matters involves actually doing the right action. While technē and phronēsis are rational excellences, for Aristotle they are not as excellent or true as epistēmē or nous because the kinds of truth that they grasp are imperfect and because they are (...) excellent states for humans, not simply speaking. I then discuss why Aristotle takes sophia (wisdom), understanding and scientific knowledge of the best things, to be its own excellence. While this is the best cognitive state for human beings, I argue that Aristotle thinks divine cognitive activity is different in kind and more perfect than any human activity. (shrink)

This paper offers an interpretation of Aristotle’s concepts of dynamis and energeia (commonly translated as potentiality and actuality), and of the thematic progression of Metaphysics IX. I first raise the question of where motion fits in Aristotle’s categories and argue that the locus of motion in the system of categories are the categories of doing and suffering, in which case dynamis and energeia in respect of motion can also be understood as the dynamis and energeia of doing and suffering. Next, (...) I argue that the analogy that Aristotle draws in IX.6 is an analogy between the dynamis and energeia of doing and suffering and the dynamis and energeia of substance. Finally, I try to show that it is this analogy between the kinetic and non-kinetic variants of dynamis and energeia—and not the distinction between end-inclusive and end-exclusive activities—that provides the key to understanding the structure of Metaphysics IX. (shrink)

Aristotle analyses a large range of objects as composites of matter and form. But how exactly should we understand the relation between the matter and form of a composite? Some commentators have argued that forms themselves are somehow material, that is, forms are impure. Others have denied that claim and argued for the purity of forms. In this paper, I develop a new purist interpretation of Metaphysics Z.10-11, a text central to the debate, which I call 'hierarchical purism'. I argue (...) that hierarchical purism can overcome the difficulties faced by previous versions of purism as well as by impurism. Roughly, on hierarchical purism, each composite can be considered and defined in two different ways: From the perspective of metaphysics, composites are considered only insofar as they have forms and defined purely formally. From the perspective of physics, composites are considered insofar as they have forms and matter and defined with reference to both. Moreover, while the metaphysical definition is a definition in the strict sense of 'definition', the physical definition is a definition in a loose sense. Analogous points hold for intelligible composites and geometry. Finally, neither sort of definitional practice implies that, for Aristotle, forms are impure. (shrink)

There are several passages in the Metaphysics where Aristotle explains ontological priority in terms of ontological dependence, but there are others where he seems to adopt a teleological conception of ontological priority. It is sometimes maintained that the latter priority too must be construed in terms of the former, or that the priorities in question are not both endorsed (or simultaneously endorsed) by Aristotle. The goal of this paper is to show otherwise; I argue that what is at issue are (...) two distinct priorities that Aristotle simultaneously endorses. (shrink)

This is a translation of Aristotle's Metaphysics V (Delta) 18-30 into Portuguese. (A different publication, with a different DOI, presents the commentaries that accompany this translation).

This essay is the first part of an analysis on the form and matter in the works of Aristotle. Within the whole analysis, I shall examine passages taken from different works of Aristotle that are relevant to the investigation on form and matter. In this essay, I shall focus exclusively on the chapter Metaphysics Zeta 3. The concepts of substance, matter, ontological subject, form, composite substance, this something and separated, which are consistently used by Aristotle within the development of the (...) mentioned chapter, will be part of my survey of the contents of the chapter. The central argument of Metaphysics Zeta 3, which maintains the equivalence between substance and the feature represented by ontological subject, and which leads, through this first equivalence and through the equivalence between matter and ontological subject, to the result that matter is (the only) substance, will be investigated step by step so that all presuppositions, entailments, and consequences of the argument itself can be clearly shown. The problems which are caused by the mentioned equivalence of substance and ontological subject will be pointed out during my look at the chapter’s contents. In particular, Aristotle cannot accept that, in spite of the ontological subject being a correct feature of substance qua substance, substance is therewith reduced to matter. Being the ontological subject does not represent the only ontological feature of substance qua substance; the ontological features too of substance qua substance that are represented by being a this something and being separated belong to the concept of substance: they can never be forgotten within a right interpretation of substance. The identification of substance only with matter can never be accepted. Only the ontological values of substance represented by the form and by the composite substance possess the ontological features “being a this something” and “being separated”. Therefore, the ontological values of substance as form and as a composite substance must always be reckoned with in a correctly interpreted ontology. Neither of these values can be forgotten within an accurate inquiry of ontology. Hence, regardless of whether matter is substance and is correctly interpreted as substance, the values of substance as form and as composite substance must belong, in Aristotle’s view, to any right ontological system whatsoever. The plurality of values for substance, which I personally advocate, finds confirmation thanks to chapter Metaphysics Zeta 3: Matter, form, and composite substance all represent values for substance, despite the differences which they have as regards their own ontological features. (shrink)

In these pages the author intends to examine the idea, quite widespread among Aristotle’s recent scholars, that the method of metaphysics were mainly dialectical. This problem is investigated in Aquinas, who decidedly denies that metaphysics uses dialectics because it just provides probability. Metaphysics, unlike dialectics, is not only based on the being of reason but also on the natural being. Therefore, it does not simply constitute a rational game about quiddities, but it studies things in their real actuality and must (...) therefore be supported by evidence. Although Aquinas agrees with Aristotle in affirming that not every science enjoys the same certainty, this fact is due to different reasons. First, all things do not possess the same stability and constancy. Secondly, there is not always a perfect match between the studied matter and the human faculty to ascertain. This match between the object and the subject is the most decisive factor for the certainty of sciences. (shrink)

Based on the notion of proem as exposed in Aristotle’s Rhetoric, we examine in detail Metaph. A1. Our goal is to understand the argument contained in this chapter, as we also endeavour to show how the Stagirite introduces with uttermost caution the theme of wisdom [σοφία], that which is the incarnation of the preeminent science in the first book of the Metaphysics. The attention we devote to the proem of this work is explained by the importance we attribute, unlike much (...) of contemporary scholars, to σοφία, that is, the science of first causes and principles, which we consider to be, ultimately, the pivotal formulation of the supreme science in the Metaphysics. (shrink)

This essay contains an attempt to trace the evolution of the concept of wisdom as found in the thought of Aristotle and Aquinas in terms of how the philosophical concept of wisdom as an intellectual virtue is understood and used to express the theological concept of wisdom as a gift of the Holy Spirit. The main aim is to understand how Aquinas derived the concept of wisdom from Aristotle's metaphysics and developed it in his mysticism. This research is based on (...) a close study of Book Six of Aristotle's Nichomachean Ethics, the corresponding sections of Aquinas' Sententia libri Ethicorum and question forty-five of the second part of the second part of Aquinas' Summa Theologiae. The insights gained from the study are then used to decipher the theoretical meaning of Augustine's famous saying: "love and do what thou wilt" and to expound on the practical value of wisdom for religious leaders. (shrink)

It is commonly assumed that Aristotle thinks that his claim that being exhibits a category-based pros hen structure, which he introduces to obviate the problem of categorial heterogeneity, is sufficient to defend the possibility of a science of being qua being. We, on the contrary, argue that Aristotle thinks that the pros hen structure is necessary only, but not sufficient, for this task. The central thesis of our paper is that Aristotle, in what follows 1003b19, raises a second problem for (...) the possibility of the science of being qua being; and that he does not think that the resolution of the first, the category-based problem, is either necessary or sufficient for resolving this problem. This is the problem: how can a plurality of apparently primary kinds and their opposites (they include to hen, to on, to auto, to homoion, to heteron and to anhomoion) be the subject-matter of the science of being qua being? It has been argued that these kinds are per se attributes of ousia and that, therefore, this problem is not different from the first problem. This, we argue, is mistaken; for nowhere in Gamma 2 does Aristotle claim that unity is a per se attribute of ousia. Rather, he says that identity, similarity, etc. are per se attributes of being qua being and unity qua unity. Aristotle’s resolution of the second problem, we argue, is that most of these kinds are reducible to a single compound principle: being-and-unity. Being and unity, moreover, are themselves related to each other as primary ousia and consequent ousia; but, we argue, Aristotle leaves it open, in Gamma 2, which of the two is primary, and which is consequent ousia. (shrink)

This monograph (TCC) analyzes the concept of prote philosophia in Aristotle's Metaphysics in order to infer what the real subject of study of the science that Aristotle intends to ground in this work. To do so, we will try to explain some Aristotelian conceptions of metaphysics as first philosophy analyzing the first causes and the first principles. Aristotle, in book IV, proposes a science that considers the study of being qua being and the properties that belong to it as such, (...) i.e., not particularly, but universally. Nevertheless, since "being" is not an univocal concept, it is necessary to describe the concept of substance (ousia), in books VII–IX and XII, as an inseparable part of being or, in other words, the substance being one being and also the cause of the existence of other beings. Afterwards, we describe the transition from the study of being to the study of substance with the purpose of safeguarding the possibility of a metaphysical science. Undoubtedly, the tasks concerning the investigation of first philosophy as a science are crucial for the study of being qua being insofar as their results explain the structure of reality itself. (shrink)

The article is the revised version of an inaugural lecture given at the University of Lucerne on 8 November 2001. In part (I), I give an interpretation of the first sentence of the Aristotelian Metaphysics: ‘All men desire by nature to know’. In part (II), I show how, for Aristotle, this desire to know constitutes a continuum from knowledge given by sense perception to knowledge of the first principles. In part (III), I compare this Aristotelian conception to Plato’s more ‘existentialist’ (...) approach which implies the turning of a ‘whole soul’ rather than a continuum. Preferring the latter concep- tion, I conclude with some hints of what I plan to do in the next years and give a short overview of the history of universities in Europe and Switzerland, ending with the University of Lucerne. (shrink)

The Eleventh Aporia results from the breakup of the entire Greek philosophy previous to Aristotle in two manners of conceiving and proposing the first principles (archai), specially the One (to hen): (i) the manner by which Physiologoi conceived the One as a principle, namely, assuming an underlying nature, different from the One in itself, not adequately characterized by the simple fact of being one and which is denoted by the concept of One, and (ii) the manner inaugurated by the Pythagoreans (...) and later endorsed by Plato, marked by the abandonment of the appeal to an underlying nature and by conceiving the One in itself (auto to hen) as a principle, depriving it of any connection with some reality not strictly characterized by being one. Aristotle faces this aporia in Metaphysics Iota 2 and, according to the interpretation I propose: (a) refuses the Pythagorean-Platonic manner of conceiving and proposing principles, (b) endorses the course of action of the Physiologoi, and, in doing so, (c) steps back and retakes the “project” of the Physiologoi at the point where it was interrupted, namely, during the search for a principle of motion. From this scenario, I will try to show that the final outcome of the Eleventh Aporia can be the introduction of the Prime Mover as the properly Aristotelian (and cosmological) candidate to the title of One between the principles. (shrink)

Aristotle talks about 'the first philosophy' throughout the Metaphysics – and it is metaphysics that Aristotle considers to be the first philosophy – but he never makes it entirely clear what first philosophy consists of. What he does make clear is that the first philosophy is not to be understood as a collection of topics that should be studied in advance of any other topics. In fact, Aristotle seems to have thought that the topics of Metaphysics are to be studied (...) after those in Physics. In what sense could metaphysics be the first philosophy in the context of contemporary metaphysics? This is the question examined in this essay. Contemporary topics such as fundamentality, grounding, and ontological dependence are considered as possible ways to understand the idea of first philosophy, but I will argue that the best way to understand it is in terms of essence. (shrink)

If the prime mover must be considered as efficient cause and not only as a final cause, then one must ask: why does God move the heavens? We hold the position that the anthropocentrism which Aristotle maintains is able to sufficiently justify the thesis that God moves the spheres so that human beings may exist. This provides an additional motive for accepting providence, which is manifestly ordered specifically towards man.

This paper looks at the causal activity of the unmoved mover of Aristotle. The author affirms both the efficient causality of God and his teleological role. He thinks that the principal character, by describing God, is ‘thinking on thinking’. That means his most important factor to act cannot only ‘be aimed’ but must also ‘be thought’. There are many new texts to defend such as an efficient causal interpretation and also various philosophical arguments to support final causality.

Aristotle, in his Metaphysics, not only tries to establish a relationship that is direct, coherent, inter-operational and "precise" between this science, its name as a science, and its object of study, but also begins an indignation that tries to set a science — materially adequate and formally correct — to study τὸ ὂν ᾗ ὂν. In order to complete this task, Aristotle does an in-focus strategy that consists on the diffusion of τὸ ὄν in its categories, that allows Aristotle the (...) possibility of formulate a science ἐπιστήμη to study τὸ ὂν ᾗ ὂν at the same time that supports the diffusion of τὸ ὄν in the "different categories or supreme genres" of τὸ ὄν. Due to this argumentation, Aristotle distinguishes the ἐπιστήμη σοφία of any other type of knowledge: the former is fundamentally an enquiry "about the first causes (πρῶτα αἴτια) and the principles (ἀρχὰς)". With this conception in mind, Aristotle was able to characterize several related forms of the ἐπιστήμη σοφία which, as a whole, eventually allow him to establish a science of the principles and causes "maximally universal and referred to…everything real", and in consequence, to "that that is, as long as something is". In this work, I will try to reconstruct such arguments, and offer some observations and conjectures referred to these notions that plausibly incline the scale in favor of an ontological reading of Aristotle’s Metaphysics, in order to contribute to clarify the confusion that exists between the aim of the discipline with the justification to establish the existence of its own object. (shrink)

The Role of Negation in the Description of the World According to Aristote’s Metaphysics. The notions of ‘being’ and ‘non-being’ have entered philosophical language, forming the basis of ontology and meontology, as the counterparts of the Greek expressions to on and to me on (nominalised forms, affirmative and negative, of the participle of the verb einai). Originally, however, these expressions did not have any objectifying meaning, but played the role of meta-language names, representing the copula einai in all its forms, (...) most generally in its affirmative and negative forms. The copula itself, which in later philosophy took on the existential meaning, had functioned only as a semantically empty connective of predicates. Over time the participle on has been used as a universal name of all predicates. The above-mentioned expressions became central in Greek philosophical terminology thanks to the debates, initiated by Parmenides, on the role of negation in the description of the world. Parmenides himself proposed a complete excision of negative sentences as describing by elimination, and created a positive-monistic system which abandoned multiplicity, divisibility, and variability. Later philosophers defended negation, fighting back against the paradoxes formulated by the Eleatics and later by the Sophists. Plato observed that without negation it is impossible to describe the multiplicity of things. He also distinguished a relative negation which does not eliminate anything but makes it possible to confront some things with others. According to the atomists, the divisibility of physical things forces us to accept that they consist of a positive element in the form of an impenetrable body, and of another element lacking any characteristics, i.e. the void. Finally, Aristotle, when analysing the process of change, justified the consistency of the statement that something comes out of “not being” and “being”, under the assumption that the former is understood as being actual, and the latter as being potential. In all these conceptions there is nothing non-existent, there are only proposals of how to identify the aspects of reality whose explanation justifies the use of negation. The affirmative and negative forms of the above expressions have also provoked reflection on the problem of truth and falsity. It has been observed that they are used in everyday language not only to state an agreement or disagreement with the actual facts of the matter, but also to affirm or deny something. (shrink)

Theophrastus' treatise "Metaphysics" contains a compact and critical reconstruction of unsolved systematic problems of classical Greek philosophy. It is primarily about fundamental problems of ontology and natural philosophy, such as the question of the interdependence of principles and perceptible phenomena or the plausibility of teleology as a methodical principle of the explanation of nature. The aim of the critical Greek-German edition (with introduction and commentary) is to make visible the systematic significance of Theophrastus' critique of metaphysics.

This paper will argue that the order and the unity of St. Thomas Aquinas’s five ways can be elucidated through a consideration of St. Thomas’s appropriation of an Avicennian insight that he used to order and unify the wisdom of the Aristotelian and Abrahamic philosophical traditions towards the existence of God. I will begin with a central aporia from Aristotle’s Metaphysics. Aristotle says that the science of first philosophy has three different theoretical vectors: ontology, aitiology, and theology. But how can (...) all three be united into a single Aristotelian science? In his Metaphysics of the Healing, Avicenna resolved the impasse by taking the ontological vector as the subject of metaphysics. He then integrated the question of the four first causes into the penultimate stage of his demonstration for the existence of God, thereby placing aitiological and theological questions among the ultimate concerns of a unified Aristotelian metaphysics. In the five ways, St. Thomas integrated Avicenna’s Aristotelian search for the first four causes into the last four of his five ways, by showing that each of the four aitiological orders terminate in an ultimate first cause that we call God. Finally, by appending the proof from the Physics to the beginning of the five ways, St. Thomas was able to show that the ultimate aim of both natural philosophy and metaphysics is the divine first principle, which is the beginning and subject of sacra doctrina. (shrink)

La exposición y crítica de las doctrinas antiguas tiene un lugar importante en los escritos de Aristóteles. Sin embargo, ciertas dudas se han vuelto corrientes acerca de la confiabilidad de sus descripciones. Más aún, se ha sostenido que Aristóteles deforma la comprensión histórica a través de la introducción de conceptos y términos propios. En este libro se aborda el problema a través de un análisis de las críticas que Aristóteles dirige a la teoría platónica de las Ideas, que permite explicar (...) la constitución y desarrollo de importantes conceptos aristotélicos a partir de la confrontación dialéctica con las doctrinas de su maestro. En efecto, las dificultades genuinas que Aristóteles descubre en el platonismo constituyen el motor para gestar nuevos conceptos, que no son ajenos, sino que surgen como implicaciones del examen crítico. Así, la imposición de términos propios no debe interpretarse como distorsión, sino como el modo que Aristóteles adopta para exhibir su particular solución a los problemas que los filósofos anteriores dejaron sin solución. (shrink)

In almost every handbook and in almost every history of philosophy you will find the thesis that Aristotle in Metaphysics Z has developed a theory about substance – an imperfect one unfortunately. From the Middle Ages until now this has been the most widely accepted claim about this book. Because the basis for this claim is not so easy to find in the text, there is a dispute about the question what a substance really is and ”which things“ are substances. (...) But the theory itself remains. If you engage to clear the field of problems in which this book has its roots, you will see apories developed by Plato in his dialogue Sophistes, mainly the apory in the middle of the dialogue. Here the guest from Elea is led to the question ”What in the world do we have to understand by the term ’to be’?“ ”...For you evidently understood the matter long ago; we, on the contrary, before thought we understood, but now are in trouble about it.“ Aristotle repeats this question, the question about being, on a new level and with new conceptual tools. In the Topics he develops what I call the ”topical approach.“ The use of it is suppported by a new type of concepts, the quotations (e. g. to ti estin: ”Say what you mean, if you ask 'What is this?'“ The standard translation ”essence“ makes impossible to see the genuine meaning of the term.) In Metaphysics Z he puts in concrete terms what in Metaphysics Λ was just a sketch of his speculation about ”to be.“ Seeing this background, it becomes clear that Metaphysics Z never contains the expected theory, which many allege that Aristotle is defending. This is no more than the remains of the pastristic and medieval interpretation. The German translation with commentary which I submit with this book, and an extensive introduction to these questions, should contribute to the destruction of this part of metaphysics. (shrink)

When I say that my conception of metaphysics is Aristotelian, or neo-Aristotelian, this may have more to do with Aristotle’s philosophical methodology than his metaphysics, but, as I see it, the core of this Aristotelian conception of metaphysics is the idea that metaphysics is the first philosophy . In what follows I will attempt to clarify what this conception of metaphysics amounts to in the context of some recent discussion on the methodology of metaphysics (e.g. Chalmers et al . (2009), (...) Ladyman and Ross (2007)). There is a lot of hostility towards the Aristotelian conception of metaphysics in this literature: for instance, the majority of the contributors to the Metametaphysics volume assume a rather more deflationary, Quinean approach towards metaphysics. In the process of replying to the criticisms towards Aristotelian metaphysics put forward in recent literature I will also identify some methodological points which deserve more attention and ought to be addressed in future research. (shrink)

In the following pages, the reader will find a detailed study of what Aristotle considered the most difficult aporia formulated in Metaphysics III (Beta), which is answered in chapter 2 of Book X (Iota): the Eleventh Aporia. In such aporia, Aristotle rivals: (i) the conception assumed by the ancient Physiologoi, which takes the One to be an underlying nature whose being is not exhausted by being One, and (ii) the Platonic-Pythagorean view, which prefers to conceive the One in itself, according (...) to its own determinations and apart from any connection with some reality outside it. (shrink)

This paper examines Aristotle’s notion of priority with the specific aim of capturing the sort of priority that characterizes the primacy of substances in his metaphysics. I reject the traditional interpretation, which understands the ontological priority of substances in terms of independent existence. But there are rather two sorts of priority: the ontological priority of substances should be understood in terms of completeness, whereas the ontological priority of “substances-of-something” (the essences) is a causal-explanatory priority. Furthermore, an important piece of Aristotle’s (...) argument against Platonism is that these two sorts of priority – namely, the completeness priority and the causal-explanatory priority – should be kept distinct. (shrink)

This book discusses Aristotle’s notions of essence and substance as they are developed in Metaphysics ZH. I examine Aristotle's argument at length and defends an unorthodox interpretation according to which his motivation is to provide an answer against a conflation between criteria for existential priority (delivering substances as primary beings) and criteria for explanatory priority (delivering essences as primary principles).

Translation of Aristotle's Metaphysics I-III into Portuguese, with a few notes and introduction. The translation, which was made at 2007, is preliminary and its publication was intended to provide a didactic tool for courses as well as a provisional resource in research seminars. It needs some revision. I am currently working (slowly...) on the revision of the translation and a new revised one will surely appear at some point.

The paper proposes a novel understanding of how Aristotle’s theoretical works complement each other in such a way as to form a genuine system, and this with the immediate (and ostensibly central) aim of addressing a longstanding question regarding Aristotle’s ‘first philosophy’—namely, is Aristotle’s first philosophy a contribution to theology, or to the science of being in general? Aristotle himself seems to suggest that it is in some ways both, but how this can be is a very difficult question. My (...) answer is in some respects a version of one that goes back at least to the middle ages—i.e., that first philosophy is concerned with the gods (and to that extent offers a theology) because the gods are causes and principles of beings precisely insofar as they are beings. The more original aspect of my position lies in my claim that the sort of tension found in the Metaphysics is likewise to be found in many of Aristotle’s physical works. Thus, for example, the De caelo is (I argue) concerned generally with natural beings (= beings susceptible of change), but its discussions are focused largely on the heavenly bodies and the Aristotelian elements insofar as they admit of change with respect to place. Here I claim that the particular objects of discussion are dealt with precisely because they are causes and principles of natural beings as such. Something similar goes, I claim, for the De generatione et corruptione, the general concern of which is a particular species of natural being—i.e., natural beings susceptible of generation and corruption. In this way, I argue, Aristotle successively deals in his theoretical works with those causes and principles of (say) a horse which attach to it insofar as it is a being, those causes and principles of a horse which attach to it insofar as it is a natural being, those causes and principles of a horse which attach to it insofar as it is a perishable natural being, and so on for the lower genera under which the species horse is subsumed. (shrink)

A tese central deste trabalho consiste em reconstruir em bases filosóficas as linhas gerais da teoria aristotélica da verdade mostrando, a partir da análise do Livro IV da Metafísica, que esta teoria está fundada naquilo que é chamado nesta investigação de princípio transcendental de verdade, o qual é constituído pela bi- implicação modal dos princípios de não-contradição, do terceiro excluído e de identidade.

Translation of Aristotle’s Metaphysics IX and X (Theta & Iota) into Portuguese, with a few notes, experimental glossary and introduction. The translation, which was made at 2004, is preliminary and its publication was intended to provide a didactic tool for courses as well as a provisional resource in research seminars. It needs some revision. I am currently working (slowly...) on the revision of the translation and a new revised one will surely appear at some point.

This paper discusses some intricacies of hylomorphism in Aristotle's discussion in his Metaphysics VII.

Notre étude sur le temps grec précédant la pensée d Aristote commencera d'abord par un commentaire de son premier texte, le Protreptique. Nous verrons se dégager deux temps distincts : l'un initiatique, circulaire et d'inspiration platonicienne, et l'autre diamétralement opposé dont Aristote serait le défenseur. Afin d'interroger cette dichotomie, nous retournerons aux conceptions poétiques. Les Tragiques nous permettront d'offrir une première esquisse de cette notion dans l'univers grec (Du destin...). Ensuite, l'oeuvre épique d'Homère sera l'occasion de mieux saisir le nouage (...) existant entre le temps et la sphère religieuse (Des héros...). Le travail du grand théologue Hésiode viendra confirmer cette vision initiatique, comme l'avait déjà remarquablement exposée F. Nietzsche (Des mythes...). C'est alors que nous plongerons au sein du pythagorisme afin de parachever cette vision (Des mystères...). Notre compréhension de ce courant, traversé par la théogonie iranienne, nous permettra, ensuite, de bien le distinguer de celui dit «ionien» et ainsi de s'éloigner de la parole platonicienne (De l'idéologie...). Enfin, en revenant aux premiers penseurs ioniens que furent Thalès et Anaximandre, nous analyserons si c'est effectivement cette vision du monde qui a été retenue par le Stagirite afin de fonder la première modélisation du concept de temps (De la science...). -/- Dans le deuxième volume, nous verrons revenir la pensée des théologoï au sein même du corpus aristotélicien et c'est alors que nous interrogerons notre division entre être et existence du temps. -/- Régis LAURENT est philosophe, membre de l'association Kairos kai logos (Centre d'études sur la pensée antique).Ce livre est le premier volet de son travail de thèse de doctorat en philosophie effectué au sein de trois Universités françaises (Grenoble, Clermont-Ferrand et Rennes).Outre cette formation philosophique,l'auteur est également diplômé en sciences humaines (Maîtrise des sciences du langage et maîtrise de psychologie). Par ailleurs, sa formation en théologie a été effectuée à l'Université thomiste de Paris (U.L.S.H = CEPHI) et au C.E.J de l'E.H.E.S.S. (shrink)

The present text is the revised and corrected English translation of the book published in German by the Lang Verlag, Bern 2008. Unfortunately the text still has some minor flaws (especially in the Index Locorum) but they do not concern the main thesis or the arguments. It will still be the final version, especially considering my age. It is among the most widespread and the least questioned convictions that in Metaphysics Lambda Aristotle presents a theology which has its basis in (...) a metaphysics of substance. Doubts about theological interpretation are beginning to stir in a growing number of publications, but nevertheless the majority of research literature, compendiums and histories of philosophy argues within this frame. A closer look at the facts reveals that this conviction has no basis in the text. Quite the contrary it is based on a reception with theological interests. It arised over centuries, starting from Patristic times and the Middle Ages; it was influenced by Neoplatonic texts as the Liber de Causis or the Theologia Aristotelis, texts for a long time considered as original Aristotelian books. And, if you read not translations but the Greek text, you see that the word 'god' occurs much less than in a theological book should be. In some translations we find more occurences of that word, and especially in French, Italian, English translations some words as le Bien, l'Intelligence etc. are written with capitals to inticate that it is about god. To make it even more clear, we read often the term 'First Mover' or 'Unmoved Mover' as an other name for god, but this expression is never used by Aristotle. So the reader has the impression that Aristotle speaks continuously about god. In addition, in the present book you will find arguments which clean up with the outdated concept of substance in the Aristotelian text, a concept which was developed for quite other problems than Aristotle had, namely theolgical ones. And, if there is no substance, there is no corresponding metaphysics of substance and no theology or onto-theology. If substance, metyphysics, theology play no role in Metaphysics Lambda, what else is its content and aim? That is not so difficult to say because Aristotle says it sufficiently clear in his first sentence, περὶ οὐσίας ἡ θεωρία: our inquiry is about being; its aim is to develop the Frage nach dem Sein and to state a speculative answer: being is noesis, Sein ist Gewahren. (shrink)