Defenses of Toleration

Contemporary philosophical debates surrounding toleration have revolved around three issues: What is toleration? Should we tolerate and, if so, why? What should be tolerated? These questions are of central importance to social and political thought.

It is common for religiously motivated actions to be specially protected by law. Many legal theorists have asked why: what makes religion special? What makes it worthy of toleration over and above other non-religious deeply held convictions? The answer I put forward is that religions’ alleged afterlife consequences call for a principle of toleration that warrants special legal treatment. Under a Rawlsian principle of toleration, it is reasonable for those in the original position to opt for principles of justice that (...) accommodate actions with alleged afterlife consequences. And, under a utilitarian principle of toleration, a greater psychological harm is eased by such accommodations. Additionally, this alleged afterlife consequence is found in most of the religions that are thought to warrant some level of special toleration—not only do the Abrahamic religions have alleged afterlife consequences, but many eastern religions do as well, e.g. reincarnation. (shrink)

This chapter examines some central features to liberal conceptions of toleration and liberty of conscience. The first section briefly examines conceptions of toleration and liberty of conscience in the traditions of Locke, Rawls, and Mill. The second section considers contemporary controversies surrounding toleration and liberty of conscience with a focus on neutrality and equality. The third section examines several challenges, including whether non-religious values should be afforded the same degree of accommodation as religious values, whether liberty of conscience requires a (...) secular state, and how bias impedes understandings of toleration and liberty of conscience. The chapter concludes with brief comments on future directions for research on toleration and liberty of conscience. One is exploring toleration and liberty of conscience in non-Western contexts; another is exploring ways that varieties of religious and political identity impact conceptions of toleration and liberty of conscience. (shrink)

A response to critical commentaries. Crookston begins her commentary by noting that my book would have been better with answers to “the following three questions: (1) Why is the harm principle the right principle upon which to base a theory of toleration? (2) How is Cohen thinking of the concept of volenti? (p. x ) Is interference (i.e., the abandonment of toleration) ever morally required by the harm principle?” (p. x ). She is right, and I address these questions below (...) in Sections 2, 3, and 4. That is the bulk of this essay. I then turn to Kelley's issues in Sections 6, 7, and 8; these have to do with “the link between toleration and relativism,” the way I distinguish “the concepts of toleration and endurance,” and a “question about moral toleration” (p. x ). Despite much agreement, there are points of contention and I try to make my position clearer in response . (shrink)

Cet article poursuit la réflexion de Dilhac (2014) touchant la relation entre politique et vérité. Au terme d’une analyse de la tolérance chez Mill et Popper, Dilhac conclut qu’une conception épistémique de la tolérance manque sa dimension politique, et qu’il est préférable d’opter pour le concept rawlsien de consensus raisonnable. Discutant ces résultats, le premier objectif est ici de montrer qu’une notion de « raisonnabilité » peut facilement trouver ses racines dans la neutralité scientifique wébérienne, et donc être porteuse d’une (...) dimension épistémique minimale. Le second objectif est de clarifier l’impact de cet argument particulier sur le débat général entourant la démocratie épistémique. Il sera défendu que l’opposition traditionnelle entre les conceptions épistémique et politique de la délibération est à trouver dans un certain perfectionnisme épistémique, mais qu’il existe au moins une conception minimale du potentiel épistémique tout à fait compatible avec les valeurs fondamentales du libéralisme, comme l’inclusion, l’égalité ou la diversité. En d’autres termes, les exigences épistémiques minimales de la neutralité scientifique peuvent être indépendantes du perfectionnisme épistémique. (shrink)

It is a widespread opinion that toleration, as a political practice, has merely instrumental value. The aim of this paper is to defend, on the contrary, that toleration has political value in itself. In more specific terms, I will claim that it is valuable in itself in virtue of its intrinsic relationship with democracy. Toleration is a constituent of democracy inasmuch as it is necessary for the existence of a democratic administration of political power. I will show that that relation (...) of constitution holds because toleration, through the protection of spaces of contestation to the political power, contributes to solving democracy’s inner tension resulting from its practical implementation. -/- Es una opinión extendida que la tolerancia, en cuanto práctica política, tiene valor meramente instrumental. El objetivo de este artículo es defender, por el contrario, que ella tiene valor político en sí. Específicamente, defenderé que es valiosa en sí misma a causa de su relación intrínseca con la democracia. La tolerancia es un constituyente de la democracia en cuanto es necesaria para que pueda existir una administración democrática del poder político. Mostraré que esa relación de constitución existe porque la tolerancia, mediante la protección de espacios de contestación al poder político, contribuye a la resolución de una tensión interna de la democracia en su implementación práctica. (shrink)

One of the pressing challenges we face today—in a post-Westphalian order and post-Bretton Woods world —is how to design the right kind of MAS that can take full advantage of the socio-economic and political progress made so far, while dealing successfully with the new global challenges that are undermining the best legacy of that very progress. This is the topic of the article. In it, I argue that in order to design the right kind of MAS, we need to design (...) the right kind of norms that constitute them; in order to design the right kind of constitutive norms, we need to identify and adopt the right kind of principles of normative design; toleration is one of those principles; unfortunately, its role as a foundation for the design of norms has been undermined by the “paradox of toleration”; however, the paradox can be solved; so toleration can be re-instated as the right kind of foundational principle for the design of the right kind of norms that can constitute the right kind of MAS that can operate across cultures, societies and states, to help us to tackle the new global challenges facing us. (shrink)

In the Āgamadambara (“Much Ado about Religion”), Jayanta Bhatta appears to be making a case for religious toleration and pluralism. This paper considers whether Jayanta has a concept like toleration in mind at all, or at least something that we today might understand to be toleration. If he is doing neither, our understanding of the nature of tolerance and its conceptual limits may be furthered by determining exactly what he is talking about and why it looks so much like tolerance.

In this paper I argue that equal respect-based accounts of the normative basis of tolerance are self-defeating, insofar as they are unable to specify the limits of tolerance in a way that is consistent with their own commitment to the equal treatment of all conceptions of the good. I show how this argument is a variant of the long-standing ‘conflict of freedoms’ objection to Kantian-inspired, freedom-based accounts of the justification of systems of norms. I criticize Thomas Scanlon’s defence of ‘pure (...) tolerance’, Anna Elisabetta Galeotti’s work on the relationship between tolerance, equal respect and recognition, and Arthur Ripstein’s recent response to the ‘conflict of freedoms’ objection. The upshot of my argument is that, while valuing tolerance for its own sake may be an appealing ideal, it is not a feasible way of grounding a system of norms. I close with a thumbnail sketch of two alternative, instrumental (i.e. non-Kantian) approaches to the normative foundations of tolerance. (shrink)

Jalal al-Din Muhammad al-Balkhi Rumi (1207-1273), often referred to as Mawlana (lord/master) or Rumi, is one of the most important figures of Islamic Sufism. Rumi’s work, I shall argue, is particularly timely today. There are tendencies among contemporary Muslim intellectuals to accept the Sufi interpretation of Islam and to present a picture of Islam as tolerant and peaceful, not only to counteract Western Islamophobia but also to counteract extremism within Islamic societies. In this paper, then, I wish to introduce some (...) aspects of Rumi’s thought and, specifically, his ideas on tolerance. The present discussion will focus on: knowledge of God and tolerance; human identity and tolerance; and spiritual journey and tolerance. My contention is that Rumi’s concept of tolerance is not only of academic and historical interest, but of particular relevance to current discussions in Islamic intellectual life. (shrink)

In this essay I consider what grounds Spinoza’s defense of the freedom to philosophize, considering why Spinoza doesn’t think that we should attempt to snuff out irrationality and dissolution with the law’s iron fist. In the first section I show that Spinoza eschews skeptical, pluralistic, and rights-based arguments for toleration. I then delineate the prudential, anticlerical roots of Spinoza’s defense, before turning in the final section to consider just how far and when toleration contributes to the guiding norms of governance: (...) peace and empowerment. Once we see how the defense of toleration is anchored in these norms, we form a clearer picture of Spinoza as a liberal perfectionist for whom the bounds of political toleration depends on pragmatic and circumstance-specific assessments of what conduces to the flourishing of the state. This will help to illuminate what is distinctive—and, perhaps, distinctively commendable—about Spinoza’s form of liberalism. (shrink)

In this paper I refute the chief arguments for cultural relativism, meaning the moral (not the descriptive) theory that goes by that name. In doing this I walk some oft-trodden paths, but I also break new ones. For instance, I take unusual pains to produce an adequate formulation of cultural relativism, and I distinguish that thesis from the relativism of present-day anthropologists, with which it is often conflated. In addition, I address not one or two, but eleven arguments for cultural (...) relativism, many of which contribute to its popularity but receive scant attention from its critics. To elicit the failings of these arguments I deploy a host of pertinent but often neglected distinctions. (shrink)

A brief reference article on cultural relativism, forthcoming in the Wiley-Blackwell Encyclopedia of Sociology, 2nd edition.

Liberals often assume that once people see the costs of intolerance that they will come to embrace toleration and that once they can accept toleration as a modus vivendi, they will soon be able to see it as a good in its own right. But, I argue, that the logic that make in tolerance difficult to break also compel people to resist any attempts to make toleration more than a modus vivendi. True toleration will not be embraced unless the people (...) undergo a kind of conversion experience. (shrink)

The key problem for normative (or moral) cultural relativism arises as soon as we try to formulate it. It resists formulations that are (1) clear, precise, and intelligible; (2) plausible enough to warrant serious attention; and (3) faithful to the aims of leading cultural relativists, one such aim being to produce an important alternative to moral universalism. Meeting one or two of these conditions is easy; meeting all three is not. I discuss twenty-four candidates for the label "cultural relativism," showing (...) that not one meets all three conditions. In the end I conclude that cultural relativists have produced nothing that threatens universalism. (shrink)

This was a class handout that I turned into a publication. As its title indicates, it's about the relation (or non-relation) of (ethical) cultural relativism to tolerance. Core elements of the paper were later absorbed into sections 5K, 6M, and 7K of my paper "Cultural Relativism" (2000), which is listed (and downloadable) on my PhilPapers page.