Civil and Political Rights, Misc

L'America e il mondo sono in procinto di collassare a causa di una crescita eccessiva della popolazione, la maggior parte per il secolo scorso e ora tutto a causa di persone del terzo mondo. Il consumo di risorse e l'aggiunta di uno o due miliardi in più di 2100 crolleranno la civiltà industriale e porterà alla fame, alle malattie, alla violenza e alla guerra su scala impressionante. Miliardi moriranno e la guerra nucleare è tutt'altro che certa. In America questo è (...) stato enormemente accelerato dalla massiccia immigrazione e dalla riproduzione degli immigrati, unite ad abusi resi possibili dalla democrazia. La natura umana depravata trasforma inesorabilmente il sogno della democrazia e della diversità in un incubo di criminalità e povertà. La causa principale del collasso è l'incapacità della nostra psicologia innata di adattarsi al mondo moderno, che porta le persone a trattare le persone non correlate come se avessero interessi comuni. Questo, oltre all'ignoranza della biologia e della psicologia di base, porta alle illusioni di ingegneria sociale dei parzialmente istruiti che controllano le società democratiche. Pochi capiscono che se aiuti una persona che fai del male a qualcun altro, non c'è pranzo gratuito e ogni singolo oggetto che qualcuno consuma distrugge la terra in modo irreparabile. Di conseguenza, le politiche sociali ovunque sono insostenibili e una dopo l'altra tutte le società senza rigorosi controlli sull'egoismo crolleranno nell'anarchia o nella dittatura. Senza cambiamenti drammatici e immediati, non c'è speranza di prevenire il crollo dell'America, o di qualsiasi paese che segua un sistema democratico. Da qui il mio saggio "Suicide by Democracy". È anche ormai chiaro che i sette sociopatici che governano la Cina stanno vincendo la terza guerra mondiale, e quindi il mio saggio conclusivo su di loro. L'unica minaccia più grande è l'Intelligenza Artificiale che commento brevemente. La chiave di tutto ciò che ci riguarda è la biologia, ed è l'ignarietà che porta milioni di persone intelligenti istruite come Obama, Chomsky,Clinton, il Partito Democratico e il Papa a sposare ideali utopici suicidi che portano inesorabilmente direttamente all'Inferno sulla Terra. Come W ha notato, è ciò che è sempre davanti ai nostri occhi che è il più difficile da vedere. Viviamo nel mondo del sistema linguistico deliberativo cosciente 2, ma è inconscio, automatico sistema riflessivo 1 che governa. Questa è la fonte della cecità universale descritta da The Phenomenological Illusion (TPI) di Searle, Pinker's Blank Slate and Tooby and Cosmides' Standard Social Science Model. Il primo gruppo di articoli cerca di dare un'idea di come ci comportiamo che è ragionevolmente privo di illusioni teoriche. Nei prossimi tre gruppi commento tre delle principali illusioni che impediscono un mondo sostenibile: tecnologia, religione e politica (gruppi cooperativi). La gente crede che la società possa essere salvata da loro, quindi fornisco alcuni suggerimenti nel resto del libro sul perché questo è improbabile attraverso brevi articoli e recensioni di libri recenti di scrittori ben noti. Un'altra sezione descrive l'illusione religiosa – che c'è qualche super potere che ci salverà. La sezione successiva descrive le illusioni digitali, che confondono i giochi linguistici del System 2 con gli automatismi del Sistema uno, e quindi non possono distinguere le macchine biologiche (cioè le persone) da altri tipi di macchine (cioè i computer). Altri illusioni digitali sono che saremo salvati dal male puro (egoismo) del Sistema 1 da computer/AI/robotica/nanotecnologia/ingegneria genetica creata dal System 2. Il principale Nessun pranzo libero ci dice che ci saranno conseguenze gravi e forse fatali. L'ultima sezione descrive The One Big Happy Family Delusion, cioè che siamo selezionati per la cooperazione con tutti, e che gli ideali euforici di Democrazia, Diversità e Uguaglianza ci condurranno all'utopia, se ne gestiamo le cose correttamente (la possibilità della politica). Ancora una volta, il No Free Lunch Principle dovrebbe avvertirci che non può essere vero, e vediamo nel corso della storia e in tutto il mondo contemporaneo, che senza controlli rigorosi,egoismo e stupidità guadagnano il sopravvento e presto distruggono qualsiasi nazione che abbracci queste illusioni. Inoltre, la mente scimmia sconti ripida il futuro, e così collaboriamo nel vendere il patrimonio del nostro discendente per comfort temporanei, esacerbando notevolmente i problemi. (shrink)

Αμερική και ο κόσμος βρίσκονται στη διαδικασία της κατάρρευσης από την υπερβολική αύξηση του πληθυσμού, το μεγαλύτερο μέρος της για τον τελευταίο αιώνα και τώρα όλα αυτά οφείλεται στον 3ο κόσμο ανθρώπους. Η κατανάλωση πόρων και η προσθήκη ενός ή δύο δισεκατομμυρίων επιπλέον περίπου 2100 θα καταρρεύσουν τον βιομηχανικό πολιτισμό και θα επιφέρουν την πείνα, τις ασθένειες, τη βία και τον πόλεμο σε μια συγκλονιστική κλίμακα. Δισεκατομμύρια θα πεθάνουν και ο πυρηνικός πόλεμος είναι όλα, αλλά βέβαιος. Στην Αμερική αυτό επιταχύνεται (...) σημαντικά από τη μαζική μετανάστευση και την αναπαραγωγή μεταναστών, σε συνδυασμό με καταχρήσεις που κατέστησαν δυνατές από τη δημοκρατία. Η διεφθαρμένη ανθρώπινη φύση μετατρέπει αδυσώπητα το όνειρο της δημοκρατίας και της πολυμορφίας σε εφιάλτη του εγκλήματος και της φτώχειας. Η βασική αιτία της κατάρρευσης είναι η αδυναμία της έμφυτης ψυχολογίας μας να προσαρμοστούν στο σύγχρονο κόσμο, η οποία οδηγεί τους ανθρώπους να αντιμετωπίζουν άσχετα πρόσωπα σαν να είχαν κοινά συμφέροντα. Αυτό, συν την άγνοια της βασικής βιολογίας και της ψυχολογίας, οδηγεί στις αυταπάτες κοινωνικής εφαρμοσμένης μηχανικής των μερικώς εκπαιδευμένων που ελέγχουν τις δημοκρατικές κοινωνίες. Λίγοι καταλαβαίνουν ότι αν βοηθήσετε ένα άτομο που να βλάψει κάποιον άλλο-δεν υπάρχει δωρεάν γεύμα και κάθε στοιχείο που καταναλώνει κανείς καταστρέφει τη γη πέρα από την επισκευή. Κατά συνέπεια, οι κοινωνικές πολιτικές παντού είναι μη βιώσιμες και μία προς μία όλες οι κοινωνίες χωρίς αυστηρούς ελέγχους του εγωισμού θα καταρρεύσουν σε αναρχία ή δικτατορία. Χωρίς δραματικές και άμεσες αλλαγές, δεν υπάρχει καμία ελπίδα για την πρόληψη της κατάρρευσης της Αμερικής, ή οποιασδήποτε χώρας που ακολουθεί ένα δημοκρατικό σύστημα. Εξ ου και το δοκίμιό μου "Αυτοκτονία από τη Δημοκρατία". Είναι επίσης πλέον σαφές ότι οι επτά κοινωνιοπαθείς που κυβερνούν την Κίνα κερδίζουν τον 3ο Παγκόσμιο Πόλεμο, και έτσι το τελικό δοκίμιό μου για αυτούς. Η μόνη μεγαλύτερη απειλή είναι η τεχνητή νοημοσύνη την οποία σχολιάζω εν συντομία. Το κλειδί για τα πάντα για εμάς είναι η βιολογία, και είναι αγνοεί σε αυτό που οδηγεί εκατομμύρια έξυπνες μορφωμένοι άνθρωποι όπως ο Ομπάμα, Chomsky, Κλίντον, το Δημοκρατικό Κόμμα και ο Πάπας να ενστερνιστεί αυτοκτονική ουτοπία που οδηγεί αδυσώπητα κατ 'ευθείαν στην κόλαση στη Γη. Όπως σημείωσε ο W, είναι αυτό που είναι πάντα μπροστά στα μάτια μας που είναι το πιο δύσκολο να δούμε. Ζούμε στον κόσμο του συνειδητού διαφωτιστικού γλωσσικού συστήματος 2, αλλά είναι ασυνείδητο, αυτόματο αντανακλαστικό σύστημα 1 που κυβερνά. Αυτή είναι η πηγή της καθολικής τύφλωση που περιγράφεται από searle η φαινομενολογική ψευδαίσθηση (TPI), Blank Σχιστόλιθος Pinker και Tooby και Πρότυπο Cosmides »Κοινωνικής Επιστήμης Μοντέλο. Η πρώτη ομάδα άρθρων προσπαθούν να δώσουν κάποια εικόνα για το πώς συμπεριφερόμαστε που είναι αρκετά απαλλαγμένη από θεωρητικές αυταπάτες. Στις επόμενες τρεις ομάδες σχολιάζω τρεις από τις κύριες αυταπάτες που εμποδίζουν έναν βιώσιμο κόσμο: την τεχνολογία, τη θρησκεία και την πολιτική (συνεταιριστικές ομάδες). Οι άνθρωποι πιστεύουν ότι η κοινωνία μπορεί να σωθεί από αυτούς, γι 'αυτό παρέχουν κάποιες προτάσεις στο υπόλοιπο του βιβλίου ως προς το γιατί αυτό είναι απίθανο μέσω σύντομων άρθρων και σχόλια των πρόσφατων βιβλίων από γνωστούς συγγραφείς. Ένα άλλο τμήμα περιγράφει τη θρησκευτική αυταπάτη - ότι υπάρχει κάποια υπερδύναμη που θα μας σώσει. Η επόμενη ενότητα περιγράφει τις ψηφιακές αυταπάτες, οι οποίες συγχέουν τα γλωσσικά παιχνίδια του Συστήματος 2 με τους αυτοματισμούς του Συστήματος ένα, και έτσι δεν μπορούν να διακρίνουν τις βιολογικές μηχανές (δηλαδή, τους ανθρώπους) από άλλα είδη μηχανών (π.χ. υπολογιστές). Άλλες ψηφιακές αυταπάτες είναι ότι θα σωθούμε από το καθαρό κακό (εγωισμός) του Συστήματος 1 από υπολογιστές/AI/ρομποτική/νανοτεχνολογία/γενετική μηχανική που δημιουργήθηκε από το Σύστημα 2. Ο διευθυντής του No Free Lunch μας λέει ότι θα υπάρξουν σοβαρές και πιθανώς μοιραίες συνέπειες. Η τελευταία ενότητα περιγράφει το One Big Happy Family Delusion, δηλαδή ότι έχουμε επιλεγεί για συνεργασία με όλους, και ότι τα ευφημιαία ιδανικά της Δημοκρατίας, της Διαφορετικότητας και της Ισότητας θα μας οδηγήσουν στην ουτοπία, αν απλά διαχειριστούμε τα πράγματα σωστά (η δυνατότητα της πολιτικής). Και πάλι, η Αρχή Χωρίς Δωρεάν Γεύμα θα έπρεπε να μας προειδοποιήσει ότι δεν μπορεί να είναι αλήθεια, και βλέπουμε σε όλη την ιστορία και σε όλο τον σύγχρονο κόσμο, ότι χωρίς αυστηρούς ελέγχους, τον εγωισμό και την ηλιθιότητα να αποκτήσουν το πάνω χέρι και σύντομα να καταστρέψουν κάθε έθνος που αγκαλιάζει αυτές τις αυταπάτες. Επιπλέον, το μυαλό μαϊμού εκπτώσεις απότομα το μέλλον, και έτσι συνεργαζόμαστε στην πώληση κληρονομιά του απογόνου μας για προσωρινές ανέσεις, επιδεινώνοντας σημαντικά τα προβλήματα. (shrink)

Short online essay on the state of policing in liberal societies, discussing how executive discretionary power has grown to such a degree that it has trended toward illiberal practices and policies.

When we abandon the neoliberal fiction that one is independent on the grounds that it is a-historic and antisocial, we realize that everyone is dependent and interdependent. In a media-driven society the self-identity of the individual is formed within the framework of the culture-ideology of consumerism from early childhood. As a result, both the environmental and social destruction have intensified. In the global era, or in the era of the global environmental crisis, self-identity as a precondition for environmentally sustainable care (...) of the self should be based on the culture-ideology of human rights and responsibilities, and on conscious self-limitation which realizes that one’s prosperity and security cannot come at the expense of others. Care of the self is about ensuring the habitability of the global environment as the primary interest of each individual. (shrink)

: Does the rejection of pure proceduralism show that we should adopt Brettschneider’s value theory of democracy? The answer, this paper suggests, is ‘no’. There are a potentially infinite number of incompatible ways to understand democracy, of which the value theory is, at best, only one. The paper illustrates and substantiates its claims by looking at what the secret ballot shows us about the importance of privacy and democracy. Drawing on the reasons to reject Mill’s arguments for open voting, in (...) a previous paper by A. Lever, it argues that people’s claims to privacy have a constitutive, as well as an instrumental, importance to democratic government, which is best seen by attending to democracy as a practice, and not merely as a distinctive set of values. (shrink)

Human rights theory and practice have long been stuck in a rut. Although disagreement is the norm in philosophy and social-political practice, the sheer depth and breadth of disagreement about human rights is truly unusual. Human rights theorists and practitioners disagree – wildly in many cases – over just about every issue: what human rights are, what they are for, how many of them there are, how they are justified, what human interests or capacities they are supposed to protect, what (...) they require of persons and institutions, etc. Disagreement about human rights is so profound, in fact, that several prominent theorists have remarked that the very concept of a “human right” appears nearly criterionless. In my 2012 article, “Reconceptualizing Human Rights”, I diagnosed the root cause of these problems. Theorists and practitioners have falsely supposed that the concept of “human right” picks out a single, unified class of moral entitlements. However, the concept actually refers to two fundamentally different types of moral entitlements: (A) international human rights, which are universal human moral entitlements to coercive international protections, and (B) domestic human rights, which are universal human moral entitlements to coercive domestic protections. Accordingly, I argue, an adequate “theory of human rights” must be a dual theory. The present paper provides the first such theory. First, I show that almost every justificatory ground given for “human rights” in the literature – such as the notion of a “minimally decent human life”, “urgent human interests”, and “human needs” – faces at least one of two fatal problems. Second, I show that after some revisions, James Griffin’s conception of “personhood” provides a compelling justificatory ground for international human rights. Third, I show that the account entails that there are very few international human rights – far fewer than existing human rights theories and practices suggest. Fourth, I show that there are reasons to find my very short list of international human rights compelling: “human rights justifications” for coercive international and foreign policy actions over the past several decades have consistently overstepped what can be morally justified, and my account reveals precisely how existing human rights theories and practices have failed to adequately grapple with these moral hazards. Finally, I outline an account of domestic human rights which fits well with many existing human rights beliefs and practices, vindicating those beliefs and practices, but only at a domestic level. (shrink)

This paper analyzes the current crisis of the global industrial civilization as a coincidence of external and internal reasons, mainly as a coincidence of economic and environmental crises tendencies. The analysis is based on Habermas´ distinction between four types of social formation, and according to their internal organizational principles and an extent of their social and system integration, also types of crises that can occur in the given type of the social formation. The paper shows that the common reason of (...) economic and environmental crises which are a part of system crisis of industrial civilization is an imperative of growth. This imperative, as Habermas points out, is the immanent principle of institutions and systems of capitalism. Economic and demographic growth of industrial civilization based on capitalism principles has reached its limits. However, all types of social formation, institutions and civilizations are also determined by the imperative of sustainability. The current crisis is then characterized as a display of antagonism between the imperative of growth and imperative of sustainability. This antagonism creates a new category of transformation for sustainable societies or revolution conflicts in states that break environmental and economic limits of growth. These conflicts result from food and water shortages and could bring a growing instability into the world or lead into the collapse of the industrial civilization. (shrink)

This article forms part of a tribute to Anita L. Allen by the APA newletter on Philosophy and Law. It celebrates Allen's work, but also explains why her conception of privacy is philosophically inadequate. It then uses basic democratic principles and the example of the secret ballot to suggest how we might develop a more philosophically persuasive version of Allen's ideas.

It is especially hard, at present, to read the newspapers without emitting a howl of anguish and outrage. Philosophy can heal some wounds but, in this case, political action may prove a better remedy than philosophy. It can therefore feel odd trying to think philosophically about surveillance at a time like this, rather than joining with like-minded people to protest the erosion of our civil liberties, the duplicity of our governments, and the failings in our political institutions - including our (...) political parties – revealed by the succession of leaks which have dripped away this the summer. Still, philosophy can help us to think about what we should do, not merely what we should believe. Thus, in what follows I draw on my previous work on privacy, democracy and security, in order to highlight aspects of recent events which – or so I hope – may prove useful both for political thought and action. (shrink)

Should voting be compulsory? This question has recently gained the attention of political scientists, politicians and philosophers, many of whom believe that countries, like Britain, which have never had compulsion, ought to adopt it. The arguments are a mixture of principle and political calculation, reflecting the idea that compulsory voting is morally right and that it is will prove beneficial. This article casts a sceptical eye on the claims, by emphasizing how complex political morality and strategy can be. Hence, I (...) show, while there are good reasons to worry about voter turnout in established democracies, and to worry about inequalities of turnout as well, the case for compulsory voting is unpersuasive. (shrink)

Lisa Hill’s response to my critique of compulsory voting, like similar responses in print or in discussion, remind me how much a child of the ‘70s I am, and how far my beliefs and intuitions about politics have been shaped by the electoral conflicts, social movements and violence of that period. -/- But my perceptions of politics have also been profoundly shaped by my teachers, and fellow graduate students, at MIT. Theda Skocpol famously urged political scientists to ‘bring the state (...) back in’ to their analyses, and to recognise that political identities, interests and coalitions cannot be read off straightforwardly from people’s socio-economic position. In their different ways, this was the lesson that Suzanne Berger, Charles Sabel and Joshua Cohen tried to teach us, emphasising the ways that political participation and conflict, themselves, can change people’s identities, their sense of what it is desirable and possible, and their ability to recognise, or oppose, the freedom and equality of others. -/- I do not therefore take it as self-evident that the poor and seemingly powerless should be politically apathetic, unwilling to vote, or incapable of imagining a political solution to at least some of the problems confronting them. Nor do I suppose that non-voters are all-of-a-piece, and that their shared interests are, inevitably, more significant, morally or politically, than those which divide them. Such assumptions seem mistaken in the case of voters, and I see no reason why they should be true of non-voters. The people we find in these categories are not predestined to be in one rather than the other; they do not always stay where they start off; and at an individual level, the reasons why people fall into one group, rather than another, are likely to be complex and sometimes unpredictable. -/- Above all I see nothing in a commitment to democratic government, understood realistically or in more idealistic terms, that requires us to treat raising turnout at national elections (once every four years or so) as of such moral or political importance that we should make it legally mandatory. Realistically, it is an open question how far the ballot box is, for most people, the path to empowerment – important though it is that people should have an equal right to vote and to stand as candidates at national elections. On a more idealistic view of democratic politics it is hard to avoid the thought that the importance of national elections to self-government, posited by proponents of compulsory voting, reflects an alienated and alienating view of democracy, in which the choice of our leaders becomes more important than the development and exercise of our own capacities to lead; and in which our awe at the power our leaders might wield is matched only by our inability to imagine less intimidating, distant and centralised forms of politics. -/- But before saying a little more about these points, and their significance for compulsory voting, I would like to dispel some misunderstandings or misrepresentations of my views in Hill’s essay. I do not believe socio-economic disparities in turnout are not worrying for democratic politics, nor do I believe that abstention is generally synonymous with consent. I do not assume that people have a right not to vote, but try to explain why moral and legal rights to abstain are an important part of democratic politics, including electoral politics. (shrink)

This paper examines Jeremy Waldron’s ‘core case’ against judicial review. Waldron’s arguments, it shows, exaggerate the importance of voting to our judgements about the legitimacy and democratic credentials of a society and its government. Moreover, Waldron is insufficiently sensitive to the ways that judicial review can provide a legitimate avenue of political activity for those seeking to rectify historic injustice. While judicial review is not necessary for democratic government, the paper concludes that Waldron is wrong to believe that it is (...) a threat to democracy. (shrink)

In my 1990 work – Marxism, Morality, and Social Justice – I argued for four modifications of Rawls’s principles of social justice and rendered a modified version of his theory in four principles, the first of which is the Basic Rights Principle demanding the protection of people’s security and subsistence rights. In both his Political Liberalism and Justice as Fairness Rawls explicitly refers to my version of his theory, clearly accepting three of my four proposed modifications but rejecting the fourth (...) ‐‐ the demand for social and economic democracy – on grounds that it automatically justifies socialism as opposed to capitalism. I argue, contrary to Rawls, that it is not true that this demand automatically picks socialism as the preferablesocioeconomic/political system and that a Social and Economic Democracy Principle demanding workplace and neighborhood democracy is officially neutral between these two systems … although plausible empirical assumptions may, indeed, favor the former. I then significantly elaborate my second version of Rawls’s theory of social justice which is composed of the following principles arranged in a very strong order of priority : Basic Rights Principle, Equal Basic Liberties Principle, Fair Equality of Opportunity Principle, Modified Difference Principle, and Social and Economic DemocracyPrinciple. I argue that this elaborated version of the theory – which I call “Justice as Fair Rights” – is better than either Rawls’s original theory or my previous versions of it. (shrink)

According to Mathias Risse and Richard Zeckhauser, racial profiling can be justified in a society, such as the contemporary United States, where the legacy of slavery and segregation is found in lesser but, nonetheless, troubling forms of racial inequality. Racial profiling, Risse and Zeckhauser recognize, is often marked by police abuse and the harassment of racial minorities and by the disproportionate use of race in profiling. These, on their view, are unjustified. But, they contend, this does not mean that all (...) forms of racial profiling are unjustified; nor, they claim, need one be indifferent to the harms of racism in order to justify racial profiling. In fact, one of the aims of their paper is to show that racial profiling, suitably understood, “is consistent with support for far-reaching measures to decrease racial inequities and inequality.” Hence, one of their most striking claims, in an original and provocative paper, is that one can endorse racial profiling without being in any way indifferent to the disadvantaged status of racial minorities. In an initial response to these claims, I argued that Risse and Zeckhauser tend to underestimate the harms of racial profiling. I suggested two main reasons why they did so. The first is that they tend to identify the more serious harms associated with profiling with background racism, and therefore to believe that these are not properly attributable to profiling itself. The second reason is that they ignore the ways in which background racism makes even relatively minor harms harder to bear and to justify than would otherwise be the case. Hence, I concluded, racial profiling cannot be a normal part of police practice in a society still struggling with racism, although under very special conditions and with special regulation and compensation in place, it might be justified as an extraordinary police measure. I want to stand by those claims. However, Risse’s response to my arguments persuades me that I misinterpreted his earlier position in one significant respect. So I will start by explaining what interpretive mistake I believe that I made. I will then argue that despite Risse’s patient and careful response to my arguments, my initial concerns with his justification of profiling remain valid. -/- . (shrink)

Od końca XX wieku w Europie rozwija się instytucja ponadpaństwowego obywatelstwa europejskiego, które obecnie pozostaje komplementarne wobec członkostwa jednostki w strukturze państwa. Obywatelstwo związane jest głównie z państwem, zarówno genetycznie, jak i funkcjonalnie, zaś proces kształtowania się idei obywatelstwa i jej prawnego urzeczywistniania leży w cywilizacji europejskiej głęboko u początków państwowości. Podkreślić należy przy tym, iż to wydarzenia końca XVIII wieku we Francji bezsprzecznie dodały rozwojowi idei obywatelstwa nowej dynamiki, prowadząc do jej nowożytnej instytucjonalizacji. Przez stulecia porządek prawny panujący w (...) państwach europejskich determinował bowiem posiadanie przez jednostkę praw, które wynikały z jej przynależności do danej grupy społecznej (kręgu wolno urodzonych, grona zamożnych, czy danego stanu). Dopiero akty prawne doby Rewolucji Francuskiej wprowadziły kategorię praw podmiotowych jednostki. Słusznie przyjęło się uważać, iż Rewolucja Francuska stworzyła „nowego człowieka” − obywatela. Nieczęsto jednak zwraca się uwagę na fakt, iż burzliwe wydarzenia końca XVIII wieku we Francji doprowadziły do powstania różnych wzorców obywatela, zaś wszystkie one razem stały się podstawą dla prawnego urzeczywistnienia obywatelstwa państwowego w Europie. Podstawy ideologiczne gruntownych przemian dawała twórczość wielkich myślicieli Oświecenia, zwłaszcza zaś poglądy wyrażane przez Monteskiusza i Jana Jakuba Rousseau. Nie bez znaczenia pozostawały również społeczno-polityczne oraz gospodarcze koncepcje przedstawicieli szkoły fizjokratów i encyklopedystów (czy nawet utopijnych komunistów). Intelektualiści epoki proponowali kierunki zmian często zasadniczo od siebie odmienne, ale zawsze – teoretycznie przynajmniej – lepsze od stanu rzeczywistego. Przelewane na papier wizje uznanych pisarzy podsycały ogólny klimat niezadowolenia i przyspieszały dojrzewanie rozwiązań radykalnych. Intelektualna krytyka istniejącego status quo prowadziła wprost do przełomu, który miał uzbroić człowieka w więcej praw, poszerzyć horyzonty jego wolności i przekształcić poddanego w obywatela. (shrink)

Poprzez wieki ewolucji idei i instytucji obywatelstwa w Europie, płeć (obok wolności osobistej, wieku, pochodzenia, miejsca urodzenia, domicylu czy majętności ) należała do głównych kryteriów posiadania pełnoprawnego statusu obywatelskiego w państwie. Obywatelstwo aż do XX wieku miało charakter patriarchalny, jednak jego współczesna definicja implikuje równouprawnienie obu płci. Egalitaryzacja dostępu do pełnego obywatelstwa w nowożytnej Europie następowała wieloetapowo. Proces ten wiązał się ze zmianami mentalności społecznej i stopniowym znoszeniem prawnego upośledzenia kobiet w różnych dziedzinach życia.

An assessment of Martha Nussbaum's capabilities approach with respect to religion. I contend that her contribution to John Rawls's project of political-liberalism would be less accommodating of religion, specifically illiberal religions, than it desires to be. This feature weakens the capabilities approach as a foundation for inclusive and stable political institutions in pluralistic societies.

Artykuł, choć traktuje głównie o statusie jednostki w realiach i myśli politycznej monarchii absolutnej doby Bodinusa i Pufendorfa, odnosi się – toutes proportions gardées – do następującej kwestii: Czy członków państw niedemokratycznych, pozbawionych pełni praw i wolności politycznych, można określać mianem obywateli? Krzysztof Trzciński, Odwrócenie perspektywy: poddany jako obywatel w monarchii absolutnej, czyli o wieloznaczności pojęć lub ich różnym rozumieniu, „Przegląd Politologiczny” 3/2004, s. 93-106.

Are rights to privacy consistent with sexual equality? In a brief, but influential, article Catherine MacKinnon trenchantly laid out feminist criticisms of the right to privacy. In “Privacy v. Equality: Beyond Roe v. Wade” she linked familiar objections to the right to privacy and connected them to the fate of abortion rights in the U.S.A. (MacKinnon, 1983, 93-102). For many feminists, the Supreme Court’s decision in Roe v. Wade (1973) had suggested that, notwithstanding a dubious past, legal rights to privacy (...) might serve feminist objectives, and prove consistent with sexual equality. By arguing that Roe’s privacy justification of abortion rights was directly responsible for the weakness and vulnerability of abortion rights in America, MacKinnon took aim at feminist hopes for the right to privacy at their strongest point. Maintaining that Roe’s privacy justification of abortion is intimately, and not contingently, related to the Supreme Court’s subsequent decision in Harris v. McRae, (1980) MacKinnon concluded that privacy rights cannot be reconciled with the freedom and equality of women, and so can have no place in a democracy.1 In Harris, the Supreme Court held that the State need not provide Medicaid coverage for abortions that are necessary to preserve the health, but not the life, of a pregnant woman, effectively depriving poor women of almost all state aid for abortions.2 Moreover, the Court’s subsequent decision in Bowers v . Hardwick (1986) appeared to confirm the truth of MacKinnon’s observation – though this case concerned gay rights, rather than abortion rights, and occurred several years after MacKinnon’s condemnation of Harris. -/- This paper examines MacKinnon’s claims about the relationship of rights to privacy and equality in light of the reasoning in Harris and Bowers. When we contrast the Majority and Minority decisions in these cases, it shows, we can distinguish interpretations of the right to privacy that are consistent with sexual equality from those that are not. This is not simply because the two differ in their consequences – though they do - but because the former, unlike the latter, rely on empirical and normative assumptions that would justify sexual inequality whatever right they were used to interpret. So while I agree with MacKinnon that the Majority’s interpretation of the right to privacy in Harris is inconsistent with the equality of men and women, I show that there is no inherent inconsistency in valuing both privacy and equality, and no reason why we must chose to protect the one, rather than the other. Indeed, an examination of MacKinnon’s article, I suggest, can help us to see why rights to privacy can be part of a scheme of democratic rights, and how we might go about democratising the right to privacy in future. To avoid confusion I should emphasise that my arguments are of a philosophical, not a legal, nature. Thus, I will be ignoring the specifically legal and constitutional aspects of MacKinnon’s article, and of the Supreme Court decisions, in order to bring their philosophical significance into focus. -/- . (shrink)