Hegel: Dialectic

N. Wiener's negative definition of information is well known: it states what information is not. According to this definition, it is neither matter nor energy. But what is it? It is shown how one can follow the lead of dialectical logic as expounded by G.W.F. Hegel in his main work -- "The Science of Logic" -- to answer this and some related questions.

Engels’ name stands and falls today with a variety of his contributions to socialist thought and Marxist philosophy. Yet there is one particular component of the Marxist body of thought that has been subject to a group of controversies for quite some time for which Engels is usually held responsible: dialectics and dialectics of nature. It is curious and ironic that a theoretical contribution to an intellectual tradi tion within the history of European political philosophy could be perceived and depicted (...) as a major distortion of that tradition. In Engels’ case, this irony is captured by the phrase “the Engels problem.” In this chapter, I will first briefly summarize what “the Engels problem” is about and lay out its connection to the reception his tory of Engels’ dialectics. Then, I will delve into the general outlines of Engels’ dialectics and focus on his intentions, tasks, and purposes in pursuing dialectics in some of his prominent works on this theme from 1870s to 1880s, most notably in Anti-Dühring and the Dialectics of Nature. In the final section, I will briefly discuss some of the open questions of Engels’ natural dialectics. (shrink)

Understanding Hegel's account of particularity has proven to be anything but straightforward. Two main accounts of particularity have been advanced: the particular as an example or instance and the particular as a subjective perspective on a universal concept. The problem with these accounts is that they reduce particularity either to singularity or to universality. As Derrida's analyses make apparent, the ‘structure of exemplarity’ in Hegel is quite intricate. Hegel uses ‘example’ in three senses: it means (1) ‘instance’, ‘illustration’, or (2) (...) ‘model’, ‘exemplary individual’, ‘paradigm’, or (3) a by-play (a meaning derived from Hegel's neologismbeiherspielen, in whichBeispielis understood quasi-etymologically as a ‘by-play’ of accidental moments). ABeispielin the first sense can be replaced by another instance in a free play (by-play). This play of accidental moments, however, is not entirely free; it generates a series (of replacements) that ultimately leads to an example in the second sense, to an exemplary individual. I argue that particularity can be taken as exemplarity of this kind, oscillating between a singular example and a universal paradigm. Within this by-play, the universal concept, its law, is supposed to be mediated and determined. However, out of the differences between the examples the by-play induces another law, the law of non-mediation, which may, in Derrida's view, actually negate the dialectical movement towards universality. I argue, utilizing Malabou's concept of plasticity, that this disruption may be recovered. This implies that each individual example within a series is a particular determination of the universal. Hence, we can take literally Hegel's claim that the movement of the concept is play. (shrink)

In the comprehension of many 19th century European philosophers, there seems ever present in much of the work, a shared notion of struggle. This notion seems mainly to arise within the confines of human consciousness. The notion of struggle is in fact pervasive in contemporary thought as well, and could simply be inherent to human nature. However, I will maintain specific focus on the notion of struggle as brought to light by a sampling of works by three relevant 19th century (...) philosophers, namely Fichte, Hegel, and Kierkegaard. I look into some of the foundational claims made by these thinkers to see what can be discovered about their reasoning and what sense can be made of this seemingly unavoidable aspect of the human condition. The goal is to see what relations can be made among their ideas and where conflict and contradiction may arise. Once these elucidations have been made, I argue for my own stance on the notion of struggle both within the confines of human consciousness and on the outset to explain my arguments in terms of human behavior. I argue that there is one thinker amongst the three covered that offers a methodology of practical application in a person’s life in terms of human nature as opposed to the formulations made by the remaining two who I consider only to offer general descriptions of human consciousness. (shrink)

By the beginning of the 19th century Hegel's dialectic turned contradiction (conceived as unity of a concept with its determined negation) into distinguished inference. In the course of 20th century a family of systems known as "paraconsistent" formalized dialectical logic according to the contemporary paradigm of inference, oriented to truth-preserving, and not powered anymore solely by contradiction. In this way, nevertheless, Hegel's idea of logic as unfolding of concepts ordered by degree of "determination" reached at every step of the process, (...) was put aside. We attempt to recover the importance of that idea for the hegelian concept of "logical necessity", pointing out in addition that it may well play the role of an order relation for dialectical inference. (shrink)

ANTONIO LABRIOLA’S THEORY OF HISTORICAL MATERIALISM. The author examines Antonio Labriola’s interpretation of historical materialism in the Saggi intorno alla concezione materialistica della storia (Essays on the Materialistic Conception of History). The author identifies the key element to grasp the relevance of Labriola’s reading of Marxism in the concept of the theory developed in the Saggi. After reviewing the main interpretations of the Saggi, the author focuses on the relationship between history and theory showing up in Labriola’s reading. Firstly, the (...) sense of the theory as an expression of the self-consciousness of a real process is examined by the author in connection with the meaning of dialectics as a self-criticism of historical development. Secondly, the author deals with the method of historical materialism and its impact on the historiographical research. Finally, the author discusses the link between the genesis of historical materialism and its scientific validity, focusing on the problems of class consciousness and ideology for this purpose. (shrink)

The article focuses on a chapter of the biography of Angela Davis which, unless mistaken, has not yet received due attention: the training and intellectual experience with her German professors, Herbert Marcuse and Theodor W. Adorno. From the philosophical studies in Frankfurt in the 1960s to the more recent reflections on movements such as Black Lives Matter, there seems to be a continuity in the way she approaches contemporary social reality, a démarche that draws its strength from the original combination (...) of two traditions of radical critical thinking: Frankfurtian and Afro-American. (shrink)

Der Denkweg Hegels kann als ein Bildungsprozess von Einheitsbegriffen angesehen werden. Dieser Weg lässt sich in zwei Phasen einteilen: eine spekulative und eine vorspekulative Phase. Die These dieses Aufsatzes besteht darin, dass der Begriff der Einheit sich innerhalb beider Phasen jenes Denkweges entwickelte und dabei die gleichen allgemeinen Formen annimmt. Von daher kann der Weg dieses Denkens durch einen Doppel-Begriff, den der spekulativen und den der vorspekulativen Einheit, rekonstruiert werden. Im Blick auf das Ganze lässt sich also sagen, dass beide (...) Phasen am Ende durch die fundamentale Entscheidung Hegels eines „Eingreifens in das Leben der Menschen“ verbunden sind. Und die letzte Form der Einheit in der spekulativen Phase – die der absoluten Idee – wird dementsprechend eine gewisse aufgehobene Bewegung der Subjektivität und der Objektivität sein, an der sich die Einheit als Freiheit zeigt. (shrink)

This paper examines Lukács’ interpretation of Lenin, with particular focus on his Lenin: A Study on the Unity of his Thought (1924), and the Postscript which was added to the book in January 1967. From 1924 onward, Lukács mainly focuses on the methodological basis of Lenin’s political thought, which vital point lays in applying the category of totality in order to grasp the complexity of the socio-historical conjuncture. In addition, Lukács deals with some ethical aspects of Lenin’s personality, i.e. his (...) human attitude. The ethical aspects are but the weakest point in Lukács’ interpretation. Diametrically opposed to any form of decisionism, Lenin embodies for Lukács both a politician and a political scientist. (shrink)

In the *Science of Logic*, Hegel states unequivocally that the category of “life” is a strictly logical, or pure, form of thinking. His treatment of actual life – i.e., that which empirically constitutes nature – arises first in his *Philosophy of Nature* when the logic is applied under the conditions of space and time. Nevertheless, many commentators find Hegel’s development of this category as a purely logical one especially difficult to accept. Indeed, they find this development only comprehensible as long (...) as one simultaneously assumes that Hegel breaks his promise to let the logic do the leading. However, if Hegel were to in fact allow the logical development to be led by biological analogies at this point, problems would ensue. Not only would it contradict his own speculative method, which should secure the necessity of the categories, but it would also endanger the ontological generality of the category of life itself. Beyond undermining his method and the logical integrity of the category, however, I will argue that such a reading makes the transition to the next category of “cognition” unintelligible and problematic. My aim in the first part of this paper is to argue how logical life can be read as a pure category. I then argue in the second part how my reconstruction makes the transition to cognition intelligible without resorting to profane or supernatural interpretations. (shrink)

Although the fact that Merleau-Ponty has a dialectical approach in Phenomenology of Perception has been discussed in recent Anglophone readings, there has not been an explicit clarification as to how his varying usages of the term hang together. Given his repeated references to Hegel and to dialectics, coupled with the fact that dialectics are not part of the Husserlian phenomenology or Heideggerean existentialism from which Merleau-Ponty draws so much, the question of just what he does with the idea of dialectics (...) presents itself. In this paper I argue that, in Phenomenology of Perception, Merleau- Ponty saw Hegel as providing a model for the conception of rationality and meaning that must underpin the existentialist response to the problems bequeathed him by Husserlian phenomenology: namely, the problems of embodiment, perception and the constitution of the world. In connection with this, I suggest an interpretation of Merleau-Ponty’s “existential dialectics” that focuses on his three principal uses of the term: 1) a “dialectic of objective thought,” 2) a set of existential-dialectical categories intended to capture the ontological structure of the “body-subject” as “being-in-the-world,” and 3) a dialectic at the cultural level concerning others and history. (shrink)

The analytical understanding cannot deal with integral wholes and therefore cannot understand the soul or God. The material body is illusory in the sense that it cannot be understood in its true identity without knowing its relationship to God. Analyzing its composition in terms of separated molecules or neurons is also illusory. To understand how to go from an untrue or partially true part to its truth in the whole a method developed by Hegel called conceptual thinking is required. Reproduction (...) is not merely concerned with individuals, it involves the genus or genus process. The universal that determines the species is not changed when particulars under the universal change, die, reproduce according to their “own kind” or species. Without connecting the individual organisms with their species we may wrongly think they can evolve into any species by chance. But this is not how individual and species are related to each other. The species determines how the individuals will appear and controls their reproduction, growth, and so on. They are not independent to become what they want by choice or by chance. Everyone calls themselves “I” so “I” is a universal, although each means only oneself. In the same way each organism is identified with its species, although we mean its own particular organism – for example, a dog and not canine in general. Thus the universal and particular cannot be separated from each other. Similarly individuals who identify only personal reason independent of universal Reason are misconceiving their true identity. At the same time universal and particular are related, they are not the same but a unity in difference. The universal by itself is as abstract as the particular by itself. At the same time their relation can only be comprehended within a higher unity, the higher Self or Supreme Individual. (shrink)

Quel message est apporté par le courant littéraire de la négritude, et comment procède-t-il pour le transmettre? C'est par le biais d'une écriture introspective que la diaspora noire a conquis sa dignité et dépassé le stade victimaire, par-delà le seul cadre de la communauté francophone. A travers l'histoire de la traite et de la colonisation, notre lecture procédera en trois phases: une phase locutoire, consacrée à un rappel chronologique du contexte noir dans l'Histoire; une phase illocutoire, où seront exposées les (...) différentes réactions de l'intelligentsia noire face à la ségrégation et au passif colonial; une phase perlocutoire, qui conclura l'étude en observant l'impact de la négritude sur la réalité sociale du genre noir. Au-delà du courant historique francophone, l'idée de négritude incarne le problème des constructions d'identité et illustre parfaitement la difficulté de la condition humaine: être ce que nous voulons de ce que les autres veulent faire de nous. (shrink)

Não é raro quando se trata da Lógica pensar na lógica aristotélica e toda a tradição que se efetivou posteriormente, sendo esta considerada como uma ciência finalizada e que, qualquer acréscimo lhe parece desnecessário. O que este trabalho busca mostrar é um modo diferente e possível para se pensar a lógica, sem que essa fique presa a uma construção puramente formal e fechada. Para tal tarefa, será definida a perspectiva que Hegel dá a essa ciência. A Lógica hegeliana possui desdobramentos (...) que a distingue do que se vinha concebendo, desde Aristóteles, por “Lógica", por não se tratar de uma lógica puramente subjetiva, mas cuja verdade efetiva foi assentada na união autodeterminadora ao mesmo tempo do sujeito e do objeto, o que pode ser compreendido como dar vida aos processos lógicos. Constitui o norte dessa pesquisa e percorrer os seus desdobramentos, contrapondo e analisando em paralelo algumas abordagens anteriores da Lógica (como em Aristóteles, Kant e Fichte). Trataremos de expor o desenvolvimento da Lógica Objetiva, explicitada nos livros primeiro e segundo da Ciência da Lógica de Hegel. Trata-se de mostrar que a realidade é pensada como desenvolvida no pensar do Conceito enquanto unificação dos opostos. Para isso o Lógico tem de ser concebido como um movimento do pensar, como junção do ser e do pensar, do objeto e do sujeito, da forma e do conteúdo, sendo que se apresenta nessa união o elemento que dá vida ao Lógico, pois este é o movimento no qual se realiza a verdade do Conceito. E é neste contexto que o Silogismo é inserido como elemento mediatizante, cuja função por vezes passa despercebida, mas que tem um papel significativo no conjunto. O silogismo dá o elo que vinha faltando quando se pensava na conciliação de elementos opostos, o que acabava os transformando em opostos inconciliáveis. (shrink)

In his Science of Logic Hegel purports to give an account of a dialectical logic that generates the totality of being’s fundamental structures. This totality does not exhaust the richness of being, but it exhausts the basis of this richness. Any phenomenon, whether cognitive, scientific, social or political, is based upon some or all of those structures. The paper presents and examines the logic of a structure which pervades each and every phenomenon: the border(die Grenze). It is analyzed as an (...) advanced manifestation of “determinateness,” an even more primitive structure of being, which makes explicit its intrinsic connection with not-being. What is distinctive about Hegel’s analysis is that it establishes a logical character concerning the concept of “border” that precedes empirical observation and a connection with space. The aim of the paper is to reconstruct Hegel’s dialectic of the border in such a way as to make this logical character apparent and convincing to contemporary audience, who begin from the assumption that all discourse about border has an empirical basis and presupposes reference to space. It will be argued that, contrary to received opinion, the very phenomenon of “border” has certain universal and necessary features which explain its very possibility, are completely a priori and are established prior to any reference to space. A discussion about “borders” that excludes any a priori investigation into this phenomenon from its domain simply fails to illuminate its most important dimension: its logical core or, if you will, its universal and necessary attributes. (shrink)

Este artículo intenta elucidar el carácter dual de la razón que ha propuesto la filosofía de Hegel. A partir de ello investiga la coincidencia que logran estos dos momentos, la negatividad y la creatividad de la razón con la realidad efectiva [Wirklichkeit], proponiendo una serie de pares categoriales que nos permitan pensar este específico doble concepto de razón y su posible vínculo con la primera obra de Slavoj Žižek, El sublime objeto de la ideología. Abstract: This paper tries to clarify (...) the dual nature of reason proposed by Hegel's philosophy. Based on this research the coincidence that achieve these two moments, negativity and creativity of reason with actuality [Wirklichkeit], proposing a series of categorical couple that allow us to think this double specific concept of reason, and its possible link to the first work of Slavoj Žižek, The Sublime Object of Ideology. (shrink)

In Sense-certainty, the being of the particular object of sense was found to belong to the universality - of consciousness. This relationship between the universal truth of the object and its sensuous determinate particularity is called the Thing of Perception, basically a Thing and its perceived properties. However, in perception it was concluded that the particular Thing is ultimately resolved into the unconditioned universality of the Understanding. Thus in both Sense-certainty and Perception the particular object or Thing proves to be (...) essentially universality. It is important to recollect the development that has taken place up to this point, i.e., the various moments and movements of thinking that constitute the activity, or dynamic essence, of what is called, in totality, consciousness or knowing. The full explication of what consciousness is in its completely developed form has not yet been reached, but only what may broadly be referred to as the first three stages (Sense-certainty, Perception, Understanding) in the complete activity that will be necessary and sufficient to adequately comprehend consciousness. When the movement of consciousness is completed, the development will continue onward to the stages of Self-consciousness, Reason, and Spirit. (shrink)

Previously it was found that the Thing is both One Thing and another Thing at the same time. The Understanding rejects such a contradiction but Reason accepts what comes before it and allows the necessity in thought to proceed to its own conclusion. The attempt to maintain distinctions such as essential vs. unessential, singleness vs. universality, etc. may appeal to what is called ‘ordinary common sense,’ but it can now be seen that they are really only abstractions from the actual (...) truth that constitutes the entirety of perceptual consciousness. Those who do not have the presence of mind to rise above the being of the material of sense may proudly assert what they consider to be real and solid, while in truth it is only the play of abstractions that they deal with, so that such boasting is poorest where it fancies itself to be the richest. Rather than apprehending Truth, such an attitude sets itself against the Truth by calling it mere thought, ‘only in the mind’, etc. It is not possible for them to engage in scientific philosophy in which one result proceeds from another by rational necessity because they think that convincing by argument (holding one side against the other) is the natural process for winning Truth. But this is the definition of sophistry, directly the opposite of scientific philosophy in which Truth unveils itself by the rational necessity of its own dialectical development. In fact, Philosophy does also deal with mental entities but at the same time it recognizes thought as the pure essentiality that it is. It is the ignorance of our ‘scientific age’ that we neither appreciate, understand or even know how to comprehend the origin and nature of thought which is so fundamentally essential to human culture. Those who are the most neglectful of such knowledge are at the same time those who most vehemently propound sensuous materialism in the name of realism and seek to annul the place of thought altogether, thus sapping Truth of its own essence. Perceptual understanding holds on to mere abstract fixed essentialities without comprehending their specific determinations, i.e. it apprehends concepts as simple familiarities and therefore does not penetrate into the actual determinateness that constitutes such concepts. In that way it fails to master them; rather such abstract essentialities become the master of this understanding, constraining it to an endless bondage in opposing dualities. By holding on to only one determinateness as truth in opposition to its other and then turning to the opposite one (e.g., as we find in Kant’s antinomies) the ultimate unessentiality of both is established, yet it ignores this fact. What perceptual consciousness should do is accept the unessentiality of both sides and thereby recognize the sublimation of these opposing elements in a higher unity. Instead of doing that, however, it resorts to the in so far as and thus leads itself into abstractions and untruth. (shrink)

What corresponds to the present-day ‘transcendental-pragmatic’ concept of ultimate grounding in Hegel is his claim to absoluteness of the logic. Hegel’s fundamental intuition is that of a ‘backward going grounding’ obtaining the initially unproved presuppositions, thereby ‘wrapping itself into a circle’ – the project of the self-grounding of logic, understood as the self-explication of logic by logical means. Yet this is not about one of the multiple ‘logics’ which as formal constructs cannot claim absoluteness. It is rather a fundamental logic (...) that only makes logical textures possible at all and so owns transcendental character. The non-contradiction-principle is an example for this. Es- sential is that it is ‘under-cover-effcient’ as soon as meaningful concepts are used. Self-explication of the fundamental logic then means explicating its implicit under-cover validity, in fact by means of the fundamental logic itself. As is shown this is the affair of dialectic which thereby is to be understood as ultimate grounding of the fundamental logic. This is analyzed in detail using the example of the being/non-being-dialectic. As is demonstrated each explication step generates a new implicit issue and therewith a new explication-discrepancy inducing an antinomical structure that anew forwards the explication procedure. So this is entirely determined by itself. Decisive for the ultimate grounding argumentation is that thereby an objectively verifyable procedure is found, which is apparently possible only in a Hegelian framework. In contrast the immediate evidence of a speech act claimed by the transcendental-pragmatic position has only private character, which is grounding-theoretically irrelevant. (shrink)

The consciousness of sense-certainty proves itself to be dialectical. It starts out with the certainty that its object is a singular immediate being. But it is just this ‘singular immediate being’ that turns around into its opposite to become a universal – i.e. it is true not only for a single but all individual objects since everything is a ‘singular immediate being’. ‘Every individual is different’ because each has free will and is independent of others. If this is universally true (...) then it dialectically turns around to its opposite and becomes ‘everyone is the same.’ This is called “negative movement” or dialectical because each side of the individual-universal relation negates itself to become the other. Immediate consciousness is called ego. The consciousness of immediate sense-certainty is not aware that ego is related to the object which it considers as immediately being. The admission of relationship cancels immediacy because a relation is something that mediates between two things that unites them, i.e. changes them from two independent beings into a unity or oneness. This change is negation, thus the many-ness is negated to become one-ness or unity as a relation. Of course the many-ness is not destroyed in a relation, or the relationship itself could not exist as such. This is the nature of negation – it does not annihilate but sublimates; unity implies that two or more things have been united, i.e. the explicit multiplicity is sublimated (becomes implicit) in the concept of unity. The change in going from one moment to another in this movement or process is called experience (as discussed in the November 2011 issue). [1] Taken together these experiences of consciousness are called its history. It is not a history of the world, or the development of consciousness through historical time. It is simply the experience or change due to the movement of thought explained previously – involving the purely philosophical, logical or conceptual events. The series of these experiences is called its history. (shrink)

Progress in philosophy means to understand and accept one point and from there go on to develop the next. The whole is made up of many parts just as a building is composed of many floors – we cannot take out one or more of the beginning floors and expect that the building can thereby be erected. The overall system of Hegel’s philosophy requires an understanding of each of the parts within it, especially the beginning steps. In the earlier articles (...) on this subject the essential point has been made that the subjective and objective aspects of reality cannot be understood separately from each other. There is no meaning to concept without that of which it is the concept, as much as there is no meaning to an object without a subject. With that basic and simple principle of the “distinct but inseparable” notion of the two, further progress was made to the details of the relationship between subject and object. The subject-predicate proposition was introduced to show how thinking takes on a dialectical nature and described this dialectical unity as being the first basic form in understanding the Concept as a dynamic unity of subject and object. Further determinations lay hidden in this structure which have not yet been made explicit for understanding. Only some general ideas or an outline for a basic understanding of what the basic principles are has been presented thus far. A more detailed comprehension is required to go further. The experiences that consciousness goes through in its development in learning about itself display the entire system of the truth of consciousness or the realm of spirit. These are not mere abstract thoughts but appear in relation to consciousness as actual shapes or stages of itself. The development of these determinate moments constitutes consciousness as a whole in its true existence. At that point in the developement of consciousness when it is no longer burdened with itself as that which appears to exist merely for it and as an other, its alien nature is overcome and appearance becomes identical to its own essence. This marks the entrance to the platform of the genuine science of spirit in which consciousness grasps its own essence or is absolute knowing. (shrink)

It is best to study Hegel as he presents himself in the context of his own writings. In this way we allow Hegel to teach us what the Science of Philosophy is, and how, through such Science, the Absolute Truth reveals or rationally unfolds itself, although this may challenge, in a radical and transformative way, the accepted ideas and methods we may currently have of philosophy and science. By taking the approach of simply following Hegel’s thought in its own development, (...) we discover in the process that we have actually re-invented Philosophy and Science in a such a totally comprehensive and systematic way that we are finally able to integrate Mind and Matter into an Absolute Whole that transcends and encompasses both while yet maintaining a clear differentiation and distinction between them – a genuine unity in diversity that has been the cynosure of philosophical inquiry from time immemorial. (shrink)

The objective here will be to take the subject (ego) and object (thing) that are held fixed, separate and in opposition to each other by the understanding and explicitly show them to be dialectically related in the dynamical movement of thinking. The dialectical movement of thought was explained by example in the propositional statement, S is P. The movement of the unified Concept as a whole, in which the fixed subject and object are considered as mere moments, constitutes the basic (...) underlying dynamic truth or reality. And the totality of the movements and moments in this dialectical relationship constitute the self-determining Concept. The thinking is involved in this dynamic movement of the Concept is called conceptual thinking. It is left to us to demonstrate that this thinking belongs to the Concept and not to the ego. We can understand this intuitively at this point by realizing that in the dialectical relationship of the propositional form, S is P, the object becomes as fluid and active as the subject or ego. Therefore it is not a mere egoic activity. (shrink)

To claim that there is a scientific Concept of knowledge may seem unfounded since it is only an assertion here at this point. We still have to demonstrate this claim. It will do no good to merely argue against the ideas of knowledge as instrument, etc. that may already be accepted since these are also unfounded assertions. What we will therefore actually do is to show that the Concept of knowledge is not a mere assertion like the others by turning (...) knowledge against itself as an assertion. An assertion may be considered what is merely given to us, and what is given to us may also be considered to be what appears or manifests. In this sense we will be considering knowledge as it appears or in its phenomenality, i.e. as it appears to natural consciousness, and work through knowledge or knowing in this modality until we arrive at the proper Concept of knowledge which gives us Truth in and for itself. This is what we would intuitively expect of knowledge so now we have to explicitly and scientifically show in what way knowledge and Truth can be understood to give this relation. (shrink)

Religion is basically a consciousness or awareness of God. This means that Religion depends upon a difference between the finite subject or consciousness and the infinite object or God. This difference is maintained because of the way Man relates to God in religion, i.e. through feeling, love, etc. Philosophy is the scientific comprehension of Truth, in which an identity-in-difference is sought between the subject and object or concept and object. This is attained through thinking, and not through feeling. Religion and (...) Philosophy often seem to be at odds in the beginning. This opposition is, however, reconciled by absolute knowledge. The love that is found in Religion is represented by the identity-in-difference principle that is found in Philosophy. The urge that the philosopher feels in the necessity to come to truth or oneness with truth, is the same urge that religion expresses in the feeling of love of God. It is merely a difference in the way they each proceed in fulfilling that need or necessity – one through thinking the other through feeling. The identity and difference of thinking and feeling is another topic that is dealt with by Hegel in his system. (shrink)

Tong Shijun holds a concept of dialectics which can also be found in Mao’s writings and in classical Chinese philosophy. Tong, however, is ambivalent in his attitude to dialectics in this sense, and for this reason he recommends Chinese philosophy to focus more on formal logic. My point will be that with another concept of dialectics Tong can have dialectics without giving up on logic and epistemology. This argument is given substance by an analysis of texts by Mao, Tong and (...) Hegel. (shrink)

Le tome 68 de l’Édition intégrale des œuvres de Martin Heidegger, qui met en scène un important épisode de son explication avec Hegel, a relativement peu été commenté jusqu’à ce jour. Cet article se veut une analyse approfondie de la première moitié du texte, intitulée « La négativité ». Heidegger y traque l’origine de la négativité hégélienne et en vient à proposer lui-même un concept de « néant » qu’il juge plus originaire que celui de son prédécesseur.

Hegel considers the Concept (in German Begriffe) to be a spiritual entity - the soul, if you will, of a thing. Looked at in another way it may be considered (although not precisely) like the essence of a thing. It is what makes the thing whatever it is. Thus if we took the Concept of a room (let’s say “roomness”) away from a thing we would no longer have a room but something else. In this sense the Concept is essential (...) to the being of anything. As soon as we determine “what” a thing is we are involved with its Concept. The Concept is the “whatness” of things. (shrink)

The purpose of Hegel’s Phenomenology of Spirit is to demonstrate that the Concept is the underlying reality or Truth that lies hidden to ordinary knowing. Once the Concept is revealed it becomes the object of scientific development in his Encyclopedia of the Philosophical Sciences, but because of its absolute nature the Concept and its development are identical while different simultaneously. On the absolute platform opposites are identical in their differences, just as the absolute value |1| is the same as the (...) absolute value |-1| in mathematics. To be able to think in terms of absolute knowledge therefore one has to leave the duality of relative knowing or understanding and raise oneself to the level of dialectical unity or Reason. (shrink)

One of the most important instances of distinct but inseparable entities is that of subject and object. When we carefully think about them, we realize that one term implies the other. In other words, a subject cannot possibly exist without a corresponding object otherwise we would never be able to talk about “subject.” In a similar way, an object can only be called an object because it is in relation to a subject. All opposites will in fact exhibit this same (...) interdependence when we carefully think about them. For example, we could not speak of “blindness” if there were no one who could see. The word “blind” would never have any reason for its existence unless someone had the ability to see. Light and darkness, sleep and waking, day and night, etc. all such terms have meaning only in relation to their opposition to one another. Thus we conclude that this opposition is essential to the existence of either term. We can look at existence as a polar reality or polarity. One side rises or falls with the other. There is no possible way that one side can exist without the other. (shrink)

Being is a peculiar concept since it seems to be associated with everything yet it is not any of those things itself. In other words, every thing has being - but being is not any of those things. To say that something “is” means that it has being. A tree is, the color red is, even a thought is or has being, yet each of these things - a tree, a color, a thought - is different from being. They all (...) have being, and certainly being cannot be taken away from any of them, yet they are not being itself. Therefore we can say that being is not any thing. We can’t point to being the way we can point to a thing, and say “that is being.” Thus being is no thing, or nothing. Being is nothing! This is one way to arrive at that elusive identity. Being is associated with everything, but it is not any of those things itself. (shrink)

We may call this the problem of thought and being, where thought represents the subjective and being the objective component in this interactive event. In order to resolve this problem we have to look more carefully at the situation to make sure we understand what is going on more clearly. Let us take the example of "seeing" as something that may be easier to understand. Between (1) "seeing" and the (2) "thing seen" we may at first think we have two (...) independent things. I have my subjective seeing capacity and there are objects in the world which are subject to my seeing capacity. Are these two really independent? Does it make any sense to speak of "things seen" unless the "seeing" capacity is already operating on them? Can we talk of an experience in such a way that what was experienced is different from the experience of it? We mean them to be different, their difference is not being denied. But are they independent or separable from one another? Whether we consider knowing, thinking, or whatever subjective activity we may come up with, it cannot be separated from the objective element that it is operating on. This interdependence of subjective and objective elements is crucial. Basically it is a situation where we have distinct elements inseparably connected to one another. This is not an extraordinary situation. It is rather most commonplace when we think about it. The sunshine is different from the Sun. No one would argue that when the Sun is shining in your room that the Sun is in your room. Distinct they are, but it would not be possible to separate the sunshine from the Sun and still have it be what we call the Sun. The point we are making is that Reality is not simply a matter of sensuous experience. Thought or conception is intimately tied up with our perception of Reality. As Kant explained, intuitions (perceptions) without conceptions are blind (indeterminate) and conceptions without intuitions are empty. Reality is a composite unity of both. (shrink)

Explorations in Systems Phenomenology in Relation to Ontology, Hermeneutics and the Meta-dialectics of Design -/- SYNOPSIS A Phenomenological Analysis of Emergent Design is performed based on the foundations of General Schemas Theory. The concept of Sign Engineering is explored in terms of Hermeneutics, Dialectics, and Ontology in order to define Emergent Systems and Metasystems Engineering based on the concept of Meta-dialectics. -/- ABSTRACT Phenomenology, Ontology, Hermeneutics, and Dialectics will dominate our inquiry into the nature of the Emergent Design of the (...) System and its inverse dual, the Meta-system. This is an speculative dissertation that attempts to produce a philosophical, mathematical, and theoretical view of the nature of Systems Engineering Design. Emergent System Design, i.e., the design of yet unheard of and/or hitherto non-existent Systems and Metasystems is the focus. This study is a frontal assault on the hard problem of explaining how Engineering produces new things, rather than a repetition or reordering of concepts that already exist. In this work the philosophies of E. Husserl, A. Gurwitsch, M. Heidegger, J. Derrida, G. Deleuze, A. Badiou, G. Hegel, I. Kant and other Continental Philosophers are brought to bear on different aspects of how new technological systems come into existence through the midwifery of Systems Engineering. Sign Engineering is singled out as the most important aspect of Systems Engineering. We will build on the work of Pieter Wisse and extend his theory of Sign Engineering to define Meta-dialectics in the form of Quadralectics and then Pentalectics. Along the way the various ontological levels of Being are explored in conjunction with the discovery that the Quadralectic is related to the possibility of design primarily at the Third Meta-level of Being, called Hyper Being. Design Process is dependent upon the emergent possibilities that appear in Hyper Being. Hyper Being, termed by Heidegger as Being (Being crossed-out) and termed by Derrida as Differance, also appears as the widest space within the Design Field at the third meta-level of Being and therefore provides the most leverage that is needed to produce emergent effects. Hyper Being is where possibilities appear within our worldview. Possibility is necessary for emergent events to occur. Hyper Being possibilities are extended by Wild Being propensities to allow the embodiment of new things. We discuss how this philosophical background relates to meta-methods such as the Gurevich Abstract State Machine and the Wisse Metapattern methods, as well as real-time architectural design methods as described in the Integral Software Engineering Methodology. One aim of this research is to find the foundation for extending the ISEM methodology to become a general purpose Systems Design Methodology. Our purpose is also to bring these philosophical considerations into the practical realm by examining P. Bourdieu’s ideas on the relationship between theoretical and practical reason and M. de Certeau’s ideas on practice. The relationship between design and implementation is seen in terms of the Set/Mass conceptual opposition. General Schemas Theory is used as a way of critiquing the dependence of Set based mathematics as a basis for Design. The dissertation delineates a new foundation for Systems Engineering as Emergent Engineering based on General Schemas Theory, and provides an advanced theory of Design based on the understanding of the meta-levels of Being, particularly focusing upon the relationship between Hyper Being and Wild Being in the context of Pure and Process Being. (shrink)

The Western world has led the development of material science for over 200 years. But they have reached an impasse in confronting the problem of consciousness. Scientific knowledge requires a scientist, but regarding knowledge concerning the scientist, they must remain silent. India has always emphasized knowledge of the conscious self or atma. Vedanta-sutra begins with the aphorism “athatho brahma jijnasa” – now, therefore, inquire about brahma (pure consciousness). Even in the West, the Greek philosopher Socrates stated, “Above all else know (...) the self.” But since the time of Newton, the objective world became the focus of science to the exclusion of the conscious observer or scientist. (shrink)

How do changes inHegel's dialectic of categories relate, if they do, to empirical language changes over time?

A concise exposition of the development of the true infinite is found in Hegel's Encyclopedia Logic (EL92-95). It may be much easier to follow than the one given in the Science of Logic. The following paragraphs are from the Gerates, et al translation of that book, along with some parts of the "Additions" where I felt they were useful. At the end I give my interpretation of the development.

Hegel often uses the example of a flower in explaining the significance of philosophy. A flower is, of course, a finite existence and therefore not a proper object of philosophy, but it does serve as a ready example to illustrate its principles.

Ken Foldes and I agreed to present what we consider an important controversy concerning the actual interpretation of Hegelian philosophy as regards the nature of the relationship between Man and God. Ken wants to argue for the oneness of God and Man, with the unity and exclusive Being of God as the Absolute Truth, making all being other than God illusory. On the other hand, I want to show the simultaneous identity and difference of Man and God dynamically integrated as (...) a variegated system that is chiefly characterized as pure negative activity, or self-thinking-thought, in which God and Man and the World each have a distinct yet harmonized relationship when considered in their negative or sublated significance with respect to God. (shrink)

Previous efforts to bring the Hegelian dialectic closer to a clarification give reason for skepticism. The question: "What is dialectic", according to Dieter Henrich, "has remained without an answer so far". Hegel's objective-idealistic program is, however, so much linked to the possibility of a dialectical logic that it is an urgent desideratum to gain clarity about the stringency of dialectical argumentation. But this is only possible on the basis of a theory of dialectic. Hegel's own reflection on methods cannot be (...) considered sufficient in this respect. It does not enable us to defend the dialectical procedure against objections or to answer questions of method. In the following, a detailed reconstruction of the dialectic of 'being' and 'nothing' in Hegel's 'Science of Logic' will reveal basic structures of dialectical argumentation. As will be shown, antinomic structures play a key role. Such a 'reconstruction', however, will not be a simple confirmation of Hegelian texts, but will always have the character of a critique. In fact, it will turn out that in comparison with Hegel's development of categories, radical revisions are to be expected. ----- Bisherige Bemühungen, das Verfahren Hegelscher Dialektik einer Klärung näherzubringen, geben Anlass zur Skepsis. Die Frage: „Was ist Dialektik?“, so Dieter Henrich, sei „bisher ohne Antwort geblieben“. Das objektiv-idealistische Programm Hegels ist indes so sehr mit der Möglichkeit einer dialektischen Logik verknüpft, daß über die Stringenz dialektischer Argumentation Klarheit zu gewinnen ein dringliches Desiderat darstellt. Das aber ist nur auf der Grundlage einer Theorie der Dialektik möglich. Hegels eigene Methodenreflexion kann diesbezüglich nicht als zureichend erachtet werden. Sie versetzt uns nicht in die Lage, das dialektische Verfahren gegen Einwände zu verteidigen oder Methodenfragen zu beantworten. Im Folgenden sollen in einer detaillierten Rekonstruktion der Dialektik von ‘Sein’ und ‘Nichts’ in Hegels ‘Wissenschaft der Logik’ Grundstrukturen dialektischer Argumentation sichtbar gemacht werden. Wie gezeigt wird, kommt dabei antinomischen Strukturen eine Schlüsselfunktion zu. Eine solche 'Rekonstruktion' wird allerdings nicht eine umstandslose Bestätigung der Hegelschen Textvorlage sein können, sondern immer auch den Charakter einer Kritik haben. In der Tat wird sich ergeben, daß im Vergleich mit Hegels Kategorienentwicklung einschneidende Revisionen zu gewärtigen sind. (shrink)

I discuss this collection of essays on Hegel and the sciences while stressing the interest of Hegel's philosophy of nature in the light of later non-mainstream developments in the life-sciences and medicine. I compare then the chapters dedicated to Hegel's logic with recent literature on para-consistent logic and re-interpretations of Hegel's own logic.