View topic on PhilPapers for more information
Related categories

6 found
Order:
More results on PhilPapers
  1. added 2020-09-28
    A Defence of the Notion of ‘Foundedness’ in Carnap’s Aufbau.Sophie Nagler - 2020 - The New Collection 14:68-87.
    In Der logische Aufbau der Welt, first published in 1928, Carnap aims to rationally reconstruct all objects of cognition by logico-definitional means. As a result, he intends to obtain a fully objective framework in which scientific discourse can take place. This is made possible by the novel method of ‘purely structural definite description’ of all scientifically relevant objects, which is first introduced in the Aufbau. Key to the attainment of this goal is the notion of ‘foundedness’, which Carnap presents as (...)
    Remove from this list   Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark  
  2. added 2019-03-27
    Why “is At”? —On Quine’s Objection to Carnap’s Aufbau in “Two Dogmas of Empiricism”.Ka Ho Lam - 2018 - Journal for the History of Analytical Philosophy 6 (4).
    In “Two Dogmas”, Quine indicates that Carnap’s Aufbau fails “in principle” to reduce our knowledge of the external world to sense data. This is because in projecting the sensory material to reconstruct the physical world, Carnap gives up the use of operating rules and switches to a procedure informed by general principles. This procedure falls short of providing an eliminative translation for the connective “is at”, which is necessary for the reduction. In dissecting Quine’s objection, I argue that Quine has (...)
    Remove from this list   Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark  
  3. added 2018-06-20
    Naturalism, Normativity, and Explanation: Some Scientistic Biases of Contemporary Naturalism.Guy Axtell - 1993 - Metaphilosophy 24 (3):253-274.
    The critical focus of this paper is on a claim made explicitly by Gilbert Harman and accepted implicitly by numerous others, the claim that naturalism supports concurrent defense of scientific objectivism and moral relativism. I challenge the assumptions of Harman's ‘argument from naturalism' used to support this combination of positions, utilizing. Hilary Putnam’s ‘companions in guilt’ argument in order to counter it. The paper concludes that while domain-specific anti-realism is often warranted, Harman’s own views about the objectivity of facts and (...)
    Remove from this list   Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark  
  4. added 2017-08-02
    Rudolf Carnap.Logan Paul Gage - 2017 - In Paul Copan, I. I. I. Tremper Longman, Christopher L. Reese & Michael G. Strauss (eds.), Dictionary of Christianity and Science: The Definitive Reference for the Intersection of Christian Faith and Contemporary Science. Grand Rapids, MI: Zondervan Academic. pp. 79-80.
    A brief introduction to the life and key work of Rudolf Carnap with special attention to his work on inductive logic.
    Remove from this list   Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark  
  5. added 2017-03-13
    Carnap’s Epistemological Critique of Metaphysics.Darren Bradley - 2018 - Synthese 195 (5):2247-2265.
    Many who take a dismissive attitude towards metaphysics trace their view back to Carnap’s ‘Empiricism, Semantics and Ontology’. But the reason Carnap takes a dismissive attitude to metaphysics is a matter of controversy. I will argue that no reason is given in ‘Empiricism, Semantics and Ontology’, and this is because his reason for rejecting metaphysical debates was given in ‘Pseudo-Problems in Philosophy’. The argument there assumes verificationism, but I will argue that his argument survives the rejection of verificationism. The root (...)
    Remove from this list   Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   2 citations  
  6. added 2013-08-19
    Truth and Confirmation.Rudolf Carnap - 1949 - In Harry Fiegl & Wilfred Sellars (eds.), Readings in Philosophical Analysis. Appleton-Century-Crofts. pp. 119--127.
    Remove from this list   Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   22 citations