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  1. added 2019-02-09
    Quine, Ontology, and Physicalism.Frederique Janssen-Lauret - 2019 - In Robert Sinclair (ed.), Science and Sensibilia by W.V. Quine: The 1980 Immanuel Kant Lectures. Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan. pp. 181-204.
    Quine's views on ontology and naturalism are well-known but rarely considered in tandem. According to my interpretation the connection between them is vital. I read Quine as a global epistemic structuralist. Quine thought we only ever know objects qua solutions to puzzles about significant intersections in observations. Objects are always accessed descriptively, via their roles in our best theory. Quine's Kant lectures contain an early version of epistemic structuralism with uncharacteristic remarks about the mental. Here Quine embraces mitigated anomalous monism, (...)
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  2. added 2018-12-10
    Interpretivism and Norms.Devin Sanchez Curry - forthcoming - Philosophical Studies:1-26.
    This article reconsiders the relationship between interpretivism about belief and normative standards. Interpretivists have traditionally taken beliefs (and thus veridicality conditions for belief attribution) to be fixed in relation to norms of interpretation. However, recent work by philosophers and psychologists reveals that human belief attribution practices are governed by a rich diversity of normative standards. Interpretivists thus face a dilemma: either give up on the idea that belief is constitutively normative or countenance a context-sensitive disjunction of norms that constitute belief. (...)
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  3. added 2018-09-17
    Creencias religiosas, inefabilidad y verdad.Angel Rivera-Novoa - 2017 - Franciscanum: Revista de Las Ciencias Del Espíritu 168 (LIX):23-61.
    El objetivo de este artículo es establecer una condición de posibilidad para el diálogo interreligioso o religioso-ateo. Esta condición consiste en tomar los conceptos de «verdad» y «condiciones de verdad» como elementos centrales de la naturaleza de la creencia religiosa. Además, para hacer posible el diálogo, es necesario rechazar cualquier rasgo de inefabilidad de cualquier descripción satisfactoria de la creencia religiosa. Así, en primer lugar, se examinará el trabajo de Wittgenstein en su Tractatus Logico-Philosophicus para mostrar que, en esta aproximación, (...)
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  4. added 2018-06-26
    Charity, Self-Interpretation, and Belief.Henry Jackman - 2003 - Journal of Philosophical Research 28:143-168.
    The purpose of this paper is to motivate and defend a recognizable version of N. L. Wilson's "Principle of Charity" Doing so will involve: (1) distinguishing it fromthe significantly different versions of the Principle familiar through the work of Quine and Davidson; (2) showing that it is compatible with, among other things, both semantic externalism and "simulation" accounts of interpretation; and (3) explaining how it follows from plausible constraints relating to the connection between interpretation and self-interpretation. Finally, it will be (...)
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  5. added 2018-06-26
    Belief, Rationality, and Psychophysical Laws.Henry Jackman - 2000 - In The Proceedings of the Twentieth World Congress of Philosophy. Philosophy Documentation Center. pp. 47-54.
    This paper argues that Davidson's claim that the connection between belief and the "constitutive ideal of rationality" precludes the possibility of any type-type identities between mental and physical events relies on blurring the distinction between two ways of understanding this "constitutive ideal", and that no consistent understanding the constitutive ideal allows it to play the dialectical role Davidson intends for it.
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  6. added 2018-06-11
    ¿principio De Caridad O Hybris?Victor J. Krebs - 2008 - Revista de Filosofía (Venezuela) 60 (3):61-90.
    “¿Principio de caridad o hybris?” La intuición de Wittgenstein, de que el significado lingüístico se constituye dentro de la trama de vida pareciera hacer posible un acercamiento entre la tradición hermenéutica continental y la filosofía analítica del lenguaje. En el presente artículo se sostiene que esta intuición debe ir acompañada de una revisión de la concepción del sujeto implícita en el “principio de caridad” de Donald Davidson. Sin esa reconcepción, el principio de caridad se convierte en una forma encubierta de (...)
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  7. added 2018-03-16
    Beliefs as Inner Causes: The (Lack of) Evidence.Devin Sanchez Curry - 2018 - Philosophical Psychology 31 (6):850-877.
    Many psychologists studying lay belief attribution and behavior explanation cite Donald Davidson in support of their assumption that people construe beliefs as inner causes. But Davidson’s influential argument is unsound; there are no objective grounds for the intuition that the folk construe beliefs as inner causes that produce behavior. Indeed, recent experimental work by Ian Apperly, Bertram Malle, Henry Wellman, and Tania Lombrozo provides an empirical framework that accords well with Gilbert Ryle’s alternative thesis that the folk construe beliefs as (...)
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  8. added 2018-03-15
    Die Vernunft der Erfahrung. Eine pragmatistische Kritik der Rationalität.Jörg Volbers - 2018 - Hamburg: Meiner.
    Die moderne Philosophie steht im Schatten des Skeptizismus: Alle Wissensansprüche scheinen fallibel, alle Theorien nur vorläufig, alle Gewissheiten nur temporär zu sein. In dieser gespannten Situation ist die Versuchung groß, das Wesen des vernünftigen Denkens in der Form zu suchen. Vernunft gilt dann als ein allgemeines Vermögen, das bei wechselnden Inhalten seine kritische Kompetenz bewahrt. Doch solche Formalismen müssen scheitern: Wer Erfahrung nur als «Wahrnehmung» oder «Gehalt» adressiert, übergeht die dynamische und überschreitende Natur alles Erfahrens, ohne die Denken und Wissen (...)
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  9. added 2018-03-13
    Ações, razões e causas.D. Davidson & Marcelo Fischborn - 2012 - Critica:NA.
    Qual é a relação entre uma razão e uma ação quando a razão explica a ação, dando a razão do agente para fazer o que fez? Podemos chamar tais explicações de racionalizações, e dizer que a razão racionaliza a ação. Neste artigo quero defender a posição antiga — e de senso comum — de que a racionalização é uma espécie de explicação causal b. A defesa sem dúvida exige alguma reelaboração, mas não parece necessário abandonar a posição, como muitos autores (...)
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  10. added 2018-01-15
    Truth-Theoretic Semantics and Its Limits.Kirk Ludwig - 2017 - Argumenta (4).
    Donald Davidson was one of the most influential philosophers of the last half of the 20th century, especially in the theory of meaning and in the philosophy of mind and action. In this paper, I concentrate on a field-shaping proposal of Davidson’s in the theory of meaning, arguably his most influential, namely, that insight into meaning may be best pursued by a bit of indirection, by showing how appropriate knowledge of a finitely axiomatized truth theory for a language can put (...)
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  11. added 2018-01-10
    Davidsonian Causalism and Wittgensteinian Anti-Causalism: A Rapprochement.Matthieu Queloz - 2018 - Ergo: An Open Access Journal of Philosophy 5 (6):153-72.
    A longstanding debate in the philosophy of action opposes causalists to anti-causalists. Causalists claim the authority of Davidson, who offered powerful arguments to the effect that intentional explanations must be causal explanations. Anti-causalists claim the authority of Wittgenstein, who offered equally powerful arguments to the effect that reasons cannot be causes. My aim in this paper is to achieve a rapprochement between Davidsonian causalists and Wittgensteinian anti-causalists by showing how both sides can agree that reasons are not causes, but that (...)
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  12. added 2017-11-22
    A Partir da Causalidade em Davidson: Uma Discussão Acerca dos Relata e Leis da Natureza.Allan Patrick de Lucena Costa - 2007 - Dissertation, UNIVERSIDADE FEDERAL DA PARAÍBA, Brazil
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  13. added 2017-09-12
    Davidson and Chinese Conceptual Scheme.Koji Tanaka - 2006 - In Bo Mou (ed.), Philosophical Engagement: Davidson’s Philosophy and Chinese Philosophy. Leiden: Brill Academic Publishers. pp. 55-71.
    In one of his influential works ‘One the Very Idea of a Conceptual Scheme’, Donald Davidson argues against conceptual relativism. According to Davidson, ‘we could not be in a position to judge that others had concepts or beliefs radically different from our own’. Davidson’s thesis seems to have a consequence for comparative philosophy, particularly in a comparative study between Chinese and Western traditions of philosophy which are often considered to differ conceptually. If Davidson is correct, it is not clear whether (...)
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  14. added 2017-02-21
    Nagel on Conceivability.Terence Rajivan Edward - 2009 - Abstracta 5 (1):16-29.
    In the sixth chapter of The View from Nowhere, Thomas Nagel aims to identify a form of idealism, to isolate the argument for it and to counter this argument. The position that Nagel takes to be idealist is that what there is must be possibly conceivable by us. In this paper, I show that Nagel has not made a convincing case against this position. I then present an alternative case. In light of this alternative case, we have reason to reject (...)
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  15. added 2017-01-15
    Is Davidson a Gricean?John Cook - 2009 - Dialogue 48 (3):557.
    ABSTRACT: In his recent collection of essays, Language, Truth and History, Donald Davidson appears to endorse a philosophy of language which gives primary importance to the notion of the speaker’s communicative intentions, a perspective on language not too dissimilar from that of Paul Grice. If that is right, then this would mark a major shift from the formal semanticist approach articulated and defended by Davidson in his Inquiries into Truth and Interpretation. In this paper, I argue that although there are (...)
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  16. added 2016-07-31
    Persons, Virtual Persons, and Radical Interpretation.Michael Bourke - 2015 - Modern Horizons:1-24.
    A dramatic problem facing the concept of the self is whether there is anything to make sense of. Despite the speculative view that there is an essential role for the perceiver in measurement, a physicalist view of reality currently seems to be ruling out the conditions of subjectivity required to keep the concept of the self. Eliminative materialism states this position explicitly. The doctrine holds that we have no objective grounds for attributing personhood to anyone, and can therefore dispense with (...)
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  17. added 2016-05-18
    Putnam and Davidson on Coherence, Truth, and Justification.Lajos L. Brons - 2016 - The Science of Mind 54:51-70.
    Putnam and Davidson both defended coherence theories of justification from the early 1980s onward. There are interesting similarities between these theories, and Putnam’s philosophical development lead to further convergence in the 1990s. The most conspicuous difference between Putnam’s and Davidson’s theories is that they appear to fundamentally disagree on the role and nature of conceptual schemes, but a closer look reveals that they are not as far apart on this issue as usually assumed. The veridicality of perceptual beliefs is a (...)
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  18. added 2016-05-14
    The Benefits of Realism: A Realist Logic with Applications.Barry Smith - 2008 - In Katherine Munn & Barry Smith (eds.), Applied Ontology: An Introduction. Ontos. pp. 109-124.
    We propose a formalization of a realist ontology using first order logic with identity and allowing quantification over terms representing both individuals and universals. In addition to identity, the ontology includes also relational predicates such as subtype, instantiation, parthood, location, and inherence. Inspired in part by Davidson’s treatment of events, the ontology includes also various relations linking events to their participants and to the times at which they occur.
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  19. added 2016-05-12
    Truth Ascriptions, Falsity Ascriptions, and the Paratactic Analysis of Indirect Discourse.Savas L. Tsohatzidis - 2015 - Logique Et Analyse (232):527-534.
    This paper argues that the obvious validity of certain inferences involving indirect speech reports as premises and truth or falsity ascriptions as conclusions is incompatible with Davidson's so-called "paratactic" analysis of the logical form of indirect discourse. Besides disqualifying that analysis, this problem is also claimed to indicate that the analysis is doubly in tension with Davidson's metasemantic views. Specifically, it can be reconciled neither with one of Davidson's key assumptions regarding the adequacy of the kind of semantic theory he (...)
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  20. added 2016-03-03
    Husserl and Davidson on the Social Origin of Our Concept of Objectivity.Cathal O'Madagain - 2016 - In Thomas Szanto & Dermot Moran (eds.), Discovering the 'We': The Phenomenology of Sociality. Routledge.
    Davidson and Husserl both arrived independently at a startling conclusion: that we need to interact with others in order to acquire the concept of objectivity, or to realize that the world we are in exists independently of us. Here I discuss both of their arguments, and argue that there are problems with each. However, I then I argue that each thinker provided us with one key insight that can be combined to provide a more compelling argument for the claim. Finally (...)
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  21. added 2016-01-12
    Does the Expressive Role of ‘True’ Preclude Deflationary Davidsonian Semantics?Steven Gross - 2015 - In Steven Gross, Nicholas Tebben & Michael Williams (eds.), Meaning Without Representation: Essays on Truth, Expression, Normativity, and Naturalism. Oxford University Press. pp. 47-63.
    Can one combine Davidsonian semantics with a deflationary conception of truth? Williams argues, contra a common worry, that Davidsonian semantics does not require truth-talk to play an explanatory role. Horisk replies that, in any event, the expressive role of truth-talk that Williams emphasizes disqualifies deflationary accounts—at least extant varieties—from combination with Davidsonian semantics. She argues, in particular, that this is so for Quine's disquotationalism, Horwich's minimalism, and Brandom's prosententialism. I argue that Horisk fails to establish her claim in all three (...)
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  22. added 2015-11-27
    Intention.Luca Ferrero - 2013 - In E. Lepore & Kirk Ludwig (eds.), A Companion to Donald Davidson. Wiley-Blackwell. pp. 75-89.
    This chapter presents Davidson’s account of intentional action and intention. Davidson initially discusses intentional action in relation to the explanation and the ontology of action. His earlier view equates acting intentionally with being caused to act by a pair of appropriately related mental states (a pro-attitude and an instrumental belief) and denies the existence of intentions as distinct mental states. Later, in his account of weakness of will, Davidson offers a more complex account of practical deliberation in terms of evaluative (...)
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  23. added 2015-08-31
    Making Something Happen. Where Causation and Agency Meet.Geert Keil - 2007 - In Francesca Castellani & Josef Quitterer (eds.), Agency and Causation in the Human Sciences. Mentis. pp. 19-35.
    1. Introduction: a look back at the reasons vs. causes debate. 2. The interventionist account of causation. 3. Four objections to interventionism. 4. The counterfactual analysis of event causation. 5. The role of free agency. 6. Causality in the human sciences. -- The reasons vs. causes debate reached its peak about 40 years ago. Hempel and Dray had debated the nature of historical explanation and the broader issue of whether explanations that cite an agent’s reasons are causal or not. Melden, (...)
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  24. added 2015-08-27
    Intérprete Omnisciente, Caridad Y Externalismo.Pablo Melogno - 2011 - Episteme NS: Revista Del Instituto de Filosofía de la Universidad Central de Venezuela 31 (1):55-67.
    Se discute el argumento del intérprete omnisciente formulado por DonaldDavidson, en relación con otros dos aspectos de la filosofía davidsoniana:el principio de caridad y la concepción externalista del significado. Se busca mostrar que el argumento ha funcionado antes como una consecuenciade la caracterización davidsoniana de la interpretación radical que como unelemento de fortalecimiento de la misma, o bien presupone la metodologíadavidsoniana de interpretación basada en el principio de caridad, cuyos problemas trataba de solucionar, o bien presupone la concepción externalista delsignificado, (...)
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  25. added 2015-08-27
    Estudios de Filosofía Contemporánea by Ricardo Navia.Pablo Melogno - 2011 - Filosofia Unisinos 12 (2):187-191.
    Estudios de filosofía contemporánea, lleva por título este volumen que reúne varios trabajos del Prof. Ricardo Navia, algunos publicados previamente en revistas especializadas de Brasil y Perú, otros que se editan por primera vez. No obstante tratarse de artículos independientes, la obra presenta continuidad temática en torno a problemas de teoría del conocimiento, filosofía del lenguaje y metafilosofía, especialmente centrados en la filosofía de la segunda mitad del siglo XX.
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  26. added 2015-07-25
    What Do Deviant Causal Chains Deviate From?Geert Keil - 2007 - In Christoph Lumer & Sandro Nannini (eds.), Intention, Deliberation and Autonomy. Ashgate. pp. 69-90.
    The problem of deviant causal chains is endemic to any theory of action that makes definitional or explanatory use of a causal connection between an agent’s beliefs and pro-attitudes and his bodily movements. Other causal theories of intentional phenomena are similarly plagued. The aim of this chapter is twofold. First, to defend Davidson’s defeatism. In his treatment of deviant causal chains, Davidson makes use of the clause “in the right way” to rule out causal waywardness, but he regards any attempt (...)
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  27. added 2015-04-04
    Davidson, Analyticity, and Theory Confirmation.Nathaniel Jason Goldberg - 2003 - Dissertation, Georgetown University
    In this dissertation, I explore the work of Donald Davidson, reveal an inconsistency in it, and resolve that inconsistency in a way that complements a debate in philosophy of science. In Part One, I explicate Davidson's extensional account of meaning; though not defending Davidson from all objections, I nonetheless present his seemingly disparate views as a coherent whole. In Part Two, I explicate Davidson's views on the dualism between conceptual schemes and empirical content, isolating four seemingly different arguments that Davidson (...)
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  28. added 2015-03-27
    Davidson’s Account Of Truth And Fictional Meaning.Michael Bourke - 2012 - Praxis 3 (2):1-27.
    Fictional and non-fictional texts rely on the same language to express their meaning; yet many philosophers in the analytic tradition would say, with reason, that fictional texts literally make no truth claims, or more modestly that the rhetorical and literary devices to which fiction and non-fiction writers alike have recourse are unconnected to truth or have no propositional content. These related views are associated with a doctrine in the philosophy of language, most notably advanced by the late Donald Davidson, which (...)
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  29. added 2015-03-17
    Radical Interpretation and the Permutation Principle.Henry Jackman - 1996 - Erkenntnis 44 (3):317-326.
    Davidson has claimed that to conclude that reference is inscrutable, one must assume that "If some theory of truth... is satisfactory in the light of all relevant evidence... then any theory that is generated from the first theory by a permutation will also be satisfactory in the light of all relevant evidence." However, given that theories of truth are not directly read off the world, but rather serve as parts of larger theories of behavior, this assumption is far from self-evident. (...)
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  30. added 2015-02-21
    Davidson, Dualism, and Truth.Nathaniel Goldberg - 2012 - Journal for the History of Analytical Philosophy 1 (7).
    Happy accidents happen even in philosophy. Sometimes our arguments yield insights despite missing their target, though when they do others can often spot it more easily. Consider the work of Donald Davidson. Few did more to explore connections among mind, language, and world. Now that we have critical distance from his views, however, we can see that Davidson’s accomplishments are not quite what they seem. First, while Davidson attacked the dualism of conceptual scheme and empirical content, he in fact illustrated (...)
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  31. added 2014-10-10
    From the Myth of the Given to Radical Conceptual Diversity.Terence Rajivan Edward - 2015 - Organon F: Medzinárodný Časopis Pre Analytickú Filozofiu 22 (1):3-8.
    This paper evaluates the following argument, suggested in the writings of Donald Davidson: if there is such a thing as the given, then there can be alternative conceptual schemes; there cannot be alternative conceptual schemes; therefore there is no such thing as the given.
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  32. added 2014-04-02
    Putting the World Back Into Semantics.Barry Smith - 1993 - Grazer Philosophische Studien 44:91-109.
    To what in reality do the logically simple sentences with empirical content correspond? Two extreme positions can be distinguished in this regard: 'Great Fact' theories, such as are defended by Davidson; and trope-theories, which see such sentences being made the simply by those events or states to which the relevant main verbs correspond. A position midway between these two extremes is defended, one according to which sentences of the given sort are made tme by what are called 'dependence structures', or (...)
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  33. added 2014-04-01
    No Need to Speak the Same Language? Review of Ramberg, Donald Davidson's Philosophy of Language.H. G. Callaway & J. van Brakel - 1996 - Dialectica, Vol. 50, No.1, 1996, Pp. 63-71 50 (1):63-72.
    The book is an “introductory” reconstruction of Davidson on interpretation —a claim to be taken with a grain of salt. Writing introductory books has become an idol of the tribe. This is a concise book and reflects much study. It has many virtues along with some flaws. Ramberg assembles themes and puzzles from Davidson into a more or less coherent viewpoint. A special virtue is the innovative treatment of incommensurability and of the relation of Davidson’s work to hermeneutic themes. The (...)
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  34. added 2014-03-26
    Davidson, First-Person Authority, and the Evidence for Semantics.Steven Gross - 2012 - In Gerhard Preyer (ed.), Donald Davidson on Truth, Meaning, and the Mental. Oxford University Press. pp. 228-48.
    Donald Davidson aims to illuminate the concept of meaning by asking: What knowledge would suffice to put one in a position to understand the speech of another, and what evidence sufficiently distant from the concepts to be illuminated could in principle ground such knowledge? Davidson answers: knowledge of an appropriate truth-theory for the speaker’s language, grounded in what sentences the speaker holds true, or prefers true, in what circumstances. In support of this answer, he both outlines such a truth-theory for (...)
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  35. added 2014-03-24
    On an “Unintelligible” Idea: Donald Davidson's Case Against Experiential Foundationalism.Daniel Howard-Snyder - 2002 - Southern Journal of Philosophy 40 (4):523-555.
    Donald Davidson’s epistemology is predicated on, among other things, the rejection of Experiential Foundationalism, which he calls ‘unintelligible’. In this essay, I assess Davidson’s arguments for this conclusion. I conclude that each of them fails on the basis of reasons that foundationalists and antifoundationalists alike can, and should, accept.
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  36. added 2014-03-22
    Donald Davidson.Ernest Lepore & Kirk Ludwig - 2004 - Midwest Studies in Philosophy 28 (1):309–333.
    This chapter reviews the major contributions of Donald Davidson to philosophy in the 20th century.
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  37. added 2014-03-16
    Meaning Without Analyticity: Essays on Logic, Language and Meaning.H. G. Callaway - 2008 - Cambridge Scholars Press.
    Meaning without Analyticity draws upon the author’s essays and articles, over a period of 20 years, focused on language, logic and meaning. The book explores the prospect of a non-behavioristic theory of cognitive meaning which rejects the analytic-synthetic distinction, Quinean behaviorism, and the logical and social-intellectual excesses of extreme holism. Cast in clear, perspicuous language and oriented to scientific discussions, this book takes up the challenges of philosophical communication and evaluation implicit in the recent revival of the pragmatist tradition—especially those (...)
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  38. added 2014-03-14
    Davidson on Value and Objectivity.Hallvard Lillehammer - 2007 - Dialectica 61 (2):203–217.
    According to one version of objectivism about value, ethical and other evaluative claims have a fixed truth-value independently of who makes them or the society in which they happen to live (c.f. Davidson 2004, 42). Subjectivists about value deny this claim. According to subjectivism so understood, ethical and other evaluative claims have no fixed truth-value, either because their truth-value is dependent on who makes them, or because they have no truth-value at all.
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  39. added 2014-03-09
    On Davidson's Refutation of Conceptual Schemes and Conceptual Relativism.Xinli Wang - 2009 - Pacific Philosophical Quarterly 90 (1):140-164.
    Despite Donald Davidson's influential criticism of the very notion of conceptual schemes, the notion continues enjoying its popularity in contemporary philosophy and, accordingly, conceptual relativism is still very much alive. There is one major reason responsible for Davidson's failure which has not been widely recognized: What Davidson attacks fiercely is not the very notion, but a notion of conceptual schemes, namely, the Quinean notion of conceptual schemes and its underlying Kantian scheme-content dualism. However, such a notion simply cannot carry the (...)
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  40. added 2014-03-07
    On the Very Good Idea of a Conceptual Scheme.Martin Coleman - 2010 - The Pluralist 5 (2):69-86.
    Richard Rorty has argued that Donald Davidson can be classified as a neopragmatist. To this end, Rorty has tried to show that Davidson's views share important similarities with those of Peirce, James, and Dewey. Davidson, for his part, has tended to resist Rorty's attempts to classify his views in this way. Interestingly, the reasons for Rorty's classification and the reasons for Davidson's resistance share a common trait: an appeal to the elimination of the dualism of conceptual scheme and experiential content (...)
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  41. added 2014-03-07
    Reclaiming Davidson's Methodological Rationalism as Galilean Idealization in Psychology.Carole J. Lee - 2010 - Philosophy of the Social Sciences 40 (1):84-106.
    In his early experimental work with Suppes, Davidson adopted rationality assumptions, not as necessary constraints on interpretation, but as practical conceits in addressing methodological problems faced by experimenters studying decision making under uncertainty. Although the content of their theory has since been undermined, their methodological approach—a Galilean form of methodological rationalism—lives on in contemporary psychological research. This article draws on Max Weber’s verstehen to articulate an account of Galilean methodological rationalism; explains how anomalies faced by Davidson’s early experimental work gave (...)
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  42. added 2013-11-23
    Skepticism and Interpretation.Kirk Ludwig - 1992 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 52 (2):317-339.
    Donald Davidson has argued that attention to the necessarily public character of language shows that we cannot be massively mistaken about the world around us, and that consequently skeptical doubts about empirical knowledge are misplaced. The arguments Davidson advances rely on taking as the fundamental methodological standpoint for investigating meaning and related concepts the standpoint of the interpreter of another speaker, on the grounds that it is from the interpreter’s standpoint that we discover what constraints are placed on meaning by (...)
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  43. added 2013-11-14
    Logical Form.Miguel Hoeltje - 2013 - In Ernest Lepore & Kirk Ludwig (eds.), A Companion to Donald Davidson (Blackwell Companions to Philosophy). Blackwell.
    Donald Davidson contributed to the discussion of logical form in two ways. On the one hand, he made several influential suggestions on how to give the logical forms of certain constructions of natural language. His account of adverbial modification and so called action-sentences is nowadays, in some form or other, widely employed in linguistics (Harman (forthcoming) calls it "the standard view"). Davidson's approaches to indirect discourse and quotation, while not as influential, also still attract attention today. On the other hand, (...)
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  44. added 2013-10-24
    Davidson on the Impossibility of Thought Without Language. Comments on Diana I. Pérez.Marcelo Fischborn - 2012 - Principia: An International Journal of Epistemology 16 (3):489-494.
    Diana Pérez (2005) criticizes Davidson’s argument for the thesis that there is no thought without language, and offers an alternative defense of that thesis on the basis of empirical studies on developmental psychology. In this comment I argue that more recent studies do not seem to affect Davidson’s argument in the way Pérez suggests, and that her alternative defense of the thesis that there is no thought without language is insufficient. At the end, I offer a sketch of how a (...)
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  45. added 2013-08-07
    Conceptual Schemes and Presuppositional Languages.Xinli Wang - 2007 reprint - The Proceedings of the Twenty-First World Congress of Philosophy 6:119-124.
    The current discussions of conceptual schemes and related topics are misguided; for they are based on a tacit assumption that the difference between two schemes consists in the different distributions in truth-values. I argue that what should concern us, in the discussions of conceptual schemes and related issues, is not truth-values of assertions, but rather the truth-value-status of the sentences used to make the assertions. This is because the genuine conceptual innovation between alternative theories or languages does not lie in (...)
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  46. added 2013-04-02
    From an Analysis of the Notion of Organization to Limits on Conceptual Diversity.Terence Rajivan Edward - 2013 - Ethos: Dialogues in Philosophy and Social Sciences 6 (1):86-94.
    This paper evaluates an argument from Donald Davidson against alternative conceptual schemes. The argument can be divided into two stages. In the first stage it is argued that only pluralities can be organized. In the second stage it is argued that if our conceptual scheme organizes a plurality and someone else’s scheme also organizes that plurality, there must be a set of common concepts, hence someone else’s scheme can never be an alternative scheme to ours. I object to the first (...)
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  47. added 2012-02-23
    Applied Relativism and Davidson's Arguments Against Conceptual Schemes.Lajos L. Brons - 2011 - The Science of Mind 49:221-240.
    This paper argues that Davidson's argument against conceptual schemes fail against so-called "Applied Relativisms", i.e. theories of conceptual relativism found outside philosophy such as Whorf's. These theories make no metaphysical claims, which Davidson seems to assume. Ultimately, the misunderstanding (and resulting strawman argument) illustrates (the effect of) differences in conceptual schemes more than that it undermines it.
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  48. added 2011-08-24
    Singular Causal Statements and Strict Deterministic Laws.Noa Latham - 1987 - Pacific Philosophical Quarterly 68 (1):29-43.
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  49. added 2011-07-16
    A. Ford, J. Hornsby, and F. Stoutland, Eds., Essays on Anscombe’s Intention. [REVIEW]John Schwenkler - 2013 - Journal of Moral Philosophy 10 (2):241-243.
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  50. added 2011-05-31
    Reason and the Structure of Davidson's "Desire-Belief Model".Henk Bij de Weg - manuscript
    of “Reason and the structure of Davidson’s ‘Desire-Belief-Model’ ” by Henk bij de Weg In the present discussion in the analytic theory of action, broadly two models for the explanation or justification of actions can be distinguished: the internalist and the externalist model. Against this background, I discuss Davidson’s version of the internalist Desire-Belief Model . First, I show that what Davidson calls “pro attitude” has two distinct meanings. An implication of this is that Davidson’s DBM actually comprises two different (...)
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