Related

Contents
81 found
Order:
1 — 50 / 81
  1. Meta-Ethical Quietism? Wittgenstein, Relaxed Realism, and Countercultures in Meta-Ethics.Farbod Akhlaghi - forthcoming - In Jonathan Beale & Richard Rowland (eds.), Wittgenstein and Contemporary Moral Philosophy.
    Ludwig Wittgenstein has often been called a quietist. His work has inspired a rich and varied array of theories in moral philosophy. Some prominent meta-ethicists have also been called quietists, or ‘relaxed’ as opposed to ‘robust’ realists, sometimes with explicit reference to Wittgenstein in attempts to clarify their views. In this chapter, I compare and contrast these groups of theories and draw out their importance for contemporary meta-ethical debate. They represent countercultures to contemporary meta-ethics. That is, they reject in different (...)
    Remove from this list   Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark  
  2. Defending Genealogy as Conceptual Reverse-Engineering.Matthieu Queloz - forthcoming - Analysis.
    In this paper, I respond to three critical notices of The Practical Origins of Ideas: Genealogy as Conceptual Reverse-Engineering, written by Cheryl Misak, Alexander Prescott-Couch, and Paul Roth, respectively. After contrasting genealogical conceptual reverse-engineering with conceptual reverse-engineering, I discuss pragmatic genealogy’s relation to history. I argue that it would be a mistake to understand pragmatic genealogy as a fiction (or a model, or an idealization) as opposed to a form of historical explanation. That would be to rely on precisely the (...)
    Remove from this list   Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark  
  3. Intrinsically Good, God Created Them.Daniel Rubio - forthcoming - Oxford Studies in Philosophy of Religion.
    Erik Wielenberg [2014] and Mark Murphy [2017], [2018] have defended a series of arguments for the conclusion that creatures are not good intrinsically. In response, I take two steps. First, I introduce a conception of intrinsic value that makes created intrinsic value unproblematic. Second, I respond to their arguments in turn. The first argument is from the sovereignty-aseity intuition and an analysis of intrinsicality that makes derivative good extrinsic. I challenge the analysis. The second comes from a conception of perfection (...)
    Remove from this list   Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   1 citation  
  4. Realism and the Value of Explanation.Samuel John Andrews - 2023 - Philosophical Quarterly 73 (4):1305–1314.
    Dasgupta poses a serious challenge to realism about natural properties. He argues that there is no acceptable explanation of why natural properties deserve the value realists assign to them and are consequently absent of value. In response, this paper defines and defends an alternative non-explanatory account of normativity compatible with realism. Unlike Lewis and Sider, who believe it is sufficient to defend realism solely on realist terms, I engage with the challenge on unfriendly grounds by revealing a tu quoque. Dasgupta (...)
    Remove from this list   Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark  
  5. Uniqueness, Intrinsic Value, and Reasons.Gwen Bradford - 2023 - Journal of Philosophy 120 (8):421-440.
    Uniqueness appears to enhance intrinsic value. A unique stamp sells for millions of dollars; Stradivarius violins are all the more precious because they are unlike any others. This observation has not gone overlooked in the value theory literature: uniqueness plays a starring role recalibrating the dominant Moorean understanding of the nature of intrinsic value. But the thesis that uniqueness enhances intrinsic value is in tension with another deeply plausible and widely held thesis, namely the thesis that there is a pro (...)
    Remove from this list   Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark  
  6. Happy Egrets Strike Back?Francesco Orsi - 2023 - In Andres Garcia, Mattias Gunnemyr & Jakob Werkmäster (eds.), Value, Morality & Social Reality: Essays dedicated to Dan Egonsson, Björn Petersson & Toni Rønnow-Rasmussen. Lund: Lund University Press. pp. 297-307.
    In this paper I articulate and respond to Kent Hurtig's objection to the fitting attitude account of value (FA). According to the objection, when a good or bad state of affairs is indexed to the actual world, but is such that the actual world does not contain anyone for whom it is fitting to (dis)favor it, it cannot be fitting for anyone in a non-actual world to (dis)favor it. So there are good or bad states of affairs that it is (...)
    Remove from this list   Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark  
  7. The Viciousness of Envy.Timothy Perrine - 2023 - Philosophia 51 (4):2171-2194.
    Across time and cultures, envy is widely regarded as a vice. This paper provides a theory of viciousness that explains why envy is a vice. First, it sketches an account of the trait of envy, utilizing some of the social psychology literature on social comparisons. Second, it considers some theories of vices—including Neo-Aristotelian, Kant’s, and Driver’s consequentialism—and briefly argues that they are not adequate in general or with regard to envy. Lastly it articulates a theory of viciousness on which a (...)
    Remove from this list   Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark  
  8. Une défense de l'hédonisme axiologique.Antonin Broi - 2022 - Dialogue 61 (2):325-346.
    L'hédonisme axiologique a une longue histoire en philosophie. Pourtant, il garde une mauvaise réputation qui lui vaut d’être parfois écarté sans ménagement de la discussion philosophique. Cet article se propose de défendre l'hédonisme axiologique en exposant les principaux arguments en sa faveur et en répondant aux principales critiques et confusions dont il fait l'objet. Une attention particulière sera portée aux arguments établissant la spécificité du plaisir et du déplaisir par rapport à toutes les autres choses — amitié, savoir, justice, etc. (...)
    Remove from this list   Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   1 citation  
  9. Created Goodness and the Goodness of God: Divine Ideas and the Possibility of Creaturely Value.Dan Kemp - 2022 - Religious Studies 58 (3):534-546.
    Traditional theism says that the goodness of everything comes from God. Moreover, the goodness of something intrinsically valuable can only come from what has it. Many conclude from these two claims that no creatures have intrinsic value if traditional theism is true. I argue that the exemplarist theory of the divine ideas gives the theist a way out. According to exemplarism, God creates everything according to ideas that are about himself, and so everything resembles God. Since God is wholly good (...)
    Remove from this list   Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   1 citation  
  10. Wittgenstein’s Transcendental Thought Experiment in Ethics.Simone Nota - 2022 - Phenomenology and Mind 22 (22):176.
    In this essay, I argue that Wittgenstein attempted to clarify ethics through a procedure that, by analogy with “transcendental arguments”, I call “transcendental thought experiment”. Specifically, after offering a brief perspectival account of both transcendental arguments and transcendental thought experiments, I focus on a thought experiment proposed by Wittgenstein in his 1929 'Lecture on Ethics', arguing that it deserves the title of “transcendental”.
    Remove from this list   Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark  
  11. Two internal critiques for theists who oppose moral enhancement on a process virtue basis.Abram Brummett & Parker Crutchfield - 2021 - Bioethics 36 (4):367-373.
    Bioethics, Volume 36, Issue 4, Page 367-373, May 2022.
    Remove from this list   Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark  
  12. Against ‘Good for’/‘Well-Being’, for ‘Simply Good’.Thomas Hurka - 2021 - Philosophical Quarterly 71 (4):803-22.
    This paper challenges the widely held view that ‘good for’, ‘well-being’, and related terms express a distinctive evaluative concept of central importance for ethics and separate from ‘simply good’ as used by G. E. Moore and others. More specifically, it argues that there's no philosophically useful good-for or well-being concept that's neither merely descriptive in the sense of naturalistic nor reducible to ‘simply good’. The paper distinguishes two interpretations of the common claim that the value ‘good for’ expresses is distinctively (...)
    Remove from this list   Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   4 citations  
  13. Conservatisms about the Valuable.Jacob M. Nebel - 2021 - Australasian Journal of Philosophy 100 (1):180-194.
    ABSTRACT Sometimes it seems that an existing bearer of value should be preserved even though it could be destroyed and replaced with something of equal or greater value. How can this conservative intuition be explained and justified? This paper distinguishes three answers, which I call existential, attitudinal, and object-affecting conservatism. I raise some problems for existential and attitudinal conservatism, and suggest how they can be solved by object-affecting conservatism.
    Remove from this list   Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   1 citation  
  14. A puzzle about epistemic value and steps towards a solution.Timothy Perrine - 2021 - Synthese 199 (5-6):12103-12119.
    This paper exposits and makes steps towards solving a puzzle about epistemic value. The puzzle is that several principles about the epistemic value of true beliefs and epistemic disvalue of false beliefs are, individually, plausible but, collectively, contradictory. My solution claims that sometimes false beliefs are epistemically valuable. I nonetheless show how my solution is not in deep tension with the Jamesian idea that true beliefs are epistemically valuable and false beliefs are epistemically disvaluable. I conclude by indicating how the (...)
    Remove from this list   Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   1 citation  
  15. Value Conservatism and Its Challenge to Consequentialism.Reuben Sass - 2021 - Utilitas 33 (3):337-352.
    G.A. Cohen’s value conservatism entails that we ought to preserve some existing sources of value in lieu of more valuable replacements, thereby repudiating maximizing consequentialism. Cohen motivates value conservatism through illustrative cases. The consequentialist, however, can explain many Cohen-style cases by taking extrinsic properties, such as historical significance, to be sources of final value. Nevertheless, it may be intuitive that there’s stronger reason to preserve than to promote certain sources of value, especially historically significant things. This motivates an argument that (...)
    Remove from this list   Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark  
  16. Becoming Attuned.Christian Busch - 2020 - In The Serendipity Mindset: The Art and Science of Creating Good Luck. pp. 1-45.
    Breaking Down the Barriers to Serendipity Life is what happens to us while we are making other plans. ALLEN SAUNDERS, AMERICAN WRITER, JOURNALIST, AND CARTOONIST.
    Remove from this list   Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   1 citation  
  17. A Paradox for the Intrinsic Value of Freedom of Choice.Johan E. Gustafsson - 2020 - Noûs 54 (4):891-913.
    A standard liberal claim is that freedom of choice is not only instrumentally valuable but also intrinsically valuable, that is, valuable for its own sake. I argue that each one of five conditions is plausible if freedom of choice is intrinsically valuable. Yet there exists a counter-example to the conjunction of these conditions. Hence freedom of choice is not intrinsically valuable.
    Remove from this list   Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   5 citations  
  18. On Some Arguments for Epistemic Value Pluralism.Timothy Perrine - 2020 - Logos and Episteme 11 (1):77-96.
    Epistemic Value Monism is the view that there is only one kind of thing of basic, final epistemic value. Perhaps the most plausible version of Epistemic Value Monism is Truth Value Monism, the view that only true beliefs are of basic, final epistemic value. Several authors—notably Jonathan Kvanvig and Michael DePaul—have criticized Truth Value Monism by appealing to the epistemic value of things other than knowledge. Such arguments, if successful, would establish Epistemic Value Pluralism is true and Epistemic Value Monism (...)
    Remove from this list   Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   4 citations  
  19. Moore, Brentano, and Scanlon: a defense of indefinability.Miles Tucker - 2020 - Philosophical Studies 177 (8):2261-2276.
    Mooreans claim that intrinsic goodness is a conceptual primitive. Fitting-attitude theorists object: they say that goodness should be defined in terms of what it is fitting for us to value. The Moorean view is often considered a relic; the fitting-attitude view is increasingly popular. I think this unfortunate. Though the fitting-attitude analysis is powerful, the Moorean view is still attractive. I dedicate myself to the influential arguments marshaled against Moore’s program, including those advanced by Scanlon, Stratton-Lake and Hooker, and Jacobson; (...)
    Remove from this list   Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   2 citations  
  20. Why Take Painkillers?David Bain - 2019 - Noûs 53 (2):462-490.
    Accounts of the nature of unpleasant pain have proliferated over the past decade, but there has been little systematic investigation of which of them can accommodate its badness. This paper is such a study. In its sights are two targets: those who deny the non-instrumental disvalue of pain's unpleasantness; and those who allow it but deny that it can be accommodated by the view—advanced by me and others—that unpleasant pains are interoceptive experiences with evaluative content. Against the former, I argue (...)
    Remove from this list   Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   31 citations  
  21. On Keeping Things in Proportion.Adam Lovett & Stefan Riedener - 2019 - Journal of Ethics and Social Philosophy 16 (3).
    Formula One isn’t very important. You can't care about it too much. The refugee crisis is more important. You can care about it much more. In this paper we investigate how important something is. By ‘importance’ we mean how much it is fitting to care about a thing. We explore a view about this which we call Proportionalism. This view says that a thing’s importance depends on that thing’s share of the world’s total value. The more of what matters there (...)
    Remove from this list   Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   3 citations  
  22. Ethics for an uninhabited planet.Erik Persson - 2019 - In Konrad Szocik (ed.), The Human Factor in a Mission to Mars – An Interdisciplinary Approach. Springer. pp. 201-216.
    Some authors argue that we have a moral obligation to leave Mars the way it is, even if it does not harbour any life. This claim is usually based on an assumption that Mars has intrinsic value. The problem with this concept is that different authors use it differently. In this chapter, I investigate different ways in which an uninhabited Mars is said to have intrinsic value. First, I investigate whether the planet can have moral standing. I find that this (...)
    Remove from this list   Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   2 citations  
  23. Each-We Dilemmas and Effective Altruism.Theron Pummer & Matthew Clark - 2019 - Journal of Practical Ethics 7 (1):24-32.
    In his interesting and provocative article ‘Being Good in a World of Need’, Larry Temkin argues for the possibility of a type of Each-We Dilemma in which, if we each produce the most good we can individually, we produce a worse outcome collectively. Such situations would ostensibly be troubling from the standpoint of effective altruism, the project of finding out how to do the most good and doing it, subject to not violating side-constraints. We here show that Temkin’s argument is (...)
    Remove from this list   Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   1 citation  
  24. Should Environmental Ethicists Fear Moral Anti-Realism?Anne Schwenkenbecher & Michael Rubin - 2019 - Environmental Values 28 (4):405-427.
    Environmental ethicists have been arguing for decades that swift action to protect our natural environment is morally paramount, and that our concern for the environment should go beyond its importance for human welfare. It might be thought that the widespread acceptance of moral anti-realism would undermine the aims of environmental ethicists. One reason is that recent empirical studies purport to show that moral realists are more likely to act on the basis of their ethical convictions than anti-realists. In addition, it (...)
    Remove from this list   Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   1 citation  
  25. Freedom and the value of games.Jonathan Gingerich - 2018 - Canadian Journal of Philosophy 48 (6):831-849.
    This essay explores the features in virtue of which games are valuable or worthwhile to play. The difficulty view of games holds that the goodness of games lies in their difficulty: by making activities more complex or making them require greater effort, they structure easier activities into more difficult, therefore more worthwhile, activities. I argue that a further source of the value of games is that they provide players with an experience of freedom, which they provide both as paradigmatically unnecessary (...)
    Remove from this list   Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   2 citations  
  26. The Good, the Bad, and the Transitivity of Better Than.Jacob M. Nebel - 2018 - Noûs 52 (4):874-899.
    The Rachels–Temkin spectrum arguments against the transitivity of better than involve good or bad experiences, lives, or outcomes that vary along multiple dimensions—e.g., duration and intensity of pleasure or pain. This paper presents variations on these arguments involving combinations of good and bad experiences, which have even more radical implications than the violation of transitivity. These variations force opponents of transitivity to conclude that something good is worse than something that isn’t good, on pain of rejecting the good altogether. That (...)
    Remove from this list   Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   30 citations  
  27. Basic Final Value and Zimmerman’s The Nature of Intrinsic Value.Timothy Perrine - 2018 - Ethical Theory and Moral Practice 21 (4):979-996.
    This paper critically examines Michael Zimmerman’s account of basic final value in The Nature of Intrinsic Value. Zimmerman’s account has several positive features. Unfortunately, as I argue, given one plausible assumption about value his account derives a contradiction. I argue that rejecting that assumption has several implausible results and that we should instead reject Zimmerman’s account. I then sketch an alternative account of basic final value, showing how it retains some of the positive features of Zimmerman’s account while avoiding its (...)
    Remove from this list   Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   5 citations  
  28. Spectrum arguments and hypersensitivity.Theron Pummer - 2018 - Philosophical Studies 175 (7):1729-1744.
    Larry Temkin famously argues that what he calls spectrum arguments yield strong reason to reject Transitivity, according to which the ‘all-things-considered better than’ relation is transitive. Spectrum arguments do reveal that the conjunctions of independently plausible claims are inconsistent with Transitivity. But I argue that there is very strong independent reason to reject such conjunctions of claims, and thus that the fact that they are inconsistent with Transitivity does not yield strong reason to reject Transitivity.
    Remove from this list   Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   15 citations  
  29. From an axiological standpoint.Miles Tucker - 2018 - Ratio 32 (2):131-138.
    I maintain that intrinsic value is the fundamental concept of axiology. Many contemporary philosophers disagree; they say the proper object of value theory is final value. I examine three accounts of the nature of final value: the first claims that final value is non‐instrumental value; the second claims that final value is the value a thing has as an end; the third claims that final value is ultimate or non‐derivative value. In each case, I argue that the concept of final (...)
    Remove from this list   Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   2 citations  
  30. Simply Good: A Defence of the Principia.Miles Tucker - 2018 - Utilitas 30 (3):253-270.
    Moore's moral programme is increasingly unpopular. Judith Jarvis Thomson's attack has been especially influential; she says the Moorean project fails because ‘there is no such thing as goodness’. I argue that her objection does not succeed: while Thomson is correct that the kind of generic goodness she targets is incoherent, it is not, I believe, the kind of goodness central to the Principia. Still, Moore's critics will resist. Some reply that we cannot understand Moorean goodness without generic goodness. Others claim (...)
    Remove from this list   Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   2 citations  
  31. The Evil of Refraining to Save: Liu on the Doctrine of Doing and Allowing.Jacob Blair - 2017 - Diametros 52:127-137.
    In a recent article, Xiaofei Liu seeks to defend, from the standpoint of consequentialism, the Doctrine of Doing and Allowing: DDA. While there are various conceptions of DDA, Liu understands it as the view that it is more difficult to justify doing harm than allowing harm. Liu argues that a typical harm doing involves the production of one more evil and one less good than a typical harm allowing. Thus, prima facie, it takes a greater amount of good to justify (...)
    Remove from this list   Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark  
  32. Pride, Achievement, and Purpose.Antti Kauppinen - 2017 - In J. Adam Carter & Emma C. Gordon (eds.), The Moral Psychology of Pride. London: Rowman and Littlefield.
    Pride in our own actions tells a story: we faced a challenge, overcame it, and achieved something praiseworthy. In this paper, I draw on recent psychological literature to distinguish to between two varieties of pride, 'authentic' pride that focuses on particular efforts (like guilt) and 'hubristic' pride that focuses on the whole self (like shame). Achievement pride is fitting when either efforts or traits explain our success in meeting contextually relevant, authoritative, and challenging standards without excessive opportunity cost. When it (...)
    Remove from this list   Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   7 citations  
  33. Towards Gratitude to Nature: Global Environmental Ethics for China and the World.Bo R. Meinertsen - 2017 - Frontiers of Philosophy in China 12 (2):207-223.
    This paper asks what should be the basis of a global environmental ethics. As Gao Shan has argued, the environmental ethics of Western philosophers such as Holmes Rolston and Paul Taylor is based on extending the notion of intrinsic value to that of objects of nature, and as such it is not very compatible with Chinese ethics. This is related to Gao’s rejection of most—if not all—Western “rationalist” environmental ethics, a stance that I grant her for pragmatic reasons (though I (...)
    Remove from this list   Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   2 citations  
  34. Kantian Ethics in the Age of Artificial Intelligence and Robotics.Ozlem Ulgen - 2017 - Questions of International Law 1 (43):59-83.
    Artificial intelligence and robotics is pervasive in daily life and set to expand to new levels potentially replacing human decision-making and action. Self-driving cars, home and healthcare robots, and autonomous weapons are some examples. A distinction appears to be emerging between potentially benevolent civilian uses of the technology (eg unmanned aerial vehicles delivering medicines), and potentially malevolent military uses (eg lethal autonomous weapons killing human com- batants). Machine-mediated human interaction challenges the philosophical basis of human existence and ethical conduct. Aside (...)
    Remove from this list   Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   2 citations  
  35. Truth is not (Very) Intrinsically Valuable.Chase B. Wrenn - 2017 - Pacific Philosophical Quarterly 98 (1):108-128.
    We might suppose it is not only instrumentally valuable for beliefs to be true, but that it is intrinsically valuable – truth makes a non-derivative, positive contribution to a belief's overall value. Some intrinsic goods are better than others, though, and this article considers the question of how good truth is, compared to other intrinsic goods. I argue that truth is the worst of all intrinsic goods; every other intrinsic good is better than it. I also suggest the best explanation (...)
    Remove from this list   Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   8 citations  
  36. Expressive Objections to Markets: Normative, Not Symbolic.Daniel Layman - 2016 - Business Ethics Journal Review 4 (1):1-6.
    Jason Brennan and Peter Jaworski reject expressive objections to markets on the grounds that market symbolism is culturally contingent, and contingent cultural symbols are less important than the benefits markets offer. I grant and, but I deny that these points suffice as grounds to dismiss expressive critiques of markets. For many plausible expressive critiques of markets are not symbolic critiques at all. Rather, they are critiques grounded in the idea that some market transactions embody morally inappropriate normative stances toward the (...)
    Remove from this list   Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   4 citations  
  37. Wittgenstein on the existence of the mind in the physical world.Rajakishore Nath - 2016 - In Austrian Ludwig Wittgenstein Society. Vienna, Austria: pp. 181-182.
    In this paper I shall explore Wittgenstein’s view on the existence of mind. The main concern is in this paper to give a positive theory of mind which can provide a method for understanding mind as a metaphysical reality. In this context the self is presupposed by which what we call the mental phenomena including consciousness, because without the self the mind will be meaningless in this physical world. That is, this phenomenon of world itself needs a self in which (...)
    Remove from this list   Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark  
  38. Rossian totalism about intrinsic value.Luis R. G. Oliveira - 2016 - Philosophical Studies 173 (8):2069-2086.
    This paper defends a novel account of how to determine the intrinsic value of possible worlds. Section 1 argues that a highly intuitive and widely accepted account leads to undesirable consequences. Section 2 takes the first of two steps towards a novel account by clarifying and defending a view about value-contribution that is based on some of W. D. Ross’ claims about the value of pleasure. Section 3 takes the second step by clarifying and defending a view about value-suppression that (...)
    Remove from this list   Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   3 citations  
  39. Can Cogency Vanish?Gilbert Plumer - 2016 - Cogency: Journal of Reasoning and Argumentation 8 (1):89-109.
    This paper considers whether universally—for all (known) rational beings—an argument scheme or pattern can go from being cogent (well-reasoned) to fallacious. This question has previously received little attention, despite the centrality of the concepts of cogency, scheme, and fallaciousness. I argue that cogency has vanished in this way for the following scheme, a common type of impersonal means-end reasoning: X is needed as a basic necessity or protection of human lives, therefore, X ought to be secured if possible. As it (...)
    Remove from this list   Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   1 citation  
  40. In defence of good simpliciter.Richard Rowland - 2016 - Philosophical Studies 173 (5):1371-1391.
    Many including Judith Jarvis Thomson, Philippa Foot, Peter Geach, Richard Kraut, and Paul Ziff have argued for good simpliciter skepticism. According to good simpliciter skepticism, we should hold that there is no concept of being good simpliciter or that there is no property of being good simpliciter. I first show that prima facie we should not accept either form of good simpliciter skepticism. I then show that all of the arguments that good simpliciter skeptics have proposed for their view fail (...)
    Remove from this list   Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   17 citations  
  41. Two Kinds of Value Pluralism.Miles Tucker - 2016 - Utilitas 28 (3):333-346.
    I argue that there are two distinct views called ‘value pluralism’ in contemporary axiology, but that these positions have not been properly distinguished. The first kind of pluralism, weak pluralism, is the view philosophers have in mind when they say that there are many things that are valuable. It is also the kind of pluralism that philosophers like Moore, Brentano and Chisholm were interested in. The second kind of pluralism, strong pluralism, is the view philosophers have in mind when they (...)
    Remove from this list   Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   4 citations  
  42. The pen, the dress, and the coat: a confusion in goodness.Miles Tucker - 2016 - Philosophical Studies 173 (7):1911-1922.
    Conditionalists say that the value something has as an end—its final value—may be conditional on its extrinsic features. They support this claim by appealing to examples: Kagan points to Abraham Lincoln’s pen, Rabinowicz and Rønnow-Rasmussen to Lady Diana’s dress, and Korsgaard to a mink coat. They contend that these things may have final value in virtue of their historical or societal roles. These three examples have become familiar: many now merely mention them to establish the conditionalist position. But the widespread (...)
    Remove from this list   Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   11 citations  
  43. Value Pluralism.Ruth Chang - 2015 - In James Wright (ed.), International Encyclopedia of the Social and Behavioral Sciences (Second Edition). Elsevier. pp. 21-26.
    ‘Value pluralism’ as traditionally understood is the metaphysical thesis that there are many values that cannot be ‘reduced’ to a single supervalue. While it is widely assumed that value pluralism is true, the case for value pluralism depends on resolution of a neglected question in value theory: how are values properly individuated? Value pluralism has been thought to be important in two main ways. If values are plural, any theory that relies on value monism, for example, hedonistic utilitarianism, is mistaken. (...)
    Remove from this list   Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   3 citations  
  44. Review of Meaning In Life: An Analytic Study by Thaddeus Metz. [REVIEW]Antti Kauppinen - 2015 - Ethics 125 (2):600-605.
    Remove from this list   Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   1 citation  
  45. The Narrative Calculus.Antti Kauppinen - 2015 - Oxford Studies in Normative Ethics 5.
    This paper examines systematically which features of a life story (or history) make it good for the subject herself - not aesthetically or morally good, but prudentially good. The tentative narrative calculus presented claims that the prudential narrative value of an event is a function of the extent to which it contributes to her concurrent and non-concurrent goals, the value of those goals, and the degree to which success in reaching the goals is deserved in virtue of exercising agency. The (...)
    Remove from this list   Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   13 citations  
  46. Toni Rønnow‐Rasmussen, Personal Value, Oxford, Oxford University Press, 2011, 185 pp., US$ 75 , ISBN 9780199603787. [REVIEW]Olivier Massin - 2015 - Dialectica 69 (2):221-231.
    Personal Values is a delightful and enlightening read. It is teeming with novel insights, ground-breaking distinctions, rich examples, new delineations of the field, refreshing historical reminders, inventive arguments, unprecedented connections, identifications of neglected difficulties, and pioneering proposals. I shall focus here on three of these insights, which are illustrative of the pervasive scrupulousness and inventiveness of the book. The first is that there is a distinction between the supervenience base of values and their constitutive grounds. The second is that FA (...)
    Remove from this list   Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark  
  47. Wittgenstein on Aspect Blindness and Meaning Blindness.Ohad Nachtomy & Andreas Blank - 2015 - Iyyun 64 (1):57-76.
    Remove from this list   Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   2 citations  
  48. Status Quo Bias, Rationality, and Conservatism about Value.Jacob M. Nebel - 2015 - Ethics 125 (2):449-476.
    Many economists and philosophers assume that status quo bias is necessarily irrational. I argue that, in some cases, status quo bias is fully rational. I discuss the rationality of status quo bias on both subjective and objective theories of the rationality of preferences. I argue that subjective theories cannot plausibly condemn this bias as irrational. I then discuss one kind of objective theory, which holds that a conservative bias toward existing things of value is rational. This account can fruitfully explain (...)
    Remove from this list   Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   29 citations  
  49. Fitting-Attitude Analyses and the Relation Between Final and Intrinsic Value.Antoine C. Dussault - 2014 - Les ateliers de l'éthique/The Ethics Forum 9 (2):166-189.
    This paper examines the debate as to whether something can have final value in virtue of its relational (i.e., non-intrinsic) properties, or, more briefly put, whether final value must be intrinsic. The paper adopts the perspective of the fitting-attitude analysis (FA analysis) of value, and argues that from this perspective, there is no ground for the requirement that things may have final value only in virtue of their intrinsic properties, but that there might be some grounds for the alternate requirement (...)
    Remove from this list   Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   1 citation  
  50. Hedonism.John J. Tilley - 2012 - In Ruth Chadwick (ed.), Encyclopedia of Applied Ethics, 2nd ed., vol. 2. Academic Press. pp. 566-73.
    This article covers four types of hedonism: ancient hedonism; ethical hedonism; axiological hedonism; and psychological hedonism. It concentrates on the latter two types, both by clarifying them and by discussing arguments in their behalf. It closes with a few words about the relevance of those positions to applied ethics.
    Remove from this list   Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   1 citation  
1 — 50 / 81