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  1. Meaning, Colouring, and Logic: Kaplan Vs. Frege on Pejoratives.Ludovic Soutif - 2022 - Princípios: Revista de Filosofia 29 (59):151-171.
    In this essay I consider Kaplan’s challenge to Frege’s so-called dictum: “Logic (and perhaps even truth) is immune to epithetical color”. I show that if it is to challenge anything, it rather challenges the view (attributable to Frege) that logic is immune to pejorative colour. This granted, I show that Kaplan’s inference-based challenge can be set even assuming that the pejorative doesn’t make any non-trivial truth-conditional (descriptive) contribution. Surprisingly, this goes against the general tendency to consider the truth-conditionally inert logically (...)
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  2. Understanding Misunderstanding.Gilad Nir - manuscript
    Wittgenstein seeks to throw light on our concept of understanding by looking at how misunderstandings arise and what kinds of failure they involve. He discerns a peculiar sort of misunderstanding in the writings of the social anthropologist James Frazer. In Frazer’s hands, the anthropological project of enabling us to understand human behavior seems to yield the result that there are certain forms of human behavior that simply cannot be understood. The source of Frazer’s misunderstanding, according to Wittgenstein, is that he (...)
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  3. Two-Sorted Frege Arithmetic is Not Conservative.Stephen Mackereth & Jeremy Avigad - 2022 - Review of Symbolic Logic:1-34.
    Neo-Fregean logicists claim that Hume's Principle (HP) may be taken as an implicit definition of cardinal number, true simply by fiat. A longstanding problem for neo-Fregean logicism is that HP is not deductively conservative over pure axiomatic second-order logic. This seems to preclude HP from being true by fiat. In this paper, we study Richard Kimberly Heck's Two-sorted Frege Arithmetic (2FA), a variation on HP which has been thought to be deductively conservative over second-order logic. We show that it isn't. (...)
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  4. Wittgenstein's Reductio.Gilad Nir - 2022 - Journal for the History of Analytical Philosophy 10 (3).
    By means of a reductio argument, Wittgenstein’s Tractatus calls into question the very idea that we can represent logical form. My paper addresses three interrelated questions: first, what conception of logical form is at issue in this argument? Second, whose conception of logic is this argument intended to undermine? And third, what could count as an adequate response to it? I show that the argument construes logical form as the universal, underlying correlation of any representation and the reality it represents. (...)
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  5. Shareability of Thought and Frege's Constraint: A Reply to Onofri.Romain Bourdoncle - forthcoming - Inquiry: An Interdisciplinary Journal of Philosophy.
    Onofri [Onofri, A. 2018. ‘The Publicity of Thought.’ Philosophical Quarterly 68 (272): 521–541.] proposes an individuation criterion for thoughts that purports to satisfy both shareability (the notion that different thinkers, or a single thinker at different times, can and generally do think type-identical thoughts) and Frege's constraint (according to which two thoughts are different if it is possible for a rational subject to endorse one while rejecting the other). I argue that his proposal fails to satisfy Frege's constraint. Then I (...)
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  6. In What Sense is Frege's (Statement of the) Puzzle "Problematic"?Ludovic Soutif - 2014 - Revista de Filosofía de la Universidad de Costa Rica 53 (136):51-57.
    I take issue with Glezakos’s explanation of why Frege’s puzzle is un-puzzling. On her view, Frege’s statement – how can sentences of the form a=a and a=b, if true, differ in cognitive value if they express the same semantic content/are made true by the same object’s self-identity? – should not be considered any puzzling either because it is on the whole circular, or because, neutrally stated, it cannot even be set up. I argue against this that if, as she takes (...)
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  7. Frege's Theorem in Plural Logic.Simon Hewitt - manuscript
    We note that a plural version of logicism about arithmetic is suggested by the standard reading of Hume's Principle in terms of `the number of Fs/Gs'. We lay out the resources needed to prove a version of Frege's principle in plural, rather than second-order, logic. We sketch a proof of the theorem and comment philosophically on the result, which sits well with a metaphysics of natural numbers as plural properties.
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  8. Davidson’s Main Arguments for the Necessity of Language for Thought (In Persian).Ali Hossein Khani - 2013 - Ketab-E-Mah-E-Falsafeh 6 (68):66-77.
    نگاهی بر استدلال‌های دونالد دیویدسون در باب ضرورت زبان برای اندیشه .
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Frege: Philosophy of Language
  1. ¿Existe Sherlock Holmes? La integración de la ficción en la filosofía del lenguaje fregeana.Alejandro Villamor-Iglesias - 2022 - Contextos 50.
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  2. Conceptos clave de la filosofía de Gottlob Frege: Una introducción.Alejandro Villamor-Iglesias - 2022 - Cuestiones de Filosofía 8.
    El presente artículo tiene como principal objetivo introducir al lector algunos de los conceptos fundamentales de la filosofía de Gottlob Frege. Estos son: el binomio sentido/referencia, el valor veritativo de oraciones con elementos no referenciales, la distinción entre pensar, juzgar y aseverar, su concepción de los indéxicos y los demostrativos, así como su defensa de la existencia de un tercer reino. En algunos de ellos se mostrarán algunas problemáticas asociadas que han sido destacados por pensadores de renombre. Tal es el (...)
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  3. Frege Plagiarized the Stoics.Susanne Bobzien - 2021 - In Fiona Leigh (ed.), Themes in Plato, Aristotle, and Hellenistic Philosophy, Keeling Lectures 2011-2018. University of Chicago Press. pp. 149-206.
    In this extended essay, I argue that Frege plagiarized the Stoics --and I mean exactly that-- on a large scale in his work on the philosophy of logic and language as written mainly between 1890 and his death in 1925 (much of which published posthumously) and possibly earlier. I use ‘plagiarize' (or 'plagiarise’) merely as a descriptive term. The essay is not concerned with finger pointing or casting moral judgement. The point is rather to demonstrate carefully by means of detailed (...)
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  4. Frege's Contribution to Philosophy of Language.Richard Heck & Robert May - 2006 - In Barry C. Smith & Ernest Lepore (eds.), The Oxford Handbook of Philosophy of Language. Oxford University Press. pp. 3-39.
    An investigation of Frege’s various contributions to the study of language, focusing on three of his most famous doctrines: that concepts are unsaturated, that sentences refer to truth-values, and that sense must be distinguished from reference.
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Frege: Singular Terms
  1. Nota Sobre o Frege de Evans.Sagid Salles - 2019 - Investigação Filosófica 10 (2):39-46.
    Evans famosamente declarou que Frege não aceitou a possibilidade de sentido sem referente, o que significa que ele não foi tão tolerante com nomes vazios quanto comumente se pensa. Um problema central para a tese de Evans é que Frege diz explicitamente que aceita esta possibilidade, e parece que ele de fato foi tolerante com nomes vazios. Neste artigo, defendo que a solução de Evans para este problema implica que Frege estava comprometido com uma explicação implausível das frases contendo nomes (...)
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  2. Termos Singulares Indefinidos: Frege, Russell e a tradição matemática.Daniel Durante Pereira Alves - 2016 - Saberes: Filosofia E Educação (Filosofia Lógica e Metafísica An):33-53.
    É bem conhecida a divergência entre as posições de Gottlob Frege e Bertrand Russell com relação ao tratamento semântico dado a sentenças contendo termos singulares indefinidos, ou seja, termos singulares sem referência ou com referência ambígua, tais como ‘Papai Noel’ ou ‘o atual rei da França’ ou ‘1/0 ’ ou ‘√4’ ou ‘o autor de Principia Mathematica’. Para Frege, as sentenças da linguagem natural que contêm termos indefinidos não formam declarações e portanto não são nem verdadeiras nem falsas. Já para (...)
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Frege: Genuine Proper Names
  1. Mill-Frege Compatibalism.John Justice - 2002 - Journal of Philosophical Research 27:567-576.
    It is generally accepted that Mill’s classification of names as nonconnotative terms is incompatible with Frege’s thesis that names have senses. However, Milldescribed the senses of nonconnotative terms—without being aware that he was doing so. These are the senses for names that were sought in vain by Frege. When Mill’s and Frege’s doctrines are understood as complementary, they constitute a fully satisfactory theory of names.
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  2. Getting Straight on How Russell Underestimated Frege.Adam P. Kubiak & Piotr Lipski - 2014 - Roczniki Filozoficzne 62 (4):121-134.
    Bertrand Russell in his essay On Denoting [1905] presented a theory of description developed in response to the one proposed by Gottlob Frege in his paper Über Sinn und Bedeutung [1892]. The aim of our work will be to show that Russell underestimated Frege three times over in presenting the latter’s work: in relation to the Gray’s Elegy argument, to the Ferdinand argument, and to puzzles discussed by Russell. First, we will discuss two claims of Russell’s which do not do (...)
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Frege: The First-Person Pronoun
  1. De Se Puzzles and Frege Puzzles.Stephan Torre & Clas Weber - 2022 - Inquiry: An Interdisciplinary Journal of Philosophy 65 (1):50-76.
    What is the relationship between Frege’s puzzle and the puzzle of the de se? An increasingly influential view claims that the de se puzzle is merely an instance of Frege’s puzzle and that the idea that de se attitudes pose a distinctive theoretical challenge rests on a myth. Here we argue that this view is misguided. There are important differences between the two puzzles. First, unlike Frege puzzle cases, de se puzzle cases involve unshareable Fregean senses. Second, unlike Frege puzzle (...)
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  2. Frege's Unthinkable Thoughts.Lukas Skiba - 2017 - Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society 117 (3):333–343.
    There are two common reactions to Frege’s claim that some senses and thoughts are private. Privatists accept both private senses and thoughts, while intersubjectivists don’t accept either. Both sides agree on a pair of tacit assumptions: first, that private senses automatically give rise to private thoughts; and second, that private senses and thoughts are the most problematic entities to which Frege’s remarks on privacy give rise. The aim of this paper is to show that both assumptions are mistaken. This will (...)
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  3. Can Fregeans Have 'I'-Thoughts?Alexandre Billon & Marie Guillot - 2014 - Revista de Filosofía de la Universidad de Costa Rica (136):97-105.
    We examine how Frege’s contrast between identity judgments of the forms “a=a” vs. “a=b” would fare in the special case where ‘a’ and ‘b’ are complex mental representations, and ‘a’ stands for an introspected ‘I’-thought. We first argue that the Fregean treatment of I-thoughts entails that they are what we call “one-shot thoughts”: they can only be thought once. This has the surprising consequence that no instance of the “a=a” form of judgment in this specific case comes out true, let (...)
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  4. Objects of Thought.Ian Rumfitt - 2016 - In Gary Ostertag (ed.), Meanings and Other Things: Essays on the Philosophy of Stephen Schiffer. Oxford University Press.
    In his book The Things We Mean, Stephen Schiffer advances a subtle defence of what he calls the ‘face-value’ analysis of attributions of belief and reports of speech. Under this analysis, ‘Harold believes that there is life on Venus’ expresses a relation between Harold and a certain abstract object, the proposition that there is life on Venus. The present essay first proposes an improvement to Schiffer’s ‘pleonastic’ theory of propositions. It then challenges the face-value analysis. There will be such things (...)
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  5. Frege on Demonstratives.John Perry - 1977 - Philosophical Review 86 (4):474-497.
    Demonstratives seem to have posed a severe difficulty for Frege’s philosophy of language, to which his doctrine of incommunicable senses was a reaction. In “The Thought,” Frege briefly discusses sentences containing such demonstratives as “today,” “here,” and “yesterday,” and then turns to certain questions that he says are raised by the occurrence of “I” in sentences (T, 24-26). He is led to say that, when one thinks about oneself, one grasps thoughts that others cannot grasp, that cannot be communicated. However, (...)
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Frege: Descriptions
  1. A Metasemantic Analysis of Gödel's Slingshot Argument.Hans-Peter Leeb - manuscript
    Gödel’s slingshot-argument proceeds from a referential theory of definite descriptions and from the principle of compositionality for reference. It outlines a metasemantic proof of Frege’s thesis that all true sentences refer to the same object—as well as all false ones. Whereas Frege drew from this the conclusion that sentences refer to truth-values, Gödel rejected a referential theory of definite descriptions. By formalising Gödel’s argument, it is possible to reconstruct all premises that are needed for the derivation of Frege’s thesis. For (...)
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  2. Das Kompositionalitätsprinzip in Seinen Anwendungen Auf Die "Slingshot-Argumente".Hans-Peter Leeb - 2004 - Sankt Augustin: Academia Verlag.
    According to the principle of compositionality, the meaning of a composed expression depends only on its logical form and the meaning of its descriptive sub-expressions. This dependence can be understood as the substitutivity of expressions that have the same meaning without changing the meaning of the composed expression. In this book the hidden complexity of Frege's and Quine's conceptions of extensionality is revealed. The insights gained by this analysis as well as two versions of the principle of compositionality are used (...)
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  3. Russell's Revenge: A Problem for Bivalent Fregean Theories of Descriptions.Jan Heylen - 2017 - Pacific Philosophical Quarterly 98 (4):636-652.
    Fregean theories of descriptions as terms have to deal with improper descriptions. To save bivalence various proposals have been made that involve assigning referents to improper descriptions. While bivalence is indeed saved, there is a price to be paid. Instantiations of the same general scheme, viz. the one and only individual that is F and G is G, are not only allowed but even required to have different truth values.
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  4. Getting Straight on How Russell Underestimated Frege.Adam P. Kubiak & Piotr Lipski - 2014 - Roczniki Filozoficzne 62 (4):121-134.
    Bertrand Russell in his essay On Denoting [1905] presented a theory of description developed in response to the one proposed by Gottlob Frege in his paper Über Sinn und Bedeutung [1892]. The aim of our work will be to show that Russell underestimated Frege three times over in presenting the latter’s work: in relation to the Gray’s Elegy argument, to the Ferdinand argument, and to puzzles discussed by Russell. First, we will discuss two claims of Russell’s which do not do (...)
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Frege: Singular Terms, Misc
  1. Resolving Frege’s Other Puzzle.Eric Snyder, Richard Samuels & Stewart Shapiro - 2022 - Philosophica Mathematica 30 (1):59-87.
    Number words seemingly function both as adjectives attributing cardinality properties to collections, as in Frege’s ‘Jupiter has four moons’, and as names referring to numbers, as in Frege’s ‘The number of Jupiter’s moons is four’. This leads to what Thomas Hofweber calls Frege’s Other Puzzle: How can number words function as modifiers and as singular terms if neither adjectives nor names can serve multiple semantic functions? Whereas most philosophers deny that one of these uses is genuine, we instead argue that (...)
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  2. Termos Singulares Indefinidos: Frege, Russell e a tradição matemática.Daniel Durante Pereira Alves - 2016 - Saberes: Filosofia E Educação (Filosofia Lógica e Metafísica An):33-53.
    É bem conhecida a divergência entre as posições de Gottlob Frege e Bertrand Russell com relação ao tratamento semântico dado a sentenças contendo termos singulares indefinidos, ou seja, termos singulares sem referência ou com referência ambígua, tais como ‘Papai Noel’ ou ‘o atual rei da França’ ou ‘1/0 ’ ou ‘√4’ ou ‘o autor de Principia Mathematica’. Para Frege, as sentenças da linguagem natural que contêm termos indefinidos não formam declarações e portanto não são nem verdadeiras nem falsas. Já para (...)
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Frege: Indexicals and Demonstratives, Misc
  1. De Se Puzzles and Frege Puzzles.Stephan Torre & Clas Weber - 2022 - Inquiry: An Interdisciplinary Journal of Philosophy 65 (1):50-76.
    What is the relationship between Frege’s puzzle and the puzzle of the de se? An increasingly influential view claims that the de se puzzle is merely an instance of Frege’s puzzle and that the idea that de se attitudes pose a distinctive theoretical challenge rests on a myth. Here we argue that this view is misguided. There are important differences between the two puzzles. First, unlike Frege puzzle cases, de se puzzle cases involve unshareable Fregean senses. Second, unlike Frege puzzle (...)
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  2. Slicing Thoughts.Vojislav Bozickovic - 2017 - American Philosophical Quarterly 54 (1):3-13.
    According to a criterion of difference for thoughts derived from Frege, two thoughts are different if it is at the same time possible for a rational subject to take conflicting epistemic attitudes toward them. But applying this criterion to perception-based demonstrative thoughts seems to slice thoughts too finely and lead to their proliferation which makes the criterion implausible. I argue that such a proliferation of thoughts is blocked by transforming this criterion into a related one that is shown to be (...)
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  3. Worldlessness, Determinism and Free Will.Ari Maunu - 1999 - Dissertation, University of Turku (Finland)
    I have three main objectives in this essay. First, in chapter 2, I shall put forward and justify what I call worldlessness, by which I mean the following: All truths (as well as falsehoods) are wholly independent of any circumstances, not only time and place but also possible worlds. It follows from this view that whatever is actually true must be taken as true with respect to every possible world, which means that all truths are (in a sense) necessary. However, (...)
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  4. Do Demonstratives Have Senses?Richard Heck - 2002 - Philosophers' Imprint 2:1-33.
    Frege held that referring expressions in general, and demonstratives and indexicals in particular, contribute more than just their reference to what is expressed by utterances of sentences containing them. Heck first attempts to get clear about what the essence of the Fregean view is, arguing that it rests upon a certain conception of linguistic communication that is ultimately indefensible. On the other hand, however, he argues that understanding a demonstrative (or indexical) utterance requires one to think of the object denoted (...)
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  5. Frege on Demonstratives.John Perry - 1977 - Philosophical Review 86 (4):474-497.
    Demonstratives seem to have posed a severe difficulty for Frege’s philosophy of language, to which his doctrine of incommunicable senses was a reaction. In “The Thought,” Frege briefly discusses sentences containing such demonstratives as “today,” “here,” and “yesterday,” and then turns to certain questions that he says are raised by the occurrence of “I” in sentences (T, 24-26). He is led to say that, when one thinks about oneself, one grasps thoughts that others cannot grasp, that cannot be communicated. However, (...)
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Frege: Sinn and Bedeutung
  1. Frege's Puzzle and the Meaning of Words.Graham Seth Moore - 2020 - 1000-Word Philosophy: An Introductory Anthology.
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  2. Solving Frege's Puzzle.Richard Heck - 2012 - Journal of Philosophy 109 (1-2):132-174.
    So-called 'Frege cases' pose a challenge for anyone who would hope to treat the contents of beliefs (and similar mental states) as Russellian propositions: It is then impossible to explain people's behavior in Frege cases without invoking non-intentional features of their mental states, and doing that seems to undermine the intentionality of psychological explanation. In the present paper, I develop this sort of objection in what seems to me to be its strongest form, but then offer a response to it. (...)
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  3. An Analysis of Two Accounts on the Sense of Singular Terms.Alan Schwerin - 1988 - Dialectica 42 (3):221-231.
    This paper is a critical investigation of Gottlob Frege's and Bertrand Russell's views on the sense or meaning of singular terms. In his famous "On denoting" Russell erects his case on objections that he raises against Frege. I suggest that Russell's criticisms of Frege are seriously misguided, due in large measure to the uneven applications of his terminology when addressing Frege's views.
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  4. Are Frege Cases Exceptions to Intentional Generalizations?Murat Aydede & Philip Robbins - 2001 - Canadian Journal of Philosophy 31 (1):1-22.
    This piece criticizes Fodor's argument (in The Elm and the Expert, 1994) for the claim that Frege cases should be treated as exceptions to (broad) psychological generalizations rather than as counterexamples.
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  5. Fodor on Concepts and Frege Puzzles.Murat Aydede - 1998 - Pacific Philosophical Quarterly 79 (4):289-294.
    ABSTRACT. Fodor characterizes concepts as consisting of two dimensions: one is content, which is purely denotational/broad, the other the Mentalese vehicle bearing that content, which Fodor calls the Mode of Presentation (MOP), understood "syntactically." I argue that, so understood, concepts are not interpersonally sharable; so Fodor's own account violates what he calls the Publicity Constraint in his (1998) book. Furthermore, I argue that Fodor's non-semantic, or "syntactic," solution to Frege cases succumbs to the problem of providing interpersonally applicable functional roles (...)
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Frege: Sinn
  1. Thoughts About Thoughts: The Structure of Fregean Propositions.Nathan Bice - 2019 - Dissertation, Columbia University
    This dissertation is about the structure of thought. Following Gottlob Frege, I define a thought as the sort of content relevant to determining whether an assertion is true or false. The historical component of the dissertation involves interpreting Frege’s actual views on the structure of thought. I argue that Frege did not think that a thought has a unique decomposition into its component senses, but rather the same thought can be decomposed into senses in a variety of distinct ways. I (...)
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  2. Frege, Sentence-Questions, Questions, and Thoughts: A Dialogue.Nathan William Davies - manuscript
    In the last forty years Dummett, Hanks, Künne, and Bobzien have claimed that when Frege wrote ‘Über Sinn und Bedeutung’, he thought that the sense of a sentence-question [Satzfrage] was not a thought [Gedanke] ((Dummett 1981: 307–308); (Hanks 2007: 142–143); (Künne 2010: 427–429); (Bobzien 2021: 163–164)). Recently, Textor has claimed that when Frege wrote ‘Über Sinn und Bedeutung’, he thought that the sense of a sentence-question was not a question [Frage] (Textor 2021: 227 fn.2). I think it is possible that (...)
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  3. Frege and Saving Substitution.Bryan Pickel & Brian Rabern - 2021 - Philosophical Studies 178 (8):2687-2697.
    Goodman and Lederman (2020) argue that the traditional Fregean strategy for preserving the validity of Leibniz’s Law of substitution fails when confronted with apparent counterexamples involving proper names embedded under propositional attitude verbs. We argue, on the contrary, that the Fregean strategy succeeds and that Goodman and Lederman’s argument misfires.
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  4. On the Notion of Meaning That Dummett Accredits to Frege.Leonardo Videira - 2018 - Analytica. Revista de Filosofia 22 (1):165-176.
    In this paper I will discuss Dummett’s interpretation of Frege’s “On sense and reference” that takes place in his Frege: Philosophy of Language, where he attributes a notion of meaning to Frege that is not explicit on the text of “On sense and reference”. I believe that this attribution is incompatible with what Frege is really saying in the article and with the partition of the notion that Dummett himself exposes.
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  5. On Frege's Supposed Hierarchy of Senses.Nicholas Georgalis - forthcoming - Inquiry: An Interdisciplinary Journal of Philosophy.
    This paper argues against the claim that Frege is committed to an infinite hierarchy of senses. Carnap and Kripke, along with many others, argue the contrary; I expose where all such arguments go astray. Invariably these arguments assume (without citation) that Frege holds that sense and reference are always distinct. This is the fulcrum upon which the hierarchy is hoisted. The counter to this assumption is based on two important but neglected passages. The locution ‘indirect sense’ has no ontological significance (...)
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  6. Frege Cases and Bad Psychological Laws.Mahrad Almotahari & Aidan Gray - forthcoming - Mind.
    We draw attention to a series of implicit assumptions that have structured the debate about Frege’s Puzzle. Once these assumptions are made explicit, we rely on them to show that if one focuses exclusively on the issues raised by Frege cases, then one obtains a powerful consideration against a fine-grained conception of propositional-attitude content. In light of this consideration, a form of Russellianism about content becomes viable.
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  7. The Diversity of Sense: An Appreciation of Frege’s Theory of Sense.Dr Sanjit Chakraborty - 2011 - Indian Journal of Analytic Philosophy 4 (2):79-96.
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  8. Objects of Thought.Ian Rumfitt - 2016 - In Gary Ostertag (ed.), Meanings and Other Things: Essays on the Philosophy of Stephen Schiffer. Oxford University Press.
    In his book The Things We Mean, Stephen Schiffer advances a subtle defence of what he calls the ‘face-value’ analysis of attributions of belief and reports of speech. Under this analysis, ‘Harold believes that there is life on Venus’ expresses a relation between Harold and a certain abstract object, the proposition that there is life on Venus. The present essay first proposes an improvement to Schiffer’s ‘pleonastic’ theory of propositions. It then challenges the face-value analysis. There will be such things (...)
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  9. Frege's Paradise and the Paradoxes.Sten Lindström - 2003 - In Krister Segerberg & Rysiek Sliwinski (eds.), A Philosophical Smorgasbord: Essays on Action, Truth and Other Things in Honour of Fredrick Stoutland. Uppsala Philosophical Studies 52.
    The main objective of this paper is to examine how theories of truth and reference that are in a broad sense Fregean in character are threatened by antinomies; in particular by the Epimenides paradox and versions of the so-called Russell-Myhill antinomy, an intensional analogue of Russell’s more well-known paradox for extensions. Frege’s ontology of propositions and senses has recently received renewed interest in connection with minimalist theories that take propositions (thoughts) and senses (concepts) as the primary bearers of truth and (...)
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  10. Arguing for Frege's Fundamental Principle.Bryan Frances - 1998 - Mind and Language 13 (3):341–346.
    Saul Kripke's puzzle about belief demonstrates the lack of soundness of the traditional argument for the Fregean fundamental principle that the sentences 'S believes that a is F' and 'S believes that b is F' can differ in truth value even if a = b. This principle is a crucial premise in the traditional Fregean argument for the existence of semantically relevant senses, individuative elements of beliefs that are sensitive to our varying conceptions of what the beliefs are about. Joseph (...)
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Frege: Criteria for Sense Identity
  1. Sense, Reference, and Computation.Bruno Bentzen - 2020 - Perspectiva Filosófica 47 (2):179-203.
    In this paper, I revisit Frege's theory of sense and reference in the constructive setting of the meaning explanations of type theory, extending and sharpening a program–value analysis of sense and reference proposed by Martin-Löf building on previous work of Dummett. I propose a computational identity criterion for senses and argue that it validates what I see as the most plausible interpretation of Frege's equipollence principle for both sentences and singular terms. Before doing so, I examine Frege's implementation of his (...)
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  2. Freges Kriterien der Sinngleichheit.Thorsten Sander - 2016 - Archiv für Geschichte der Philosophie 98 (4):395-432.
    Frege's mature writings apparently contain two different criteria of sense identity. While in "Über Sinn und Bedeutung" (1892) and in "Kurze Übersicht meiner logischen Lehren" (1906?) he seems to advocate a psychological criterion, his letter to Husserl of December 12, 1906 offers a thoroughly logical criterion of sense identity. It is argued that the latter proposal is not a "momentary aberration", but rather Frege's official criterion; his psychological criteria only serve as a way of illustrating questions of sense identity by (...)
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  3. Slicing Thoughts.Vojislav Bozickovic - 2017 - American Philosophical Quarterly 54 (1):3-13.
    According to a criterion of difference for thoughts derived from Frege, two thoughts are different if it is at the same time possible for a rational subject to take conflicting epistemic attitudes toward them. But applying this criterion to perception-based demonstrative thoughts seems to slice thoughts too finely and lead to their proliferation which makes the criterion implausible. I argue that such a proliferation of thoughts is blocked by transforming this criterion into a related one that is shown to be (...)
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