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  1. Hume’s Law Violated?Rik Peels - 2014 - Journal of Value Inquiry 48 (3):449-455.
    Introduction: Prinz’s SentimentalismMany ethicists claim that one cannot derive an ought from an is. In others words, they think that one cannot derive a statement that has prescriptive force from purely descriptive statements. This thesis plays a crucial role in many theoretical and practical ethical arguments. Since, according to many, David Hume advocated a view along these lines, this thesis has been called ‘Hume’s Law’. In this paper, I adopt this widespread terminology, whether or not Hume did indeed take this (...)
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  2. Hume On Is and Ought: Logic, Promises and the Duke of Wellington.Charles Pigden - forthcoming - In Paul Russell (ed.), Oxford Handbook on David Hume. Oxford University Press.
    Hume seems to contend that you can’t get an ought from an is. Searle professed to prove otherwise, deriving a conclusion about obligations from a premise about promises. Since (as Schurz and I have shown) you can’t derive a substantive ought from an is by logic alone, Searle is best construed as claiming that there are analytic bridge principles linking premises about promises to conclusions about obligations. But we can no more derive a moral obligation to pay up from the (...)
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  3. On the Triviality of Hume's Law: A Reply to Gerhard Schurz.Charles Pigden - 2010 - In Hume on Is and Ought. Palgrave-Macmillan. pp. 217-238.
    I argue that No-Ought-From-Is (in the sense that I believe it) is a relatively trivial affair. Of course, when people try to derive substantive or non-vacuous moral conclusions from non-moral premises, they are making a mistake. But No-Non-Vacuous-Ought-From-Is is meta-ethically inert. It tells us nothing about the nature of the moral concepts. It neither refutes naturalism nor supports non-cognitivism. And this is not very surprising since it is merely an instance of an updated version of the conservativeness of logic (in (...)
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  4. Hume, Motivation and “the Moral Problem”.Charles R. Pigden - 2007 - Rivista di Storia Della Filosofia 62 (3):199-221.
    Hume is widely regarded as the grandfather of emotivism and indeed of non-cognitivism in general. For the chief argument for emotivism - the Argument from Motivation - is derived from him. In my opinion Hume was not an emotivist or proto-emotivist but a moral realist in the modern ‘response-dependent’ style. But my interest in this paper is not the historical Hume but the Hume of legend since the legendary Hume is one of the most influential philosophers of the present age. (...)
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  5. El pluralismo moral de David Hume.Agustin Arrieta & Agustin Vicente - 2013 - Critica 45 (134):17-42.
    In this paper, we argue for an objectivist pluralist interpretation of Hume’s moral philosophy. We begin by approaching the pluralist/relativist distinction in aesthetics. Then we move to ethics, and present some reasons which justify considering Hume a normative pluralist, and, in particular, an objectivist pluralist. Our argument will make use of Hume’s idea that there are foru sources of value, and of his notion of artificial lives/moralities.
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  6. Empathy, Emotion Regulation, and Moral Judgment.Antti Kauppinen - 2014 - In Heidi Maibom (ed.), Empathy and Morality. Oxford University Press.
    In this paper, my aim is to bring together contemporary psychological literature on emotion regulation and the classical sentimentalism of David Hume and Adam Smith to arrive at a plausible account of empathy's role in explaining patterns of moral judgment. Along the way, I criticize related arguments by Michael Slote, Jesse Prinz, and others.
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  7. Fikcja moralności, czyli problem motywacji w etyce Davida Hume'a.Tomasz Żuradzki - 2010 - Kwartalnik Filozoficzny 26 (4):85-109.
    David Hume jest powszechnie uważany za prekursora metaetycznego nonkognitywizmu, a jego filozofia moralności jest traktowana jako klasyczny przykład motywacyjnego internalizmu. W artykule omawiam poglądy Hume'a na problem motywacji do działania moralnego odwołując się do cnót naturalnych i sztucznych. Dochodzę do wniosku, że choć Hume może być traktowany jako nonkognitywista, to jest to nonkognitywizm bardzo różny od współczesnych wersji tego stanowiska. Główna różnica polega na tym, że Hume nie uważał, by poczucie powinności z konieczności motywowało do działania.
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  8. Hume's Morality: Feeling and Fabrication – Rachel Cohon. [REVIEW]Guy Fletcher - 2010 - Philosophical Quarterly 60 (241):861-863.
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  9. Sobre a natureza da teoria moral de Hume.Jaimir Conte - 2006 - Kriterion: Journal of Philosophy 47 (113):131-146.
    RESUMO -/- Este artigo discute duas variedades de interpretação para a teoria moral de Hume. De um lado, ela é representada como uma forma de subjetivismo e, de outro, como uma forma de realismo. Ao final, é proposto que esta filosofia pode ser melhor descrita como uma forma de intersubjetivismo. -/- ABSTRACT -/- This paper discusses two varieties of interpretations of Hume's moral theory. On the one side the attempt to represent Hume's moral theory as a form of the moral (...)
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  10. The Standard-Relational Theory of 'Ought' and the Oughtistic Theory of Reasons.Daan Evers - 2011 - Australasian Journal of Philosophy 89 (1):131-147.
    The idea that normative statements implicitly refer to standards has been around for quite some time. It is usually defended by normative antirealists, who tend to be attracted to Humean theories of reasons. But this is an awkward combination: 'A ought to X' entails that there are reasons for A to X, and 'A ought to X all things considered' entails that the balance of reasons favours X-ing. If the standards implicitly referred to are not those of the agent, then (...)
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  11. On Three Defenses of Sentimentalism.Noriaki Iwasa - 2013 - Prolegomena 12 (1):61-82.
    This essay shows that a moral sense or moral sentiments alone cannot identify appropriate morals. To this end, the essay analyzes three defenses of Francis Hutcheson's, David Hume's, and Adam Smith's moral sense theories against the relativism charge that a moral sense or moral sentiments vary across people, societies, cultures, or times. The first defense is the claim that there is a universal moral sense or universal moral sentiments. However, even if they exist, a moral sense or moral sentiments alone (...)
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  12. Sentimentalism and Metaphysical Beliefs.Noriaki Iwasa - 2010 - Prolegomena 9 (2):271-286.
    This essay first introduces the moral sense theories of Francis Hutcheson, David Hume, and Adam Smith, and clarifies important differences between them. It then examines whether moral judgment based on the moral sense or moral sentiments varies according to one's metaphysical beliefs. For this, the essay mainly applies those theories to such issues as stem cell research, abortion, and active euthanasia. In all three theories, false religious beliefs can distort moral judgment. In Hutcheson's theory, answers to stem cell research, abortion, (...)
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  13. Ethics and Reason: Richard M. Hare and Hume's Law.Maurilio Lovatti - 1994 - Per la Filosofia (31):50-56.
    A synthetic glance about the basic outlines of Hare's Meta-ethics is offered in this paper to support the idea that Hume's law is still a productive resource for ethical studies. Hare accepted the emotivist premise that moral judgments do not, in the same way as ordinary statements do, state matters of fact that are either true or false, but denied that therefore they must be forms of exclamation. The essential character of moral discourse consisted, not, as the emotivists had held, (...)
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Hume: Moral Internalism and Externalism
  1. Introduction to Hume on Motivation and Virtue.Charles Pigden - 2009 - In Hume on Motivation and Virtue. pp. 1-29.
    This includes a methodological meditation (in blank verse) on the history of philosophy as a contribution to philosophy (rather than as a contribution to history) plus a conspectus of the issues surrounding Hume, the Motivation Argument and the Slavery of Reason Thesis. However I am posting it here mainly because it contains a novel restatement of the Argument from Queerness. Big Thesis: the Slavery of Reason Thesis (via the Motivation Argument) provides no support for non-cognitivism or emotivism, but there is (...)
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Hume: Moral Noncognitivism
  1. If Not Non-Cognitivism, Then What?Charles R. Pigden - 2009 - In Hume on Motivation and Virtue. Palgrave-Macmillan.
    Taking my cue from Michael Smith, I try to extract a decent argument for non-cognitivism from the text of the Treatise. I argue that the premises are false and that the whole thing rests on a petitio principi. I then re-jig the argument so as to support that conclusion that Hume actually believed (namely that an action is virtuous if it would excite the approbation of a suitably qualified spectator). This argument too rests on false premises and a begged question. (...)
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  2. Snare's Puzzle/Hume's Purpose: Non-Cognitivism and What Hume Was Really Up to with No-Ought-From-Is.Charles Pigden - 2010 - In Pigden (ed.), Hume on Is and Ought. Palgrave-Macmillan.
    Frank Snare had a puzzle. Noncognitivism implies No-Ought-From-Is but No- Ought-From-Is does not imply non-cognitivism. How then can we derive non-cognitivism from No-Ought-From-Is? Via an abductive argument. If we combine non-cognitivism with the conservativeness of logic (the idea that in a valid argument the conclusion is contained in the premises), this implies No-Ought-From-Is. Hence if No-Ought-From-Is is true, we can arrive at non-cognitivism via an inference to the best explanation. With prescriptivism we can make this argument more precise. I develop (...)
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Hume: Moral Judgment
  1. The Humean Approach to Moral Diversity.Mark Collier - 2013 - Journal of Scottish Philosophy 11 (1):41-52.
    In ‘A Dialogue’, Hume offers an important reply to the moral skeptic. Skeptics traditionally point to instances of moral diversity in support of the claim that our core values are fixed by enculturation. Hume argues that the skeptic exaggerates the amount of variation in moral codes, however, and fails to adopt an indulgent stance toward attitudes different from ours. Hume proposes a charitable interpretation of moral disagreement, moreover, which traces it back to shared principles of human nature. Contemporary philosophers attempt (...)
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Hume: Moral Realism and Irrealism
  1. The Humean Approach to Moral Diversity.Mark Collier - 2013 - Journal of Scottish Philosophy 11 (1):41-52.
    In ‘A Dialogue’, Hume offers an important reply to the moral skeptic. Skeptics traditionally point to instances of moral diversity in support of the claim that our core values are fixed by enculturation. Hume argues that the skeptic exaggerates the amount of variation in moral codes, however, and fails to adopt an indulgent stance toward attitudes different from ours. Hume proposes a charitable interpretation of moral disagreement, moreover, which traces it back to shared principles of human nature. Contemporary philosophers attempt (...)
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Hume: Moral Relativism
  1. The Humean Approach to Moral Diversity.Mark Collier - 2013 - Journal of Scottish Philosophy 11 (1):41-52.
    In ‘A Dialogue’, Hume offers an important reply to the moral skeptic. Skeptics traditionally point to instances of moral diversity in support of the claim that our core values are fixed by enculturation. Hume argues that the skeptic exaggerates the amount of variation in moral codes, however, and fails to adopt an indulgent stance toward attitudes different from ours. Hume proposes a charitable interpretation of moral disagreement, moreover, which traces it back to shared principles of human nature. Contemporary philosophers attempt (...)
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Hume: The Is/Ought Gap
  1. Substance, Content, Taxonomy and Consequence: A Comment on Stephen Maitzen.Charles Pigden - 2010 - In Hume on Is and Ought. Palgrave-Macmillan. pp. 313-319.
    This is a response to Stephen Maitzen’s paper. ‘Moral Conclusions from Nonmoral Premises’. Maitzen thinks that No-Ought-From-Is is false. He does not dispute the formal proofs of Schurz and myself, but he thinks they are beside the point. For what the proponents of No-Ought-From-Is need to show is not that you cannot get SUBSTANTIVELY moral conclusions from FORMALLY non-moral premises but that you cannot get SUBSTANTIVELY moral conclusions from SUBSTANTIVELY non-moral premises. And he believes that he can derive substantively moral (...)
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  2. Comments on 'Hume's Master Argument'.Charles Pigden - 2010 - In Hume on Is and Ought. Palgrave-Macmillan. pp. 128-142.
    This is a commentary on Adrian Heathcote’s interesting paper ‘Hume’s Master Argument’. Heathcote contends that No-Ought-From-Is is primarily a logical thesis, a ban on Is/Ought inferences which Hume derives from the logic of Ockham. NOFI is thus a variation on what Heathcote calls ‘Hume’s Master Argument’, which he also deploys to prove that conclusions about the future (and therefore a-temporal generalizations) cannot be derived by reason from premises about the past, and that conclusions about external objects or other minds cannot (...)
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  3. Letter From a Gentleman in Dunedin to a Lady in the Countryside.Charles Pigden - 2010 - In Hume on Is and Ought.
    I argue 1) That in his celebrated Is/Ought passage, Hume employs ‘deduction’ in the strict sense, according to which if a conclusion B is justly or evidently deduced from a set of premises A, A cannot be true and B false, or B false and the premises A true. 2) That Hume was following the common custom of his times which sometimes employed ‘deduction’ in a strict sense to denote inferences in which, in the words of Dr Watts’ Logick, ‘the (...)
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  4. Sentimentalism and the Is-Ought Problem.Noriaki Iwasa - 2011 - Croatian Journal of Philosophy 11 (3):323-352.
    Examining the moral sense theories of Francis Hutcheson, David Hume, and Adam Smith from the perspective of the is-ought problem, this essay shows that the moral sense or moral sentiments in those theories alone cannot identify appropriate morals. According to one interpretation, Hume's or Smith's theory is just a description of human nature. In this case, it does not answer the question of how we ought to live. According to another interpretation, it has some normative implications. In this case, it (...)
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  5. Snare's Puzzle/Hume's Purpose: Non-Cognitivism and What Hume Was Really Up to with No-Ought-From-Is.Charles Pigden - 2010 - In Pigden (ed.), Hume on Is and Ought. Palgrave-Macmillan.
    Frank Snare had a puzzle. Noncognitivism implies No-Ought-From-Is but No- Ought-From-Is does not imply non-cognitivism. How then can we derive non-cognitivism from No-Ought-From-Is? Via an abductive argument. If we combine non-cognitivism with the conservativeness of logic (the idea that in a valid argument the conclusion is contained in the premises), this implies No-Ought-From-Is. Hence if No-Ought-From-Is is true, we can arrive at non-cognitivism via an inference to the best explanation. With prescriptivism we can make this argument more precise. I develop (...)
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Hume: Moral Sentimentalism
  1. The Humean Approach to Moral Diversity.Mark Collier - 2013 - Journal of Scottish Philosophy 11 (1):41-52.
    In ‘A Dialogue’, Hume offers an important reply to the moral skeptic. Skeptics traditionally point to instances of moral diversity in support of the claim that our core values are fixed by enculturation. Hume argues that the skeptic exaggerates the amount of variation in moral codes, however, and fails to adopt an indulgent stance toward attitudes different from ours. Hume proposes a charitable interpretation of moral disagreement, moreover, which traces it back to shared principles of human nature. Contemporary philosophers attempt (...)
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  2. Hume's Theory of Moral Imagination.Mark Collier - 2010 - History of Philosophy Quarterly 27 (3):255-273.
    David Hume endorses three claims that are difficult to reconcile: (1) sympathy with those in distress is sufficient to produce compassion towards their plight, (2) adopting the general point of view often requires us to sympathize with the pain and suffering of distant strangers, but (3) our care and concern is limited to those in our close circle. Hume manages to resolve this tension, however, by distinguishing two types of sympathy. We feel compassion towards those around us because associative sympathy (...)
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  3. Sentimentalism and the Is-Ought Problem.Noriaki Iwasa - 2011 - Croatian Journal of Philosophy 11 (3):323-352.
    Examining the moral sense theories of Francis Hutcheson, David Hume, and Adam Smith from the perspective of the is-ought problem, this essay shows that the moral sense or moral sentiments in those theories alone cannot identify appropriate morals. According to one interpretation, Hume's or Smith's theory is just a description of human nature. In this case, it does not answer the question of how we ought to live. According to another interpretation, it has some normative implications. In this case, it (...)
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Hume: Meta-Ethics, Misc
  1. The Humean Approach to Moral Diversity.Mark Collier - 2013 - Journal of Scottish Philosophy 11 (1):41-52.
    In ‘A Dialogue’, Hume offers an important reply to the moral skeptic. Skeptics traditionally point to instances of moral diversity in support of the claim that our core values are fixed by enculturation. Hume argues that the skeptic exaggerates the amount of variation in moral codes, however, and fails to adopt an indulgent stance toward attitudes different from ours. Hume proposes a charitable interpretation of moral disagreement, moreover, which traces it back to shared principles of human nature. Contemporary philosophers attempt (...)
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  2. Philosophical Melancholy and Delirium: Hume's Pathology of Philosophy. Donald W. Livingston. [REVIEW]Marina Frasca-Spada - 2001 - Mind 110 (439):783-789.
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