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  1. added 2019-02-01
    Second Philosophy: A Naturalistic Method. [REVIEW]Eduardo Castro - 2008 - Disputatio 2 (24):349-355.
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  2. added 2018-09-06
    Aristotelianism in the Philosophy of Mathematics.James Franklin - 2011 - Studia Neoaristotelica 8 (1):3-15.
    Modern philosophy of mathematics has been dominated by Platonism and nominalism, to the neglect of the Aristotelian realist option. Aristotelianism holds that mathematics studies certain real properties of the world – mathematics is neither about a disembodied world of “abstract objects”, as Platonism holds, nor it is merely a language of science, as nominalism holds. Aristotle’s theory that mathematics is the “science of quantity” is a good account of at least elementarymathematics: the ratio of two heights, for example, is a (...)
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  3. added 2014-04-01
    Deferentialism.Chris Daly & David Liggins - 2011 - Philosophical Studies 156 (3):321-337.
    There is a recent and growing trend in philosophy that involves deferring to the claims of certain disciplines outside of philosophy, such as mathematics, the natural sciences, and linguistics. According to this trend— deferentialism , as we will call it—certain disciplines outside of philosophy make claims that have a decisive bearing on philosophical disputes, where those claims are more epistemically justified than any philosophical considerations just because those claims are made by those disciplines. Deferentialists believe that certain longstanding philosophical problems (...)
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  4. added 2014-03-17
    Second Philosophy: A Naturalistic Method.Penelope Maddy - 2007 - Oxford University Press.
    Many philosophers these days consider themselves naturalists, but it's doubtful any two of them intend the same position by the term. In Second Philosophy, Penelope Maddy describes and practices a particularly austere form of naturalism called "Second Philosophy". Without a definitive criterion for what counts as "science" and what doesn't, Second Philosophy can't be specified directly ("trust only the methods of science" for example), so Maddy proceeds instead by illustrating the behaviors of an idealized inquirer she calls the "Second Philosopher". (...)
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  5. added 2012-11-13
    On Some Considerations of Mathematical Physics: May We Identify Clifford Algebra as a Common Algebraic Structure for Classical Diffusion and Schrödinger Equations?Elio Conte - 2012 - Advanced Studies in Theoretical Physics 6 (26):1289-1307.
    We start from previous studies of G.N. Ord and A.S. Deakin showing that both the classical diffusion equation and Schrödinger equation of quantum mechanics have a common stump. Such result is obtained in rigorous terms since it is demonstrated that both diffusion and Schrödinger equations are manifestation of the same mathematical axiomatic set of the Clifford algebra. By using both such ( ) i A S and the i,±1 N algebra, it is evidenced, however, that possibly the two basic equations (...)
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  6. added 2010-05-17
    Anti-Nominalism Reconsidered.David Liggins - 2007 - Philosophical Quarterly 57 (226):104–111.
    Many philosophers of mathematics are attracted by nominalism – the doctrine that there are no sets, numbers, functions, or other mathematical objects. John Burgess and Gideon Rosen have put forward an intriguing argument against nominalism, based on the thought that philosophy cannot overrule internal mathematical and scientific standards of acceptability. I argue that Burgess and Rosen’s argument fails because it relies on a mistaken view of what the standards of mathematics require.
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  7. added 2010-05-17
    Is There a Good Epistemological Argument Against Platonism?David Liggins - 2006 - Analysis 66 (2):135–141.
    Platonism in the philosophy of mathematics is the doctrine that there are mathematical objects such as numbers. John Burgess and Gideon Rosen have argued that that there is no good epistemological argument against platonism. They propose a dilemma, claiming that epistemological arguments against platonism either rely on a dubious epistemology, or resemble a dubious sceptical argument concerning perceptual knowledge. Against Burgess and Rosen, I show that an epistemological anti- platonist argument proposed by Hartry Field avoids both horns of their dilemma.
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