Consciousness and Psychology, Foundational Issues

Representing oneself as an existing entity and having intense fear of the unknown are human specificities. Self-consciousness and anxiety states are characteristics of our human minds. We propose that these two characteristics share a common evolutionary history during which they acted in synergy for the build-up of our human minds. We present that perspective by using an evolutionary scenario for self-consciousness in which anxiety management plays a key role. Such evolutionary background can introduce new relations between philosophy of mind and (...) psychology. The proposed evolutionary scenario starts at the Pan-Homo split time (about 6my ago) when our pre-human ancestors were able to manage representations while also being able to partly identify with their conspecifics. These identifications allowed our ancestors to merge the representations they had of parts of themselves with the corresponding representations they had of their conspecifics. The scenario proposes that such merger has led our ancestors to progressively build up a representation of their own entity as existing in the environment, like conspecifics were represented as existing. This evolutionary process is considered in the scenario as the source of an ancestral form of self-consciousness. The same process has also produced identifications with suffering or endangered conspecifics which have created in the minds of our ancestors some new anxieties coming in addition to the animal ones. The resulting psychological sufferings had to be limited for evolution to continue. The tools developed to that end by our ancestors (caring, collaboration, communication, ToM, ...) have also procured significant evolutionary benefits with positive feedbacks on identifications. Overall, the evolutionary scenario proposes that the combination of the anxiety management processes with the evolution toward self-consciousness has created an evolutionary engine that has accelerated the coming up of our human self-consciousness. As a result, our today human minds contain important anxieties interwoven with an evolutionary nature of self-consciousness. Such perspective brings to consider that many of our mental states may be unconsciously guided by these evolutionary sourced anxieties (which are still to be clearly understood). Corresponding anxiety management processes are then key contributors to our human feelings and motivations, and to our interpersonal relationship. For instance, the role of Pascalian type diversions can be understood as keeping consciousness away from psychological sufferings produced by too anxious mental states. Also, part of our human sexuality developed during human evolution can be considered as a multidimensional escape and refuge from anxiety. This also brings to look at our psychological well-being and to our mental health as much more related to anxiety management than assumed so far. Dis-functioning of anxiety management processes can then be source of mental disorders and illnesses. On that subject the evolutionary scenario proposes that avoidances of too anxious mental states can lead to evil behaviors. These subjects need more developments. Possible continuations are introduced. (shrink)

The different approaches of the mind-body problem a fortiori have implications on the foundations of Psychology, Psychopathology and Psychiatry, leading to many clashing theories about the determinants of "normal" human behavior, as well of the mental illnesses. These schools of research on the human mind may on a first approach be divided in two main branches: 1) the neurogenetic ones; 2) the psychogenetic ones. This paper sprang up from a lifelong pondering on its subject by its author, while working as (...) a Clinical Psychiatrist and conducting a Ph D in Philosophy. (shrink)

To study (un)conscious perception and test hypotheses about consciousness, researchers need procedures for determining whether subjects consciously perceive stimuli or not. This article is an introduction to a family of procedures called ‘confidence-based procedures’, which consist in interpreting metacognitive indicators as indicators of consciousness. I assess the validity and accuracy of these procedures, and answer a series of common objections to their use in consciousness research. I conclude that confidence-based procedures are valid for assessing consciousness, and, in most cases, accurate (...) enough for our practical and scientific purposes. (shrink)

The primary determinant of the self (S) is the conscious experience (CE) we have of it. Therefore, it does not come as a surprise that empirical research on S mainly resorts to the CE (or lack of CE) that subjects have of their S. What comes as a surprise is that empirical research on S does not tackle the problem of how CE contributes to building S. Empirical research investigates how S either biases the cognitive processing of stimuli or is (...) altered through a wide range of means (meditation, hypnosis, etc.). In either case, even for different reasons, considerations of how CE contributes to building S are left unspecified in empirical research. This article analyzes these reasons and proposes a theoretical model of how CE contributes to building S. According to the proposed model, the phenomenal aspect of consciousness is produced by the modulation—engendered by attentional activity—of the energy level of the neural substrate (that is, the organ of attention) that underpins attentional activity. The phenomenal aspect of consciousness supplies the agent with a sense of S and informs the agent on how its S is affected by the agent’s own operations. The phenomenal aspect of consciousness performs its functions through its five main dimensions: qualitative, quantitative, hedonic, temporal, and spatial. Each dimension of the phenomenal aspect of consciousness can be explained by a specific aspect of the modulation of the energy level of the organ of attention. Among other advantages, the model explains the various forms of S as outcomes resulting from the operations of a single mechanism and provides a unifying framework for empirical research on the neural underpinnings of S. (shrink)

この巨大な専門用語を積んだ(この本は本当に用語集が必要です!)、重い学術的な仕事が教育を受けた世界でベストセラーになったことは驚くべきことであり、フィッティングです。専門用語を学び、551ページのテキ ストと238ページのノートを耕すために専用する必要があります。私たちは何度も何度も言われていますが、これは来るものの輪郭に過ぎないと言われています! 彼は3つの運動の行き過ぎを厳しく批判するが、これは非常にリベラルで精神的な観点から、宗教、哲学、行動科学の非建設的でNew年齢の神秘的でポストモダンな解釈である。 彼は哲学、心理学、社会学、宗教の様々な世界観を詳細に分析し、彼らの致命的な還元主義的欠陥を(主に)ケアと輝きの気持ちで暴露するが、彼が分析する情報源のほとんどは今日はほとんど関連性がない。 彼らは20年前に研究と執筆をしていたときにすでに時代遅れだった用語や概念を使用しています。一つは、専門用語の無限のページをスローする必要があります - ハーバーマス、カント、エマーソン、ユングet.alの議論を積んだ。真珠にたどり着くために。 あなたは悪い書き込み、混乱し、時代遅れのアイデアと時代遅れの専門用語の素晴らしいサンプリングを得る。 現在の教育が良ければ、この本を読むのは二重に苦痛です(そして、ほとんどの人間の行動に関する書き込み)。 それは非常に拷問と混乱しているので、痛みを伴う、そして、あなたがそれが現代の心理学と哲学でいかに単純であるかを認識したときに再び。用語とアイデアは恐ろしく混乱し、日付が付いています(しかし、ウィルバー 自身の分析では、彼の情報源よりもそれほどではありません)。 著者のほとんどはそれに気づいていませんでしたが、この本とその情報源のほとんどは心理学のテキストです。それは、なぜ私たちが私たちがどのように考え、行動するのか、そして将来どのように変わるのかについて、人 間の行動と推論についてです。しかし、(最近までそのような議論のように)説明のどれも本当に説明ではないので、彼らは人間の行動に関する洞察を与えなくなります。誰も関係する精神的なメカニズムについて議論しま せん。これは、ステアリングホイールについて話し合うエンジン、燃料、またはドライブトレインの知識なしに、ハンドルと金属と塗料について議論する車の仕組みを説明するようなものです。実際には、ほとんどの古い' 説明'の行動と同様に、テキストはここでdを引用し、Wilberによるコムメントは、多くの場合、彼らが説明として受け入れる(そして省略する)ものの種類、そしてhey 実際のコンテンツよりも推論の種類のためにより興味深いです。 哲学と認知と進化心理学に取り組むならば、そのほとんどは古風です。ほぼすべての人(学者と公共の人)と同じように-e.g.、デネットの自由の進化や他の本の私のレビューを参照してください)、彼は宗教と倫理の 基礎を理解していない - 実際には、すべての人間の行動は、私たちの遺伝子にプログラムされています。彼が多くの本を書いている間、私たち自身を理解する革命が起こり、それが彼を通り過ぎました。 現代の2つのシス・エムスの見解から人間の行動のための包括的な最新の枠組みを望む人は、私の著書「ルートヴィヒ・ヴィトゲンシュタインとジョン・サールの第2回(2019)における哲学、心理学、ミンと言語の論 理的構造」を参照することができます。私の著作の多くにご興味がある人は、運命の惑星における「話す猿--哲学、心理学、科学、宗教、政治―記事とレビュー2006-2019 第3回(2019)」と21世紀4日(2019年)の自殺ユートピア妄想st Century 4th ed (2019)などを見ることができます。 .

Sono molto abituato a libri strani e persone speciali, ma Hawkins si distingue per il suo uso di una semplice tecnica per testare la tensione muscolare come chiave per la "verità" di qualsiasi tipo di affermazione di sorta, cioè, non solo per se la persona che viene testata ci crede, ma se è davvero vero! Ciò che è ben noto è che le persone mostreranno risposte fisiologiche e psicologiche automatiche, inconscie, a qualsiasi cosa siano esposte: immagini, suoni, tatto, odori, idee, (...) persone. Quindi, la lettura muscolare per scoprire i loro veri sentimenti non è affatto radicale, a differenza di usarlo come un bastone dousing (più lettura muscolare) per fare "scienza paranormale". Hawkins descrive l'uso di diminuire la tensione nei muscoli di un braccio in risposta ad aumenti del carico cognitivo causando così il braccio a cadere in risposta alla pressione costante delle dita di qualcuno. Sembra inconsapevole che c'è un vasto e vasto sforzo di ricerca in psicologia sociale a cui si fa riferimento come "cognizione implicita", "automaticità" ecc., e che il suo uso della "cinesiologia" è una piccola sezione. Oltre al tono muscolare (usato raramente) gli psicologi sociali misurano l'EEG, la risposta galvanica della pelle e più frequentemente le risposte verbali a parole, frasi, immagini o situazioni che variano da secondi a mesi dopo lo stimolo. Molti, come Bargh e Wegner, prendono i risultati per significare che siamo automi che imparano e agiscono in gran parte senza consapevolezza tramite S1 (sistema automatizzato 1) e molti altri come Kihlstrom e Shanks dicono che questi studi sono imperfetti e siamo creature di S2 (sistema deliberativo 2). Anche se Hawkins sembra non avere idea, come in altre aree della psicologia descrittiva del pensiero di ordine superiore, la situazione per quanto riguarda l'"automaticità" è ancora caotica come lo era quando Wittgenstein descrisse le ragioni della sterilità e della sterilità della psicologia negli anni '30. Tuttavia, questo libro è di facile lettura e alcuni terapisti e insegnanti spirituali possono trovarlo utile. Coloro che desiderano un quadro aggiornato completo per il comportamento umano dalla moderna vista a due systems possono consultare il mio libro 'La struttura logica dellafilosofia, psicologia, Mind e il linguaggio in Ludwig Wittgenstein e John Searle' 2nd ed (2019). Coloro che sono interessati a più dei miei scritti possono vedere 'TalkingMonkeys--Filosofia, Psicologia, Scienza, Religione e Politica su un Pianeta Condannato--Articoli e Recensioni 2006-2019 3rd ed (2019) e Suicidal Utopian Delusions in the 21st Century 4th ed (2019) . (shrink)

Probably the leading exponent of Wittgenstein’s ideas on the language games of inner and outer (the ‘Two Selves’ operation of our personality or intentionality or EP etc.) the prolific Daniel Hutto’s approach is called ‘Radical Enactivism’ and is well explained in numerous recent books and papers. It is a development of or version of the Embodied Mind ideas now current and, cleansed of its jargon, it is a straightforward extension of Wittgenstein’s 2nd and 3rd period writings (though Hutto seems only (...) intermittently aware of this). -/- The basic idea of the Embodied Mind or Enactivism is that much of behavior is automated and does not involve representations (basically S2 dispositions-see Hutto’s lovely dissection of the ‘representation rats nest’ in his online papers). To me this is just another way of stating the fact that System 1 precedes the operation of System 2 which is a standard feature of contemporary psychology, which I have explained above and in further detail in my reviews of Wittgenstein (hereafter W-who was the first to see this and explored it in great detail) and Searle (hereafter S-who called it The Phenomenological Illusion in his superb essay of this name in his book Philosophy in a New Century, which I have also reviewed). Since these are basic incontrovertible facts of animal behavior and I have already discussed them I won’t dwell on it here. -/- This book is a sustained argument against other similar ways of describing behavior which he calls CEC and CIC in favor of REC (Radical Embodied Cognition), which he characterizes as “the strongest reading of the embodiment thesis—one that uncompromisingly maintains that basic cognition is literally constituted by, and to be understood in terms of concrete patterns of environmental situated organismic activity, nothing more or less” (p11). This is clear as a bell if you understand the two systems view explained above but likely opaque if you don’t. Much clearer is Fodor’s characterization which he quotes as “abilities are prior to theories”, that “competence is prior to content” and that “knowing how is the paradigm cognitive state and it is prior to knowing that” (p10). That is, the unconscious automatisms of S1 are evolutionarily and behaviorally prior to the slow conscious dispositions of S2. -/- This is classic Hutto high-level philosophical dialog, which is quite elegant, but somewhat too dense and a tad pretentious for the rest of us. I have not before encountered his coauthor Myin, so can’t say how much of this text is really due to him. It is clear from this and the rest of Hutto’s work that (like everyone else) he has not quite kept up with the latest work in psychology nor really grasped the full power of W or S, even though he is one of the top Wittgensteinians alive and as bright as anyone in the field. His discussions of the language games of “information” and “representation” in his other papers and books (and much else including his deconstructions of Dennett and Fodor) should be required reading for anyone interested in behavior. So, I have the greatest respect for him, but one hopes that he will mellow with time and write descriptions of behavior (i.e., all we can really do as philosophers according to W) in more mundane prose such as this lovely summation on p15. “Hence, REC is nothing less than a fundamental rethinking of the very foundations of standard approaches to cognitive science and philosophy of mind.” Yes, and what a pity that this great Wittgensteinian (and everyone else) does not realize that W laid it all out with unmatched clarity in his third period works over 60 years ago. -/- I have much less sympathy for the extended and scaffolded minds of Chap 7. I don’t see how one can lay the burden of explaining how the ‘mind’ works at Searle’s door, nor how the convoluted prose about “decoupled contentful activities” etc. helps at all. Why not just say that automated unconscious prelinguistic S1 feeds deliberate, conscious linguistic S2, which is axiomatically extended by public language into the myriad wonders of culture (S3)? Beginning and end of story. Their last chapter is about “regaining consciousness,” but I would say that if one has understood Wittgenstein and Searle, one has never lost it. And, though this is an excellent book by two of the brightest and the best, I suggest an even better filter for folly is mulling over my thoughts in this and other reviews, and reading Johnston and the latest from Searle, along of course with as much of 3rd period W as feasible. In sum an excellent book with various faults which I try to correct. -/- Those wishing a comprehensive up to date framework for human behavior from the modern two systems view may consult my book ‘The Logical Structure of Philosophy, Psychology, Mind and Language in Ludwig Wittgenstein and John Searle’ 2nd ed (2019). Those interested in more of my writings may see ‘Talking Monkeys--Philosophy, Psychology, Science, Religion and Politics on a Doomed Planet--Articles and Reviews 2006-2019 3rd ed (2019), The Logical Structure of Human Behavior (2019), and Suicidal Utopian Delusions in the 21st Century 4th ed (2019) . (shrink)

Does perceptual consciousness require cognitive access? Ned Block argues that it does not. Central to his case are visual memory experiments that employ post-stimulus cueing—in particular, Sperling's classic partial report studies, change-detection work by Lamme and colleagues, and a recent paper by Bronfman and colleagues that exploits our perception of ‘gist’ properties. We argue contra Block that these experiments do not support his claim. Our reinterpretations differ from previous critics' in challenging as well a longstanding and common view of visual (...) memory as involving declining capacity across a series of stores. We conclude by discussing the relation of probabilistic perceptual representations and phenomenal consciousness. (shrink)

The famous advaitic expressions -/- Brahma sat jagat mithya jivo brahma eva na apraha and Asti bhaati priyam namam roopamcheti amsa panchakam AAdya trayam brahma roopam tato dwayam jagat roopam -/- will be analyzed through physics and electronics and interpreted. -/- Four phases of mind, four modes of language acquisition and communication and seven cognitive states of mind participating in human cognitive and language acquisition and communication processes will be identified and discussed. -/- Implications and application of such an identification (...) and analysis to the fields of cognitive sciences, mind-machine modeling, natural language comprehension field of artificial intelligence and physiological psychology will be hinted. A comprehensive modern scientific understanding of human consciousness, mind and mental functions will be presented. (shrink)