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  1. Frege's Concept of the Thought.Pickard Dean - manuscript
    Frege's attempt to provide a foundation for the possibility of language and communication, like Kant's attempt to provide a foundation for the possibility of knowledge, fails to provide us with something absolute and foundational in a fixed sense. However, both these philosophers succeed in showing something about necessity that can be preserved independently of their absolutisms. Part III of this paper will provide reasons for accepting this thesis, while Parts I and II will provide an expository background on Frege's view (...)
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  2. Frege's Hyperbolic Objectivism.Joseph Li Vecchi - 2021 - Proceedings, Seventh World Conference on Metaphysics, Pontifical University of Salamanca, 7:615-618.
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  3. The Modern Semantic Principles Behind Gilson’s Existential Interpretation of Aquinas (Part 2).Elliot Polsky - forthcoming - Studia Gilsoniana.
    Part one of this two-part paper looked at the modern semantic developments underlying Gilson’s innovative and highly influential semantic theory in Being and Some Philosophers (BSP)—the existential neutrality of the copula, the distinction between predication and some positing or “thetic” function of judgment, and the distinction between predication and assertion. The present part of this paper offers a rereading of Gilson’s work in light of this modern backdrop. It argues that Gilson’s BSP, rather than being a purely historical exegesis of (...)
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  4. The Modern Semantic Principles Behind Gilson’s Existential Interpretation of Aquinas (Part 1).Elliot Polsky - forthcoming - Studia Gilsoniana.
    Gilson’s Being and Some Philosophers (BSP) has been widely influential well beyond Thomistic circles, but its modern historical sources and logical consequences call for further investigation. The first part of this two-part article explores three modern semantic assumptions or principles without which BSP’s innovated theory of existential judgment cannot be fully appreciated—the existential neutrality of the copula ubiquitous among modern logicians; Kant’s introduction of a positing or “thetic” function of judgment, the understanding of which evolved in nineteenth-century logic; and the (...)
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  5. How does a tautology say nothing?Ian Proops - forthcoming - In Wittgenstein's pre-Tractatus writings: Interpretations and Reappraisals.
    In the Tractatus, Wittgenstein conceives of tautology as 'saying nothing'. More precisely, he holds -- or so this essay contends -- that it says nothing in virtue of possessing a zero quantity of sense. Insofar as it is the limit of a series of propositions of diminishing quantity of sense, tautology resembles a degenerate conic section. But it also resembles the result of a summing together of equal and opposite linear vector quantities. Both of these models shape Wittgenstein's conception of (...)
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  6. Peano, Frege and Russell’s Logical Influences.Kevin C. Klement - forthcoming - Forthcoming.
    This chapter clarifies that it was the works Giuseppe Peano and his school that first led Russell to embrace symbolic logic as a tool for understanding the foundations of mathematics, not those of Frege, who undertook a similar project starting earlier on. It also discusses Russell’s reaction to Peano’s logic and its influence on his own. However, the chapter also seeks to clarify how and in what ways Frege was influential on Russell’s views regarding such topics as classes, functions, meaning (...)
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  7. The Russell–Dummett Correspondence on Frege and his Nachlaß.Kevin C. Klement - 2014 - The Bertrand Russell Society Bulletin 150:25–29.
    Russell corresponded with Sir Michael Dummett (1925–2011) between 1953 and 1963 while the latter was working on a book on Frege, eventually published as Frege: Philosophy of Language (1973). In their letters they discuss Russell’s correspondence with Frege, translating it into English, as well as Frege’s attempted solution to Russell’s paradox in the appendix to vol. 2 of his Grundgesetze der Arithmetik. After Dummett visited the University of Münster to view Frege’s Nachlaß, he sent reports back to Russell concerning both (...)
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  8. Um estudo do estatuto das leis lógicas a partir de Frege.Samuel Cibils - 2013 - Porto Alegre: LUME - the Digital Repository of the Universidade Federal do Rio Grande do Sul.
    Philosophy undergraduate course completion work published in 2015. This work examines Frege's concept of logical law and its relationship to other normative and descriptive approaches in the history of philosophy, as well as epistemological conceptions of the a priori aspects of mathematical knowledge.
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  9. Sidestepping the Frege-Geach Problem.Graham Bex-Priestley & Will Gamester - forthcoming - Philosophical Quarterly.
    Hybrid expressivists claim to solve the Frege-Geach problem by offloading the explanation of the logico-semantic properties of moral sentences onto beliefs that are components of hybrid states they express. We argue that this strategy is undermined by one of hybrid expressivism’s own commitments: that the truth of the belief-component is neither necessary nor sufficient for the truth of the hybrid state it composes. We articulate a new approach. Instead of explaining head-on what it is for, say, a pair of moral (...)
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  10. Understanding Misunderstanding.Gilad Nir - 2023 - In Carla Carmona, David Perez-Chico & Chon Tejedor (eds.), Intercultural Understanding after Wittgenstein. Anthem.
    Wittgenstein seeks to throw light on our concept of understanding by looking at how misunderstandings arise and what kinds of failure they involve. He discerns a peculiar sort of misunderstanding in the writings of the social anthropologist James Frazer. In Frazer’s hands, the anthropological project of enabling us to understand human behavior seems to yield the result that there are certain forms of human behavior that simply cannot be understood. The source of Frazer’s misunderstanding, according to Wittgenstein, is that he (...)
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  11. Two-sorted Frege Arithmetic is not Conservative.Stephen Mackereth & Jeremy Avigad - 2022 - Review of Symbolic Logic:1-34.
    Neo-Fregean logicists claim that Hume's Principle (HP) may be taken as an implicit definition of cardinal number, true simply by fiat. A longstanding problem for neo-Fregean logicism is that HP is not deductively conservative over pure axiomatic second-order logic. This seems to preclude HP from being true by fiat. In this paper, we study Richard Kimberly Heck's Two-sorted Frege Arithmetic (2FA), a variation on HP which has been thought to be deductively conservative over second-order logic. We show that it isn't. (...)
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  12. Wittgenstein's Reductio.Gilad Nir - 2022 - Journal for the History of Analytical Philosophy 10 (3).
    By means of a reductio argument, Wittgenstein’s Tractatus calls into question the very idea that we can represent logical form. My paper addresses three interrelated questions: first, what conception of logical form is at issue in this argument? Second, whose conception of logic is this argument intended to undermine? And third, what could count as an adequate response to it? I show that the argument construes logical form as the universal, underlying correlation of any representation and the reality it represents. (...)
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  13. Objetores de Descartes, ¿y también de Frege? Apuntes críticos al artículo “La naturaleza de las entidades matemáticas. Gassendi y Mersenne: objetores de Descartes”.Emilio Méndez Pinto - 2021 - Dianoia 66 (86):129-144.
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  14. In What Sense is Frege's (Statement of the) Puzzle 'Problematic'?Ludovic Soutif - 2014 - Revista de Filosofía de la Universidad de Costa Rica 53 (136):51-57.
    I take issue with Glezakos’s explanation of why Frege’s puzzle is un-puzzling. On her view, Frege’s statement – how can sentences of the form a=a and a=b, if true, differ in cognitive value if they express the same semantic content/are made true by the same object’s self-identity? – should not be considered any puzzling either because it is on the whole circular, or because, neutrally stated, it cannot even be set up. I argue against this that if, as she takes (...)
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  15. Frege's Theorem in Plural Logic.Simon Hewitt - manuscript
    We note that a plural version of logicism about arithmetic is suggested by the standard reading of Hume's Principle in terms of `the number of Fs/Gs'. We lay out the resources needed to prove a version of Frege's principle in plural, rather than second-order, logic. We sketch a proof of the theorem and comment philosophically on the result, which sits well with a metaphysics of natural numbers as plural properties.
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  16. Davidson’s Main Arguments for the Necessity of Language for Thought (In Persian).Ali Hossein Khani - 2013 - Ketab-E-Mah-E-Falsafeh 6 (68):66-77.
    نگاهی بر استدلال‌های دونالد دیویدسون در باب ضرورت زبان برای اندیشه .
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Frege: Philosophy of Language
  1. Vagueness and Frege.Marian Călborean - 2021 - Romanian Journal of Analytic Philosophy 2:12-44.
    A constant of Frege’s writing is his rejection of indeterminate predicates as found in natural language. This paper follows Frege’s remarks on vagueness from the early "Begriffsschrift” to his mature works, drawing brief parallels with the main contemporary theories of vagueness. I critically examine Frege’s arguments for the inconsistency of natural language and argue that the inability to accommodate vagueness in his mature ontology is mainly due to heuristic rules of thumb which Frege took as essential, not to a deep (...)
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  2. Grundgesetze and the Sense/Reference Distinction.Kevin C. Klement - 2019 - In Philip A. Ebert & Marcus Rossberg (eds.), Essays on Frege's Basic Laws of Arithmetic. Oxford: Oxford University Press. pp. 142-166.
    Frege developed the theory of sense and reference while composing his Grundgesetze and considering its philosophical implications. The Grundgesetze is thus the most important test case for the application of this theory of meaning. I argue that evidence internal and external to the Grundgesetze suggests that he thought of senses as having a structure isomorphic to the Grundgesetze expressions that would be used to express them, which entails a theory about the identity conditions of senses that is relatively fine-grained, though (...)
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  3. The Semantics of Divine Esse in Boethius.Elliot Polsky - forthcoming - Nova et Vetera.
    Boethius identifies God both with esse ipsum and esse suum. This paper explains Boethius's general semantic use of "esse" and the application of this use to God. It questions the helpfulness of attributing to Boethius "existence" words and argues for a more robust role in Boethius’s thought for Hilary of Poitiers’s and Augustine’s exegeses of Exodus 3:14-15 than has been acknowledged in recent scholarship.
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  4. The Decomposition of Thought.Nathan Bice - manuscript
    This paper defends an interpretation of Gottlob Frege’s views on the structure of thought. I argue that Frege did not think that a thought has a unique decomposition into its component senses, but rather the same thought can be decomposed into senses in multiple, distinct ways. These multiple decompositions will often have distinct logical forms. I also argue against Michael Dummett and others that Frege was committed to the sense of a predicate being a function from the sense of a (...)
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  5. Frege's equivalence thesis and reference failure.Nathan Hawkins - 2021 - Organon F: Medzinárodný Časopis Pre Analytickú Filozofiu 28 (1):198-222.
    Frege claims that sentences of the form ‘A’ are equivalent to sentences of the form ‘it is true that A’ (The Equivalence Thesis). Frege also says that there are fictional names that fail to refer, and that sentences featuring fictional names fail to refer as a result. The thoughts such sentences express, Frege says, are also fictional, and neither true nor false. Michael Dummett argues that these claims are inconsistent. But his argument requires clarification, since there are two ways The (...)
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  6. ¿Existe Sherlock Holmes? La integración de la ficción en la filosofía del lenguaje fregeana.Alejandro Villamor-Iglesias - 2022 - Contextos 50.
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  7. Conceptos clave de la filosofía de Gottlob Frege: Una introducción.Alejandro Villamor-Iglesias - 2022 - Cuestiones de Filosofía 8.
    El presente artículo tiene como principal objetivo introducir al lector algunos de los conceptos fundamentales de la filosofía de Gottlob Frege. Estos son: el binomio sentido/referencia, el valor veritativo de oraciones con elementos no referenciales, la distinción entre pensar, juzgar y aseverar, su concepción de los indéxicos y los demostrativos, así como su defensa de la existencia de un tercer reino. En algunos de ellos se mostrarán algunas problemáticas asociadas que han sido destacados por pensadores de renombre. Tal es el (...)
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  8. Frege plagiarized the Stoics.Susanne Bobzien - 2021 - In Fiona Leigh (ed.), Themes in Plato, Aristotle, and Hellenistic Philosophy, Keeling Lectures 2011-2018, OPEN ACCESS. University of Chicago Press. pp. 149-206.
    In this extended essay, I argue that Frege plagiarized the Stoics --and I mean exactly that-- on a large scale in his work on the philosophy of logic and language as written mainly between 1890 and his death in 1925 (much of which published posthumously) and possibly earlier. I use ‘plagiarize' (or 'plagiarise’) merely as a descriptive term. The essay is not concerned with finger pointing or casting moral judgement. The point is rather to demonstrate carefully by means of detailed (...)
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  9. Gottlob Frege.Kevin Klement - 2010 - In Dean Moyar (ed.), The Routledge Companion to Nineteenth Century Philosophy. Routledge. pp. 858-886.
    A summary of the philosophical career and intellectual contributions of Gottlob Frege (1848–1925), including his invention of first- and second-order quantified logic, his logicist understanding of arithmetic and numbers, the theory of sense (Sinn) and reference (Bedeutung) of language, the third-realm metaphysics of “thoughts”, his arguments against rival views, and other topics.
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  10. The senses of functions in the logic of sense and denotation.Kevin C. Klement - 2010 - Bulletin of Symbolic Logic 16 (2):153-188.
    This paper discusses certain problems arising within the treatment of the senses of functions in Alonzo Church's Logic of Sense and Denotation. Church understands such senses themselves to be "sense-functions," functions from sense to sense. However, the conditions he lays out under which a sense-function is to be regarded as a sense presenting another function as denotation allow for certain undesirable results given certain unusual or "deviant" sense-functions. Certain absurdities result, e.g., an argument can be found for equating any two (...)
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Frege: Singular Terms
  1. Nota Sobre o Frege de Evans.Sagid Salles - 2019 - Investigação Filosófica 10 (2):39-46.
    Evans famosamente declarou que Frege não aceitou a possibilidade de sentido sem referente, o que significa que ele não foi tão tolerante com nomes vazios quanto comumente se pensa. Um problema central para a tese de Evans é que Frege diz explicitamente que aceita esta possibilidade, e parece que ele de fato foi tolerante com nomes vazios. Neste artigo, defendo que a solução de Evans para este problema implica que Frege estava comprometido com uma explicação implausível das frases contendo nomes (...)
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  2. Termos Singulares Indefinidos: Frege, Russell e a tradição matemática.Daniel Durante Pereira Alves - 2016 - Saberes: Filosofia E Educação (Filosofia Lógica e Metafísica An):33-53.
    É bem conhecida a divergência entre as posições de Gottlob Frege e Bertrand Russell com relação ao tratamento semântico dado a sentenças contendo termos singulares indefinidos, ou seja, termos singulares sem referência ou com referência ambígua, tais como ‘Papai Noel’ ou ‘o atual rei da França’ ou ‘1/0 ’ ou ‘√4’ ou ‘o autor de Principia Mathematica’. Para Frege, as sentenças da linguagem natural que contêm termos indefinidos não formam declarações e portanto não são nem verdadeiras nem falsas. Já para (...)
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Frege: Genuine Proper Names
  1. Mill-Frege Compatibalism.John Justice - 2002 - Journal of Philosophical Research 27:567-576.
    It is generally accepted that Mill’s classification of names as nonconnotative terms is incompatible with Frege’s thesis that names have senses. However, Milldescribed the senses of nonconnotative terms—without being aware that he was doing so. These are the senses for names that were sought in vain by Frege. When Mill’s and Frege’s doctrines are understood as complementary, they constitute a fully satisfactory theory of names.
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  2. Getting Straight on How Russell Underestimated Frege.Adam P. Kubiak & Piotr Lipski - 2014 - Roczniki Filozoficzne 62 (4):121-134.
    Bertrand Russell in his essay On Denoting [1905] presented a theory of description developed in response to the one proposed by Gottlob Frege in his paper Über Sinn und Bedeutung [1892]. The aim of our work will be to show that Russell underestimated Frege three times over in presenting the latter’s work: in relation to the Gray’s Elegy argument, to the Ferdinand argument, and to puzzles discussed by Russell. First, we will discuss two claims of Russell’s which do not do (...)
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Frege: The First-Person Pronoun
  1. De Se Puzzles and Frege Puzzles.Stephan Torre & Clas Weber - 2022 - Inquiry: An Interdisciplinary Journal of Philosophy 65 (1):50-76.
    What is the relationship between Frege’s puzzle and the puzzle of the de se? An increasingly influential view claims that the de se puzzle is merely an instance of Frege’s puzzle and that the idea that de se attitudes pose a distinctive theoretical challenge rests on a myth. Here we argue that this view is misguided. There are important differences between the two puzzles. First, unlike Frege puzzle cases, de se puzzle cases involve unshareable Fregean senses. Second, unlike Frege puzzle (...)
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  2. Frege's Unthinkable Thoughts.Lukas Skiba - 2017 - Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society 117 (3):333–343.
    There are two common reactions to Frege’s claim that some senses and thoughts are private. Privatists accept both private senses and thoughts, while intersubjectivists don’t accept either. Both sides agree on a pair of tacit assumptions: first, that private senses automatically give rise to private thoughts; and second, that private senses and thoughts are the most problematic entities to which Frege’s remarks on privacy give rise. The aim of this paper is to show that both assumptions are mistaken. This will (...)
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  3. Can Fregeans Have 'I'-Thoughts?Alexandre Billon & Marie Guillot - 2014 - Revista de Filosofía de la Universidad de Costa Rica (136):97-105.
    We examine how Frege’s contrast between identity judgments of the forms “a=a” vs. “a=b” would fare in the special case where ‘a’ and ‘b’ are complex mental representations, and ‘a’ stands for an introspected ‘I’-thought. We first argue that the Fregean treatment of I-thoughts entails that they are what we call “one-shot thoughts”: they can only be thought once. This has the surprising consequence that no instance of the “a=a” form of judgment in this specific case comes out true, let (...)
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  4. Objects of Thought.Ian Rumfitt - 2016 - In Gary Ostertag (ed.), Meanings and Other Things: Essays on the Philosophy of Stephen Schiffer. Oxford University Press.
    In his book The Things We Mean, Stephen Schiffer advances a subtle defence of what he calls the ‘face-value’ analysis of attributions of belief and reports of speech. Under this analysis, ‘Harold believes that there is life on Venus’ expresses a relation between Harold and a certain abstract object, the proposition that there is life on Venus. The present essay first proposes an improvement to Schiffer’s ‘pleonastic’ theory of propositions. It then challenges the face-value analysis. There will be such things (...)
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  5. Frege on demonstratives.John Perry - 1977 - Philosophical Review 86 (4):474-497.
    Demonstratives seem to have posed a severe difficulty for Frege’s philosophy of language, to which his doctrine of incommunicable senses was a reaction. In “The Thought,” Frege briefly discusses sentences containing such demonstratives as “today,” “here,” and “yesterday,” and then turns to certain questions that he says are raised by the occurrence of “I” in sentences (T, 24-26). He is led to say that, when one thinks about oneself, one grasps thoughts that others cannot grasp, that cannot be communicated. However, (...)
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Frege: Descriptions
  1. A Metasemantic Analysis of Gödel's Slingshot Argument.Hans-Peter Leeb - manuscript
    Gödel’s slingshot-argument proceeds from a referential theory of definite descriptions and from the principle of compositionality for reference. It outlines a metasemantic proof of Frege’s thesis that all true sentences refer to the same object—as well as all false ones. Whereas Frege drew from this the conclusion that sentences refer to truth-values, Gödel rejected a referential theory of definite descriptions. By formalising Gödel’s argument, it is possible to reconstruct all premises that are needed for the derivation of Frege’s thesis. For (...)
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  2. Das Kompositionalitätsprinzip in seinen Anwendungen auf die "Slingshot-Argumente".Hans-Peter Leeb - 2004 - Sankt Augustin: Academia Verlag.
    According to the principle of compositionality, the meaning of a composed expression depends only on its logical form and the meaning of its descriptive sub-expressions. This dependence can be understood as the substitutivity of expressions that have the same meaning without changing the meaning of the composed expression. In this book the hidden complexity of Frege's and Quine's conceptions of extensionality is revealed. The insights gained by this analysis as well as two versions of the principle of compositionality are used (...)
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  3. Russell's Revenge: A Problem for Bivalent Fregean Theories of Descriptions.Jan Heylen - 2017 - Pacific Philosophical Quarterly 98 (4):636-652.
    Fregean theories of descriptions as terms have to deal with improper descriptions. To save bivalence various proposals have been made that involve assigning referents to improper descriptions. While bivalence is indeed saved, there is a price to be paid. Instantiations of the same general scheme, viz. the one and only individual that is F and G is G, are not only allowed but even required to have different truth values.
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  4. Getting Straight on How Russell Underestimated Frege.Adam P. Kubiak & Piotr Lipski - 2014 - Roczniki Filozoficzne 62 (4):121-134.
    Bertrand Russell in his essay On Denoting [1905] presented a theory of description developed in response to the one proposed by Gottlob Frege in his paper Über Sinn und Bedeutung [1892]. The aim of our work will be to show that Russell underestimated Frege three times over in presenting the latter’s work: in relation to the Gray’s Elegy argument, to the Ferdinand argument, and to puzzles discussed by Russell. First, we will discuss two claims of Russell’s which do not do (...)
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  5. A Cantorian argument against Frege's and early Russell's theories of descriptions.Kevin C. Klement - 2009 - In Nicholas Griffin & Dale Jacquette (eds.), Russell Vs. Meinong: The Legacy of "On Denoting". Routledge. pp. 65-77.
    It would be an understatement to say that Russell was interested in Cantorian diagonal paradoxes. His discovery of the various versions of Russell’s paradox—the classes version, the predicates version, the propositional functions version—had a lasting effect on his views in philosophical logic. Similar Cantorian paradoxes regarding propositions—such as that discussed in §500 of The Principles of Mathematics—were surely among the reasons Russell eventually abandoned his ontology of propositions.1 However, Russell’s reasons for abandoning what he called “denoting concepts”, and his rejection (...)
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Frege: Singular Terms, Misc
  1. Resolving Frege’s Other Puzzle.Eric Snyder, Richard Samuels & Stewart Shapiro - 2022 - Philosophica Mathematica 30 (1):59-87.
    Number words seemingly function both as adjectives attributing cardinality properties to collections, as in Frege’s ‘Jupiter has four moons’, and as names referring to numbers, as in Frege’s ‘The number of Jupiter’s moons is four’. This leads to what Thomas Hofweber calls Frege’s Other Puzzle: How can number words function as modifiers and as singular terms if neither adjectives nor names can serve multiple semantic functions? Whereas most philosophers deny that one of these uses is genuine, we instead argue that (...)
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  2. Termos Singulares Indefinidos: Frege, Russell e a tradição matemática.Daniel Durante Pereira Alves - 2016 - Saberes: Filosofia E Educação (Filosofia Lógica e Metafísica An):33-53.
    É bem conhecida a divergência entre as posições de Gottlob Frege e Bertrand Russell com relação ao tratamento semântico dado a sentenças contendo termos singulares indefinidos, ou seja, termos singulares sem referência ou com referência ambígua, tais como ‘Papai Noel’ ou ‘o atual rei da França’ ou ‘1/0 ’ ou ‘√4’ ou ‘o autor de Principia Mathematica’. Para Frege, as sentenças da linguagem natural que contêm termos indefinidos não formam declarações e portanto não são nem verdadeiras nem falsas. Já para (...)
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Frege: Indexicals and Demonstratives, Misc
  1. Thoughts about Thoughts: The Structure of Fregean Propositions.Nathan Bice - 2019 - Dissertation, Columbia University
    This dissertation is about the structure of thought. Following Gottlob Frege, I define a thought as the sort of content relevant to determining whether an assertion is true or false. The historical component of the dissertation involves interpreting Frege’s actual views on the structure of thought. I argue that Frege did not think that a thought has a unique decomposition into its component senses, but rather the same thought can be decomposed into senses in a variety of distinct ways. I (...)
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  2. De Se Puzzles and Frege Puzzles.Stephan Torre & Clas Weber - 2022 - Inquiry: An Interdisciplinary Journal of Philosophy 65 (1):50-76.
    What is the relationship between Frege’s puzzle and the puzzle of the de se? An increasingly influential view claims that the de se puzzle is merely an instance of Frege’s puzzle and that the idea that de se attitudes pose a distinctive theoretical challenge rests on a myth. Here we argue that this view is misguided. There are important differences between the two puzzles. First, unlike Frege puzzle cases, de se puzzle cases involve unshareable Fregean senses. Second, unlike Frege puzzle (...)
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  3. Slicing Thoughts.Vojislav Bozickovic - 2017 - American Philosophical Quarterly 54 (1):3-13.
    According to a criterion of difference for thoughts derived from Frege, two thoughts are different if it is at the same time possible for a rational subject to take conflicting epistemic attitudes toward them. But applying this criterion to perception-based demonstrative thoughts seems to slice thoughts too finely and lead to their proliferation which makes the criterion implausible. I argue that such a proliferation of thoughts is blocked by transforming this criterion into a related one that is shown to be (...)
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  4. Worldlessness, Determinism and Free Will.Ari Maunu - 1999 - Dissertation, University of Turku (Finland)
    I have three main objectives in this essay. First, in chapter 2, I shall put forward and justify what I call worldlessness, by which I mean the following: All truths (as well as falsehoods) are wholly independent of any circumstances, not only time and place but also possible worlds. It follows from this view that whatever is actually true must be taken as true with respect to every possible world, which means that all truths are (in a sense) necessary. However, (...)
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  5. Do demonstratives have senses?Richard Heck - 2002 - Philosophers' Imprint 2:1-33.
    Frege held that referring expressions in general, and demonstratives and indexicals in particular, contribute more than just their reference to what is expressed by utterances of sentences containing them. Heck first attempts to get clear about what the essence of the Fregean view is, arguing that it rests upon a certain conception of linguistic communication that is ultimately indefensible. On the other hand, however, he argues that understanding a demonstrative (or indexical) utterance requires one to think of the object denoted (...)
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  6. Frege on demonstratives.John Perry - 1977 - Philosophical Review 86 (4):474-497.
    Demonstratives seem to have posed a severe difficulty for Frege’s philosophy of language, to which his doctrine of incommunicable senses was a reaction. In “The Thought,” Frege briefly discusses sentences containing such demonstratives as “today,” “here,” and “yesterday,” and then turns to certain questions that he says are raised by the occurrence of “I” in sentences (T, 24-26). He is led to say that, when one thinks about oneself, one grasps thoughts that others cannot grasp, that cannot be communicated. However, (...)
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Frege: Sinn and Bedeutung
  1. Thoughts about Thoughts: The Structure of Fregean Propositions.Nathan Bice - 2019 - Dissertation, Columbia University
    This dissertation is about the structure of thought. Following Gottlob Frege, I define a thought as the sort of content relevant to determining whether an assertion is true or false. The historical component of the dissertation involves interpreting Frege’s actual views on the structure of thought. I argue that Frege did not think that a thought has a unique decomposition into its component senses, but rather the same thought can be decomposed into senses in a variety of distinct ways. I (...)
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  2. Frege's Puzzle and the Meaning of Words.Graham Seth Moore - 2020 - 1000-Word Philosophy: An Introductory Anthology.
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