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  1. Consciousness, Origins.Gregory Nixon - 2016 - In Harold L. Miller Jr (ed.), The SAGE Encyclopedia of Theory in Psychology. Thousand Oaks, CA, USA: Sage Publications. pp. 172-176.
    To explain the origin of anything, we must be clear about that which we are explaining. There seem to be two main meanings for the term consciousness. One might be called open in that it equates consciousness with awareness and experience and considers rudimentary sensations to have evolved at a specific point in the evolution of increasing complexity. But certainly the foundation for such sensation is a physical body. It is unclear, however, exactly what the physical requirements are for a (...)
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  2. Neurophenomenology: An Invitation to Discussion.Paweł Gładziejewski - 2010 - Avant: Trends in Interdisciplinary Studies 1 (1):179–189.
    No more than a few years ago could open an article concerning neurophenomenology with a statement describing recent rediscovery of the problem of consciousness by the cognitive sciences and pointing to the fact that right now, explaining conscious experience in neuroscientific or computational terms poses the greatest challenge for those sciences. Today however, constatations of this sort start to sound like trivial descriptions of a universally recognized state of affairs. The question of “how the water of the physical brain is (...)
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  3. Weakness of Will and Motivational Internalism.Voin Milevski - 2017 - Philosophical Psychology 30 (1-2):44-57.
    The unconditional version of motivational internalism says that if an agent sincerely judges that to φ in circumstances C is the best option available to her, then, as a matter of conceptual necessity, she will be motivated to φ in C. This position faces a powerful counterargument according to which it is possible for various cases of practical irrationality to completely defeat an agent’s moral motivation while, at the same time, leaving her appreciation of her moral reasons intact. In this (...)
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  4. The Dynamic Role of Breathing and Cellular Membrane Potentials in the Experience of Consciousness.Jerath Ravinder, Shannon M. Cearley, Vernon A. Barnes & Santiago Junca - 2017 - World Journal of Neuroscience 7:66-81.
    Understanding the mechanics of consciousness remains one of the most important challenges in modern cognitive science. One key step toward understanding consciousness is to associate unconscious physiological processes with subjective experiences of sensory, motor, and emotional contents. This article explores the role of various cellular membrane potential differences and how they give rise to the dynamic infrastructure of conscious experience. This article explains that consciousness is a body-wide, biological process not limited to individual organs because the mind and body are (...)
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  5. Plato on Perceptual Cognition.Grönroos Gösta - 2001 - Dissertation, Stockholm University
    The aim of the study is to spell out and consider Plato' s views on perceptual cog­nition. It is argued that Plato is cornrnitted to the view that perceptual cognition can be rational, and that beliefs about the sensible world need not be confused or ill-founded. Plato' s interest in the matter arises from worries over the way in which his fore­runners and contemporaries conceived of perceptual cognition. They conceived of cognitive processes in terms of corporeal changes and attempted to (...)
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  6. Is There a Perceptual Relation?Tim Crane - 2006 - In Tamar Szabó Gendler & John Hawthorne (eds.), Perceptual Experiences. Oxford, UK: Oxford University Press. pp. 126-146.
    P.F. Strawson argued that ‘mature sensible experience (in general) presents itself as … an immediate consciousness of the existence of things outside us’ (1979: 97). He began his defence of this very natural idea by asking how someone might typically give a description of their current visual experience, and offered this example of such a description: ‘I see the red light of the setting sun filtering through the black and thickly clustered branches of the elms; I see the dappled deer (...)
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  7. The Problem of Perception in Analytic Philosophy.Tim Crane - unknown
    It will be obvious to anyone with a slight knowledge of twentieth-century analytic philosophy that one of the central themes of this kind of philosophy is the nature of perception: the awareness of the world through the five senses of sight, touch, smell, taste, and hearing. Yet it can seem puzzling, from our twenty-first-century perspective, why there is a distinctively philosophical problem of perception at all. For when philosophers ask ‘what is the nature of perception?’, the question can be confused (...)
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  8. Intentionalism.Tim Crane - 2009 - In Brian McLaughlin & Ansgar Beckermann (eds.), The Oxford Handbook to the Philosophy of Mind. Oxford: Oxford University Press. pp. 474-93.
    The central and defining characteristic of thoughts is that they have objects. The object of a thought is what the thought concerns, or what it is about. Since there cannot be thoughts which are not about anything, or which do not concern anything, there cannot be thoughts without objects. Mental states or events or processes which have objects in this sense are traditionally called ‘intentional,’ and ‘intentionality’ is for this reason the general term for this defining characteristic of thought. Under (...)
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  9. The Nature of Unsymbolized Thinking.Agustin Vicente & Fernando Martinez-Manrique - 2016 - Philosophical Explorations 19 (2):173-187.
    Using the method of Descriptive Experience Sampling, some subjects report experiences of thinking that do not involve words or any other symbols [Hurlburt, R. T., and C. L. Heavey. 2006. Exploring Inner Experience. Amsterdam: John Benjamins; Hurlburt, R. T., and S. A. Akhter. 2008. “Unsymbolized Thinking.” Consciousness and Cognition 17 : 1364–1374]. Even though the possibility of this unsymbolized thinking has consequences for the debate on the phenomenological status of cognitive states, the phenomenon is still insufficiently examined. This paper analyzes (...)
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  10. Experience and Reason.Fabian Dorsch - 2011 - Rero Doc.
    This collection brings together a selection of my recently published or forthcoming articles. What unites them is their common concern with one of the central ambitions of philosophy, namely to get clearer about our first-personal perspective onto the world and our minds. Three aspects of that perspective are of particular importance: consciousness, intentionality, and rationality. The collected essays address metaphysical and epistemological questions both concerning the nature of each of these aspects and concerning the various connections among them. More generally, (...)
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  11. Interview with Duncan Prichard.Luca Moretti - 2016 - The Reasoner 10 (11):87-89.
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  12. Zdravko Radman , The Hand: An Organ of the Mind, What the Manual Tells the Mental. [REVIEW]Victor Loughlin - 2016 - Phenomenology and the Cognitive Sciences 15 (2):291-296.
    Hands undoubtedly matter. Few, I suspect, would disagree. Yet The Hand, an Organ of the Mind uses this commonplace to dispel what is termed the “intellectualist illusion” , the illusion that the things we do with our hands are always and everywhere guided by an in-the-head centralised planner. Radman’s spirited collection of essays makes the point that we are not the sort of “centralised knowers” that the history of cognitive science might have us believe. Rather the manual is primary: it (...)
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  13. How I Learned to Stop Worrying and Love Probability 1.Daniel Greco - 2015 - Philosophical Perspectives 29 (1):179-201.
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  14. Perceptual Confidence.John Morrison - 2016 - Analytic Philosophy 57 (1):15-48.
    Perceptual Confidence is the view that perceptual experiences assign degrees of confidence. After introducing, clarifying, and motivating Perceptual Confidence, I catalogue some of its more interesting consequences, such as the way it blurs the distinction between veridical and illusory experiences, a distinction that is sometimes said to carry a lot of metaphysical weight. I also explain how Perceptual Confidence fills a hole in our best scientific theories of perception and why it implies that experiences don't have objective accuracy conditions.
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  15. Hill on Mind.Alex Byrne - 2016 - Philosophical Studies 173:831-39.
    Hill's views on visual experience are critically examined.
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  16. Semantic Inferentialism as (a Form of) Active Externalism.J. Adam Carter, James Henry Collin & S. Orestis Palermos - forthcoming - Phenomenology and the Cognitive Sciences.
    Within contemporary philosophy of mind, it is taken for granted that externalist accounts of meaning and mental content are, in principle, orthogonal to the matter of whether cognition itself is bound within the biological brain or whether it can constitutively include parts of the world. Accordingly, Clark and Chalmers (1998) distinguish these varieties of externalism as ‘passive’ and ‘active’ respectively. The aim here is to suggest that we should resist the received way of thinking about these dividing lines. With reference (...)
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  17. sSecial Relativity and Perception: The Singular Time of Philosophy and Physics.Stephen E. Robbins - 2010 - Journal of Consciousness Exploration and Research 1:500-531.
    The Special Theory of Relativity (STR) holds sway as a theory of time due to its apparently successful predictive structure regarding time-related phenomena such as the increased life spans of mesons or retarded clocks on jets circling the globe, and due to the relativization of simultaneity intrinsic to this theoretical structure. Yet the very structure of the theory demands that such very real physical effects be construed as non-ontological. The scope and depth of this contradiction is explored and, if these (...)
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  18. The Idols of Inner-Sense.Chad Kidd - 2015 - Philosophical Studies 172 (7):1759-1782.
    Many philosophers hold one of two extreme views about our capacity to have phenomenally conscious experience : either that inner-sense enables us to know our experience and its properties infallibly or the contrary conviction that inner-sense is utterly fallible and the evidence it provides completely defeasible. Both of these are in error. This paper presents an alternative conception of inner-sense, modeled on disjunctive conceptions of perceptual awareness, that avoids both erroneous extremes, but that builds on the commonsense intuitions that motivate (...)
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  19. The Innocent Eye: Why Vision Is Not a Cognitive Process By Nico Orlandi. [REVIEW]Thomas Polger - 2015 - Analysis 75 (2):343-345.
    In The Innocent Eye, Nico Orlandi argues that vision is not a cognitive process. In particular, she argues that forming subject-level visual representations that are available for reasoning should not itself be understood as a process of inference. This comes to the claim that vision (properly so-called) is a process that produces representations but is not best understood as a process that uses representations.
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  20. From Perception to Subject: The Bergsonian Reversal.Messay Kebede - 2014 - Journal of French and Francophone Philosophy 22 (1):102-123.
    Regardless of the metaphysics that inspires them, theories of perception invariably end up in the trap of subjectivism. Thus, idealism argues that the world can be nothing more than a representation of the mind. As to dualism and materialism, despite fundamental differences, they share the common assumption that perception is a subjective replica of external objects. Opposed to these theories is common sense with its tenacious belief that an external world exists and that things are perceived where they are and (...)
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  21. Sensorimotor Enactivism and Temporal Experience.David Silverman - 2013 - Adaptive Behavior 21 (3):151-158.
    O’Regan and Noë’s sensorimotor approach rejects the old-fashioned view that perceptual experience in humans depends solely on the activation of internal representations. Reflecting a wealth of empirical work, for example active vision, the approach suggests that perceiving is, instead, a matter of bodily exploration of the outside environment. To this end, the approach says the perceiver must deploy knowledge of sensorimotor contingencies, the ways sense input changes with movement by the perceiver or object perceived. Clark has observed that the approach (...)
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  22. Feigl, Sellars, and the Idea of a 'Pure Pragmatics'.Matthias Neuber - manuscript
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  23. Empirical Protocols for Mediating Long-Range Coherence in Biological Systems.Richard L. Amoroso - 2013 - Journal of Consciousness Exploration and Research 4 (09):24-45.
    Delineating the framework for a fundamental model of long-range coherence in biological systems is said to rely on principles beyond parameters addressed by current physical science. Just as phenomena of quantum mechanics lay beyond tools of classical Newtonian mechanics we must now enter a 3rd regime of unified field, UF mechanics. In this paper we present a battery of nine empirical protocols for manipulating long-range coherence in complex self-organized living systems (SOLS) in a manner surmounting the Copenhagen Interpretation of quantum (...)
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  24. Terms, Things and Response-Dependence.Philip Pettit - 1998 - European Review of Philosophy 3:55-66.
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  25. Social Mirrors and Shared Experiential Worlds.Charles Whitehead - 2001 - Journal of Consciousness Studies 8 (4):3-36.
    We humans have a formidable armamentarium of social display behaviours, including song-and-dance, the visual arts, and role-play. Of these, role-play is probably the crucial adaptation which makes us most different from other apes. Human childhood, a sheltered period of ‘extended irresponsibility’, allows us to develop our powers of make-believe and role-play, prerequisites for human cooperation, culture, and reflective consciousness. Social mirror theory, originating with Dilthey, Baldwin, Cooley and Mead, holds that there cannot be mirrors in the mind without mirrors in (...)
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  26. The You-I Event: On the Genesis of Self-Awareness.Stephen Langfur - 2013 - Phenomenology and the Cognitive Sciences 12 (4):769-790.
    I present empirical evidence suggesting that an infant first becomes aware of herself as the focal center of a caregiver's attending. Yet that does not account for her awareness of herself as agent. To address this question, I bring in research on neonatal imitation, as well as studies demonstrating the existence of a neural system in which parts of the same brain areas are activated when observing another's action and when executing a similar one. Applying these findings, I consider gestural (...)
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  27. Perceptual Aquaintance and Informational Content.Donovan Wishon - 2012 - In Miguens & Preyer (eds.), Consciousness and Subjectivity. Ontos Verlag. pp. 47--89.
    Many currently working on a Russellian notion of perceptual acquaintance and its role in perceptual experience (including Campbell 2002a, 2002b, and 2009 and Tye 2009) treat naïve realism and indirect realism as an exhaustive disjunction of possible views. In this paper, I propose a form of direct realism according to which one is directly aware of external objects and their features without perceiving a mind-dependent intermediary and without making any inference. Nevertheless, it also maintains that the qualitative character of perceptual (...)
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  28. Feeling or Thought – Both or Neither? A Short Review.Robert Zaborowski - 2012 - Organon 44:27-42.
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  29. Conceptual Knowledge: Grounded in Sensorimotor States, or a Disembodied Deus Ex Machina?Ezequiel Morsella, Carlos Montemayor, Jason Hubbard & Pareezad Zarolia - 2010 - Behavioral and Brain Sciences 33 (6):455-456.
    If embodied models no longer address the symbol grounding problem and a conceptual system can step in and resolve categorizations when embodied simulations fail, then perhaps the next step in theory-building is to isolate the unique contributions of embodied simulation. What is a disembodied conceptual system incapable of doing with respect to semantic processing or the categorization of smiles?
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  30. Prosthetic Gestures: How the Tool Shapes the Mind.Lambros Malafouris - 2012 - Behavioral and Brain Sciences 35 (4):230-231.
    I agree with Vaesen that it is a mistake to discard tool use as a hallmark of human cognition. I contend, nonetheless, that tools are not simply external markers of a distinctive human mental architecture. Rather, they actively and meaningfully participate in the process by which hominin brains and bodies make up their sapient minds.
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  31. Social Perception and “Spectator Theories” of Other Minds.Søren Overgaard & Joel Krueger - 2013 - Behavioral and Brain Sciences 36 (4):434 - 435.
    We resist Schilbach et al.’s characterization of the “social perception” approach to social cognition as a “spectator theory” of other minds. We show how the social perception view acknowledges the crucial role interaction plays in enabling social understanding. We also highlight a dilemma Schilbach et al. face in attempting to distinguish their second person approach from the social perception view.
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  32. Hiding in Plain Sight, Yet Again: An Unseen Attribute, An Unseen Plan, and A New Analysis of the Portland Vase Frieze.Randall Skalsky - Spr/Summer 2010 - Arion 18 (1):1-26.
    All interpretations of the Portland Vase frieze to date have failed to see, much less explain, a crucial figural attribute in the frieze, one that proves to be both explicit and explicatory, and whose location and appearance secures the identification of not one but, indeed, three figures. Furthermore, the attribute lies at the heart of a distinct schema of figural grouping and arrangement which has also gone unheeded in previous treatments of the Portland Vase frieze. By dint of this previously (...)
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  33. Is Cognition an Attribute of the Self or It Rather Belongs to the Body? Some Dialectical Considerations on Udbhaṭabhaṭṭa’s Position Against Nyāya and Vaiśeṣika.Krishna Del Toso - 2011 - Open Journal of Philosophy 1 (2):48.
    In this article an attempt is made to detect what could have been the dialectical reasons that impelled the Cār-vāka thinker Udbhatabhatta to revise and reformulate the classical materialistic concept of cognition. If indeed according to ancient Cārvākas cognition is an attribute entirely dependent on the physical body, for Udbhatabhatta cognition is an independent principle that, of course, needs the presence of a human body to manifest itself and for this very reason it is said to be a peculiarity of (...)
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  34. Visual Perception in Japanese Rock Garden Design.Gert J. van Tonder & Michael J. Lyons - 2005 - Axiomathes 15 (3):353-371.
    We present an investigation into the relation between design princi- ples in Japanese gardens, and their associated perceptual effects. This leads to the realization that a set of design principles described in a Japanese gardening text by Shingen (1466), shows many parallels to the visual effects of perceptual grouping, studied by the Gestalt school of psychology. Guidelines for composition of rock clusters closely relate to perception of visual figure. Garden design elements are arranged into patterns that simplify figure-ground segmentation, while (...)
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  35. Le fonctionnalisme face au problème Des qualia.Ned Block - 1992 - Les Etudes Philosophiques (3):337-369.
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  36. The Problem of Qualia.Brent Silby - unknown
    One of the major concerns for the contemporary philosophy of mind involves the problem of qualia. The word qualia refers to our subjective experience of the world and includes the properties of our experience that cannot be located in the world external to our minds. For example, the ineffable feel of a blue experience when one looks at the sky, or the pain one feels when one is stuck with a pin. These sensations are the essence of our experience and (...)
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  37. Understanding Unconscious Intelligence and Intuition: "Blink" and Beyond.Lois Isenman - 2013 - Perspectives in Biology and Medicine 56 (1):148-166.
    The importance of unconscious cognition is seeping into popular consciousness. A number of recent books bridging the academic world and the reading public stress that at least a portion of decision-making depends not on conscious reasoning, but instead on cognition that occurs below awareness. However, these books provide a limited perspective on how the unconscious mind works and the potential power of intuition. This essay is an effort to expand the picture. It is structured around the book that has garnered (...)
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  38. Perceptive Actions in Tetris.David Kirsh & Paul Maglio - 1992 - Proceedings of the AAAI Spring Symposium.
    Cognitive organisms have three rather different techniques for intelligently regulating their intake of environmental information. In order of the time needed to uncover information they are: 1. control of attention: within an image produced by a given sensor certain elements can be selected for additional processing; 2. control of gaze: the orientation and resolution (center of foveation) of the sensor can be regulated to create a new image; 3. control of activity: certain non-perceptual actions can be performed to increase the (...)
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  39. Top-Down Attention and Consciousness: Comment on Cohen Et Al.Naotsugu Tsuchiya, Ned Block & Christof Koch - 2012 - Trends in Cognitive Sciences 16 (11):527.
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  40. Replies to Commentators. Faulkner - 2012 - Abstracta (6).
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  41. The Great Philosophers: Where They Missed It and Why.Lorna Green - manuscript
    The great philosophers missed it, and here are the reasons why, how to bring them all up to date, a woman's take on things, with new categories and concepts, like love, oneness, the feminine, the earth, Spirit, the end of the old order, and the beginning of the new.
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  42. Introduction to All My Works 2012.Lorna Green - manuscript
    I am proposing a new Copernican revolution, that Consciousness and not matter is the true basis of the universe. Here is an account of my graduate student days at the Rockefeller University as a woman pioneer in science, and a sense of what I am really about in all of my works. I am giving a woman's take on the universe.
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  43. Perceiving Others and Their Minds: Response to McGeer.William Hirstein - 2009 - Modern Schoolman 86 (3-4):319-326.
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  44. The Phenomenology of Person Perception.Joel Krueger - 2014 - In Mark Bruhn & Donald Wehrs (eds.), Neuroscience, Literature, and History. Routledge. pp. 153-173.
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  45. Is Moral Internalism Supported by Folk Intuitions?Caj Strandberg & Fredrik Björklund - 2013 - Philosophical Psychology 26 (3):319-335.
    In the metaethical debate on moral internalism and externalism, appeal is constantly made to people’s intuitions about the connection between moral judgments and motivation. However, internalists and externalists disagree considerably about their content. In this paper, we present an empirical study of laymen’s intuitions about this connection. We found that they lend surprisingly little support to the most celebrated versions of internalism, which provide reasons to be skeptical of the evidential basis for these views.
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  46. What Someone’s Behaviour Must Be Like If We Are to Be Aware of Their Emotions in It.Rowland Stout - 2012 - Phenomenology and the Cognitive Sciences 11 (2):135-148.
    What someone’s behaviour must be like if we are to be aware of their emotions in it Content Type Journal Article Pages 1-14 DOI 10.1007/s11097-011-9224-0 Authors Rowland Stout, School of Philosophy, UCD Dublin, Dublin 4, Republic of Ireland Journal Phenomenology and the Cognitive Sciences Online ISSN 1572-8676 Print ISSN 1568-7759.
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  47. Framework of Consciousness From Semblance of Activity at Functionally LINKed Postsynaptic Membranes. Vadakkan - 2010 - Frontiers in Conssciousness Research 1 (1):1-12.
    Consciousness is seen as a difficult “binding” problem. Binding, a process where different sensations evoked by an item are associated in the nervous system, can be viewed as a process similar to associative learning. Several reports that consciousness is associated with some form of memory imply that different forms of memories have a common feature contributing to consciousness. Based on a proposed synaptic mechanism capable of explaining different forms of memory, we developed a framework for consciousness. It is based on (...)
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  48. Laws of Form: Why Spencer-Brown is Missing the Point.Claus Janew - 2011 - Journal of Consciousness Exploration and Research 2 (6):885-886.
    What George Spencer-Brown wants to rationalize out of existence is alternation itself – the prerequisite of his whole operation. By that he simplifies (identifies) more than he says. And he does not say all that is important.
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  49. Whitehead & the Elusive Present: Process Philosophy's Creative Core.Gregory M. Nixon - 2010 - Journal of Consciousness Exploration and Research 1 (5):625-639.
    Time’s arrow is necessary for progress from a past that has already happened to a future that is only potential until creatively determined in the present. But time’s arrow is unnecessary in Einstein’s so-called block universe, so there is no creative unfolding in an actual present. How can there be an actual present when there is no universal moment of simultaneity? Events in various places will have different presents according to the position, velocity, and nature of the perceiver. Standing against (...)
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  50. Four Theories of Inversion in Art and Music.John Dilworth - 2002 - Southern Journal of Philosophy 40 (1):1-19.
    Issues about the nature and ontology of works of art play a central part in contemporary aesthetics. But such issues are complicated by the fact that there seem to be two fundamentally different kinds of artworks. First, a visual artwork such as a picture or drawing seems to be closely identified with a particular physical object, in that even an exact copy of it does not count as being genuinely the same work of art. Nelson Goodman describes such works as (...)
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