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  1. The Ambiguity of Indiscernibility.John Dilworth - manuscript
    I argue that there is an ambiguity in the concept of indiscernibility as applied to objects, because there are two different categories of properties, associated with two different ways in which all of the pre-theoretical 'properties' of an object may be identified. In one structural way, identifications of properties are independent of any particular spatial orientation of the object in question, but in another 'field' way, identifications are instead dependent on an object's particular spatial orientation, so that its properties as (...)
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  2. The elimination of metaphysics through the epistemological analysis: lessons (un)learned from metaphysical underdetermination.Raoni Wohnrath Arroyo, Jonas R. B. Arenhart & Décio Krause - forthcoming - In Diederik Aerts, Jonas R. B. Arenhart, Christian de Ronde & Giuseppe Sergioli (eds.), Probing the Meaning of Quantum Mechanics: Probability, Metaphysics, Explanation and Measurement. World Scientific.
    This chapter argues that the general philosophy of science should learn metaphilosophical lessons from the case of metaphysical underdetermination, as it occurs in non-relativistic quantum mechanics. Section presents the traditional discussion of metaphysical underdetermination regarding the individuality and non-individuality of quantum particles. Section discusses three reactions to it found in the literature: eliminativism about individuality; conservatism about individuality; eliminativism about objects. Section wraps it all up with metametaphysical considerations regarding the epistemology of metaphysics of science.
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  3. Identidade e Sistemas Conceituais.Kherian Gracher - forthcoming - Metatheoria.
    Is identity fundamental to every conceptual systems? In this article I intend to present reasons against the claim that every conceptual system presupposes the notion of identity. To address this debate I analyze the positions of Bueno (2014; 2016) and Krause and Arenhart (2015). While Bueno argues that identity is necessary for all conceptual systems, Krause and Arenhart present a series of objections against such position, thus defending that identity is not fundamental. I intend to show that the main objections (...)
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  4. The Principles of Contradiction, Sufficient Reason, and Identity of Indiscernibles.Gonzalo Rodriguez-Pereyra - forthcoming - In Maria Rosa Antognazza (ed.), Oxford Handbook of Leibniz. Oxford University Press.
    Leibniz was a philosopher of principles: the principles of Contradiction, of Sufficient Reason, of Identity of Indiscernibles, of Plenitude, of the Best, and of Continuity are among the most famous Leibnizian principles. In this article I shall focus on the first three principles; I shall discuss various formulations of the principles (sect. 1), what it means for these theses to have the status of principles or axioms in Leibniz’s philosophy (sect. 2), the fundamental character of the Principles of Contradiction and (...)
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  5. Strategies for defending the Principle of Identity of Indiscernibles: a critical survey and a new approach.L. G. S. Videira - 2023 - Dissertation, University of Campinas (Unicamp)
    The Principle of Identity of Indiscernibles (PII) is the focus of much controversy in the history of Metaphysics and in contemporary Physics. Many questions rover the debate about its truth or falsehood, for example, to which objects the principle applies? Which properties can be counted as discerning properties? Is the principle necessary? In other words, which version of the principle is the correct and is this version true? This thesis aims to answer this questions in order to show that PII (...)
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  6. Grounding and defining identity.Jon Erling Litland - 2022 - Noûs 57 (4):850-876.
    I systematically defend a novel account of the grounds for identity and distinctness facts: they are all uniquely zero‐grounded. First, this Null Account is shown to avoid a range of problems facing other accounts: a relation satisfying the Null Account would be an excellent candidate for being the identity relation. Second, a plenitudinist view of relations suggests that there is such a relation. To flesh out this plenitudinist view I sketch a novel framework for expressing real definitions, use this framework (...)
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  7. To Be is to Persist.Dustin Gray - 2020 - Philosophy Now 141 (141):8-11.
    What does it mean for an object to persist through time? Consider the statement, ‘My car is filthy, I need to wash it.’ Consider the response, ‘How did it get that way?’ The answer is that dirt, dust and other particles have collected on the car’s surface thus making it filthy. Its properties have changed. At one point in the car’s career, none of that dirt and grime existed on its surface and the car was said to be clean. The (...)
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  8. Strong Pluralism, Coincident Objects and Haecceitism.Karol Lenart & Artur Szachniewicz - 2020 - Axiomathes 30 (4):347-370.
    According to strong pluralism, objects distinct by virtue of their modal properties can coincide. The most common objection towards such view invokes the so-called Grounding Problem according to which the strong pluralist needs to explain what the grounds are for supposed modal differences between the coincidents. As recognized in the literature, the failure to provide an answer to the Grounding Problem critically undermines the plausibility of strong pluralism. Moreover, there are strong reasons to believe that strong pluralists cannot provide an (...)
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  9. A fractal universe and the identity of indiscernibles.Matteo Casarosa - 2019 - Stance 12 (1):87-95.
    The principle of Identity of Indiscernibles has been challenged with various thought experiments involving symmetric universes. In this paper, I describe a fractal universe and argue that, while it is not a symmetric universe in the classical sense, under the assumption of a relational theory of space it nonetheless contains a set of objects indiscernible by pure properties alone. I then argue that the argument against the principle from this new thought experiment resists better than those from classical symmetric universes (...)
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  10. Bundle Theory and the Identity of Indiscernibles.Philip Swenson & Bradley Rettler - 2019 - Res Philosophica 96 (4):495-508.
    A and B continue their conversation concerning the Identity of Indiscernibles. Both are aware of recent critiques of the principle that haven’t received replies; B summarizes those critiques, and A offers the replies that are due. B then raises a new worry.
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  11. Grades of Discrimination: Indiscernibility, Symmetry, and Relativity.Tim Button - 2017 - Notre Dame Journal of Formal Logic 58 (4):527-553.
    There are several relations which may fall short of genuine identity, but which behave like identity in important respects. Such grades of discrimination have recently been the subject of much philosophical and technical discussion. This paper aims to complete their technical investigation. Grades of indiscernibility are defined in terms of satisfaction of certain first-order formulas. Grades of symmetry are defined in terms of symmetries on a structure. Both of these families of grades of discrimination have been studied in some detail. (...)
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  12. Composition as a Kind of Identity.Phillip Bricker - 2016 - Inquiry: An Interdisciplinary Journal of Philosophy 59 (3):264-294.
    Composition as identity, as I understand it, is a theory of the composite structure of reality. The theory’s underlying logic is irreducibly plural; its fundamental primitive is a generalized identity relation that takes either plural or singular arguments. Strong versions of the theory that incorporate a generalized version of the indiscernibility of identicals are incompatible with the framework of plural logic, and should be rejected. Weak versions of the theory that are based on the idea that composition is merely analogous (...)
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  13. The physical world as a blob: Is OSR really realism?: Steven French: The Structure of the World: Metaphysics and Representation. Oxford: OUP, 2014, 416pp, ₤50.00 HB.Mauro Dorato - 2016 - Metascience 25 (2):173-181.
    In my review of Steven French's The structure of the world. Metaphysics & Representation. OUP, Oxford, 2014 I argue that the author is forced to navigate between the Scilla of Tegmark’s Pitagoreanism (2008) and the Carybdis of “blobobjectivism” (Horgan and Potrč 2008), namely the claim that the whole physical universe is a single concrete structurally complex but partless cosmos (a “blob”).
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  14. Identical Legal Entities and the Trinity: Relative-Social Trinitarianism.James Goetz - 2016 - Journal of Analytic Theology 4:128-146.
    Goetz outlined legal models of identical entities that include natural persons who are identical to a coregency and natural persons who are identical to a general partnership. Those entities cohere with the formula logic of relative identity. This essay outlines the coexistence of relative identity and numerical identity in the models of identical legal entities, which is impure relative identity. These models support the synthesis of Relative Trinitarianism and Social Trinitarianism, which I call Relative-Social Trinitarianism.
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  15. É a Identidade Fundamental?Kherian Gracher - 2016 - Dissertation, Federal University of Santa Catarina
    (Abstract - Inglês) Identity is traditionally taken to be a fundamental notion of our conceptual framework as well as a fundamental metaphysical component of entities. But as far as we make this claim we face ourselves with two problems: what is identity? And why would it be fundamental? These questions will guide us towards a discussion put forward by Bueno (2014), Krause and Arenhart (2015). Bueno holds that there are four aspects that make identity being fundamental: (1) identity is assumed (...)
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  16. É a identidade fundamental?Kherian Gracher - 2016 - Dissertation, Federal University of Santa Catarina
    Identity is traditionally taken to be a fundamental notion of our conceptual framework as well as a fundamental metaphysical component of entities. But as far as we make this claim we face ourselves with two problems: what is identity? And why would it be fundamental? These questions will guide us towards a discussion put forward by Bueno (2014), Krause and Arenhart (2015). Bueno holds that there are four aspects that make identity being fundamental: (1) identity is assumed in every conceptual (...)
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  17. Bohm's approach and individuality.Paavo Pylkkänen, Basil Hiley & Ilkka Pättiniemi - 2016 - In Alexandre Guay & Thomas Pradeu (eds.), Individuals Across the Sciences. Oxford, UK: Oxford University Press.
    Ladyman and Ross argue that quantum objects are not individuals and use this idea to ground their metaphysical view, ontic structural realism, according to which relational structures are primary to things. LR acknowledge that there is a version of quantum theory, namely the Bohm theory, according to which particles do have denite trajectories at all times. However, LR interpret the research by Brown et al. as implying that "raw stuff" or haecceities are needed for the individuality of particles of BT, (...)
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  18. Structuralism and Its Ontology.Marc Gasser - 2015 - Ergo: An Open Access Journal of Philosophy 2:1-26.
    A prominent version of mathematical structuralism holds that mathematical objects are at bottom nothing but "positions in structures," purely relational entities without any sort of nature independent of the structure to which they belong. Such an ontology is often presented as a response to Benacerraf's "multiple reductions" problem, or motivated on hermeneutic grounds, as a faithful representation of the discourse and practice of mathematics. In this paper I argue that there are serious difficulties with this kind of view: its proponents (...)
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  19. Identidade, Indiscernibilidade e Lógica.Kherian Gracher - 2015 - Fundamento 1 (10):21-40.
    Is identity fundamental to formal systems? Even if a system have no the identity relation, is that concept is not assumed in any way – whether in a metalinguistic or intuitive level? In this paper we shall discuss this issue. Otávio Bueno (2014, 2016) argues against the elimination of identity, holding that this concept is fundamental and non-eliminable (even in does systems that claim to do so). Décio Arenhart Krause and Jonas (2015), by the other hand, have a number of (...)
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  20. Natural Unity and Paradoxes of Legal Persons.James Goetz - 2014 - Journal Jurisprudence 21:27-46.
    This essay proposes an ontological model in which a legal person such as a polity possesses natural unity from group properties that emerge in the self-organization of the human population. Also, analysis of customary legal persons and property indicates noncontradictory paradoxes that include Aristotelian essence of an entity, relative identity over time, ubiquitous authority, coinciding authorities, and identical entities. Mathematical modeling helps to explain the logic of the paradoxes.
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  21. Discernibility and Qualitative Difference.Micah Newman - 2014 - Journal of Philosophical Research 39:43-49.
    The Principle of the Identity of Indiscernibles , according to which two objects are identical if they share all the same properties, has come in for much criticism. Michael Della Rocca has recently defended PII on the grounds that it is needed to forestall the possibility that where there appears to be only one object present, there is actually a multiplicity of exactly-overlapping such objects. Katherine Hawley has criticized this approach for violating a plausible “ground rule” in applying rules of (...)
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  22. Grades of individuality. A pluralistic view of identity in quantum mechanics and in the sciences.Mauro Dorato & Matteo Morganti - 2013 - Philosophical Studies 163 (3):591-610.
    This paper offers a critical assessment of the current state of the debate about the identity and individuality of material objects. Its main aim, in particular, is to show that, in a sense to be carefully specified, the opposition between the Leibnizian ‘reductionist’ tradition, based on discernibility, and the sort of ‘primitivism’ that denies that facts of identity and individuality must be analysable has become outdated. In particular, it is argued that—contrary to a widespread consensus—‘naturalised’ metaphysics supports both the acceptability (...)
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  23. Cut the Pie Any Way You Like? Cotnoir on General Identity.Katherine Hawley - 2013 - Oxford Studies in Metaphysics 8:323-30.
    This is a short response to Aaron Cotnoir's 'Composition as General Identity', in which I suggest some further applications of his ideas, and try to press the question of why we should think of his 'general identity relation' as a genuine identity relation.
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  24. Identity.Varol Akman - 2006 - In A. C. Grayling, Naomi Goulder & Andrew Pyle (eds.), The Continuum Encyclopedia of British Philosophy (4 volumes). London: Continuum. pp. 1610-1611.
    In logic, the law (or principle) of identity states simply: 'A is A'. This article gives a concise account of identity.
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  25. A modal bundle theory.Jiri Benovsky - 2006 - Metaphysica 7 (2).
    If ordinary particulars are bundles of properties, and if properties are said to be universals, then three well-known objections arise : no particular can change, all particulars have all of their properties essentially (even the most insignificant ones), and there cannot be two numerically distinct but qualitatively indiscernible particulars. In this paper, I try to make a little headway on these issues and see how the objections can be met, if one accepts a certain view about persistence through time and (...)
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  26. Twin-Consciousnesses and the Identity of Indiscernibles in Leibniz’s Nouveaux Essais.Andreas Blank - 2006 - In Leibniz selon les Nouveaux essais sur l’entendement humain. Montreal/ Paris: pp. 189-202.
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  27. Twin-Consciousnesses and the Identity of Indiscernibles in Leibniz’s Nouveaux Essais.Andreas Blank - 2006 - In François Duchesneau and Jérémie Griard (ed.), Leibniz selon les Nouveaux essais sur l’entendement humain. pp. 189-202.
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  28. Realistic structuralism's identity crisis: A hybrid solution.Tim Button - 2006 - Analysis 66 (3):216–222.
    Keränen (2001) raises an argument against realistic (ante rem) structuralism: where a mathematical structure has a non-trivial automorphism, distinct indiscernible positions within the structure cannot be shown to be non-identical using only the properties and relations of that structure. Ladyman (2005) responds by allowing our identity criterion to include 'irreflexive two-place relations'. I note that this does not solve the problem for structures with indistinguishable positions, i.e. positions that have all the same properties as each other and exactly the same (...)
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  29. How not to trivialise the identity of indiscernibles.Gonzalo Rodriguez-Pereyra - 2006 - In P. F. Strawson & A. Chakrabarti (eds.), Concepts, Properties and Qualities. Ashgate.
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  30. Some Ontological Remarks on the Maxim of Identification of Indiscernibles.Paolo Valore - 2006 - In Topics on General and Formal Ontology. Polimetrica International Scientific Publisher. pp. 67.
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  31. Neural Materialism, Pain's Badness, and a Posteriori Identities.Irwin Goldstein - 2004 - Canadian Journal of Philosophy 34 (Supplement):261-273.
    Orthodox neural materialists think mental states are neural events or orthodox material properties of neutral events. Orthodox material properties are defining properties of the “physical”. A “defining property” of the physical is a type of property that provides a necessary condition for something’s being correctly termed “physical”. In this paper I give an argument against orthodox neural materialism. If successful, the argument would show at least some properties of some mental states are not orthodox material properties of neural events. Opposing (...)
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  32. The Bundle Theory is compatible with distinct but indiscernible particulars.Gonzalo Rodriguez-Pereyra - 2004 - Analysis 64 (1):72-81.
    1. The Bundle Theory I shall discuss is a theory about the nature of substances or concrete particulars, like apples, chairs, atoms, stars and people. The point of the Bundle Theory is to avoid undesirable entities like substrata that allegedly constitute particulars. The version of the Bundle Theory I shall discuss takes particulars to be entirely constituted by the universals they instantiate.' Thus particulars are said to be just bundles of universals. Together with the claim that it is necessary that (...)
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  33. Identities, Distinctnesses, Truthmakers, and Indiscernibility Principles.Denis Robinson - 2000 - Logique Et Analyse 43 (169-170):145-183.
    After sketching some aspects of truthmaker doctrines and "truthmaker projects", and canvassing some prima facie objections to the latter, I turn to an issue which might seem to involve confusion about the nature of character of truthmakers if such there be, viz for statements of identity and (specially) distinctness. The real issue here is versions of the Identity of Indiscernibles. I discuss ways of discriminating versions, which are almost certainly true but trivial, which almost certainly substantive but false, and explore (...)
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  34. The Discernibility of Identicals.Donald L. M. Baxter - 1999 - Journal of Philosophical Research 24:37-55.
    I argue via examples that there are cases in which things that are not two distinct things qualitatively differ without contradiction. In other words, there are cases in which something differs from itself. Standard responses to such cases are to divide the thing into distinct parts, or to conceive of the thing under different descriptions, or to appeal to different times, or to deny that the property had is the property lacked. I show these responses to be unsatisfactory. I then (...)
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  35. Almost indiscernible twins.H. E. Baber - 1992 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 52 (2):365-382.
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  36. Hegel on Singular Demonstrative Reference.Gilbert Plumer - 1980 - Southwestern Journal of Philosophy 11 (2):71-94.
    The initial one-third of the paper is devoted to exposing the first chapter (“Sense-Certainty”) of Hegel’s PHENOMENOLOGY OF SPIRIT as a thesis about reference, viz., that singular demonstrative reference is impossible. In the remainder I basically argue that such a view commits one to radically undermining our conceptions of space, time, and substance (concrete individuality), and rests on the central mistake of construing <this> on the model of a predicable (or property).
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