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  1. Guilt: The Debt and the Stain.Samuel Reis-Dennis - manuscript
    Abstract: Contemporary analytic philosophers of the “reactive attitudes” tend to share a simple conception of guilt as “self-directed blame”—roughly, an “unpleasant affect” felt in combination with, or in response to, the thought that one has violated a moral requirement, evinced substandard “quality of will,” or is blameworthy. I believe that this simple conception is inadequate. As an alternative, I offer my own theory of guilt’s logic and its connection to morality. In doing so, I attempt to articulate guilt’s defining thought (...)
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  2. Psychological Mechanism of Corruption: A Comprehensive Review. [REVIEW]Juneman Abraham, Julia Suleeman & Bagus Takwin - forthcoming - Asian Journal of Scientific Research.
    Corruption prevention can be more effective if it does not rely merely on legal enforcement. This theoretical review aimed to propose a hypothetical psychological model capable of explaining the behavior of corruption. Moral disengagement is a variable that is considered ontologically closest in “distance” to the variable of corruption behavior. Counterfeit self, implicit self-theory, ethical mindset and moral emotion are taken into account as the pivotal factors of the corruption behavior and its mechanism of moral disengagement. Counterfeit self along with (...)
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  3. Krista K. Thomason, Naked: The Dark Side of Shame and Moral Life, Oxford University Press, 2018.Mark Alfano - forthcoming - Criminal Justice Ethics.
    In Naked, Krista K. Thomason offers a multi-faceted account of shame, covering its nature as an emotion, its positive and negative roles in moral life, its association with violence, and its provocation through invitations to shame, public shaming, and stigmatization. Along the way, she reflects on a range of examples drawn from literature, memoirs, journalism, and her own imagination. She also considers alternative views at length, draws a wealth of important distinctions, and articulates many of the most intuitive objections to (...)
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  4. The functions of shame in Nietzsche.Mark Alfano - forthcoming - In Raffaele Rodogno & Alessandra Fussi (eds.), The Moral Psychology of Shame. Rowman & Littlefield.
    Nietzsche talks about shame [scham*, schmach*, schand*] in all of his published and authorized works, from The Birth of Tragedy to Ecce Homo. He refers to shame in over one hundred passages – at least five times as often as he refers to resentment/ressentiment. Yet the scholarly literature on Nietzsche and shame includes just a handful of publications, while the literature on Nietzsche and resentment includes over a thousand. Arguably, this disproportionate engagement has been driven by the fact that English (...)
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  5. An Evolutionary Account of Guilt?Charlie Kurth - forthcoming - Philosophy of Science.
    . Grant Ramsey and Michael Deem argue that appreciating the role that empathy plays in posttransgression guilt leads to a more promising account of the emotion’s evolutionary origins. But because their proposal fails to adequately distinguish guilt from shame, we cannot say which of the two emotions we are actually getting an evolutionary account of. Moreover, a closer look at the details suggests both that empathy may be more relevant for our understanding of shame’s evolutionary origins than guilt’s, and that (...)
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  6. Shame and History.Bennett Gilbert - 2024 - Geschichtstheorie Am Werk.
    If history—our past, the sum of our thoughts, passions, and deeds—is so pervasive, influential, and meaningful, why then do we lose sight of it? Why do we not gain good values from it? And if it is part of our existential core, why then do we so often fail to ravel it into our deliberations? I propose that very often and to a great degree it is shame that separates us from history.
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  7. Cancel Culture, Then and Now: A Platonic Approach to the Shaming of People and the Exclusion of Ideas.Douglas R. Campbell - 2023 - Journal of Cyberspace Studies 7 (2):147-166.
    In this article, I approach some phenomena seen predominantly on social-media sites that are grouped together as cancel culture with guidance from two major themes in Plato’s thought. In the first section, I argue that shame can play a constructive and valuable role in a person’s improvement, just as we see Socrates throughout Plato’s dialogues use shame to help his interlocutors improve. This insight can help us understand the value of shaming people online for, among other things, their morally reprehensible (...)
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  8. Robots, Rebukes, and Relationships: Confucian Ethics and the Study of Human-Robot Interactions.Alexis Elder - 2023 - Res Philosophica 100 (1):43-62.
    The status and functioning of shame is contested in moral psychology. In much of anglophone philosophy and psychology, it is presumed to be largely destructive, while in Confucian philosophy and many East Asian communities, it is positively associated with moral development. Recent work in human-robot interaction offers a unique opportunity to investigate how shame functions while controlling for confounding variables of interpersonal interaction. One research program suggests a Confucian strategy for using robots to rebuke participants, but results from experiments with (...)
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  9. Il rincrescimento dell'agente di Bernard Williams: un confronto con la colpa, il rimorso e altre forme di rincrescimento.Simone Gasparoni - 2023 - Thaumàzein 11 (2):217-247.
    This essay explores Bernard Williams’ notion of agent-regret, comparing it with guilt, remorse, and other forms of regret. I first highlight some features of the intentional structure of guilt (also in relation to shame) and remorse, and then proceed to the analysis of regret. I discuss several examples of regret, including Williams’ discussion of the truck driver who accidentally runs over a child. In agreement with Williams, I argue that agent-regret has a moral significance not captured by either guilt or (...)
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  10. Survivor guilt.Jordan MacKenzie & Michael Zhao - 2023 - Philosophical Studies 180 (9):2707-2726.
    We often feel survivor guilt when the very circumstances that harm others leave us unscathed. Although survivor guilt is both commonplace and intelligible, it raises a puzzle for the standard philosophical account of guilt, according to which people feel guilt only when they take themselves to be morally blameworthy. The standard account implies that survivor guilt is uniformly unfitting, as people are not blameworthy simply for having fared better than others. In this paper, we offer a rival account of guilt, (...)
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  11. How Should We Respond to Shame?Madeleine Shield - 2023 - Social Theory and Practice 49 (3):513-542.
    How one should respond to shame is a moral consideration that has figured relatively little in philosophical discourse. Recent psychological insights tell us that, at its core, shame reflects an unfulfilled need for emotional connection. As such, it often results in psychological and moral damage—harm which, I argue, renders shaming practices very difficult to justify. Following this, I posit that a morally preferable response to shame is one that successfully addresses and dispels the emotion. To this end, I critique two (...)
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  12. The Moralizing Effect: self-directed emotions and their impact on culpability attributions.Elisabetta Sirgiovanni, Joanna Smolenski, Ben Abelson & Taylor Webb - 2023 - Frontiers in Integrative Neuroscience 17 (Emotions in Neuroscience: Fundam):1-12.
    Introduction: A general trend in the psychological literature suggests that guilt contributes to morality more than shame does. Unlike shame-prone individuals, guilt-prone individuals internalize the causality of negative events, attribute responsibility in the first person, and engage in responsible behavior. However, it is not known how guilt- and shame-proneness interact with the attribution of responsibility to others. -/- Methods: In two Web-based experiments, participants reported their attributions of moral culpability (i.e., responsibility, causality, punishment and decision-making) about morally ambiguous acts of (...)
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  13. Shame, Gender, and Self-Making.Krista Thomason - 2023 - In Alessandra Fussi & Raffaele Rodogno (eds.), The Moral Psychology of Shame. Lanham, MD: Rowman & Littlefield. pp. 205-220.
    Although moral philosophers have argued that shame is a valuable moral emotion, feminist philosophers have been skeptical. From the feminist perspective, shame appears to be an emotion more mediated by social circumstances than moral philosophers acknowledge. It is, they will argue, not an accident that shame occurs more frequently in people with marginalized identities. If who I am is a social subordinate, this would explain why women feel more shame. This argument relies on the assumption that the reason women feel (...)
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  14. John Rawls on Moral Emotions: Guilt and Shame.Bainur Yelubayev - 2023 - Flsf (Journal of Philosophy and Social Sciences) 1 (36):81-93.
    The main purpose of this work is to examine John Rawls’ views on guilt and shame, as well as briefly review the relationship between his theory of moral development and the problem of stability. First of all, in order to fully reveal the subject, it is important to outline the central views on moral emotions developed in Ethics. So, in the first part of the work, four families of moral emotions developed by Jonathan Haidt and the principal differences between shame (...)
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  15. Moral Responsibility Reconsidered.Gregg D. Caruso & Derk Pereboom - 2022 - Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press.
    This Element examines the concept of moral responsibility as it is used in contemporary philosophical debates and explores the justifiability of the moral practices associated with it, including moral praise/blame, retributive punishment, and the reactive attitudes of resentment and indignation. After identifying and discussing several different varieties of responsibility-including causal responsibility, take-charge responsibility, role responsibility, liability responsibility, and the kinds of responsibility associated with attributability, answerability, and accountability-it distinguishes between basic and non-basic desert conceptions of moral responsibility and considers a (...)
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  16. Shame, selves, and morality.Charlie Kurth - 2022 - Philosophical Psychology 35 (1):122-140.
    This essay critically examines the account of shame and its moral value that Krista Thomason develops in her book, Naked.
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  17. Toward a Reactive Attitudes Theodicy.Garrett Pendergraft - 2022 - In Peter Furlong & Leigh Vicens (eds.), Theological Determinism: New Perspectives. Cambridge University Press. pp. 231–50.
    According to the argument from gratuitous evil, if God were to exist, then gratuitous evil wouldn’t; but gratuitous evil does exist, so God doesn’t. We can evaluate different views of divine providence with respect to the resources they are able to bring to bear when encountering this argument. By these lights, theological determinism is often seen as especially problematic: the determinist is seen as having an impoverished set of resources to draw from in her attempts to respond to the argument (...)
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  18. A Comprehensive Account of Blame: Self-Blame, Non-Moral Blame, and Blame for the Non-Voluntary.Douglas W. Portmore - 2022 - In Andreas Brekke Carlsson (ed.), Self-Blame and Moral Responsibility. New York, USA: Cambridge University Press.
    Blame is multifarious. It can be passionate or dispassionate. It can be expressed or kept private. We blame both the living and the dead. And we blame ourselves as well as others. What’s more, we blame ourselves, not only for our moral failings, but also for our non-moral failings: for our aesthetic bad taste, gustatory self-indulgence, or poor athletic performance. And we blame ourselves both for things over which we exerted agential control (e.g., our voluntary acts) and for things over (...)
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  19. Can We Force Someone to Feel Shame?Madeleine Shield - 2022 - Philosophy Today 66 (4):817-828.
    For many philosophers, there is a tension inherent to shame as an inward-looking, yet intersubjective, emotion: that between the role of the ashamed self and the part of the shaming Other in pronouncing the judgement of shame. Simply put, the issue is this: either the perspective of the ashamed self takes precedence in autonomously choosing to feel shame, and the necessary role of the audience is overlooked, or else the view of the shaming Other prevails in heteronomously casting the shame, (...)
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  20. On being angry at oneself.Laura Silva - 2022 - Ratio 35 (3):236-244.
    The phenomenon of self-anger has been overlooked in the contemporary literature on emotion. This is a failing we should seek to remedy. In this paper I provide the first ef-fort towards a philosophical characterization of self-anger. I argue that self-anger is a genuine instance of anger and that, as such, it is importantly distinct from the negative self-directed emotions of guilt and shame. Doing so will uncover a potentially distinctive role for self-anger in our moral psychology, as one of the (...)
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  21. Don't Suffer in Silence: A Self-Help Guide to Self-Blame.Hannah Tierney - 2022 - In Andreas Brekke Carlsson (ed.), Self-Blame and Moral Responsibility. New York, USA: Cambridge University Press.
    There are better and worse ways to blame others. Likewise, there are better and worse ways to blame yourself. And though there is an ever-expanding literature on the norms that govern our blaming practices, relatively little attention has been paid to the norms that govern expressions of self-blame. In this essay, I argue that when we blame ourselves, we ought not do so privately. Rather, we should, ceteris paribus, express our self-blame to those we have wronged. I then explore how (...)
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  22. The paradox of self-blame.Patrick Todd & Brian Rabern - 2022 - American Philosophical Quarterly 59 (2):111–125.
    It is widely accepted that there is what has been called a non-hypocrisy norm on the appropriateness of moral blame; roughly, one has standing to blame only if one is not guilty of the very offence one seeks to criticize. Our acceptance of this norm is embodied in the common retort to criticism, “Who are you to blame me?”. But there is a paradox lurking behind this commonplace norm. If it is always inappropriate for x to blame y for a (...)
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  23. The Social Account of Humour.Daniel Abrahams - 2021 - Canadian Journal of Philosophy 51 (2):81-93.
    Philosophical accounts of humour standardly account for humour in terms of what happens within a person. On these internalist accounts, humour is to be understood in terms of cognition, perception, and sensation. These accounts, while valuable, are poorly-situated to engage the social functions of humour. They have difficulty engaging why we value humour, why we use it define ourselves and our friendships, and why it may be essential to our self-esteem. In opposition to these internal accounts, I offer a social (...)
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  24. Feeling Racial Pride in the Mode of Frederick Douglass.Jeremy Fischer - 2021 - Critical Philosophy of Race 9 (1):71-101.
    Drawing on Frederick Douglass’s arguments about racial pride, I develop and defend an account of feeling racial pride that centers on resisting racialized oppression. Such pride is racially ecumenical in that it does not imply partiality towards one’s own racial group. I argue that it can both accurately represent its intentional object and be intrinsically and extrinsically valuable to experience. It follows, I argue, that there is, under certain conditions, a morally unproblematic, and plausibly valuable, kind of racial pride available (...)
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  25. Articulating Understanding: A Phenomenological Approach to Testimony on Gendered Violence.Charlotte Knowles - 2021 - International Journal of Philosophical Studies 29 (4):448-472.
    ABSTRACT Testimony from victims of gendered violence is often wrongly disbelieved. This paper explores a way to address this problem by developing a phenomenological approach to testimony. Guided by the concept of ‘disclosedness’, a tripartite analysis of testimony as an affective, embodied, communicative act is developed. Affect indicates how scepticism may arise through the social moods that often attune agents to victims’ testimony. The embodiment of meaning suggests testimony should not be approached as an assertion, but as a process of (...)
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  26. Kantian Guilt.Paula Satne - 2021 - In Beatrix Himmelmann & Camilla Serck-Hanssen (eds.), The Court of Reason: Proceedings of the 13th International Kant Congress. Berlin, Germany: De Gruyter. pp. 1511-1520.
    Claudia Blöser has recently proposed that Kant’s duty to be forgiving is grounded on the need to be relieved from the burden of our moral guilt, a need we have in virtue of our morally fallible nature, irrespectively of whether we have repented. I argue that Blöser's proposal does not fit well with certain central aspects of Kant’s views on moral guilt. For Kant, moral guilt is a complex phenomenon, that has both an intellectual and an affective aspect. I argue (...)
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  27. Guilty Confessions.Hannah Tierney - 2021 - In Oxford Studies in Agency and Responsibility. New York: Oxford University Press. pp. 182-204.
    Recent work on blameworthiness has prominently featured discussions of guilt. The philosophers who develop guilt-based views of blameworthiness do an excellent job of attending to the evaluative and affective features of feeling guilty. However, these philosophers have been less attentive to guilt’s characteristic action tendencies and the role admissions of guilt play in our blaming practices. This paper focuses on the nature of guilty confession and argues that it illuminates an important function of blame that has been overlooked in the (...)
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  28. Coolness, Aesthetic Agency and Self-Construction.Emanuele Arielli - 2020 - Zonemoda Journal 1 (10):15-22.
    The notion of coolness is connected with a broad range of different meanings that involve personal attitude, taste, fashion choices but also the recognition of uniqueness and authenticity by others. Moreover, coolness is related to self-confidence and imperturbability, as the usual historical reconstructions of its meaning show. In fact, the manifestation of subjective invulnerability is the expression of the general need to avoid any weakness that could challenge one’s own autonomy through other people’s gaze. In other words, the opposite of (...)
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  29. The Affective and the Political: Rousseau and Contemporary Kantianism.Byron Davies - 2020 - Tópicos: Revista de Filosofía 59:301-339.
    Jean-Jacques Rousseau is often associated with a certain political mode of relating to another, where a person (“a Citizen”) is a locus of enforceable demands. I claim that Rousseau also articulated an affective mode of relating to another, where a person is seen as the locus of a kind of value (expressive of their being an independent point of view) that cannot be demanded. These are not isolated sides of a distinction, for the political mode constitutes a solution to certain (...)
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  30. Honour (draft of entry for Routledge Encyclopedia of Philosophy).Dan Demetriou - 2020 - Routledge Encyclopedia of Philosophy.
    Given its psychological and sociological importance, especially in non-liberal societies, honor may be the most undertheorized normative phenomenon. Philosophical neglect of honor is due partly to the doubtful moral bona fides of honor: honor-typical motives have been usually viewed by philosophers in both the Christian and liberal West as either non-moral or immoral but replaced by morally sounder ones. More practically, honor (and what is usually translated into the English “honor”) connotes a number of apparently contradictory meanings, further bedeviling analyses. (...)
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  31. Shame and moral autonomy.Jack M. C. Kwong - 2020 - Ratio 34 (1):44-55.
    Does shame have a place in a mature moral agent's psychology? Does it play a useful and positive role in morality? One skepticism that disputes shame's compatibility with mature moral agency or its being a useful moral emotion is that shame appears heteronomous in nature: We experience shame not because we have behaved badly by our own moral standards, but because we have been reproved by other people and suffered an injury to our social image. To mitigate this skepticism, this (...)
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  32. Learning from Failure: Shame and Emotion Regulation in Virtue as Skill.Matt Stichter - 2020 - Ethical Theory and Moral Practice 23 (2):341-354.
    On an account of virtue as skill, virtues are acquired in the ways that skills are acquired. In this paper I focus on one implication of that account that is deserving of greater attention, which is that becoming more skillful requires learning from one’s failures, but that turns out to be especially challenging when dealing with moral failures. In skill acquisition, skills are improved by deliberate practice, where you strive to correct past mistakes and learn how to overcome your current (...)
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  33. Wittgenstein, Guilt And Western Buddhism.Robert Vinten - 2020 - Contemporary Buddhism 21 (2):284-303.
    Whereas Christians often give guilt a prominent role, Buddhists are encouraged not to dwell on feelings of guilt. Leading members of the Triratna organisation – Sangharakshita, Subhuti and Subhadramati – characterise guilt as a negative emotion that hinders spiritual growth. However, if we carefully examine the concept of guilt in the manner of Wittgenstein we find that the accounts of guilt given by leading members of Triratna mischaracterise it and so ignore its positive aspects. They should acknowledge the valuable role (...)
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  34. Guilt Without Perceived Wrongdoing.Michael Zhao - 2020 - Philosophy and Public Affairs 48 (3):285-314.
    According to the received account of guilt in the philosophical literature, one cannot feel guilt unless one takes oneself to have done something morally wrong. But ordinary people feel guilt in many cases in which they do not take themselves to have done anything morally wrong. In this paper, I focus on one kind of guilt without perceived wrongdoing, guilt about being merely causally responsible for a bad state-of-affairs. I go on to present a novel account of guilt that explains (...)
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  35. Beyond Harm: Toward Justice, Healing and Peace.Derek R. Brookes - 2019 - Sydney NSW, Australia: Relational Approaches.
    This book looks at what it means to be wronged, and why we react to wrongdoing in ways that can cause us more suffering and pain. An alternative approach called 'restorative justice' is proposed as a safe and effective way of avoiding these reactions whilst honouring our values and our common humanity.
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  36. Blameless Guilt: The Case of Carer Guilt and Chronic and Terminal Illness.Matthew Bennett - 2018 - International Journal of Philosophical Studies 26 (1):72-89.
    My ambition in this paper is to provide an account of an unacknowledged example of blameless guilt that, I argue, merits further examination. The example is what I call carer guilt: guilt felt by nurses and family members caring for patients with palliative-care needs. Nurses and carers involved in palliative care often feel guilty about what they perceive as their failure to provide sufficient care for a patient. However, in some cases the guilty carer does not think that he has (...)
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  37. Investigating Shame: A comparison between the Freudian psychoanalysis and cognitive approach in psychology and a theological-moral view about shame.Hossein Dabbagh - 2018 - Journal of Philosophical Meditations 8 (20):109-143.
    Shame’s conceptualization is one of the most challenging discussions in psychological studies. This challenge creates many ambiguities for both psychologists and theologians in Eastern cultures especially Iranian-Islamic culture. This paper discusses the dominant psychological researches about shame and tries to compare the outcome of these researches with Abdulkarim Soroush’s theological-moral view about shame. This comparison, we believe, helps us to understand their different approaches for further psychological and theological studies. We used descriptive-analytical method for the current research and our resources (...)
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  38. Making Sense of Survivor’s Guilt: How to Justify It with an African Ethic.Thaddeus Metz - 2018 - In George Hull (ed.), Debating African Philosophy: Perspectives on Identity, Decolonial Ethics and Comparative Philosophy. New York: Routledge. pp. 149-163.
    The default position in Western ethics is that survivor’s guilt is either irrational or not rational, i.e., that while survivor’s guilt might be understandable, it is not justified in the sense of there being good reason for a person to exhibit it. From a widely held perspective, for example, one ought to feel guilty only for having done wrong, and in a culpable way, which, by hypothesis, a mere survivor has not done. Typical is the following: ‘Strictly speaking, survivor guilt (...)
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  39. Ukrainian Guilts and Apologies: a Space of Connotations.Vadym Vasiutynskyi - 2018 - Psychology and Psychosocial Interventions 1:25-30.
    According to the results of 162 respondents survey, the affective and cognitive components of feelings of guilt in the space of Ukrainians’ collective consciousness were described. This space is complex, but poorly structured, capable of appearing and spreading little understood defensive assessments and attitudes. -/- The content of relevant processes recorded the following trends: undifferentiated feelings of guilt, general self-accusations, accusations of Ukrainians themselves for historical failures, shame for Ukrainians’ violence, readiness to recognize or not to recognize Ukrainians’ guilties, accusations (...)
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  40. Piper’s question and ours: a role for adversity in group-centred views of non-agentive shame.Basil Vassilicos - 2018 - Continental Philosophy Review 52 (2):241-264.
    This paper aims to contribute to ‘group-centred views’ of non-agentive shame, by linking them to an ‘anepistemic’ model of the experience and impact of human failing. One of the most vexing aspects of those group-centred views remains how susceptivity to such shame ought to be understood. This contribution focuses on how a basic familiarity with adversity, in everyday life, may open individuals up to these forms of shame. If, per group-centred views, non-agentive shame is importantly driven by participation in social (...)
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  41. Blameworthiness as Deserved Guilt.Andreas Brekke Carlsson - 2017 - The Journal of Ethics 21 (1):89-115.
    It is often assumed that we are only blameworthy for that over which we have control. In recent years, however, several philosophers have argued that we can be blameworthy for occurrences that appear to be outside our control, such as attitudes, beliefs and omissions. This has prompted the question of why control should be a condition on blameworthiness. This paper aims at defending the control condition by developing a new conception of blameworthiness: To be blameworthy, I argue, is most fundamentally (...)
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  42. Self‐Assessment and Social Practices.Jeremy Fischer - 2017 - Journal of Social Philosophy 48 (2):144-164.
    This article develops and defends a social practice-based theory of personal ideals. After sketching this theory, I show how it undermines the sharp dichotomy between evaluative self-assessment and assessment of one’s social standing that underlies common objections to accounts of pride and shame (such as Rawls’s account of shame) that explain these emotions in terms of personal ideals.
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  43. On the Possibility and Permissibility of Interpersonal Punishment.Laura Gillespie - 2017 - Dissertation, University of California, Los Angeles
    In the dissertation, I consider the permissibility of a familiar set of responses to wrongdoing in our interpersonal relationships—those responses that constitute the imposition of some cost upon the wrongdoer. Some of these responses are, I argue, properly considered punishing, and some of these instances of punishing are in turn permissible. Punishment as I understand it is a broad phenomenon, common in and to all human relationships, and not exclusively or even primarily the domain of the state. Personal interactions expressive (...)
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  44. Agent-Regret and the Social Practice of Moral Luck.Jordan MacKenzie - 2017 - Res Philosophica 94 (1):95-117.
    Agent-regret seems to give rise to a philosophical puzzle. If we grant that we are not morally responsible for consequences outside our control (the ‘Standard View’), then agent-regret—which involves self-reproach and a desire to make amends for consequences outside one’s control—appears rationally indefensible. But despite its apparent indefensibility, agent-regret still seems like a reasonable response to bad moral luck. I argue here that the puzzle can be resolved if we appreciate the role that agent-regret plays in a larger social practice (...)
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  45. Online Shaming.Kathryn J. Norlock - 2017 - Social Philosophy Today 33:187-197.
    Online shaming is a subject of import for social philosophy in the Internet age, and not simply because shaming seems generally bad. I argue that social philosophers are well-placed to address the imaginal relationships we entertain when we engage in social media; activity in cyberspace results in more relationships than one previously had, entailing new and more responsibilities, and our relational behaviors admit of ethical assessment. I consider the stresses of social media, including the indefinite expansion of our relationships and (...)
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  46. The Original Position and the Rationality of Levi's Shame.Josep E. Corbi - 2016 - Bollettino Filosofico 31:323-340.
    Contrary to what he expected, Primo Levi didn’t experience his life after being released from Auschwitz as cheerful and light-hearted. He – like many other survivors – was haunted by an obscure and solid anguish. It took some effort for him to discern the object or source of this anguish. He finally identified it as springing from a sense of shame or guilt in front of the drowned, that is, of those who were exterminated in the Lager. He could not (...)
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  47. Guilt and Child Soldiers.Krista K. Thomason - 2016 - Ethical Theory and Moral Practice 19 (1):115-127.
    The use of child soldiers in armed conflict is an increasing global concern. Although philosophers have examined whether child soldiers can be considered combatants in war, much less attention has been paid to their moral responsibility. While it is tempting to think of them as having diminished or limited responsibility, child soldiers often report feeling guilt for the wrongs they commit. Here I argue that their feelings of guilt are both intelligible and morally appropriate. The feelings of guilt that child (...)
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  48. The Body and Shame: Phenomenology, Feminism, and the Socially Shaped Body.Luna Dolezal - 2015 - Lanham, MD: Lexington Books.
    This book investigates the concept of body shame and explores its significance when considering philosophical accounts of embodied subjectivity, providing phenomenological reflections on how the body is shaped by social forces.
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  49. Regaining the 'Lost Self': A Philosophical Analysis of Survivor's Guilt.Amber L. Griffioen - 2014 - In Altered Self and Altered Self Experience. pp. 43-57.
    Although there has been much discussion regarding shame and guilt, not enough has been said about the complexities of the relationship between the two. In this paper, I examine one way in which I take shame and guilt to interact – namely in cases of so-called “survivor’s guilt” among victims of trauma. More specifically, I argue that survivor’s guilt may represent a kind of response to feelings of shame – one which is centrally tied to the central philosophical notions of (...)
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  50. Shame, Violence, and Morality.Krista K. Thomason - 2014 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 91 (1):1-24.
    Shame is most frequently defined as the emotion we feel when we fail to live up to standards, norms, or ideals. I argue that this definition is flawed because it cannot explain some of the most paradigmatic features of shame. Agents often respond to shame with violence, but if shame is the painful feeling of failing to live up to an ideal, this response is unintelligible. I offer a new account of shame that can explain the link between shame and (...)
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