View topic on PhilPapers for more information
Related categories

26 found
Order:
More results on PhilPapers
Material to categorize
  1. Consciousness, Origins.Gregory Nixon - 2016 - In Harold L. Miller Jr (ed.), The SAGE Encyclopedia of Theory in Psychology. Thousand Oaks, CA, USA: Sage Publications. pp. 172-176.
    To explain the origin of anything, we must be clear about that which we are explaining. There seem to be two main meanings for the term consciousness. One might be called open in that it equates consciousness with awareness and experience and considers rudimentary sensations to have evolved at a specific point in the evolution of increasing complexity. But certainly the foundation for such sensation is a physical body. It is unclear, however, exactly what the physical requirements are for a (...)
    Remove from this list   Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark  
  2. Evolvability, Plausibility, and Possibility. [REVIEW]A. C. Love - 2006 - BioScience 56:772–774.
    Judgments of plausibility involve appearance of the truth or reasonableness, which is always a function of background knowledge. What anyone will countenance is conditioned by what they already know (or think they know). Marc Kirschner (professor of systems biology at Harvard) and John Gerhart (professor of molecular and cell biology at the University of California—Berkeley) aim to show that molecular, cellular, and developmental processes relevant to the generation of phenotypic variation in anatomy, physiology, and behavior demonstrate how evolutionary processes, especially (...)
    Remove from this list   Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark  
  3. Świadomość jako zindywidualizowana informacja w działaniu : uniwersalna charakterystyka.Jakub Jonkisz - 2016 - Filozofia Nauki 24 (2).
    The aim of the article is to formulate a universal characterization of consciousness, despite the conceptual vagueness of that term. The fundamental aspects of this phenomenon as studied by science consist of four features: its being accessible from the inside and the outside (subjectively and objectively), its being about something (referential), its being bodily determined, and its possessing a certain function (being useful). Approached in this way and in broad terms, consciousness seems to be a graded rather than all-or-none phenomenon. (...)
    Remove from this list   Download  
    Translate
     
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark  
  4. Leopold Stubenberg, Consciousness and Qualia. [REVIEW]Josh Weisberg - 1999 - Journal of Consciousness Studies 6 (4):154-154.
    Remove from this list   Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark  
  5. Le fonctionnalisme face au problème Des qualia.Ned Block - 1992 - Les Etudes Philosophiques (3):337-369.
    Remove from this list   Download  
    Translate
     
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark  
  6. Uma Teoria Fisicalista Do Conteúdo E da Consciência - D. Dennett E Os Debates da Filosofia da Mente.Sofia Miguens - 2002 - Campo das Letras.
    Remove from this list   Download  
    Translate
     
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   1 citation  
  7. Free Action as Two Level Voluntary Control.John Dilworth - 2008 - Philosophical Frontiers 3 (1):29-45.
    The naturalistic voluntary control (VC) theory explains free will and consciousness in terms of each other. It is central to free voluntary control of action that one can control both what one is conscious of, and also what one is not conscious of. Furthermore, the specific cognitive ability or skill involved in voluntarily controlling whether information is processed consciously or unconsciously can itself be used to explain consciousness. In functional terms, it is whatever kind of cognitive processing occurs when a (...)
    Remove from this list   Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark  
  8. A Computational Framework for Implementing Baars' Global Worslaoce Theory of Consciousness.Ivan Moura & Pierre Bonzon - 2004 - In Proceedings Conference of Brain Inspired Cognitive Systems (BICS),.
    We consider Baars’ "Global Workspace" theory of consciousness and discuss its possible representation within a model of intelligent agents. We first review a particular agent implementation that is given by an abstract machine, and then identify the extensions that are required in order to accommodate the main aspects of consciousness. According to Baars’ theory, this amounts to unconscious process coalitions that result in the creation of contexts. These extensions can be formulated within a reified virtual machine encompassing a representation of (...)
    Remove from this list   Download  
    Translate
     
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark  
  9. Conscious Perceptual Experience as Representational Self-Prompting.John Dilworth - 2007 - Journal of Mind and Behavior 28 (2):135-156.
    Journal of Mind and Behavior 28 no. 2 , pp. 135-156. The self-prompting theory of consciousness holds that conscious perceptual experience occurs when non-routine perceptual data prompt the activation of a plan in an executive control system that monitors perceptual input. On the other hand, routine, non-conscious perception merely provides data about the world, which indicatively describes the world correctly or incorrectly. Perceptual experience instead involves data that are about the perceiver, not the world. Their function is that of imperatively (...)
    Remove from this list   Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark  
  10. Against Functionalism: Consciousness as an Information-Bearing Medium.Bruce Mangan - 1998 - In Stuart R. Hameroff, Alfred W. Kaszniak & A. C. Scott (eds.), Toward a Science of Consciousness II. Cambridge, USA: MIT Press. pp. 135-141.
    Remove from this list   Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   1 citation  
  11. Consciousness Explained.Adam Morton - 1993 - Cogito 7 (2):159-161.
    reviews of Dennett & McGinn on consciousness for an unsophisticated audience.
    Remove from this list   Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark  
Dennett's Functionalism
  1. Cognitive Approaches to Phenomenal Consciousness.Pete Mandik - 2018 - In Dale Jacquette (ed.), The Bloomsbury Companion to the Philosophy of Consciousness. New York: Bloomsbury Academic. pp. 347-370.
    The most promising approaches to understanding phenomenal consciousness are what I’ll call cognitive approaches, the most notable exemplars of which are the theories of consciousness articulated by David Rosenthal and Daniel Dennett. The aim of the present contribution is to review the core similarities and differences of these exemplars, as well as to outline the main strengths and remaining challenges to this general sort of approach.
    Remove from this list   Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark  
  2. The Fallacy of the Homuncular Fallacy.Carrie Figdor - 2018 - Belgrade Philosophical Annual 31:41-56.
    A leading theoretical framework for naturalistic explanation of mind holds that we explain the mind by positing progressively "stupider" capacities ("homunculi") until the mind is "discharged" by means of capacities that are not intelligent at all. The so-called homuncular fallacy involves violating this procedure by positing the same capacities at subpersonal levels. I argue that the homuncular fallacy is not a fallacy, and that modern-day homunculi are idle posits. I propose an alternative view of what naturalism requires that reflects how (...)
    Remove from this list   Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark  
  3. Consciousness as an Adaptation. What Animals Feel and Why.Pouwel Slurink - 2016 - In Andreas Blank (ed.), Animals. New Essays. Munich: Philosophia Verlag. pp. 303-332.
    Evolutionary epistemology (Lorenz, Vollmer) and value-driven decision theory (Pugh) are used to explain the fundamental properties of consciousness. It is shown that this approach is compatible with global workspace theory (Baars) and global neuronal workspace theory (De Haene). The emotions are, however, that what drives consciousness. A hypothetical evolutionary tree of the emotions is given – intended to show that consciousness evolves and is probably qualitatively different in different groups of animals.
    Remove from this list   Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark  
  4. Persons, Virtual Persons, and Radical Interpretation.Michael Bourke - 2015 - Modern Horizons:1-24.
    A dramatic problem facing the concept of the self is whether there is anything to make sense of. Despite the speculative view that there is an essential role for the perceiver in measurement, a physicalist view of reality currently seems to be ruling out the conditions of subjectivity required to keep the concept of the self. Eliminative materialism states this position explicitly. The doctrine holds that we have no objective grounds for attributing personhood to anyone, and can therefore dispense with (...)
    Remove from this list   Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark  
  5. Homunkulismus in den Kognitionswissenschaften.Geert Keil - 2003 - In Wolfgang R. Köhler & Hans-Dieter Mutschler (eds.), Ist der Geist berechenbar? Wissenschaftliche Buchgesellschaft. pp. 77-112.
    1. Was ist ein Homunkulus-Fehlschluß? 2. Analyse des Mentalen und Naturalisierung der Intentionalität 3. Homunkulismus in Theorien der visuellen Wahrnehmung 4. Homunkulismus und Repräsentationalismus 5. Der homunkulare Funktionalismus 6. Philosophische Sinnkritik und empirische Wissenschaft Literatur .
    Remove from this list   Download  
    Translate
     
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark  
  6. Daniel Dennett's Intuition Pumps. [REVIEW]Brendan Shea - 2015 - Reason Papers 37 (2).
    A review of Daniel Dennett's Intuition Pumps (W.V. Norton: 2013).
    Remove from this list   Download  
    Translate
     
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark  
  7. Filozofia jako inżynieria odwrotna: rzecz o naturalizmie Daniela C. Dennetta.Marcin Miłkowski - 2004 - Przeglad Filozoficzny - Nowa Seria 50 (2):75-89.
    Remove from this list   Download  
    Translate
     
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark  
  8. What is It Like to Be Nonconscious? A Defense of Julian Jaynes.Gary Williams - 2011 - Phenomenology and the Cognitive Sciences 10 (2):217-239.
    I respond to Ned Block’s claim that it is ridiculous to suppose that consciousness is a cultural construction based on language and learned in childhood. Block is wrong to dismiss social constructivist theories of consciousness on account of it being ludicrous that conscious experience is anything but a biological feature of our animal heritage, characterized by sensory experience, evolved over millions of years. By defending social constructivism in terms of both Julian Jaynes’ behaviorism and J.J. Gibson’s ecological psychology, I draw (...)
    Remove from this list   Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark  
  9. Daniel Dennett. Reconciling Science and Our Self-Conception. By Matthew. [REVIEW]David Bain - 2005 - Philosophical Quarterly 55 (219):369-371.
    Over 35 years, Daniel Dennett has articulated a rich and expansive philosophical outlook. There have been elaborations, refinements, and changes of mind, exposi- tory and substantive. This makes him hard to pin down. Does he, for example, think intentional states are real? In places, he sounds distinctly instrumentalist; elsewhere, he avows realism, ‘sort of’. What is needed is a map, charting developments and tracing dialectical threads through his extensive writings and the different regions of his thought. This is what Matthew (...)
    Remove from this list   Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark  
  10. A 'Hermeneutic Objection': Language and the Inner View.Gregory M. Nixon - 1999 - Journal of Consciousness Studies 6 (2-3):257-269.
    In the worlds of philosophy, linguistics, and communications theory, a view has developed which understands conscious experience as experience which is 'reflected' back upon itself through language. This indicates that the consciousness we experience is possible only because we have culturally invented language and subsequently evolved to accommodate it. This accords with the conclusions of Daniel Dennett (1991), but the 'hermeneutic objection' would go further and deny that the objective sciences themselves have escaped the hermeneutic circle. -/- The consciousness we (...)
    Remove from this list   Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   2 citations  
Functionalist Theories of Consciousness, Misc
  1. Concrete Consciousness: A Sartrean Critique of Functionalist Accounts of Mind.Joel W. Krueger - 2006 - Sartre Studies International 12 (2):44-60.
    In this essay, I argue that Sartre's notion of pre-reflective consciousness can be summoned to offer a general challenge to contemporary functionalist accounts of mind, broadly construed. In virtue of the challenge Sartre offers these contemporary functionalist accounts and the richness of his phenomenological analysis, I conclude that his voice needs to be included in ongoing debates over the nature of consciousness. First, I look at some of the basic claims motivating functionalist accounts of mind. Next, I look at Sartre's (...)
    Remove from this list   Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   1 citation  
  2. Against the Necessity of Functional Roles for Conscious Experience: Reviving and Revising a Neglected Argument.Gary Bartlett - 2014 - Journal of Consciousness Studies 21 (1-2):33-53.
    While the claim that certain functional states are sufficient for conscious experience has received substantial critical attention, the claim that functional states are necessary is rarely addressed. Yet the latter claim is perhaps now more common than the former. I aim to revive and revise a neglected argument against the necessity claim, by Michael Antony. The argument involves manipulating a conscious subject's brain so as to cancel a disposition which is supposedly crucial to the realization of an experience that the (...)
    Remove from this list   Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   1 citation  
  3. Materialismus a hylemorfismus.Tomas Hribek - 2012 - Filosoficky Casopis 60 (4):585-600.
    [Materialism and Hylomorphism] The author disputes the view, expressed recently by Tomáš Machula a David Peroutka, that materialism, dominant in contemporary philosophy of mind, should be substituted by Thomist hylomorphism. The critique focuses on two aspects of Machula and Peroutka’s argument. Firstly, on their assumption that the contemporary preference for materialism is the result of chance (ignorance of the fact that in addition to materialism and dualism the position of hylomorphism is also available). This assumption fails to take into account (...)
    Remove from this list   Download  
    Translate
     
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark  
  4. The Science of Human Consciousness.Ramabrahmam Varanasi - 2007 - Ludus Vitalis 15 (27):127-141.
    A model of human consciousness is presented here in terms of physics and electronics using Upanishadic awareness. The form of Atman proposed in the Upanishads in relation to human consciousness as oscillating psychic energy-presence and its virtual or unreal energy reflection maya, responsible for mental energy and mental time-space are discussed. Analogy with Fresnel’s bi-prism experimental set up in physical optics is used to state, describe and understand the form, structure and function of Atman and maya, the ingredients of human (...)
    Remove from this list   Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark  
  5. Computational Theories of Conscious Experience: Between a Rock and a Hard Place.Gary Bartlett - 2012 - Erkenntnis 76 (2):195-209.
    Very plausibly, nothing can be a genuine computing system unless it meets an input-sensitivity requirement. Otherwise all sorts of objects, such as rocks or pails of water, can count as performing computations, even such as might suffice for mentality—thus threatening computationalism about the mind with panpsychism. Maudlin in J Philos 86:407–432, ( 1989 ) and Bishop ( 2002a , b ) have argued, however, that such a requirement creates difficulties for computationalism about conscious experience, putting it in conflict with the (...)
    Remove from this list   Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   2 citations