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  1. Meinongian Merits and Maladies.Samuel Hoadley-Brill - manuscript
    According to what has long been the dominant school of thought in analytic meta-ontology––defended not only by W. V. O. Quine, but also by Bertrand Russell, Alvin Plantinga, Peter van Inwagen, and many others––the meaning of ‘there is’ is identical to the meaning of ‘there exists.’ The most (in)famous aberration from this view is advanced by Alexius Meinong, whose ontological picture has endured extensive criticism (and borderline abuse) from several subscribers to the majority view. Meinong denies the identity of being (...)
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  2. Russell's 1927 The Analysis of Matter as the First Book on Quantum Gravity.Said Mikki - manuscript
    The goal of this note is to bring into wider attention the often neglected important work by Bertrand Russell on the foundations of physics published in the late 1920s. In particular, we emphasize how the book The Analysis of Matter can be considered the earliest systematic attempt to unify the modern quantum theory, just emerging by that time, with general relativity. More importantly, it is argued that the idea of what I call Russell space, introduced in Part III of that (...)
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  3. A Quantificational Analysis of the Liar Paradox.Matheus Silva - manuscript
    It seems that the most common strategy to solve the liar paradox is to argue that liar sentences are meaningless and, consequently, truth-valueless. The other main option that has grown in recent years is the dialetheist view that treats liar sentences as meaningful, truth-apt and true. In this paper I will offer a new approach that does not belong in either camp. I hope to show that liar sentences can be interpreted as meaningful, truth-apt and false, but without engendering any (...)
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  4. "If-Then" as a Version of "Implies".Matheus Silva - manuscript
    Russell’s role in the controversy about the paradoxes of material implication is usually presented as a tale of how even the greatest minds can fall prey of basic conceptual confusions. Quine accused him of making a silly mistake in Principia Mathematica. He interpreted “if-then” as a version of “implies” and called it material implication. Quine’s accusation is that this decision involved a use-mention fallacy because the antecedent and consequent of “if-then” are used instead of being mentioned as the premise and (...)
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  5. The Quasi-Verbal Dispute Between Kripke and 'Frege-Russell'.J. P. Smit - manuscript
    Traditional descriptivism and Kripkean causalism are standardly interpreted as rival theories on a single topic. I argue that there is no such shared topic, i.e. that there is no question that they can be interpreted as giving rival answers to. The only way to make sense of the commitment to epistemic transparency that characterizes traditional descriptivism is to interpret Russell and Frege as proposing rival accounts of how to characterize a subject’s beliefs about what names refer to. My argument relies (...)
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  6. On the Gnoseologic Principles of Bertrand Russell.Rafael Andrés Alemañ-Berenguer - forthcoming - Naturaleza y Libertad. Revista de Estudios Interdisciplinares.
    Exposed in 1948, within his masterpiece on the scope and limits of human knowledge, the epistemological tenets that Bertrand Russell regarded as fundamental elements in the construction of scientific knowledge, are still worthy of a detailed discussion today. Given the excellence of the author, it will not be surprising to see that Russell's gnoseologic postulates, even for the present scientific view, address some of the most controversial questions still to be solved in the theory of knowledge.
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  7. The Limits and Basis of Logical Tolerance: Carnap’s Combination of Russell and Wittgenstein.Adam Tamas Tuboly - forthcoming - In Peter Stone (ed.), Bertrand Russell’s Life and Legacy. Vernon Press.
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  8. Russell Reads Bergson.Andreas Vrahimis - forthcoming - In Mark Sinclair & Yaron Wolf (eds.), The Bergsonian Mind. Oxon: Routledge.
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  9. Are Rules of Inference Superfluous? Wittgenstein Vs. Frege and Russell.Gilad Nir - 2021 - Teorema: International Journal of Philosophy 40 (2):45-61.
    In Tractatus 5.132 Wittgenstein argues that inferential justification depends solely on the understanding of the premises and conclusion, and is not mediated by any further act. On this basis he argues that Frege’s and Russell’s rules of inference are “senseless” and “superfluous”. This line of argument is puzzling, since it is unclear that there could be any viable account of inference according to which no such mediation takes place. I show that Wittgenstein’s rejection of rules of inference can be motivated (...)
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  10. How Not To Know The Principle of Induction.Howard Sankey - 2021 - International Journal for the Study of Skepticism 11 (3):243-254.
    In The Problems of Philosophy, Bertrand Russell presents a justification of induction based on a principle he refers to as “the principle of induction”. Owing to the ambiguity of the notion of probability, the principle of induction may be interpreted in two different ways. If interpreted in terms of the subjective interpretation of probability, the principle of induction may be known a priori to be true. But it is unclear how this should give us any confidence in our use of (...)
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  11. Why Did Frege Reject the Theory of Types?Wim Vanrie - 2021 - British Journal for the History of Philosophy 29 (3):517-536.
    I investigate why Frege rejected the theory of types, as Russell presented it to him in their correspondence. Frege claims that it commits one to violations of the law of excluded middle, but this complaint seems to rest on a dogmatic refusal to take Russell’s proposal seriously on its own terms. What is at stake is not so much the truth of a law of logic, but the structure of the hierarchy of the logical categories, something Frege seems to neglect. (...)
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  12. Ludwig’s Punch and Bertie’s Comeback. Reconciling Russell and Wittgenstein on the Content of Desires.Peter Baumann - 2020 - Russell: The Journal of Bertrand Russell Studies 40 (2):132-149.
    Desires are contentful mental states. But what determines the content of a desire? Two different classic answers were proposed by Russell and by Wittgenstein, starting in the 1910s. Russell proposed a behaviorist account according to which the content of the desire is fixed by the type of state that puts an end to the relevant kind of behavior which was triggered by some initial discomfort. The desire’s content consists in its “satisfaction conditions”. Wittgenstein criticized such an account for neglecting the (...)
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  13. Hegel's Proto-Modernist Conception of Philosophy as Science.Zeyad El Nabolsy - 2020 - Problemata: Revista Internacional de Filosofía 11 (4):81-107.
    I argue that the reception of Hegel in the sub-field of history and philosophy of science has been in part impeded by a misunderstanding of his mature metaphilosophical views. I take Alan Richardson’s influential account of the rise of scientific philosophy as an illustration of such misunderstanding, I argue that the mature Hegel’s metaphilosophical views place him much closer to the philosophers who are commonly taken as paradigms of scientific philosophy than it is commonly thought. Hegel is commonly presented as (...)
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  14. Arnošt Kolman’s Critique of Mathematical Fetishism.Jakub Mácha & Jan Zouhar - 2020 - In Radek Schuster (ed.), The Vienna Circle in Czechoslovakia. Cham, Switzerland: Springer. pp. 135-150.
    Arnošt Kolman (1892–1979) was a Czech mathematician, philosopher and Communist official. In this paper, we would like to look at Kolman’s arguments against logical positivism which revolve around the notion of the fetishization of mathematics. Kolman derives his notion of fetishism from Marx’s conception of commodity fetishism. Kolman is aiming to show the fact that an entity (system, structure, logical construction) acquires besides its real existence another formal existence. Fetishism means the fantastic detachment of the physical characteristics of real things (...)
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  15. Russell’s Conception of Propositional Attitudes in Relation to Pragmatism.Nikolay Milkov - 2020 - An Anthology of Philosophical Studies 14:117-128.
    The conventional wisdom has it that between 1905 and 1919 Russell was critical to pragmatism. In particular, in two essays written in 1908–9, he sharply attacked the pragmatist theory of truth, emphasizing that truth is not relative to human practice. In fact, however, Russell was much more indebted to the pragmatists, in particular to William James, as usually believed. For example, he borrowed from James two key concepts of his new epistemology: sense-data, and the distinction between knowledge by acquaintance and (...)
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  16. "Philosophie ist Möglichkeitswissenschaft" - Zur Beziehung von Philosophie, Wissenschaft und logischer Analyse bei Russell.Thomas Mormann - 2020 - Aufklärung Und Kritik 2020 (1):51 - 64.
    Bis heute wird Russells Philosophie nicht selten der Vorwurf gemacht, es fehle ihr an Kohärenz und Zusammenhang. Russell wird als ein Autor charakterisiert, der alle paar Jahre eine neue alternative Philosophie vorgeschlagen habe. In der vorliegenden Arbeit soll dagegen argumentiert werden, daß diese These auf einer zu oberflächlichen Ein–schätzung von Russells Denken beruht. Seine Philosophie verfügte sehr wohl über eine Einheit, die durch ihre charakteristische einheitsstiftende Methode vermittelt wurde. Dies war die Methode der logischen Analyse, die sich als Invariante in (...)
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  17. DESCRIPTION, ESPACE LOGIQUE ET ENJEU DE L'IMPLICATION DE L'OUVERTURE AU LANGAGE POUR LA CONCEPTION DU JUGEMENT DE LA LOGIQUE DE PORT-ROYAL.Katarina Peixoto - 2020 - Logique Et Analyse 249 (249-250):79-95.
    In this study, I intend to show how and why, in the Port-Royal Logic, a singular term can reveal the nature of the logical judgment in the handbook. As I argue, the treatment given to one of thee singular terms, namely, the defined descriptions, in the terminology introduced by Russell, leads to an opening to langage that sounds unexpected and unjustified. Considering the privilege of thinking over langage and also that judgment is the mental act that defines logic, however, we (...)
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  18. Bertrand Russell on Logical Constructions: Matter as a Logical Construction From Sense-Data.Mika Suojanen - 2020 - AL-Mukhatabat 36:13-33.
    The notion of logical construction was used by Bertrand Russell in the early 20th century, which originally comes from A. N. Whitehead. Russell said that matter as a mind-independent thing can only be known by description. He also argued that matter is a logical construction of sense-data. However, this leads to an incoherent view of the direct or indirect connection between a mind and the external world. The problem examining is whether a collapsing house is a logical construction of the (...)
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  19. A Brief Introduction to Analytic Philosophy.Oleksandr Kulyk - 2019 - Dnipro: LIRA.
    This brief introduction is for people who want to know the leading approaches to philosophy in the twentieth century in English-speaking countries but do not have much time to study them. The book contains texts of lectures and quizzes with explained answers. By the end of this book, you will understand what analysis is and how to practice it in a philosophical way. Moreover, you will be able to talk confidently about some of the great ideas of such philosophers as (...)
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  20. Review: Kant on Reflection and Virtue (by Melissa Merritt). [REVIEW]Francey Russell - 2019 - Society for German Idealism and Romanticism 2:60-72.
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  21. Did Russell Experience an Epiphany in 1911?Alan Kenneth Schwerin - 2019 - Principia: An International Journal of Epistemology 23 (1):1-17.
    Bertrand Russell’s conception of philosophy evolved dramatically in 1911 — the year he fell in love with Lady Ottoline Morrell. For many years Russell had been an ardent advocate of the view that philosophers ought to look for truths that are certain. The co-author of Principia Mathematica altered his commitment to certainty in philosophy in 1911. An analysis of his published views and correspondence from this time strongly suggests that the radical transformation was induced by an epiphany brought about by (...)
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  22. Russell and the Temporal Contiguity of Causes and Effects.Graham Clay - 2018 - Erkenntnis 83 (6):1245-1264.
    There are some necessary conditions on causal relations that seem to be so trivial that they do not merit further inquiry. Many philosophers assume that the requirement that there could be no temporal gaps between causes and their effects is such a condition. Bertrand Russell disagrees. In this paper, an in-depth discussion of Russell’s argument against this necessary condition is the centerpiece of an analysis of what is at stake when one accepts or denies that there can be temporal gaps (...)
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  23. Russell’s Logical Construction of the World.Peter J. Graham - 2018 - In Diego Machua & Baron Reed (eds.), Skepticism: From Antiquity to the Present. New York, USA: Bloomsbury Academic. pp. 454-466.
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  24. Analytic Philosophy and Philosophy of Language.Oleksandr Kulyk - 2018 - Днипро, Днепропетровская область, Украина, 49000: LIRA.
    This is an instructor’s manual with student exercises for the Analytic Philosophy and Philosophy of Language course. It is intended to assist the instructor in teaching the subject to students for whom English is a second language. -/- This manual begins with a chapter that describes the types of learning activities during this course. Next are topic chapters, each of which has four sections: a synopsis of the lecture on the topic; a lecture lesson worksheet with tasks; a seminar lesson (...)
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  25. Russell on Introspection and Self-Knowledge.Donovan Wishon - 2018 - In Russell Wahl (ed.), The Bloomsbury Companion to Bertrand Russell. New York, NY, USA: pp. 256-285.
    This chapter examines Bertrand Russell's developing views--roughly from 1911 to 1918--on the nature of introspective knowledge and subjects' most basic knowledge of themselves as themselves. It argues that Russell's theory of introspection distinguishes between direct awareness of individual psychological objects and features, the presentation of psychological complexes involving those objects and features, and introspective judgments which aim to correspond with them. It also explores his transition from believing that subjects enjoy introspective self-acquaintance, to believing that they only know themselves by (...)
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  26. Susan Stebbing, Incomplete Symbols and Foundherentist Meta-Ontology.Frederique Janssen-Lauret - 2017 - Journal for the History of Analytical Philosophy 5 (2):6-17.
    Susan Stebbing’s work on incomplete symbols and analysis was instrumental in clarifying, sharpening, and improving the project of logical constructions which was pivotal to early analytic philosophy. She dispelled use-mention confusions by restricting the term ‘incomplete symbol’ to expressions eliminable through analysis, rather than those expressions’ purported referents, and distinguished linguistic analysis from analysis of facts. In this paper I explore Stebbing’s role in analytic philosophy’s development from anti-holism, presupposing that analysis terminates in simples, to the more holist or foundherentist (...)
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  27. Russell on Acquaintance with Spatial Properties: The Significance of James.Alexander Klein - 2017 - In Innovations in the History of Analytical Philosophy. London: Palgrave Macmillan. pp. 229 – 264.
    The standard, foundationalist reading of Our Knowledge of the External World requires Russell to have a view of perceptual acquaintance that he demonstrably does not have. Russell’s actual purpose in “constructing” physical bodies out of sense-data is instead to show that psychology and physics are consistent. But how seriously engaged was Russell with actual psychology? I show that OKEW makes some non-trivial assumptions about the character of visual space, and I argue that he drew those assumptions from William James’s Principles. (...)
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  28. Causation, Physics, and Fit.Christian Loew - 2017 - Synthese 194 (6):1945–1965.
    Our ordinary causal concept seems to fit poorly with how our best physics describes the world. We think of causation as a time-asymmetric dependence relation between relatively local events. Yet fundamental physics describes the world in terms of dynamical laws that are, possible small exceptions aside, time symmetric and that relate global time slices. My goal in this paper is to show why we are successful at using local, time-asymmetric models in causal explanations despite this apparent mismatch with fundamental physics. (...)
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  29. The 1900 Turn in Bertrand Russell’s Logic, the Emergence of His Paradox, and the Way Out.Nikolay Milkov - 2017 - Siegener Beiträge Zur Geschichte Und Philosophie der Mathematik 7:29-50.
    Russell’s initial project in philosophy (1898) was to make mathematics rigorous reducing it to logic. Before August 1900, however, Russell’s logic was nothing but mereology. First, his acquaintance with Peano’s ideas in August 1900 led him to discard the part-whole logic and accept a kind of intensional predicate logic instead. Among other things, the predicate logic helped Russell embrace a technique of treating the paradox of infinite numbers with the help of a singular concept, which he called ‘denoting phrase’. Unfortunately, (...)
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  30. Russell and Husserl (1905–1918): The Not-So-Odd Couple.Nikolay Milkov - 2017 - In Peter Stone (ed.), Bertrand Russell’s Life and Legacy. Wilmington, DE: Vernon Press. pp. 73-96.
    Historians of philosophy commonly regard as antipodal Bertrand Russell and Edmund Husserl, the founding fathers of analytic philosophy and phenomenology. This paper, however, establishes that during a formative phase in both of their careers Russell and Husserl shared a range of seminal ideas. In particular, the essay adduces clear cases of family resemblance between Husserl’s and Russell’s philosophy during their middle period, which spanned the years 1905 through 1918. The paper thus challenges the received view of Husserl’s relation to early (...)
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  31. Russell’s Method of Analysis and the Axioms of Mathematics.Lydia Patton - 2017 - In Sandra Lapointe Christopher Pincock (ed.), Innovations in the History of Analytical Philosophy. London: Palgrave-Macmillan. pp. 105-126.
    In the early 1900s, Russell began to recognize that he, and many other mathematicians, had been using assertions like the Axiom of Choice implicitly, and without explicitly proving them. In working with the Axioms of Choice, Infinity, and Reducibility, and his and Whitehead’s Multiplicative Axiom, Russell came to take the position that some axioms are necessary to recovering certain results of mathematics, but may not be proven to be true absolutely. The essay traces historical roots of, and motivations for, Russell’s (...)
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  32. Is Russell's Conclusion About the Table Coherent?Alan Schwerin - 2017 - In Peter Stone (ed.), Bertrand Russell’s Life and Legacy. Vernon Press. pp. 111 - 140.
    In his The Problems of Philosophy Bertrand Russell presents us with his famous argument for representative realism. After a clear and accessible analysis of sensations, qualities and the multiplicity of perceptions of the qualities of physical objects, Russell concludes with a bold statement: -/- "The real table, if there is one, is not immediately known to us at all, but must be an inference from what is immediately known". -/- My argument and analysis strongly suggests that the conclusion that Russell (...)
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  33. Panpsychism, Panprotopsychism, and Neutral Monism.Donovan Wishon - 2017 - In Brian P. McLaughlin (ed.), Philosophy: Mind (MacMillan Interdisciplinary Handbooks). Farmington Hills, MI: pp. 51-70.
    This chapter provides an introduction to panpsychism, panprotopsychism, and neutral monism to an interdisciplinary audience.
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  34. Mapping The Understanding Complex in Russell's Theory of Knowledge.Katarina Perovic - 2016 - Russell: The Journal of Bertrand Russell Studies 36 (2):101-127.
    Anyone familiar with Russell’s work on the multiple-relation theory of judgment will at some point have puzzled over the map of the five-term understanding complex at the end of Chapter 1, Part II of his Theory of Knowledge (1913). Russell presents the map with the intention of clarifying what goes on when a subject S understands the “proposition” that A and B are similar. But the map raises more questions than it answers. In this paper I present and develop some (...)
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  35. Three Unpublished Manuscripts From 1903: "Functions", "Proof That No Function Takes All Values", "Meaning and Denotation".Bertrand Russell & Kevin C. Klement - 2016 - Russell: The Journal of Bertrand Russell Studies 36 (1):5-44.
    I present and discuss three previously unpublished manuscripts written by Bertrand Russell in 1903, not included with similar manuscripts in Volume 4 of his Collected Papers. One is a one-page list of basic principles for his “functional theory” of May 1903, in which Russell partly anticipated the later Lambda Calculus. The next, catalogued under the title “Proof That No Function Takes All Values”, largely explores the status of Cantor’s proof that there is no greatest cardinal number in the variation of (...)
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  36. Leaving the Soul Apart. An Introductory Study.Pietro Gori - 2015 - Philosophical Readings 7 (2):3-13.
    In The Analysis of Mind (1921), Bertrand Russell stresses the importance of William James’ late neutral monist view of consciousness for the studies in psychology. In so doing, he focuses on a topic whose roots can be traced back to the nineteenth-century European debate on physiology and scientific psychology. In this introductory paper I shall briefly outline the path that, starting from the revival of Kant in the German scientific debate, leads to both Ernst Mach’s and William James’ questioning the (...)
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  37. Jolen Galaugher, Russell’s Philosophy of Logical Analysis: 1897–1905. [REVIEW]Kevin C. Klement - 2015 - Journal for the History of Analytical Philosophy 3 (2).
    Review of Russell’s Philosophy of Logical Atomism 1897–1905, by Jolen Galaugher (Palgrave Macmillan 2013).
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  38. The Importance of Russell's Regress Argument for Universals.Katarina Perovic - 2015 - In Donovan Wishon Bernard Linsky (ed.), Acquaintance, Knowledge, and Logic: New Essays on Bertrand Russell's The Problems of Philosophy. pp. 277.
    In The Problems of Philosophy, Russell presented his famous regress argument against the nominalist denial of universals. In this paper I explore the origin of the argument in Russell and explore its relevance in contemporary metaphysical debate. I argue that a hundred years on, the argument still presents a powerful tool for realists in their debate with nominalists and trope theorists.
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  39. Gönderim Üzerine.Bertrand Russell - 2015 - Felsefe Tartismalari (49):55-72.
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  40. Frege, Russell, Ramsey and the Notion of an Arbitrary Function.Gabriel Sandu - 2015 - In Gabriel Sandu, Marco Panza & Hourya Benis-Sinaceur (eds.), Functions and Generality of Logic. Springer Verlag.
    The paper argues that unlike Ramsey, Frege and Russell lacked the idea of an arbitrary function and this had important consequences for their foundational programs.
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  41. The Cognitive Gap, Neural Darwinism & Linguistic Dualism —Russell, Husserl, Heidegger & Quine.Hermann G. W. Burchard - 2014 - Open Journal of Philosophy 4 (3):244-264.
    Guided by key insights of the four great philosophers mentioned in the title, here, in review of and expanding on our earlier work (Burchard, 2005, 2011), we present an exposition of the role played by language, & in the broader sense, λογοζ, the Logos, in how the CNS, the brain, is running the human being. Evolution by neural Darwinism has been forcing the linguistic nature of mind, enabling it to overcome & exploit the cognitive gap between an animal and its (...)
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  42. Russell's Logicism Through Kantian Spectacles [Review of Anssi Korhonen, Logic as Universal Science: Russell’s Early Logicism and Its Philosophical Context].Kevin C. Klement - 2014 - Russell: The Journal of Bertrand Russell Studies 34 (1).
    Review of Logic as Universal Science: Russell’s Early Logicism and Its Philosophical Context, by Anssi Korhonen (Palgrave Macmillan 2013).
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  43. Russellian Acquaintance Revisited.Ian Proops - 2014 - Journal of the History of Philosophy 52 (4):779-811.
    It is sometimes claimed that in his 1912 work, "The Problems of Philosophy" (POP), and possibly as early as “on Denoting”, Russell conceives of the mind's acquaintance with sense-data as providing an indubitable or certain foundation for empirical knowledge. However, although he does say things suggestive of this view in certain of his 1914 works, Russell also makes remarks in POP that conflict with any such broadly "Cartesian" interpretation of this work. This paper attempts to resolve this apparent tension, while (...)
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  44. Espace logique et modalités chez Wittgenstein.Fabien Schang - 2014 - AL-Mukhatabat 9:230-242.
    L'article s'intéresse aux obstacles épistémologiques qui empêchèrent Wittgenstein d'admettre l'idée moderne de logique modale et, en particulier, les logiques d'attitudes propositionnelles. Tout en proposant un aperçu rétrospectif de la logique des modalités épistémiques, nous verrons que ces obstacles reposent avant tout sur la nature de l'espace logique présenté dans le Tractatus Logico-Philosophicus et le statut métaphysique du sujet. Des passages éclairants seront rappelés pour justi.
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  45. Russell's Progress: Spatial Dimensions, the From-Which, and the At-Which.Gary Hatfield - 2013 - In Dina Emundts (ed.), Self, World, and Art: Metaphysical Topics in Kant and Hegel. De Gruyter. pp. 321–44.
    The chapter concerns some aspects of Russell’s epistemological turn in the period after 1911. In particular, it focuses on two aspects of his philosophy in this period: his attempt to render material objects as constructions out of sense data, and his attitude toward sense data as “hard data.” It examines closely Russell’s “breakthrough” of early 1914, in which he concluded that, viewed from the standpoint of epistemology and analytic construction, space has six dimensions, not merely three. Russell posits a three-dimensional (...)
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  46. The Joint Philosophical Program of Russell and Wittgenstein and Its Demise.Nikolay Milkov - 2013 - Nordic Wittgenstein Review 2 (1):81-105.
    Between April and November 1912, Bertrand Russell and Ludwig Wittgenstein were engaged in a joint philosophical program. Wittgenstein‘s meeting with Gottlob Frege in December 1912 led, however, to its dissolution – the joint program was abandoned. Section 2 of this paper outlines the key points of that program, identifying what Russell and Wittgenstein each contributed to it. The third section determines precisely those features of their collaborative work that Frege criticized. Finally, building upon the evidence developed in the preceding two (...)
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  47. Analytic Philosophy (Alternative Title 'Analytic Atheism?').Charles Pigden - 2013 - In Stephen Bullivant & Michael Ruse (eds.), The Oxford Handbook of Atheism. Oxford University Press. pp. 307-319.
    Most analytic philosophers are atheists, but is there a deep connection between analytic philosophy and atheism? The paper argues a) that the founding fathers of analytic philosophy were mostly teenage atheists before they became philosophers; b) that analytic philosophy was invented partly because it was realized that the God-substitute provided by the previously fashionable philosophy - Absolute Idealism – could not cut the spiritual mustard; c) that analytic philosophy developed an unhealthy obsession with meaninglessness which led to a new kind (...)
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  48. Russell on Hume's Account of the Self.Alan Schwerin - 2013 - Russell: The Journal of Bertrand Russell Studies 33 (1):31 - 47.
    The History of Western Philosophy enhanced Russell’s broad reputation among members of the public and helped secure his finances. But the academic community was less enthusiastic about the text and tended to treat it with contempt. My paper is a critical investigation of one of the central chapters of Russell’s History: namely, Russell’s rendition of David Hume’s views on the self. My argument is that Russell’s concise treat­ment of le bon David’s provocative views on the self must be read with (...)
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  49. On Russell’s Projected Review of Husserl’s Logische Untersuchungen.Andreas Vrahimis - 2013 - Proceedings of the 13th International Conference of ISSEI 13.
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  50. Russell, Wittgenstein, and Synthesis in Thought.Colin Johnston - 2012 - In Jose L. Zalabardo (ed.), Wittgenstein's Early Philosophy. Oxford University Press. pp. 15.
    Wittgenstein held that Russell’s multiple relation theory of judgment fails to explain an atomic judgment’s representation of entities as combined. He demonstrated this failure as follows. Under the multiple relation theory, an atomic judgment is a complex whose relating relation is judgment, the universal, and whose terms include the entities the judgment represents as combined. Taking such a complex we may arrive through the substitution of constituents at a complex whose relating relation is again judgment but whose terms do not (...)
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