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  1. added 2019-09-02
    Subjective Externalism.Sarah Sawyer - 2018 - Theoria 84 (1):4-22.
    In this article I argue for a novel theory of representational content, which I call ‘subjective externalism’. The view combines an internal, subjective constraint on the attribution of thought content which traditionally underpins internalist theories of thought, and an external, objective constraint on the attribution of thought content which traditionally underpins externalist theories of thought. While internalism and externalism are mutually inconsistent, the constraints to which each theory is committed are not. It is this realization that opens up the conceptual (...)
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  2. added 2019-07-08
    Incorrigibilidade nas circunstâncias adequadas: “qualquer tipo de enunciado pode oferecer evidências para qualquer outro tipo”.Eros Carvalho - 2014 - Analytica (Rio) 18 (2):41-65.
    In this paper, I present the discussion between Ayer and Austin about whether sentences or utterances can be incorrigible and I argue in favor of Austin position. I defend Austin against objections from Ayer presented after the publication of Sense & Sensibilia. Unlike what was sustained by Ayer, experiential sentences and material object sentences are not epistemically asymmetrical. A material object sentence can be incorrigible if uttered in appropriated circumstances, and an experiential sentence can be corrigible if uttered in unappropriated (...)
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  3. added 2019-06-20
    Urteilen, Glauben, Bewusstsein: Ein Kommentar zu Andreas Kemmerlings Glauben. Essay über einen Begriff.Wolfgang Barz - 2019 - Zeitschrift für Philosophische Forschung 73 (2):279-284.
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  4. added 2019-06-06
    Stanley B. Klein: The Two Selves—Their Metaphysical Commitments and Functional Independence.Kourken Michaelian - 2015 - Minds and Machines 25 (1):119-122.
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  5. added 2019-06-06
    Davidson y la autoridad de la primera persona [Davidson on First Person Authority].Martin Francisco Fricke - 2007 - Dianoia 52 (58):49-76.
    In this paper, I reconstruct Davidson’s explanation of first person authority and criticize it in three main points: (1) The status of the theory is unclear, given that it is phenomenologically inadequate. (2) The theory explains only that part of the phenomenon of first person authority which is due to the fact that no two speakers speak exactly the same idiolect. But first person authority might be a more far-reaching phenomenon than this. (3) Davidson’s argument depends on the claim that (...)
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  6. added 2019-04-23
    Introspektion.Wolfgang Barz - 2019 - In Martin Grajner & Guido Melchior (eds.), Handbuch Erkenntnistheorie. Stuttgart: Metzler. pp. 129-135.
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  7. added 2019-03-15
    Concepts, Conceptions and Self-Knowledge.Sarah Sawyer - 2019 - Erkenntnis (y).
    Content externalism implies first, that there is a distinction between concepts and conceptions, and second, that there is a distinction between thoughts and states of mind. In this paper, I argue for a novel theory of self-knowledge: the partial-representation theory of self-knowledge, according to which the self-ascription of a thought is authoritative when it is based on a con-scious, occurrent thought in virtue of which it partially represents an underlying state of mind.
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  8. added 2019-02-10
    Introspection Without Judgment.Anna Giustina - forthcoming - Erkenntnis:1-21.
    The focus of this paper is introspection of phenomenal states, i.e. the distinctively first-personal method through which one can form beliefs about the phenomenology of one’s current conscious mental states. I argue that two different kinds of phenomenal state introspection should be distinguished: one which involves recognizing and classifying the introspected phenomenal state as an instance of a certain experience type, and another which does not involve such classification. Whereas the former is potentially judgment-like, the latter is not. I call (...)
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  9. added 2019-01-16
    What has Transparency to Do with Husserlian Phenomenology?Chad Kidd - forthcoming - ProtoSociology.
    This paper critically evaluates Amie Thomasson’s (2003; 2005; 2006) view of the conscious mind and the interpretation of Husserl’s phenomenological reduction that it adopts. In Thomasson’s view, the phenomenological method is not an introspectionist method, but rather a “transparent” or “extrospectionist” method for acquiring epistemically privileged self-knowledge. I argue that Thomasson’s reading of Husserl’s phenomenological reduction is correct. But the view of consciousness that she pairs with it—a view of consciousness as “transparent” in the sense that first-order, world-oriented experience is (...)
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  10. added 2019-01-02
    Authority Without Privilege: How to Be a Dretskean Conciliatory Skeptic on Self-Knowledge.Michael Roche & William Roche - forthcoming - Synthese:1-17.
    Dretske is a “conciliatory skeptic” on self-knowledge. Take some subject S such that (i) S thinks that P and (ii) S knows that she has thoughts. Dretske’s theory can be put as follows: S has a privileged way of knowing what she thinks, but she has no privileged way of knowing that she thinks it. There is much to be said on behalf of conciliatory skepticism (“CS” for short) and Dretske’s defense of it. We aim to show, however, that Dretske’s (...)
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  11. added 2018-08-29
    Assertion and Transparent Self-Knowledge.Eric Marcus & John Schwenkler - 2018 - Canadian Journal of Philosophy 49 (7):873-889.
    ABSTRACTWe argue that honesty in assertion requires non-empirical knowledge that what one asserts is what one believes. Our argument proceeds from the thought that to assert honestly, one must follow and not merely conform to the norm ‘Assert that p only if you believe that p’. Furthermore, careful consideration of cases shows that the sort of doxastic self-knowledge required for following this norm cannot be acquired on the basis of observation, inference, or any other form of detection of one’s own (...)
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  12. added 2018-08-29
    Practical Knowledge as Knowledge of a Normative Judgment.Eric Marcus - 2018 - Manuscrito (4):319-347.
    According to one interpretation of Aristotle’s famous thesis, to say that action is the conclusion of practical reasoning is to say that action is itself a judgment about what to do. A central motivation for the thesis is that it suggests a path for understanding the non-observational character of practical knowledge. If actions are judgments, then whatever explains an agent’s knowledge of the relevant judgment can explain her knowledge of the action. I call the approach to action that accepts Aristotle’s (...)
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  13. added 2018-07-14
    Is There Anything to the Authority Thesis?Wolfgang Barz - 2018 - Journal of Philosophical Research 43:125-143.
    Many philosophical theories of self-knowledge can be understood as attempts to explain why self-ascriptions enjoy a certain kind of authority that other-ascriptions lack (the Authority Thesis). The aim of this paper is not to expand the stock of existing explanations but to ask whether the Authority Thesis can be adequately specified. To this end, I identify three requirements that must be met by any satisfactory specification. I conclude that the search for an adequate specification of the Authority Thesis leads to (...)
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  14. added 2018-06-15
    The Evil Demon Inside.Nicholas Silins - forthcoming - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research.
    This paper examines how new evil demon problems could arise for our access to the internal world of our own minds. I start by arguing that the internalist/externalist debate in epistemology has been widely misconstrued---we need to reconfigure the debate in order to see how it can arise about our access to the internal world. I then argue for the coherence of scenarios of radical deception about our own minds, and I use them to defend a properly formulated internalist view (...)
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  15. added 2018-04-13
    Moran, Richard. The story of my life: narrative and self-understanding. [REVIEW]César Schirmer Dos Santos - 2017 - Analytica (Rio) 21 (1):259-262.
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  16. added 2018-03-05
    As origens do expressivismo e o ponto de Geach.César Schirmer Dos Santos - 2018 - Dissertatio:3-26.
    Our question, in this paper, is about the plausibility of the expressivist account of one’s self- attribution of mental states. More to the point, we will strictly follow the principle of charity as a mean to show that an expressivist philosopher can have good and reasonable answers to the set of objections put together in so called “Geach’s point”. Using this method, we hope to give enough evidences that an expressivist philosopher has enough resources to build a plausible explanation for (...)
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  17. added 2018-02-17
    Evans and First Person Authority.Martin Francisco Fricke - 2009 - Abstracta 5 (1):3-15.
    In The Varieties of Reference, Gareth Evans describes the acquisition of beliefs about one’s beliefs in the following way: ‘I get myself in a position to answer the question whether I believe that p by putting into operation whatever procedure I have for answering the question whether p.’ In this paper I argue that Evans’s remark can be used to explain first person authority if it is supplemented with the following consideration: Holding on to the content of a belief and (...)
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  18. added 2018-02-06
    Hidden Qualia.Derek Shiller - 2017 - Review of Philosophy and Psychology 8 (1):165-180.
    In this paper, I propose that those who reject higher-order theories of consciousness should not rule out the possibility of having conscious experiences that they cannot introspect. I begin by offering four arguments that such non-introspectible conscious experiences are possible. Next, I offer two arguments for thinking that we actually have such experiences. According to the first argument, it is unlikely that evolution would have furnished us with a faculty of introspection that worked flawlessly. According to the second argument, there (...)
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  19. added 2018-01-25
    Saying Without Knowing What or How.Elmar Unnsteinsson - 2017 - Croatian Journal of Philosophy 17 (3):351-382.
    In response to Stephen Neale (2016), I argue that aphonic expressions, such as PRO, are intentionally uttered by normal speakers of natural language, either by acts of omitting to say something explicitly, or by acts of giving phonetic realization to aphonics. I argue, also, that Gricean intention-based semantics should seek divorce from Cartesian assumptions of transparent access to propositional attitudes and, consequently, that Stephen Schiffer's so-called meaning-intention problem is not powerful enough to banish alleged cases of over-intellectualization in contemporary philosophy (...)
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  20. added 2018-01-20
    If You Believe You Believe, You Believe. A Constitutive Account of Knowledge of One’s Own Beliefs.Peter Baumann - 2017 - Logos and Episteme:389-416.
    Can I be wrong about my own beliefs? More precisely: Can I falsely believe that I believe that p? I argue that the answer is negative. This runs against what many philosophers and psychologists have traditionally thought and still think. I use a rather new kind of argument, – one that is based on considerations about Moore's paradox. It shows that if one believes that one believes that p then one believes that p – even though one can believe that (...)
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  21. added 2017-11-16
    Explicaciones "racionalistas" de la autoridad de la primera persona.Martin Francisco Fricke - 2010 - In Jaime Labastida & Violeta Aréchiga (eds.), Identidad y diferencia. Vol. 3: La filosofía y la ciencia. México, D.F.: Siglo XXI and Asociación Filosófica de México. pp. 211-226.
    Conocemos la propia mente mejor que la mente de otras personas. Explicaciones racionalistas dicen que este fenómeno se debe a nuestra racionalidad: Somos capaces de ajustar nuestras creencias e intenciones racionalmente en vista de su coherencia o de nueva evidencia y tal ajuste requiere que conozcamos nuestras creencias e intenciones con la autoridad de la primera persona. Examino pasajes de McGinn, Shoemaker y Burge, criticando el argumento en tres puntos: (1) Es posible pensar racionalmente sin autoconocimiento. (2) Los requerimientos racionalistas (...)
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  22. added 2017-11-15
    Wright y la autoridad de la primera persona: Problemas de teorías constitutivas de la autoridad.Martin Francisco Fricke - 2007 - In Jorge Martínez Contreras & Aura Ponce de León (eds.), El saber filosófico. Vol. 3: Tópicos. México, D.F.: Siglo XXI and Asociación Filosófica de México, A.C.. pp. 265-276.
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  23. added 2017-11-01
    Action Without The First Person Perspective.Herman Cappelen & Joshua Dever - manuscript
    In our book The Inessential Indexical we argue that the various theses of essential indexicality all fail. Indexicals are not essential, we conclude. One essentiality thesis we target in the third chapter is the claim that indexical attitudes are essential for action. Our strategy is to give examples of what we call impersonal action rationalizations , which explain actions without citing indexical attitudes. To defeat the claim that indexical attitudes are essential for action, it suffices that there could be even (...)
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  24. added 2017-10-24
    Perspective and Epistemic State Ascriptions.Markus Kneer - 2018 - Review of Philosophy and Psychology 9 (2):313-341.
    This article explores whether perspective taking has an impact on the ascription of epistemic states. To do so, a new method is introduced which incites participants to imagine themselves in the position of the protagonist of a short vignette and to judge from her perspective. In a series of experiments, perspective proves to have a significant impact on belief ascriptions, but not on knowledge ascriptions. For belief, perspective is further found to moderate the epistemic side-effect effect significantly. It is hypothesized (...)
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  25. added 2017-09-19
    Transparency and Partial Beliefs.Weng Hong Tang - 2017 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 95 (1):153-166.
    How should we account for self-knowledge of our inner lives? Some have argued that just as we have various senses that allow us to perceive the environment, we have an inner sense that allows us to perceive our inner lives. But others find such a view implausible and think that there are other ways to account for self-knowledge. With respect to all-or-nothing beliefs, some have held that we may account for self-knowledge by appealing to the claim that such beliefs are (...)
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  26. added 2017-08-06
    Reliability of a Speaker and Recognition of a Listener: Bocheński and Nyāya on the Relation of Authority.Agnieszka Rostalska - 2017 - Kervan. International Journal of Afro-Asiatic Studies 21:155-173.
    In the Nyāyasūtras (NS), the fundamental text of the Nyāya tradition, testimony is defined as a statement of a reliable speaker (āpta). According to the NS, such a speaker should possess three qualities: competence, honesty and desire to speak. The content of a discourse, including the prescriptions, is also considered reliable due to the status of a given author and the person that communicated it. -/- The Polish philosopher J.M. Bocheński similarly stresses the role of a speaker; he holds that (...)
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  27. added 2017-03-02
    Dretske on Self-Knowledge and Contrastive Focus: How to Understand Dretske’s Theory, and Why It Matters.Michael Roche & William Roche - 2017 - Erkenntnis 82 (5):975-992.
    Dretske’s theory of self-knowledge is interesting but peculiar and can seem implausible. He denies that we can know by introspection that we have thoughts, feelings, and experiences. But he allows that we can know by introspection what we think, feel, and experience. We consider two puzzles. The first puzzle, PUZZLE 1, is interpretive. Is there a way of understanding Dretske’s theory on which the knowledge affirmed by its positive side is different than the knowledge denied by its negative side? The (...)
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  28. added 2017-01-29
    Why Transparency Undermines Economy.Derek Baker - 2015 - Synthese 192 (9):3037-3050.
    Byrne offers a novel interpretation of the idea that the mind is transparent to its possessor, and that one knows one’s own mind by looking out at the world. This paper argues that his attempts to extend this picture of self-knowledge force him to sacrifice the theoretical parsimony he presents as the primary virtue of his account. The paper concludes by discussing two general problems transparency accounts of self-knowledge must address.
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  29. added 2016-11-06
    Knowing What One Believes – In Defense of a Dispositional Reliabilist Extrospective Account.Michael Roche - 2016 - American Philosophical Quarterly 53 (4):365-379.
    We seem to enjoy a special kind of access to our beliefs. We seem able to know about them via a distinctively first-personal method, and such knowledge seems epistemically superior to any knowledge that others might attain of our beliefs. This paper defends a novel account of this access. The account is extrospective in that it explains this access in terms of our ability to think about the (non-mental) world. Moreover, it does not require the contentious claim that judging that (...)
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  30. added 2016-08-25
    Embedded Mental Action in Self-Attribution of Belief.Antonia Peacocke - 2017 - Philosophical Studies 174 (2):353-377.
    You can come to know that you believe that p partly by reflecting on whether p and then judging that p. Call this procedure “the transparency method for belief.” How exactly does the transparency method generate known self-attributions of belief? To answer that question, we cannot interpret the transparency method as involving a transition between the contents p and I believe that p. It is hard to see how some such transition could be warranted. Instead, in this context, one mental (...)
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  31. added 2016-07-21
    Autoconhecimento e os limites da autenticidade.Sven Bernecker - 2016 - Skepsis: A Journal for Philosophy and Interdisciplinary Research 9 (13):105-125.
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  32. added 2016-07-21
    O problema da autenticidade do conhecimento: uma breve apresentação.César Schirmer dos Santos - 2016 - Sképsis 9 (13):85-103.
    Minha proposta, nesta introdução a “Autoconhecimento e os limites da autenticidade”, texto de Sven Bernecker traduzido e publicado neste número de Sképsis, é dar razões para que defensores do anti-individualismo que sejam partidários da estratégia do autoconhecimento básico, no que diz respeito ao debate sobre a compatibilidade entre anti-individualismo e conhecimento de si, mudem de posição, e passem a defender anti-individualismo com teoria da autenticidade.
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  33. added 2016-07-11
    To Believe is to Know That You Believe.Eric Marcus - 2016 - Dialectica 70 (3):375-405.
    Most agree that believing a proposition normally or ideally results in believing that one believes it, at least if one considers the question of whether one believes it. I defend a much stronger thesis. It is impossible to believe without knowledge of one's belief. I argue, roughly, as follows. Believing that p entails that one is able to honestly assert that p. But anyone who is able to honestly assert that p is also able to just say – i.e., authoritatively, (...)
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  34. added 2016-04-30
    De Se Thoughts and Immunity to Error Through Misidentification.Manuel García-Carpintero - 2018 - Synthese 195 (8):3311-3333.
    I discuss an aspect of the relation between accounts of de se thought and the phenomenon of immunity to error through misidentification. I will argue that a deflationary account of the latter—the Simple Account, due to Evans —will not do; a more robust one based on an account of de se thoughts is required. I will then sketch such an alternative account, based on a more general view on singular thoughts, and show how it can deal with the problems I (...)
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  35. added 2016-04-21
    Pain and Incorrigibility.Peter Langland-Hassan - forthcoming - In J. Corns (ed.), Routledge Handbook of Philosophy of Pain. Routledge.
    This chapter (from Routledge's forthcoming handbook on the philosophy of pain) considers the question of whether people are always correct when they judge themselves to be in pain, or not in pain. While I don't show sympathy for traditional routes to the conclusion that people are "incorrigible" in their pain judgments, I explore--and perhaps even advocate--a different route to such incorrigibility. On this low road to incorrigibility, a sensory state's being judged unpleasant is what makes it a pain (or not).
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  36. added 2016-04-01
    Narrative Identity and Diachronic Self-Knowledge.Kevin J. Harrelson - 2016 - Journal of the American Philosophical Association 2 (1):164-179.
    Our ability to tell stories about ourselves has captivated many theorists, and some have taken these developments for an opportunity to answer long-standing questions about the nature of personhood. In this essay I employ two skeptical arguments to show that this move was a mistake. The first argument rests on the observation that storytelling is revisionary. The second implies that our stories about ourselves are biased in regard to our existing self-image. These arguments undercut narrative theories of identity, but they (...)
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  37. added 2016-02-28
    Introspection, Isolation, and Construction: Mentality as Activity. Commentary on Hurlburt, Heavey & Kelsey, “Toward a Phenomenology of Inner Speaking”.Joel Krueger, Marco Bernini & Sam Wilkinson - 2014 - Consciousness and Cognition 25:9-10.
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  38. added 2016-02-26
    XIII—Self‐Knowledge, Transparency, and Self‐Authorship.Sacha Golob - 2015 - Wiley: Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society 115 (3pt3):235-253.
    Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society, Volume 115, Issue 3pt3, Page 235-253, December 2015.
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  39. added 2016-02-22
    A View to a Kill: Perspectives on Faux-Snuff and Self.Steve Jones - 2016 - In Neil Jackson, Shaun Kimber, Johnny Walker & Thomas Watson (eds.), Snuff: Real Death and Screen Media. Bloomsbury Academic. pp. 277-294.
    Scholarly debate over faux-snuff’s content has predominantly focused on realism and affect. This paper seeks to offer an alternative interpretation, examining what faux-snuff’s form reveals about self. Faux-snuff is typically presented from a first-person perspective (killer-cam), and as such is foundationally invested in the killer’s experiences as they record their murder spree. First then, I propose that the simulated-snuff form reifies self-experience in numerous ways. Faux-snuff’s characteristic formal attributes capture the self’s limited, fractured qualities, for example. Second, I contend that (...)
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  40. added 2016-02-17
    Inferential Justification and the Transparency of Belief.David James Barnett - 2016 - Noûs 50 (1):184-212.
    This paper critically examines currently influential transparency accounts of our knowledge of our own beliefs that say that self-ascriptions of belief typically are arrived at by “looking outward” onto the world. For example, one version of the transparency account says that one self-ascribes beliefs via an inference from a premise to the conclusion that one believes that premise. This rule of inference reliably yields accurate self-ascriptions because you cannot infer a conclusion from a premise without believing the premise, and so (...)
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  41. added 2016-02-06
    The Sceptical Paradox and the Nature of the Self.Tony Cheng - 2016 - Philosophical Investigations 39 (1):3-14.
    In the present article, I attempt to relate Saul Kripke's “sceptical paradox” to some issues about the self; specifically, the relation between the self and its mental states and episodes. I start with a brief reconstruction of the paradox, and venture to argue that it relies crucially on a Cartesian model of the self: the sceptic regards the Wittgensteinian “infinite regress of interpretation” as the foundation of his challenge, and this is where he commits the crucial mistake. After the diagnosis, (...)
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  42. added 2016-01-24
    Self-Knowledge and Its Limits.John Schwenkler - 2018 - Journal of Moral Philosophy 15 (1):85-95.
    This is a review essay of Quassim Cassam, Self-Knowledge for Humans (Oxford, 2014) and John Doris, Talking to Our Selves (Oxford, 2015). In it I question whether Cassam succeeds in his challenge to Richard Moran's account of first-personal authority, and whether Doris is right that experimental evidence for unconscious influences on behavior generates skeptical worries on accounts that regard accurate self-knowledge as a precondition of agency.
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  43. added 2016-01-11
    De Se Attitudes and Semiotic Aspects of Cognition.Erich Rast - 2015 - In J. Fonseca & J. Gonçalves (eds.), Philosophical Perspectives on the Self. Peter Lang. pp. 121-146.
    Typical puzzles for de se attitudes by Perry and Lewis are laid out and contrasted with the original version of Jackson's Knowledge Argument. It is argued, from an epistemic perspective, that de se attitudes can be explained by looking at the way internal/introspective knowledge is formed without resorting to acquaintance or making assumptions about the Mind/Body problem.
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  44. added 2015-12-01
    Racionalidad y autoconocimiento en Shoemaker.Martin F. Fricke - 2012 - In Pedro Stepanenko (ed.), La primera persona y sus percepciones. Universidad Nacional Autónoma de México. pp. 53-73.
    En su artículo “On Knowing One’s Own Mind” (1988), Shoemaker argumenta en favor de tres afirmaciones: (1) se requiere un autoconocimiento directo (self-acquaintance) para la cooperación racional con otras personas (porque ésta depende de que podamos decirles qué es lo que creemos e intentamos hacer); (2) el autoconocimiento directo es necesario para la deliberación sobre qué creer y qué hacer (porque no podemos ajustar racionalmente creencias y deseos sin saber qué creencias y deseos tenemos); y (3) el autoconocimiento directo es (...)
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  45. added 2015-11-18
    Review of Declan Smithies and Daniel Stoljar’s (Eds.) Introspection and Consciousness (2012, Oxford University Press). [REVIEW]Michael Roche & William Roche - 2016 - Philosophical Quarterly 66 (262):203-208.
    This is an excellent collection of essays on introspection and consciousness. There are fifteen essays in total (all new except for Sydney Shoemaker’s essay). There is also an introduction where the editors explain the impetus for the collection and provide a helpful overview. The essays contain a wealth of new and challenging material sure to excite specialists and shape future research. Below we extract a skeptical argument from Fred Dretske’s essay and relate the remaining essays to that argument. Due to (...)
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  46. added 2015-09-05
    The Argument from Normativity against Dispositional Analyses of Meaning.Andrea Guardo - 2009 - In Volker A. Munz, Klaus Puhl & Joseph Wang (eds.), Language and World – Papers of the XXXII International Wittgenstein Symposium. Kirchberg am Wechsel: Austrian Ludwig Wittgenstein Society. pp. 163-165.
    A talk given at the XXXII International Wittgenstein Symposium.
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  47. added 2015-08-26
    Introduction: Self-Knowledge in Perspective.Fleur Jongepier & Derek Strijbos - 2015 - Philosophical Explorations 18 (2):123-133.
    This introduction is part of the special issue ‘ Self-knowledge in perspective’ guest edited by Fleur Jongepier and Derek Strijbos. // Papers included in the special issue: Transparency, expression, and self-knowledge Dorit Bar-On -/- Self-knowledge and communication Johannes Roessler -/- First-person privilege, judgment, and avowal Kateryna Samoilova -/- Self-knowledge about attitudes: rationalism meets interpretation Franz Knappik -/- How do you know that you settled a question? Tillmann Vierkant -/- On knowing one’s own resistant beliefs Cristina Borgoni -/- Self-knowledge and imagination (...)
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  48. added 2015-06-15
    Self-Knowledge About Attitudes: Rationalism Meets Interpretation.Franz Knappik - 2015 - Philosophical Explorations 18 (2):183-198.
    Recently influential “rationalist” views of self-knowledge about our rational attitudes hold that such self-knowledge is essentially connected to rational agency, and therefore has to be particularly reliable, immediate, and distinct from third-personal access. This approach has been challenged by “theory theory” or “interpretationist” views of self-knowledge: on such views, self-knowledge is based on the interpretation of information about ourselves, and this interpretation involves the same mindreading mechanisms that we use to access other persons’ mental states. Interpretationist views are usually dismissed (...)
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  49. added 2015-04-04
    Introspection, Anton's Syndrome, and Human Echolocation.Sean Allen‐Hermanson - 2015 - Pacific Philosophical Quarterly 96 (3):n/a-n/a.
    Philosophers have recently argued that since there are people who are blind, but don't know it, and people who echolocate, but don't know it, conscious introspection is highly unreliable. I contend that a second look at Anton's syndrome, human echolocation, and ‘facial vision’ suggests otherwise. These examples do not support skepticism about the reliability of introspection.
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  50. added 2015-03-28
    Introspective Knowledge of Experience and its Role in Consciousness Studies.Jesse Butler - 2011 - Journal of Consciousness Studies 18 (2):128-145.
    In response to Petitmengin and Bitbol's recent account of first-person methodologies in the study of consciousness, I provide a revised model of our introspective knowledge of our own conscious experience. This model, which I call the existential constitution model of phenomenal knowledge, avoids the problems that Petitmengin and Bitbol identify with standard observational models of introspection while also avoiding an underlying metaphorical misconception in their own proximity model, which misconstrues first-person knowledge of consciousness in terms of a dichotomous epistemic relationship. (...)
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