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  1. What Is the Bearing of Thinking on Doing?Marshall Bierson & John Schwenkler - forthcoming - In Adrian Haddock & Rachael Wiseman (eds.), The Anscombean Mind. Routledge.
    What a person is doing often depends on that person’s thought about what they are doing, or about the wider circumstances of their action. For example, whether my killing is murder or manslaughter depends, in part, on whether I understand that what I am doing is killing you, and on whether I understand that my killing is unjustified. Similarly, if I know that the backpack I am taking is yours, then my taking it may be an act of theft; but (...)
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  2. Intention as Belief.John Schwenkler - forthcoming - Pacific Philosophical Quarterly.
    What’s the relationship between (i) intending to do something, (ii) believing that you are going to do this, and (iii) its being the case that you are going to do the thing in question? I propose a position on which all three categories, correctly understood, amount in the fundamental case to the very same thing. The belief that constitutes future-directed intention, when strong, likewise constitutes one as having a real tendency to act in the intended way.
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  3. Anscombe on Acting for Reasons.Keshav Singh - forthcoming - In Ruth Chang & Kurt Sylvan (eds.), The Routledge Handbook of Practical Reason.
    This chapter discusses some of Anscombe’s contributions to the philosophy of practical reason. It focuses particularly on Anscombe’s view of what it is to act for reasons. I begin by discussing the relationship between acting intentionally and acting for reasons in Anscombe's theory of action. I then further explicate her view by discussing her rejection of two related views about acting for reasons: causalism (the view that reasons are a kind of cause of actions) and psychologism (the view that reasons (...)
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  4. Success and Knowledge in Action: Saving Anscombe’s Account of Intentionality.Markus Kneer - 2021 - In Tadeusz Ciecierski & Paweł Grabarczyk (eds.), Context Dependence in Language, Action, and Cognition. De Gruyter. pp. 131-154.
    According to Anscombe, acting intentionally entails knowledge in ac- tion. This thesis has been near-universally rejected due to a well-known counter- example by Davidson: a man intending to make ten legible carbon copies might not believe with confidence, and hence not know, that he will succeed. If he does, however, his action surely counts as intentional. Damaging as it seems, an even more powerful objection can be levelled against Anscombe: while act- ing, there is as yet no fact of the (...)
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  5. Anscombe and the Unity of Intention.Noam Melamed - 2020 - Enrahonar: Quaderns de Filosofía 64:113-133.
    The conviction that ‘intention’ is not semantically ambiguous but has a single and distinctive meaning frames the argument of Anscombe’s masterwork Intention. What this meaning is, however, is barely recognizable in her book. One reason for this difficulty is that Intention starts from a threefold division of the appearance of the concept in our natural language and proceeds to develop its various accounts piecemeal. Another is the obscurity of the notion of ‘practical knowledge’ it introduces, precisely for shedding the light (...)
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  6. Argumentando Dios desde la filosofía analítica: Cracovia, Oxford y los comienzos de una nueva disciplina.Alejandro Pérez - 2017 - Quarentibus 9:68-87.
    El presente artículo introduce el lector a la filosofía analítica de la religión desde un punto de vista histórico y haciendo énfasis en su evolución. El objetivo es doble: primero dar a conocer una nueva disciplina que se ha desarrollado de manera notoria dentro del habla inglesa pero que ha sido ignorada dentro de la filosofía de habla hispana; segundo, comprender su nacimiento y algunas de sus principales características.
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  7. Understanding 'Practical Knowledge'.John Schwenkler - 2015 - Philosophers' Imprint 15.
    The concept of practical knowledge is central to G.E.M. Anscombe's argument in Intention, yet its meaning is little understood. There are several reasons for this, including a lack of attention to Anscombe's ancient and medieval sources for the concept, and an emphasis on the more straightforward concept of knowledge "without observation" in the interpretation of Anscombe's position. This paper remedies the situation, first by appealing to the writings of Thomas Aquinas to develop an account of practical knowledge as a distinctive (...)
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  8. Anscombe on the Philosophy of Psychology as Propaedeutic to Ethics.Sergio Volodia Marcello Cremaschi - 2014 - In Matteo Galletti (ed.), La mente morale. Persone, ragioni, virtù. Rome, Italy: Edizioni di Storia e Letteratura. pp. 17-62.
    The chapter reconstructs and criticizes one of Anscombe's famous three these, namely the claim that a ‘philosophy of psychology’ is a preliminary task to the construction of any possible ethical theory, or that moral philosophy ‘should be laid aside at any rate until we have an adequate philosophy of psychology, in which we are conspicuously lacking’. The claim is that Anscombe’s idea of a philosophy of psychology cannot be simply identified with that of moral psychology with which we are familiar (...)
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  9. Elizabeth Anscombe on Consequentialism and Absolute Prohibitions.Sergio Cremaschi - 2012 - Danish Yearbook of Philosophy 47 (1):7-39.
    I discuss the third of Anscombe’s theses from “Modern Moral Philosophy”, namely that post-Sidgwickian consequentialism makes the worst action acceptable. I scrutinize her comprehension of “consequentialism”, her reconstruction of Sidgwick’s view of intention, her defence of casuistry, her reformulation of the double-effect doctrine, and her view of morality as based on Divine commands. I argue that her characterization of consequentialism suffers from lack of understanding of the history of utilitarianism and its self-transformation through the Intuitionism-Utilitarianism controversy; that she uncritically accepted (...)
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  10. Anscombe aurait-elle été relativiste?Marie Guillot - 2012 - Repha (6):55-72.
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  11. Anscombe on `Ought'.Charles Pigden - 1988 - Philosophical Quarterly 38 (150):20-41.
    n ‘Modern Moral Philosophy’ Anscombe argues that the moral ‘ought’ should be abandoned as the senseless survivor from a defunct conceptual scheme. I argue 1) That even if the moral ‘ought’ derives its meaning from a Divine Law conception of ethics it does not follow that it cannot sensibly survive the Death of God. 2) That anyway Anscombe is mistaken since ancestors of the emphatic moral ‘ought’ predate the system of Christian Divine Law from which the moral ‘ought’ supposedly derives (...)
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