International Law

Earth consciousness involves an understanding of our relationship with earth. It involves the study of earth forms, their life processes and inherent needs. The concept has created a field of frameworks and knowledge systems permeating into the day to day lives of humans including their political-economic-cultural spaces. The expression earth consciousness can be interpreted in many ways to include human awareness of nature & its processes, or the bond with mother earth and all its forms . Earth consciousness or the (...) universal respect for nature and all of its forms is manifesting in different ways. The multidisciplinary approaches that build the idea of Earth consciousness have added much weight to building frameworks for protection & preservation. One can see an influence of cultural, ethical, legal, philosophical, religious, & spiritual perspectives in the realization of a deep & meaningful relationship between humans with nature. This document sheds light on the diverse frameworks evolved and evolving to give effect to the growing earth consciousness. Much emphasis also placed on the "Rights in Nature Framework" and the "Post 2020 Bio-diversity Framework". (shrink)

A draft White Paper associated with Fulbright Specialist Program lectures at the University of Ljubljana, Ljubljana, Slovenia, in March-April 2015, concerning neo-liberal capitalist exploitation of academic research and publications.

"Resolution of Jerusalem’s status arguably remains controversial because of the divergent analytical lenses through which the conflict’s parties, and others, view its intertwined legal, territorial, historical and religious issues. Thus, Jerusalem persists as an intricate and intractable cornerstone of the Israel-Palestine conflict." Diakonia International Humanitarian Law Resource Centre.

What is the rational foundation for the doctrine of universal human rights? Some philosophers, such as Alan Gewirth, argue that it may be discovered simply by reflection on certain essential features of the human constitution. However this approach has significant problems, achieving its ends by smuggling certain tacit premises into the argument. A better approach is one that appeals to the communal practices and traditions within which doctrines of human rights have evolved historically. It is here that Alasdair MacIntyre's work (...) becomes relevant, because it maintains that traditions have a rationality of their own, and that all rationality is in some sense traditional. That MacIntyre himself has used these ideas to dismiss the doctrine of universal human rights only shows the extent to which MacIntyre (like many others) has misunderstood the true character of that doctrine. (shrink)

How can legal orders coexist? Contemporary lawyers and philosophers frequently accept that a legal system operates under its own terms and is shaped by its own participants. Any problems posed by the plurality of legal orders in the world are to be dealt with by each legal order separately. So persons that are caught in transnational disputes because they are subject to two or more jurisdictions, have recourse to private international law, which is always part of domestic law, i.e. the (...) law where the case happens to arise. But this analysis does not capture international law. This is, or appears to be, a distinct legal order that is certainly not the law of a distinct nation or a people but aspires to cover the whole of the world and – perhaps surprisingly – does seem to meet many of the ordinary criteria of a legal order. This review essay discusses two recent attempts at accommodating international law, Regulating Jurisdictional Relations Between National and International Courts, by Yuval Shany and A Theory of Interpretation of the European Convention of Human Rights, by George Letsas. In their own ways both books outline a ‘substantive’ theory of international law, which is to be welcomed. (shrink)

The Committee on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights (CESCR) has a new mechanism to receive individual complaints and issue views, which makes the question of how the Committee should interpret the broad articles of the International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights more pressing than ever. Most commentators on the legitimacy of the CESCR’s interpretation have argued that interpreters should make better use of Articles 31–33 of the Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties (VCLT) in order to improve (...) the legitimacy of their findings. In this article, we argue conversely that the individual communication mechanism should be evaluated and reformed in terms of legitimate authority. In the context of the Committee’s process of interpretation, we contend that proportionality is better suited than the various interpretive options of the VCLT to offer a consistent procedure that is able to generate legitimacy by attenuating the tension between personal and collective autonomy. (shrink)

In the field of human rights, expressions like justice and legal reform are closely linked to the process of harmonization of domestic and international human rights standards. Harmonization of human rights standards can be described as a process wherein international human rights are incorporated or given full effect to at the domestic level. [i] To harmonize the two set of standards i.e. domestic and international is viewed as both a commitment and obligation of states under international law. [ii] In terms (...) of state practice, the process of harmonization may entail a set of actions including adoption of laws and creation of mechanisms for enforcement and redressal of violations. -/- At the international level, the harmonization agenda is actively promoted at forums including the Universal Periodic Review (UPR) or during consultations between states and human rights treaty bodies, etc. Questions on whether states are in compliance with their international human rights commitments under treaties and other resolutions are to a large extent determined based on the extent of harmonization. Other pertinent questions being whether existing domestic laws are compatible with international human rights standards? What conditions obstruct and facilitate harmonization of human rights standards? Are there any parameters to measure harmonization? -/- While harmonization is widely promoted, its study and assessment is complex. (shrink)

The following is an unedited/copy edited version of a review to appear in Ethics. if citation is desired, please cite to the published version when it appears (April 2021). -/- For several years Michael Blake has been among the most important contributors to the philosophical literature on immigration. This book is therefore greatly anticipated, and develops a number of fruitful arguments. Although I will argue that the account is unsuccessful or incomplete at key points, it’s clearly an important work of (...) relevance to those working on immigration, as well as to political philosophers more generally. In particular, Blake provides powerful arguments against the claim that “open borders” are required by liberal principles of justice, develops his own “jurisdictional” account justifying immigration restrictions and the acceptable limits to these restrictions, and, in the most interesting and novel part of the book, discusses the role of virtues and values other than justice in relation to immigration policy, focusing specifically on the virtue of mercy. This last section of the book has potential for starting a rewarding line of research for political philosophers working on many topics, not just immigration. (shrink)

Many theorists understand human rights as only aiming to secure a minimally decent existence, rather than a positively good or flourishing life. Some of the theoretical considerations that support this minimalist view have been mapped out in the philosophical literature. The aim of this paper is to explain how a relatively neglected theoretical desideratum – namely, determinacy – can be invoked in arguing for human rights minimalism. Most of us want a theory of human rights whose demands can be realized, (...) and which is acceptable to a range of worldviews. But we might also expect our theory to provide determinate answers to questions of scope (i.e. which putative rights are bona fide human rights?) and practical implementation (i.e. what concrete duties are generated by which rights?). A minimalist view of human rights makes it is easier to jointly fulfil all of these desiderata. (shrink)

Throughout history, Eurasia has been central to relations between Europe and Asia. It has been the crossroads of civilizations, contributing to the cultural and ethnic hybridity of the region. However, after the fall of the Ottoman Empire and later the Soviet Union in the twentieth century, Eurasia lost its geostrategic importance in the US-led liberal world order. In the 1920s, a group of Russian emigres described the cultural and ethnic ties among the communities living across the vast Eurasian steppes as (...) Eurasianism. Eurasianists divide the world into two opposing forces with Eurasianism including Russia and the European states favoring integration with it and Atlanticism including the US and European countries supporting an American-led Atlantic order. Today, Russia is an important revisionist power in Eurasia, with huge stakes in the global order and the capability to help forge new relationships in the region. (shrink)

Since the disintegration of the USSR Eurasia has gained a new geopolitical and strategic significance. Fifteen Countries emerged as a result of disintegration, among which only the Russian Federation was the successor state. The post-soviet era especially the era of the 1990s was a political and economic trauma for the Russian Federation and the post-soviet space. But Eurasianists were well aware of the American unilateralism and American ‘Grand Chessboard strategy” that was solely aimed at encircling Russian geography. With these concerns, (...) the Eurasianists advised the Russian political and military elites to initiate the Eurasian Union Project. This paper briefly sketches the Russian historical Eurasian dream, which deeply rooted in Russian imperial history, and discusses the importance of Eurasian philosophy for the political and economic stability of Russia-Eurasia. The paper also illustrates the challenges and opportunities for Eurasian integration and for the establishment of multipolar world order. Moreover, the paper also briefly outlines the geopolitical rationale behind the Eurasian project as a key objective of contemporary Russian foreign policy and geopolitics. (shrink)

Warfare is becoming increasingly automated, from automatic missile defense systems to micro-UAVs (WASPs) that can maneuver through urban environments with ease, and each advance brings with it ethical questions in need of resolving. Proponents of lethal autonomous weapons systems (LAWS) provide varied arguments in their favor; robots are capable of better identifying combatants and civilians, thus reducing "collateral damage"; robots need not protect themselves and so can incur more risks to protect innocents or gather more information before using deadly force; (...) robots can assess situations more quickly and do so without emotion, reducing the likelihood of fatal mistakes due to human error; and sending robots to war protects our own soldiers from harm. However, these arguments only point in favor of autonomous weapons systems, failing to demonstrate why such systems need be made *lethal*. In this paper I argue that if one grants all of the proponents' points in favor of LAWS, then, contrary to what might be expected, this leads to the conclusion that it would be both immoral and illegal to deploy *lethal* autonomous weapons, because the many features that speak in favor of them also undermine the need for them to be programmed to take lives. In particular, I argue that such systems, if lethal, would violate the moral and legal principle of necessity, which forbids the use of weapons that impose superfluous injury or unnecessary harm. I conclude by highlighting that the argument is not against autonomous weapons per se, but only against *lethal* autonomous weapons. (shrink)

During long-term refugee displacements, it is common for the refugees’ country of origin to be called on to recognize a right of return. A long-standing tradition of philosophical theorizing is sceptical of such a right. Howard Adelman and Elazar Barkan are contemporary proponents of this view. They argue that, in many cases, it is not feasible for entire refugee populations to return home, and so the notion of a right of return is no right at all. We can call Adelman (...) and Barkan’s view the feasibility objection. Many defenders of rights will deny that empirical facts such as the kind to which Adelman and Barkan appeal are relevant to determining whether a moral entitlement amounts to a right. In contrast, I offer a response to the feasibility objection that does admit the relevance of facts. In my view, considerations of feasibility do matter when determining what rights human beings possess. Nevertheless, the feasibility objection is undone by its failure to acknowledge a distinction between two different kinds of feasibility constraints. ‘Hard’ constraints include logical, nomological and biological considerations. ‘Soft’ constraints include political, cultural and institutional factors. A necessary condition of a moral entitlement achieving the status of a right, I argue, is that it be feasible in the hard sense. Crucially, however, a right need not always be feasible in the soft sense. Refugees can have rights that it is not currently possible to implement politically. (shrink)

A Significant percentage of the people outside their country of citizenship or residence who are unable to meet their basic needs on their own, and need international protection, do not fall under the definition set out in the UN Refugee Convention. This has led many - both academic commentators and activists - to call for a new, expanded refugee definition, preferably backed up by a new, binding, international convention. In earlier work I have resisted this call, arguing that there is (...) good reason to pick out a sub-stet of those in need of international aid - a set that largely, if not completely, corresponds to those picked out by the Refugee Convention - for special benefit and protection. However, even if Convention refugees are in some ways special, we are left with the question of what, if anything, is owed to those in need of aid who are not Convention refugees. In this chapter, I set out philosophical foundations for so-called complementary protection, and show how this may and should apply to people in need of international aid who are not Convention refugees. (shrink)

The credit crises experienced in the US in year 2008 is labeled as perhaps the most significant crises since the great depression. The roots of the crises were found in the default of the sub-prime mortgages and the failure occurred in both the US and the UK. Due to the integrated nature of international financial systems the spillover impacted many countries as the economies in Asia and Europe were purchasers of the sub-prime mortgages that originated in both UK and US. (...) The impact of the credit crises in Canada is of unique importance due to the close proximity to US, and both the US and Canada being of great strategic importance to each other as well as one of the largest trading partners.Even though the international financial credit crises adversely impacted many countries, the evidence that has come across recent years point towards the conclusion that Canada was able to weather the crises much better than many other countries. (shrink)

The principle of self-determination, like Janus, has two faces: negative and positive. Often understood as enabling the fracture of states into national components, the principle is better seen as facilitating the creation of multinational frameworks that foster toleration and human rights.

*North American Society for Social Philosophy (NASSP) Book Award 2019.* -/- *International Studies Association (ISA) - International Ethics Section Book Award 2021.* -/- Although military mores have relied primarily on just war theory, the ethic of cooperation in warfare (ECW)—between enemies even as they are trying to kill each other—is as central to the practice of warfare and to conceptualization of its morality. Neither game theory nor unilateral moral duties (God-given or otherwise) can explain the explicit language of cooperation in (...) developing and enforcing principles of military ethics and the law of armed conflict. -/- The ethic of cooperation is borne of various motivations: reciprocity, self-preservation, and efficiency, to be sure, but also a sense of warrior honor and concern with human rights. This shared morality can persist despite making it more difficult for one side or the other to win and, unfortunately, its well-meaning motivations often lead to unintended tragic consequences. -/- This book explores three manifestations of this significant yet overlooked ethic of cooperation in warfare: (1) for a “fair fight,” (2) to protect classes of individuals (e.g., non-combatants or prisoners of war), and (3) to end the war quickly. Such cooperation can take unexpected forms, from ad hoc decisions on the battlefield to institutionalization in international law, and is the source of some critical tensions in one of the most significant developments in warfare in recent years: namely, how to handle terrorism or other forms of warfare that lie outside the purview of international law. -/- Each type of ECW raises questions internal to that ethic, such as inconsistencies in the concept of “parity” across different weapons bans, contradictions within the warrior ethic that heavily influence—and therefore confuse—notions of the “fair fight,” the disconnect between what protections a person receives and his responsibility for the war (e.g., political leaders), or the limited decisiveness of outcomes generated by very short wars. -/- Their simultaneous application also generates significant tensions and raises questions about the proper relationship of ECW to the immediate goal of war itself, which is to win, and thus yield either a political settlement or a justicial decision. For example, the ECWs for a “fair fight” and to protect classes of individuals can make it harder to win the war, but even more concerning is that they can also kill more people, which in the latter case contravenes its very purpose. -/- Human history is in some ways the story of trying to concurrently wage and tame war, and the architecture of warfare itself is informed by the ECW, in particular: (a) the political nature of war, (b) the abdication from jus ad bellum judgments in order to concentrate on justice within war (jus in bello), and (c) the ways in which modern nation-states collude to define “legitimacy” in war. -/- The combination of these three features leave questions of justicial right and responsibility for war disturbingly unresolved, it also generates new challenges in a geopolitical context in which cooperative and non-cooperative (e.g. contemporary terrorism) forms of warfare clash. (shrink)

Il settantesimo anniversario della Dichiarazione universale dei diritti umani è, senza dubbio, un’importante occasione per riflettere sui diritti umani. In questo breve intervento, propongo una riflessione sul problema concettuale relativo alle disposizioni normative che vengono utilizzate per riconoscere e/o stabilire diritti umani. La domanda può essere posta in questi termini: che tipo di norme esprimono queste disposizioni? Regole, principi, oppure entrambe, a seconda delle circostanze? La risposta a questa domanda implica la soluzione di due distinti problemi. Da un lato, un (...) problema concettuale: che tipo di teoria o di approccio può meglio render conto delle norme sui diritti umani? Quale teoria o approccio meglio si attaglia alla loro struttura, alle loro condizioni, ecc.? Da un altro, un problema assiologico: come dovremmo considerare le norme sui diritti umani, alla luce di una data dottrina o ideologia ritenuta migliore o corretta? In considerazione di ciò, la struttura di questo saggio segue il seguente andamento. Nella sezione 2, vengono effettuate in via preliminare alcune distinzioni concettuali, pregiudiziali rispetto alla tematica affrontata. La sezione 3 offre risposta alla domanda di cui sopra, sia sotto il profilo concettuale sia sotto il profilo assiologico. La sezione 4 è dedicata al possibile modo di risolvere le tensioni identificate nella sezione precedente. Infine, l’ultima sezione contiene una breve conclusione sulle riflessioni precedenti. (shrink)

International institutions have become increasingly important not only in the relations between states, but also for individuals. When are these institutions legitimate? The legitimacy standards fo...

In this article, I contribute to the debate between two philosophical traditions—the Kantian and the Aristotelian—on the requirements of criminal responsibility and the grounds for excuse by taking this debate to a new context: international criminal law. After laying out broadly Kantian and Aristotelian conceptions of criminal responsibility, I defend a quasi-Aristotelian conception, which affords a central role to moral development, and especially to the development of moral perception, for international criminal law. I show than an implication of this view (...) is that persons who are substantially and non-culpably limited in their capacity for ordinary moral perception warrant an excuse for engaging in unlawful conduct. I identify a particular set of conditions that trigger this excuse, and then I systematically examine it as applied to the controversial case of former-child-soldier-turned leader of the Lord’s Resistance Army, Dominic Ongwen, who is currently at trial at the International Criminal Court. (shrink)

Lo primero que debemos tener en cuenta es que cuando decimos que China dice esto o China hace eso, no estamos hablando del pueblo chino, sino de los sociópatas que controlan el PCC -- Partido Comunista Chino, es decir, los Siete Asesinos En Serie Seniláticos (SSSSK) de th e Comité Permanente del PCC o de los 25 miembros del Politburó, etc. -/- Los planes del PCC para la Tercera Guerra Mundial y la dominación total están muy claro en las publicaciones (...) y discursos del gobierno chino y este es el "sueño de China" de Xi Jinping. Es un sueño sólo para la pequeña minoría (tal vez unas pocas docenas a unos pocos cientos) que gobiernan China y una pesadilla para todos los demás (incluyendo 1.400 millones de chinos). Los 10 mil millones de dólares anuales les permiten a ellos o a sus marionetas poseer o controlar periódicos, revistas, canales de televisión y radio y colocar noticias falsas en la mayoría de los principales medios de comunicación de todo el día. Además, tienen un ejército (tal vez millones de personas) que troll todos los medios de comunicación colocando más propaganda y ahogando comentarios legítimos (el ejército de 50 centavos). -/- Además de despojar al tercer mundo de recursos, un gran impulso de la Iniciativa de Cinturón y Carretera sin peaje es la construcción de bases militares en todo el mundo. Están forzando al mundo libre a una carrera armamentista masiva de alta tecnología que hace que la guerra fría con la Unión Soviética parezca un picnic. -/- Aunque el SSSSK, y el resto de los militares del mundo, están gastando enormes sumas en hardware avanzado, es muy probable que WW3 (o los compromisos más pequeños que conducen a él) esté dominado por software. No está fuera de cuestión que el SSSSK, con probablemente más hackers (codificadores) trabajando para ellos entonces todo el resto del mundo combinado, ganará futuras guerras con un conflicto físico mínimo, sólo por paralizar a sus enemigos a través de la red. Sin satélites, sin teléfonos, sin comunicaciones, sin transacciones financieras, sin red eléctrica, sin internet, sin armas avanzadas, sin vehículos, trenes, barcos o aviones. -/- Sólo hay dos caminos principales para eliminar el PCC, liberar a 1.400 millones de prisioneros chinos y poner fin a la marcha lunática a la Segunda Guerra Mundial. La pacífica es lanzar una guerra comercial total para devastar la economía china hasta que los militares se cansen y arranquen el PCC. -/- Una alternativa al cierre de la economía de China es una guerra limitada, como una huelga dirigida por decir 50 drones termobáricos en el 20o Congreso del PCC, cuando todos los miembros principales están en un solo lugar, pero eso no tendrá lugar hasta 2022 por lo que uno podría ir a la sesión plenaria anual. Se informaría a los chinos, como ocurrió el ataque, de que debían deponer las armas y prepararse para celebrar una elección democrática o ser arrojados a la edad de piedra. La otra alternativa es un ataque nuclear total. La confrontación militar es inevitable dado el curso actual del PCC. Es probable que suceda sobre las islas en el Mar de China Meridional o Taiwán dentro de unas pocas décadas, pero a medida que establecen bases militares en todo el mundo podría suceder en cualquier lugar (ver Tigre Agachado, etc.). Los conflictos futuros tendrán aspectos difíciles y blandos con los objetivos declarados del PCC para enfatizar la ciberguerra mediante la piratería y paralización de los sistemas de control de todas las comunicaciones militares e industriales, equipos, centrales eléctricas, satélites, Internet, bancos, y cualquier dispositivo o vehículo conectado a la red. Las SS están lanzando lentamente una gama mundial de submarinos de superficie y submarinas tripulados y autónomos o drones capaces de lanzar armas convencionales o nucleares que pueden estar latentes a la espera de una señal de China o incluso buscando la firma de buques o aviones estadounidenses. Mientras destruyen nuestros satélites, eliminando así la comunicación entre los EE.UU. y nuestras fuerzas en todo el mundo, utilizarán los suyos, junto con los drones para atacar y destruir nuestras fuerzas navales actualmente superiores. Por supuesto, todo esto se hace cada vez más automáticamente por la IA. -/- Con mucho, el mayor aliado del PCC es el Partido Demócrata de los Estados Unidos. La opción es detener al PCC ahora o observar cómo extienden la prisión china por todo el mundo. -/- Por supuesto, la vigilancia universal y la digitalización de nuestras vidas es inevitable en todas partes. Cualquiera que no lo crea está profundamente fuera de contacto. -/- Por supuesto, son los optomistas los que esperan que los sociópatas chinos gobiernen el mundo, mientras que los pesimistas (que se ven a sí mismos como realistas) esperan que la sociopatía de IA (o como yo la llamo, es decir, la estupidez artificial o la sociósima artificial) tomen el control, tal vez para 2030 Los interesados en más detalles sobre el camino lunático de la sociedad moderna pueden consultar mis otras obras como Suicidio por democracia y obituario para América y el mundo 2019 y Delirios Utópicos Suicidas en el Siglo 21 -La filosofía, la naturaleza humana y el colapso de la civilización : Artículos y reseñas 2006-2019 5ª edicion (2019) -/- . (shrink)

Political legitimacy is best understood as one type of a broader notion, which I call institutional legitimacy. An institution is legitimate in my sense when it has the right to function. The right to function correlates to a duty of non-interference. Understanding legitimacy in this way favorably contrasts with legitimacy understood in the traditional way, as the right to rule correlating to a duty of obedience. It helps unify our discourses of legitimacy across a wider range of practices, especially including (...) the many evaluations we increasingly make of international institutions of various sorts, but also including domestic institutions. (shrink)

In this article we address the question of individual identity and its place – or rather omission – in contemporary discussions about the cosmopolitan extension of liberalism as the dominant political theory. The article is divided into two parts. In the first part we show that if we consistently emphasise the complementarity of the “inner” and “outer” identity of a person, which is essential to liberalism from its very beginnings, then a fundamental flaw in the liberal cosmopolitan project becomes apparent. (...) This is the underestimation of the indispensability of an unambiguously determined public framework which will fix and enforce liberal principles and values in a comprehensible way. Such a framework for liberalism was always the political community and then, above all, the modern state, in which the liberal identity could then be realised. The discussion in this part of the article prepares the ground for an examination, in the second part, of a dilemma which cosmopolitan liberalism must face. In the second part we argue that the attempt to tackle the given problem presents liberals with the following dilemma: either it is necessary to plead for the institution of a global political authority (a “world state”), or to give up the belief that fundamental liberal principles and values can be realised to a global extent. We show, at the same time, that because of the character and ambitions of the cosmopolitan project, the promise of plural identities and multi­centred law cannot be relied upon. By way of conclusion we then ask what is the price of the realisation of cosmopolitan liberal ideals. -/- NOTE: This is a two-part article (in Czech). For download here is the first part; please see the link below for the second part as well. (shrink)

Global law settings are characterized by a structural pre-eminence of connectivity norms, a type of norm which differs from coherency or possibility norms. The centrality of connectivity norms emerges from the function of global law, which is to increase the probability of transfers of condensed social components, such as economic capital and products, religious doctrines, and scientific knowledge, from one legally structured context to another within world society. This was the case from colonialism and colonial law to contemporary global supply (...) chains and human rights. Both colonial law and human rights can be understood as serving a constitutionalizing function aimed at stabiliz- ing and facilitating connectivity. This allows for an understanding of colonialism and contemporary global governance as functional, but not as normative, equivalents. (shrink)

Conservadurismo y dogmática constitucional en Japón. Conservatism and the dogmatic part of constitution in Japan.

In recent decades, environmental rights have been increasingly developed at both the national and international level, along with increased adjudication of such rights in both national (constitutional) courts and international human rights courts. This raises a question as to whether it is better to develop and adjudicate environmental rights at the national or international level. This article considers the case made by James May and Erin Daly in favor of developing environmental rights at the national constitutional level and adjudicating such (...) rights in domestic courts. I consider the limitations of this case by showing that international environmental human rights can play a role that systematically benefits environmental protection, with adjudication in international human rights courts a key part of that process. This involves drawing on an argument offered by Allen Buchanan to justify a system of international legal human rights, which appeals to a number of benefits that such a system can provide. The argument is developed and applied to adjudication of environmental human rights in international human rights courts. First, it is shown how these benefits are realized in the area of environmental human rights. Second, it is shown how adjudication can enhance the benefits, both by providing a mechanism for their realization and by facilitating a mutually supportive relationship among them. On the basis of these enhanced benefits, and the value that they add, it is concluded that there is strong justification for developing and adjudicating environmental human rights at the international level. (shrink)

This article provides a brief introduction to some contemporary challenges found in the intersection of bioethics and international criminal law involving genetic privacy, organ trafficking, genetic engineering, and cloning. These challenges push us to re-evaluate the question of whether the international criminal law should hold corporations criminally liable. I argue that a minimalist and Strawsonian conception of corporate responsibility could be useful for deterring the wrongs outlined in first few sections and in answering compelling objections to corporate criminal liability.

The paper considers the proper method for theorizing about criminal jurisdiction. It challenges a received understanding of how to substantiate the right to punish, and articulates an alternative account of how that theoretical task is properly conducted. The received view says that a special relationship is the ground of a tribunal’s authority to prosecute and, hence, that a normative theory of that authority is faced with identifying a distinctive relation. The alternative account locates prosecutorial standing on an institution’s capacity to (...) address the basic reasons generating criminal liability. This reframes the normative issues at stake, and has the result that various, perhaps quite heterogeneous, considerations can substantiate penal authority. It also eliminates the existence of a special relation as a necessary condition for legitimate criminal accountability. The argument proceeds by offering an analysis and account of universal jurisdiction. Not only does the alternative elegantly perform where the received view struggles, it can accommodate much of what motivates the pursuit of relational ties in existing efforts to vindicate jurisdictional conclusions. (shrink)

In this article, I discuss prospects for democracy in the Middle East. I argue, first, that some democratic experiments—for instance, Egypt under Mohammed Morsi—are not in keeping with etymological and historical meanings of democracy; and second, that efforts to promote democracy, especially as exemplified in U.N. documents emphasizing universal rights grounded in Western traditions, are possibly totalitarian and also colonialist and hence counter to democratic ideals insofar as they impart one set of values as the only morally acceptable ones. A (...) respectful dialogue in which people from both regions strive to understand conditions giving rise to certain social practices would be more productive than morally superior attitudes, and help all to see areas where their respective cultures could be improved. I conclude by discussing concepts of democratic and pragmatic faith articulated by John Dewey and William James, arguing that democracy will continue to flounder in the Middle East so long as the basic trust implied in these concepts is lacking; and how Westerners might consider this a cautionary tale regarding social attitudes and public policies contrary to democratic life in their own countries. (shrink)

Several European and North American states encourage or even require, via good Samaritan and duty to rescue laws, that persons assist others in distress. This paper offers a utilitarian and contractualist defense of this view as applied to corporations. It is argued that just as we should sometimes frown on bad Samaritans who fail to aid persons in distress, we should also frown on bad corporate Samaritans who neglect to use their considerable multinational power to undertake disaster relief or to (...) confront widespread social ills such as those currently befalling public health (obesity) and the environment (climate change). As such, the corporate duty to assist approach provides a novel justification for sustainable business practices in such cases. The paper concludes by arguing that traditional stakeholder approaches have not articulated this duty of assistance obligation, though a new utilitarian stakeholder theory by Thomas Jones and Will Felps may be coextensive. (shrink)

Problem of Axiological Legitimization of the Universal System of the Protection of Human Rights Summary In this paper it is argued that legitimization of the universal system of the protection of human rights depends primary not from the content of values recognised as fundamental but rather from metaaxiological solutions related to the way of existence and to the possibility of cognition of these values. Legitimisation is based on the recognition of an objective nature and of cognoscibility of basic values. Realisation (...) of the primary aim of this paper is linked to the problem of different meanings of the notion of universality, used in the context of the universal system of the protection of human rights. First, descriptive and normative meanings have to be distinguished. In the case of normative sense, there are moral and legal meanings of “universality”. An axiological justification of the universality of human rights in the legal sense leads to the legitimisation of the universal system. It is shown that modifications of – broadly accepted in the Polish theory of law – definitions of an axiological justification of legal norms are needed. These definitions base such a justification on the valuations made by particular groups of subjects. It is argued that it is much more convenient to refer to valuations understood as meanings of sentences of certain kind. -/- Streszczenie W artykule zmierza się do uzasadnienia tezy, że legitymizacja uniwersalnego systemu ochrony praw człowieka jest oparta nie tyle na treści wartości uznawanych w tym systemie, ale na uznanych w nich rozstrzygnięciach metaaksjologicznych, dotyczących tego, jak istnieją wartości podstawowe dla tego systemu i czy są one poznawalne. Walor legitymizacyjny posiada przede wszystkim uznanie obiektywnego charakteru tych wartości i ich poznawalności. Realizacja zasadniczego celu zakłada uporządkowanie podstawowych pojęć dotyczących problematyki powszechności praw człowieka – termin „powszechność” stosowany w odniesieniu do praw człowieka w kontekście uniwersalnego systemu ochrony ma wiele znaczeń. Przede wszystkim odróżnić trzeba powszechność w aspekcie opisowym i w aspekcie normatywnym. W przypadku powszechności w aspekcie normatywnym w grę może wchodzić powszechność w sensie ideowym i powszechność w sensie pozytywnoprawnym. Uzasadnienie tej ostatniej jest też uzasadnieniem poszukiwanej tu legitymizacji uniwersalnego systemu ochrony praw człowieka. Prowadzone analizy prowadza także do sformułowania postulatów dotyczących sposobu definiowania uzasadnienia aksjologicznego norm prawnych. Modyfikacji wymagają powszechnie przyjmowane w polskiej teorii prawa definicje relatywizujące takie uzasadnienie do ocen przyjmowanych przez konkretne podmioty oceniające lub ich grupy. (shrink)

Problem of Axiological Legitimization of the Universal System of the Protection of Human Rights Summary In this paper it is argued that legitimization of the universal system (UN-system) of the protection of human rights depends primary not from the content of values recognised as fundamental but rather from metaaxiological solutions related to the way of existence and to the possibility of cognition of these values. Legitimisation is based on the recognition of an objective nature and of cognoscibility of basic values. (...) Realisation of the primary aim of this paper is linked to the problem of different meanings of the notion of universality, used in the context of the universal system of the protection of human rights. First, descriptive and normative (prescriptive) meanings have to be distinguished. In the case of normative sense, there are moral and legal meanings of “universality”. An axiological justification of the universality of human rights in the legal sense leads to the legitimisation of the universal system. It is shown that modifications of – broadly accepted in the Polish theory of law – definitions of an axiological justification of legal norms are needed. These definitions base such a justification on the valuations made by particular groups of subjects. It is argued that it is much more convenient to refer to valuations understood as meanings of sentences of certain kind. -/- Streszczenie W artykule zmierza się do uzasadnienia tezy, że legitymizacja uniwersalnego systemu ochrony praw człowieka jest oparta nie tyle na treści wartości uznawanych w tym systemie, ale na uznanych w nich rozstrzygnięciach metaaksjologicznych, dotyczących tego, jak istnieją wartości podstawowe dla tego systemu i czy są one poznawalne. Walor legitymizacyjny posiada przede wszystkim uznanie obiektywnego charakteru tych wartości i ich poznawalności (uznanie kognitywizmu aksjologicznego). Realizacja zasadniczego celu zakłada uporządkowanie podstawowych pojęć dotyczących problematyki powszechności praw człowieka – termin „powszechność” stosowany w odniesieniu do praw człowieka w kontekście uniwersalnego systemu ochrony ma wiele znaczeń. Przede wszystkim odróżnić trzeba powszechność w aspekcie opisowym i w aspekcie normatywnym. W przypadku powszechności w aspekcie normatywnym w grę może wchodzić powszechność w sensie ideowym (moralnym) i powszechność w sensie pozytywnoprawnym. Uzasadnienie tej ostatniej jest też uzasadnieniem poszukiwanej tu legitymizacji uniwersalnego systemu ochrony praw człowieka. Prowadzone analizy prowadza także do sformułowania postulatów dotyczących sposobu definiowania uzasadnienia aksjologicznego norm prawnych. Modyfikacji wymagają powszechnie przyjmowane w polskiej teorii prawa definicje relatywizujące takie uzasadnienie do ocen przyjmowanych przez konkretne podmioty oceniające lub ich grupy. (shrink)

Pogge and Wenar have recently argued that we are responsible for the persistence of the so-called ‘resource curse’. But their analyses are limited in important ways. I trace these limitations to their undue focus on the ways in which the international rules governing resource transactions undermine government accountability. To overcome the shortcomings of Pogge’s and Wenar’s analyses, I propose a normative framework organized around the social value of government responsiveness and discuss the implications of adopting this framework for future normative (...) assessment of the resource curse and our relationships to it. (shrink)

Domination consists in subjection to the will of others and manifests itself both as a personal relation and a structural phenomenon serving as the context for relations of power. Domination has again become a central political concern through the revival of the republican tradition of political thought . However, normative debates about domination have mostly remained limited to the context of domestic politics. Also, the republican debate has not taken into account alternative ways of conceptualizing domination. Critical theorists, liberals, feminists, (...) critical race theorists, and postcolonial writers have discussed domination in different ways, focusing on such problems as imperialism, racism, and the subjection of indigenous peoples. This volume extends debates about domination to the global level and considers how other streams in political theory and nearby disciplines enrich, expand upon, and critique the republican tradition’s contributions to the debate. This volume brings together, for the first time, mostly original pieces on domination and global political justice by some of this generation’s most prominent scholars, including Philip Pettit, James Bohman, Rainer Forst, Amy Allen, John McCormick, Thomas McCarthy, Charles Mills, Duncan Ivison, John Maynor, Terry Macdonald, Stefan Gosepath, and Hauke Brunkhorst. -/- Front matter and First chapter available for download. (shrink)

Some progress has been made in recent decades to articulate corporate social responsibility (CSR) and, more recently, to associate CSR with international enforcement of human rights. This progress continues to be hampered, however, by the ability of a multinational corporation (MNC) that violates human rights not only to shift liability from itself to a nation-state but even to win compensation from that nation-state for loss of profits due to restrictions on its business activities. In the process, the nation-state’s sovereignty is (...) diminishing; and, in effect, though still attributed to nation-states, it is being transferred to the MNC. The main aim of this article is (1) to draw on normative considerations to claim that this MNC proto-sovereignty should be modified and (2) to contend that this can eventually be accomplished by adding to corporate adoption of CSR guidelines a regimen of global human rights enforcement. I base this contention on expectations about the internationalization of corporate criminal law and the globalization of civil society in general and of NGOs in particular. I consider various jurisdictions but I focus on US jurisprudence. (shrink)

Antony Duff argues that the criminal law’s characteristic function is to hold people responsible. It only has the authority to do this when the person who is called to account, and those who call her to account, share some prior relationship. In systems of domestic criminal law, this relationship is co-citizenship. The polity is the relevant community. In international criminal law, the relevant community is simply the moral community of humanity. I am sympathetic to his community-based analysis, but argue that (...) the moral community must play a greater role in the domestic case and that the collection of individual political communities must play a greater role in the international case. (shrink)

Demonstrating that a developing norm is not yet well established in international law is frequently thought to show that states are not bound by the norm as law. More precisely, showing that a purported international legal norm has only limited support from well-established international legal sources is normally seen as sufficient to rebut an obligation on the part of subjects to comply with the norm in virtue of its legal status. I contend that this view is mistaken. Nascent norms of (...) international law (e.g., crystallizing norms of customary law) can be binding in much the same way as better-established doctrine. This point becomes perspicuous, I argue, once we get a clear sense of the plausible options for grounding the moral authority of international law generally. -/- This result is interesting in its own right, but it also reveals two other features of the character of state responsibility under international law. First, the distinction between legislation and compliance is less pronounced compared to domestic law. Consequently, the virtues of good governance will frequently be pertinent to determining the content of states’ obligations under international law. Second, normally more powerful and influential agents will be more strongly bound by international law than other subjects. This is an attractive result, addressing a concern that motivates many international lawyers to view international law as absolutely binding. An absolutist view international legal authority is unnecessary for showing that the most powerful and dangerous states are strongly bound by the terms of much existing law. (shrink)

The discursive character of human rights prevents a precise summary of historical origin, rationale, or definition outside of the various codifications in religious texts, secular philosophies, founding national documents, and international treaties, charters, conventions, covenants, declarations, and protocols. Regarding the objects of human rights, we can speak of a “foundational five” 1) Personal security 2) Material subsistence 3) Elemental equality 4) Personal Freedom and 5) Recognition as a member of the human community. Despite, or perhaps because of its multivalence, the (...) concept of human rights has been criticized as “foundationalist,” “essentialist,” or “ethnocentric”—its universalism being used as a weapon against itself by critics of cultural imperialism. Even the tolerance discourses so popular in critical theory, however, gain their normative force from the same basic notion of individual or group rights. Notwithstanding these rhetorical abuses, the concept of human rights has proved robust as a doctrine of equality owing to its openness to a pluralism of justifications grounding the basic “goods” agreed as necessary for human development. (shrink)

In this paper, I present and make a critical analysis of the thoughts of the Sierra Leonean philosopher George M. Carew, who is the author of one of the broadest contemporary visions of the political future of Africa. The significance of Carew's views consists mainly in the fact that he points out the importance of the concept of deliberative democracy for the African countries looking after their interests, as now they do not have any effective instruments of acting in the (...) global environment. Published in: Re-Visions and Re-Orientations: Non-European Thought in International Relations Studies, ed. by J. Zajączkowski, M.F. Gawrycki and A. Bógdał Brzezińska, Bloomsbury, London 2014, pp. 112-129. (shrink)

Citizenship and marriage are legal statuses that generate numerous privileges and responsibilities. Legal doctrine and argument have analogized these statuses in passing: consider, for example, Ted Olson’s statement in the Hollingsworth v. Perry oral argument that denying the label “marriage” to gay unions “is like you were to say you can vote, you can travel, but you may not be a citizen.” However, the parallel between citizenship and marriage has rarely been investigated in depth. This paper investigates the marriage-citizenship parallel (...) with a particular focus on three questions prompted by recent developments in law and policy: -/- 1) Should we provide second-best statuses? Some couples — in particular gay and lesbian couples — have been offered permanent statuses, like civil unions, that bear legal privileges but fall short of full marriage equality. In contrast, similar differentiations within citizenship are generally resisted. The history of citizenship may presage the increasing unacceptability of differentiations within status in the gay marriage context. Meanwhile, the history of marriage equality efforts may help present-day citizenship advocates choose legal strategies. -/- 2) Should statuses be a gateway to rights? Some early gay rights advocates unsuccessfully argued that advocates should challenge the primacy of marriage, rather than seek access to the institution. Advocates attempting to expand the rights of current noncitizens face similar choices: should they seek to give current noncitizens greater access to citizenship, or challenge the reservation of important rights to citizens? -/- 3) Can status relationships be plural? Many critics of dual and multiple citizenship argued that allegiance to multiple states was immoral, unadministrable, or both. More recently, polygamous marriage has become a topic of legal and political discourse, first as a foil in anti-gay marriage arguments and later as a political possibility in its own right. I consider whether polygamous marriage advocates can profitably draw on arguments for multiple citizenship, and how multiple-citizenship advocates should responsibly respond to the analogy with polygamy. (shrink)

This paper defends several highly revisionary theses about human rights. Section 1 shows that the phrase 'human rights' refers to two distinct types of moral claims. Sections 2 and 3 argue that several longstanding problems in human rights theory and practice can be solved if, and only if, the concept of a human right is replaced by two more exact concepts: (A) International human rights, which are moral claims sufficient to warrant coercive domestic and international social protection; and (B) Domestic (...) human rights, which are moral claims sufficient to warrant coercive domestic social protection but only non-coercive international action. Section 3 then argues that because coercion is central to both types of human rights, and coercion is a matter of justice, the traditional view of human rights -- that they are normative entitlements prior to and independent of substantive theories of justice -- is incorrect. Human rights must instead be seen as emerging from substantive theories of domestic and international justice. Finally, Section 4 uses this reconceptualization to show that only a few very minimal claims about international human rights are presently warranted. Because international human rights are rights of international justice, but theorists of international justice disagree widely about the demands of international justice, much more research on international justice is needed -- and much greater agreement about international justice should be reached -- before anything more than a very minimal list of international human rights can be justified. (shrink)

Business ethicists should examine ethical issues that impinge on the perimeters of their specialized studies (Byrne 2011 ). This article addresses one peripheral issue that cries out for such consideration: the international resource privilege (IRP). After explaining briefly what the IRP involves I argue that it is unethical and should not be supported in international law. My argument is based on others’ findings as to the consequences of current IRP transactions and of their ethically indefensible historical precedents. In particular I (...) examine arguments from political philosophy for more equitable distribution of resources and appeals to property rights as a means of achieving this; business ethicists’ critiques of contemporary resource appropriations; and legal historians’ accounts of despoliation of aboriginal peoples, especially in what is now the United States, involving acquisition via conquest, asserted jurisdiction, and religious and racial preeminence. I also consider relevant human rights’ standards; supportive views of some theorists, especially early modern realists and current supporters of group rights and multidimensional rectification; some de facto incidences of substantive restitution; and proposals for effecting further rectification. (shrink)

Hacia la reconstrucción de un modelo integrado de proporcionalidad a la luz de la jurisprudencia de la Corte Interamericana de Derechos Humanos.

In this paper, I suggest that for some proposed solutions to global justice problems, incompatibility with the necessary features of international law is a reason to reject them. I illustrate this by discussing the problem raised by the case of unjust combatants, that is, combatants lacking a just cause for war. I argue that the principle of inequality of combatants, which suggests that we ought to prohibit those without a just cause for war from fighting, is not only a bad (...) international legal principle, but also a bad principle of global justice. (shrink)

This paper is a historical, legal and philosophical analysis of the concept of human dignity in German and Kenyan constitutional law. We base our analysis on decisions of the Federal Constitutional Court of Germany, in particular its take on life imprisonment and its 2006 decision concerning the shooting of hijacked airplanes, and on a close reading of the Constitution of Kenya. We also present a dialogue between us in which we offer some critical remarks on the concept of human dignity (...) in the two constitutions, each one of us from his own philosophical perspective. (shrink)

This paper examines the extent to which dispute resolvers in customary law systems provide widely understandable justifications for their decisions. The paper first examines the liberal-democratic reasons for the importance of publicity, understood to be wide accessibility of legal justification, by reviewing the uses of publicity in Habermas’ and Rawls’ accounts of the rule of law. Taking examples from Sierra Leone, the paper then argues that customary law systems would benefit from making local dispute resolution practices, such as “begging” from (...) elders, witchcraft, and customary law judgments, more widely accessible. The paper concludes that while legal pluralism is usually taken to be an analytical concept, it may have a normative thrust as well, and that publicity standards would also apply to formal courts in developing countries, which are also typically “defective” along this dimension. (shrink)

This essay investigates the possibilities and limits of interdisciplinary research into terrorism. It is shown that approaches that combine philosophy and international law are necessary, and when such an approach needs to be adopted. However, it is also important not to underestimate how much of a challenge is posed by the absence of agreement concerning the definition of terrorism, and also by the structural differences in the way the two disciplines address the problem and formulate the issues. Not least, the (...) discussion enables us to reach conclusions as to how terrorism research that combines philosophy and international law in particular, and interdisciplinary research into terrorism in general, can be meaningfully implemented. The individual aspects are clarified on the basis of the discussion surrounding justified measures for combating terrorism and the justification of the targeted killing of terrorists. (shrink)