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  1. added 2020-03-18
    Pytanie o kryterium poprawności wykładni prawa w świetle neopragmatyzmu Stanley'a Fisha.Michał Wieczorkowski - 2018 - Lublin, Polska: Tygiel.
    „O pełnej znajomości prawa można mówić tylko wówczas, gdy zna się prawo i wytworzone przez praktykę reguły posługiwania się nim” – pisał swego czasu Marek Zirk-Sadowski. Pogląd ten wiąże się z niezwykle istotnym sporem o kryterium poprawności dokonywanej przez sędziów wykładni prawa. Zlokalizowanie takiego kryterium wydaje się być szczególnie ważne choćby ze względu na zawartą w naszym systemie prawnym konieczność realizowania zasady trójpodziału władzy, zgodnie z którą w procesie stosowania prawa nie może dochodzić do tzw. kryptoprawotwórstwa. Celem niniejszego tekstu jest (...)
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  2. added 2020-03-03
    Problem aktywizmu i prawotwórstwa sędziowskiego w świetle współczesnych teorii interpretacji.Michał Wieczorkowski - 2018 - Warsaw University Law Review 17 (2):169-200.
    It causes many difficulties for jurisprudence to define the notion of judicial activism. At the very beginning it had rather a journalistic character, but but over time it has become a serious charge against these judges who act on the basis of their vision of what the law ought to be like rather than what it actually is like. On the ground of the polish legal theory the echoes of the dispute about judicial activism are reflected in the discussions about (...)
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  3. added 2019-10-14
    How Much of Commonsense and Legal Reasoning is Formalizable? A Review of Conceptual Obstacles.James Franklin - 2012 - Law, Probability and Risk 11:225-245.
    Fifty years of effort in artificial intelligence (AI) and the formalization of legal reasoning have produced both successes and failures. Considerable success in organizing and displaying evidence and its interrelationships has been accompanied by failure to achieve the original ambition of AI as applied to law: fully automated legal decision-making. The obstacles to formalizing legal reasoning have proved to be the same ones that make the formalization of commonsense reasoning so difficult, and are most evident where legal reasoning has to (...)
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  4. added 2019-10-09
    Arguments Whose Strength Depends on Continuous Variation.James Franklin - 2013 - Informal Logic 33 (1):33-56.
    Both the traditional Aristotelian and modern symbolic approaches to logic have seen logic in terms of discrete symbol processing. Yet there are several kinds of argument whose validity depends on some topological notion of continuous variation, which is not well captured by discrete symbols. Examples include extrapolation and slippery slope arguments, sorites, fuzzy logic, and those involving closeness of possible worlds. It is argued that the natural first attempts to analyze these notions and explain their relation to reasoning fail, so (...)
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  5. added 2019-02-24
    The Representation of Context: Ideas From Artificial Intelligence.James Franklin - 2003 - Law, Probability and Risk 2:191-199.
    To move beyond vague platitudes about the importance of context in legal reasoning or natural language understanding, one must take account of ideas from artificial intelligence on how to represent context formally. Work on topics like prior probabilities, the theory-ladenness of observation, encyclopedic knowledge for disambiguation in language translation and pathology test diagnosis has produced a body of knowledge on how to represent context in artificial intelligence applications.
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  6. added 2018-11-21
    Has Vagueness Really No Function in Law?David Lanius - 2013 - Sektionsbeiträge des Achten Internationalen Kongresses der Gesellschaft Für Analytische Philosophie E.V.
    When the United States Supreme Court used the expression “with all deliberate speed” in the case Brown v. Board of Education, it did so presumably because of its vagueness. Many jurists, economists, linguists, and philosophers accordingly assume that vagueness can be strategically used to one’s advantage. Roy Sorensen has cast doubt on this assumption by strictly differentiating between vagueness and generality. Indeed, most arguments for the value of vagueness go through only when vagueness is confused with generality. Sorensen claims that (...)
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  7. added 2018-04-26
    Recension de F. Schauer, Penser en Juriste. [REVIEW]Pierre Landou - 2018 - L'Oeil de Minerve:2018.
    Recension de la traduction française de l'ouvrage de F. Schauer, Penser en Juriste, Dalloz, 2018.
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  8. added 2016-06-10
    Causal and Moral Indeterminacy.Sara Bernstein - 2016 - Ratio 29 (4):434-447.
    This paper argues that several sorts of metaphysical and semantic indeterminacy afflict the causal relation. If, as it is plausible to hold, there is a relationship between causation and moral responsibility, then indeterminacy in the causal relation results in indeterminacy of moral responsibility more generally.
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  9. added 2015-08-12
    A Critique of Critical Legal Studies' Claim of Legal Indeterminacy.Ian Carlo Dapalla Benitez - 2015 - Lambert Academic Publishing.
    This paper challenges the Critical Legal Studies (CLS) claims of legal indeterminacy. It shall use a legal formalist logic and language as its main assertion, further maintaining that the CLS claims is only grounded in ambiguity and confusion. CLS is a legal theory that challenges and overturns accepted norms and standards in legal theory and practice. They maintained that law in the historical and contemporary society has an alleged impartiality, and it is used as a tool of privilege and power (...)
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