Minorities

Activist artists often face a difficult question: is striving to change the world undermined when pursued through difficult and experimental artistic means? Looking closely at Adrian Piper's 'Four Intruders plus Alarm Systems' (1980), I will consider why this is an important concern for activist art, and assess three different responses in relation to Piper’s work. What I call the conciliatory stance recommends that when activist artists encounter misunderstanding, they should downplay their experimental artistry in favor of fitting their work to (...) their audience's appreciative capacities. What I call the steadfast stance recommends that activist artists have reason to use their privilege of artistic exceptionalism to challenge their audience's expectations, even if this leads to misunderstanding. I claim that a middle position that I call liberal conciliation best balances the demands for actual change placed on activism and the experimental means that artists bring to activism. (shrink)

Originally proposed by John Rawls, the idea of reasoning from conjecture is popular among the proponents of political liberalism in normative political theory. Reasoning from conjecture consists in discussing with fellow citizens who are attracted to illiberal and antidemocratic ideas by focusing on their religious or otherwise comprehensive doctrines, attempting to convince them that such doctrines actually call for loyalty to liberal democracy. Our goal is to criticise reasoning from conjecture as a tool aimed at persuasion and, in turn, at (...) improving the stability of liberal democratic institutions. To pursue this goal, we use as case study real-world efforts to counter-radicalise at-risk Muslim citizens, which, at first glance, reasoning from conjecture seems well-placed to contribute to. This case study helps us to argue that the supporters of reasoning from conjecture over-intellectualise opposition to liberal democracy and what societies can do to counter it. Specifically, they (i) underestimate how few members of society can effectively perform reasoning from conjecture; (ii) overlook that the burdens of judgement, a key notion for political liberals, highlight how dim the prospects of reasoning from conjecture are and (iii) do not pay attention to the causes of religious persons’ opposition to liberal democracy. However, not everything is lost for political liberals, provided that they redirect attention to different and under-researched resources contained in Rawls’s theory. In closing, we briefly explain how such resources are much better placed than reasoning from conjecture to provide guidance relative to counter-radicalisation in societies (i) populated by persons who do not generally hold anything close to a fully worked out and internally consistent comprehensive doctrine and (ii) where political institutions should take responsibility for at least part of the existing alienation from liberal democratic values. (shrink)

Notwithstanding its many successes, African-centred pedagogy (ACP) has been vulnerable to criticism, implicit and explicit, from several quarters. For example, ACP can be justly criticized for not recognizing the general diversity of blacks in America, a “nation” of more than 30 million spread across a tremendous variety of lifeways, locations, and historical circumstances. It also has been accused of abandoning the democratic purposes of the civil rights movement and repudiating its real successes. In addition to the ambiguities of Black identity, (...) many difficulties also attend the conceptualization and implementation of ACP. To examine the various challenges that confront ACP, our essay will be framed by the following three questions: (1) Does the historical context in which many black children live justify the existence of African-centered schools? (2) Does ACP prepare black children to participate in a democratic society? (3) Does the construction of an essentialist racial identity in ACP compromise its mission and success? In response to the first question, we will briefly review the historical conditions and circumstances of American schooling for blacks before considering both the motivations for establishing African-centered schools and the aims of ACP. Efforts to forge a parallel society and to foster Black consciousness and pride, including the establishment of separatist schools, are not new. We will limit our historical overview to the years following the 1954 Brown decision and leave to others the examination of historically unique examples of separate Black schooling that predate the rise of African-centered schools in their present incarnation. We conclude that both historical and contemporary realities do in fact justify some forms of voluntary separated schooling such as African-centered schools. (shrink)

According to a prominent argument, citizens in unjust societies have a duty to resist injustice. The moral and political principles that ground the duty to obey the law in just or nearly just conditions, also ground the duty to resist in unjust conditions. This argument is often applied to a variety of unjust conditions. In this essay, I critically examine this argument, focusing on conditions involving institutionally entrenched and socially normalised injustice. In such conditions, the issue of citizens’ duties to (...) resist is complicated. I conclude by considering how my discussions may clarify a contemporary problem about engaging in resistance to aid potential migrants who have been turned away by states in accordance with widely accepted rules. (shrink)

Most discussions of racial fetish center on the question of whether it is caused by negative racial stereotypes. In this paper I adopt a different strategy, one that begins with the experiences of those targeted by racial fetish rather than those who possess it; that is, I shift focus away from the origins of racial fetishes to their effects as a social phenomenon in a racially stratified world. I examine the case of preferences for Asian women, also known as ‘yellow (...) fever’, to argue against the claim that racial fetishes are unobjectionable if they are merely based on personal or aesthetic preference rather than racial stereotypes. I contend that even if this were so, yellow fever would still be morally objectionable because of the disproportionate psychological burdens it places on Asian and Asian-American women, along with the role it plays in a pernicious system of racial social meanings. (shrink)

In lieu of an abstract here is the first paragraph: -/- I mean the subtitle of my essay both as praise for the clarity with which Elizabeth Anderson writes about what is at stake in debates about values in science, and as a promise to outline an even more direct route to the heart of the matter. I begin with a quick review of the steps in Anderson’s argument that seem necessary and, indeed, laudable, followed by a brief discussion of (...) those steps in her argument that we might fruitfully skip. The hope is that we will arrive at roughly the same location but with a firmer foothold. (shrink)

The science and philosophy of xenophobic behavior.

An education for cultural coherence tends to the child’s well-being through identity construction and maintenance. Critics charge that this sort of education will not bode well for the future autonomy of children. I will argue that culturally coherent education, provided there is no coercion, can lend itself to eventual autonomy and may assist minority children in countering the negative stereotypes and discrimination they face in the larger society. Further, I will argue that few individuals actually possess an entirely coherent identity; (...) rather, most of us possess hybrid identities that lend themselves to multiple, not necessarily conflicting allegiances. (shrink)

In this short comment on Just, Reasonable Multiculturalism, I concentrate on the permissible extent of interference by a liberal state in a community within that state when such interference aims to protect individuals within that community from it. He and I both value individuals and want them protected, of course. This shared value, however, leads us to different conclusions. On any liberal view, individuals must be allowed to act as they wish subject only to specific sorts of justified limitations. In (...) the mainstream approach that Cohen-Almagor accepts, these will include limitations necessary to not merely protect but also to promote autonomy. On my own view, by contrast, it is protection alone that justifies interference. I thus spell out Cohen-Almagor’s view about the need for interference with non-liberal groups within a liberal state and indicate my disagreement. (shrink)

This essay seeks to examine D’Arcy’s notion of sound militancy to discern whether this term can be fruitfully applied to establishing rioting (riots) as a democratic form of resistance to injustice or negligence. The first part of the essay provides an account of Frazer and Hutchings’ critique of political violence, a critique that perceives violence (used in politics or for political aims) as never being justifiable. In opposition to this position, the second part of the essay posits, through both theoretical (...) (Marcuse, Celikates) and practical (Soei, Sutterlüty) references, the case for an understanding of political violence (riots) as justifiable or defensible in certain circumstances – those that adhere to D’Arcy’s concept of sound militancy and seek to address a particular and present grievance. In conclusion, the essay suggests that (Hegelian) recognition provides an account of why marginalizing seems so pervasive in contemporary Western societies. (shrink)

What does it mean to treat people as equals when the legacies of feudalism, religious persecution, authoritarian and oligarchic government have shaped the landscape within which we must construct something better? This question has come to dominate much constitutional practice as well as philosophical inquiry in the past 50 years. The combination of Second Wave Feminism with the continuing struggle for racial equality in the 1970s brought into sharp relief the variety of ways in which people can be treated unequally, (...) while respecting the formalities of constitutional government. Most obviously, the content of laws can mistreat them by wrongfully assuming that they are either threats to others, or that, like children, they need to be protected from harm through paternalistic limitations on their freedom of action. Or, as those concerned with class inequality have long noted, formal equality can create legal requirements, permissions, and prohibitions whose burdens fall predictably, and often solely, on groups who are already marginalised, and most in need of state protection. (Kairys, David 1990) Above all, what these two great political movements made plain, is that a concern for group inequality and, specifically, group injustice must figure in the formulation and adjudication of individual rights, if legal protections for equality are adequately to combat the causes of inequality. Getting to grips with that challenge, it became obvious, required going beyond the familiar analyses of inequality inherited from Liberalism and Marxism, given the many different ways in which people can be equal or unequal.(Hackett and Haslanger 2006, 3 - 15) In the first part of this chapter, I will seek to illustrate these claims, by focusing on efforts to reframe the theory and practice of constitutional equality given demands for sexual and racial equality. I will then show that analytic philosophy has also come to recognise the various non-reducible dimensions of equality in ways that reinforce the claims of critical legal theory, even as philosophers highlight their disconcerting consequences. If equality has multiple irreducible dimensions, conflicts between the legitimate demands of equality are unavoidable features of law and politics, even in the best possible world, and are likely to be particularly painful when set against a background of historical injustice. The chapter concludes with the challenges to democratic constitutionalism, and the scope for constructive responses to those challenges, which the rapprochement between critical and analytic thinking on equality suggests. (shrink)

One central objection to philosophical defences of liberal neutrality is that many neutrally justified laws and policies are nonetheless discriminatory as they unilaterally impose costs or confer unearned privileges on the bearers of a particular conception of the good. Call this the false neutrality objection. While liberal neutralists seldom consider this objection to be a serious allegation, and often claim that it rests on a misunderstanding, I argue that it is a serious challenge for proponents of justificatory neutrality. Indeed, a (...) careful examination of recent French and Canadian laws which impede the members of cultural minorities from freely practising their religion reveals that the state can hide its discriminatory aims by cloaking the policies it enacts in neutral language. In order to avoid the problem of false neutrality, I contend, liberal neutralists should defend a combination of neutrality of justification and neutrality of aim and operationalize neutrality of aim through a practical test that has been a defining feature of American jurisprudence on religious freedom in the last thirty years: the general applicability requirement. (shrink)

Recognition of Religion or Belief presents a global overview of the systems, laws and mechanisms states have established to recognise religions and beliefs and to legally register their affiliated organisations. Recognition of Religion or Belief is the first book of its kind to dedicate its contents to the recognition and registration issues, especially how they intersect with religious freedom conditions around the world. The book provides an analysis of the most up-to-date data on the recognition systems and registration procedures of (...) every country and territory on the planet using terminology derived from Cometan's doctoral research forming his upcoming thesis titled Religious Freedom & State Recognition of Belief to which Recognition of Religion or Belief acts as both a compliment and precursor. (shrink)

Conditions for recognition of religion or belief (RoRB) continued to deteriorate around the world from June 2021 to June 2022. Authoritarian regimes bent on controlling religious activity maintained a foothold in Africa, Asia and parts of Central and South America. The liberties enshrined in the European Convention on Human Rights are at serious threat by the Russian Federation's invasion of Ukraine. While in Afghanistan, the Taliban's reclamation of power after twenty years of being kept at bay likely signals a new (...) generation of Afghan boys and girls who will not see their fundamental human rights upheld by the very institutions that are supposed to protect them.​ -/- The Religious Recognition Project considers the topic of how countries register religious groups and activities is one of the foremost issues in the modern world when it comes to respecting and protecting freedom of religion or belief (FoRB). The majority of countries and territories (58% or 137 out of 235 studied) either continue to make government registration mandatory for religious groups or provide no registration procedures at all. -/- An even greater majority of countries have established onerous registration procedures, the consequences of which, whether by intention or not, include the disenfranchisement of belief communities, the deregistration or denial of registered status for minority or "untraditional" religious groups, and the state's maintenance of control over the religious and philosophical lives of citizens. In essence, issues of registration remain a harbinger of worse violations of FoRB to come so if a focus is placed on dismantling these misused recognition and registration systems, it is possible that we could see a brighter future for FoRB conditions in countries worst effected by this issue. (shrink)

I argue that changes in the numerical identity of groups do not necessarily speak in favour of the supersession of some historical injustice. I contend that the correlativity between the perpetrator and the victim of injustices is not broken when the identity of groups changes. I develop this argument by considering indigenous people's claims in Argentina for the injustices suffered during the Conquest of the Desert. I argue that present claimants do not need to be part of the same entity (...) whose members suffered injustices many years ago. For identifying the proper recipients of reparation, all that is necessary is that the group who suffered the historical injustice under consideration has survived into the present. I also support a view upon which present living members of a certain group have reasons to redress those injustices perpetrated by their predecessors if they are relevantly connected with each other. In particular, by relying on the notion of collective inheritance, I argue that if present-day members of a certain group claim that they are the continuation of the group whose past members bequeathed them certain goods, they cannot consistently reject such a membership when the very same people legated them certain evils. (shrink)

Can one expect religious minorities to be committed to a liberal democratic state? Can a democratic, Western, liberal state be open and safe for all – both ultra-orthodox and secular alike – and count on the allegiance of all? Does this require that religious minorities ‘hide’ their religious identity and conform to prevailing laws and customs and express their religious views and practices only in the privacy of their own homes? Or should minorities request that they receive public recognition? Ought (...) such minorities tolerate opposing views and practices on matters that are central to their faith, or should they request that these are not expressed in public? In this paper, I discuss and evaluate four possible responses to these questions. (shrink)

In this article, I explain and defend the concept of multicultural nationhood. Multicultural nationhood accounts for how a nation can have a cohesive identity despite being internally diverse. In Canada, the challenge of nation-building despite the country’s diversity has prompted reflection on how to conceive of the national identity. The two most influential theories of multiculturalism to come from Canada, those of Charles Taylor and Will Kymlicka, emerged through consideration of Canada’s diversity, particularly the place of Québécois, Indigenous peoples, and (...) immigrants in society. I begin by synthesizing Taylor’s and Kymlicka’s theories. I then propose a new subjective definition of nation, wherein the character of a nation is determined by how its members conceive of themselves. Once these concepts are explained, they are combined in an account of multicultural nationhood. Multicultural nationhood involves the cultivation of a national identity wherein various cultural groups are recognized as constitutive of the nation. (shrink)

Luego de la Conquista del Desierto, el Estado argentino impuso su ordenamiento institucional a los miembros sobrevivientes de varias comunidades indígenas. De este modo, sus instituciones fueron desplazadas. Esta es una injusticia histórica cuya reparación, en aquel tiempo, requería la restauración de la vigencia de las instituciones indígenas. Sin embargo, no estamos más en 1885 y muchas circunstancias han cambiado. Muchas personas indígenas y no indígenas viven en las mismas ciudades, tienen intereses en las mismas porciones de tierra, e interactúan (...) entre ellos en innumerables formas. Por lo tanto, debe analizarse si, bajo estas condiciones, los reclamos indígenas por recuperar su soberanía siguen siendo válidos. En este trabajo argumentaré que, debido a cambios en las circunstancias, estos reclamos tienen menos fuerza que en el pasado. Por lo tanto, la injusticia histórica no puede ser reparada del mismo modo que en 1885. No obstante, dada la historia de opresión a la que los indígenas han sido sometidos, el sistema institucional de Argentina tiene que ser reformado de manera tal que su aplicación sobre ellos sea legítima. Propongo tres medidas que contribuyen a conseguir dicho objetivo, a saber, el autogobierno para asuntos internos, la representación en el Senado y el cambio institucional por mayoría simple. -/- After the Conquest of the Desert, the State of Argentina forcibly imposed its institutional system over the surviving members of several indigenous communities. In that way, their institutions were ousted. The reparation of this historical injustice, at that time, required the reversion of the indigenous institutions. However, we are not in 1885 anymore, and several circumstances have changed. Many indigenous and non-indigenous persons live in the same cities, have interests in similar portions of land, and interact with each other in an infinite number of ways. Therefore, it should be assessed whether indigenous claims for their sovereignty to be restored are still valid. In this paper, I argue that, owed to changing circumstances, these claims have less normative force than they had in the past. Therefore, those injustices cannot be redressed in the same way as in 1885. However, I argue that due to the history of oppression indigenous people have suffered, the Argentinian institutional system has to be reformed so that its application over them not being illegitimate. I propose three measures to achieve this aim: self-government over internal affairs, indigenous representatives in the Senate, and institutional change by a simple majority of votes. (shrink)

Diese Rezension widmet sich Plamen Makarievs Werk "The Public Legitimacy of Minority Claims. A Central/Eastern European perspective" und der Frage, wie Minderheiten ihre Bedürfnisse und Rechte in einer Weise legitimieren können, die es der Öffentlichkeit unmöglich macht, diese zu ignorieren.

In this article, the author analyzes the term "power-sharing" in the context of power exercised within a state. He first examines the term in the very general sense, in which it can be applied to all types and dimensions of sharing of power between various groups and institutional entities. Second, the author examines the meaning of the term in the narrow sense, that is, the phenomenon of systemic sharing of power by groups (segments) whose membership is based on ascribed criteria (...) such as common ancestors, relatives, or racial background, and/or cultural ones such as a common language, religion, or celebrations. The basic segmental units in this sense are nations (understood in the sociological sense), ethnic groups, or religious and denominational communities that form part of divided societies. Third, the article shows the differences between the principal models (types) of power-sharing in the narrow sense: consociationalism, centripetalism, and hybrid power-sharing. (shrink)

In this paper, I show how a novel treatment of speech acts can be combined with a well-known liberal argument for multiculturalism in a way that will justify claims about the preservation, protection, or accommodation of minority languages. The key to the paper is the claim that every language makes a distinctive range of speech acts possible, acts that cannot be realized by means of any other language. As a result, when a language disappears, so does a class of speech (...) acts. If we accept that our social identities are in large part constituted by the decisions we make about how to speak, language loss, then, will amount to a substantial infringement on our autonomy in a particularly important domain. (shrink)

This paper briefly highlights a small part of the work being done by Indigenous groups in Canada to integrate science into their ways of knowing and living with nature. Special attention is given to a recent attempt by Mi'kmaw educators in Unama'ki (Cape Breton, Nova Scotia) to overcome suspicion of science among their youth by establishing an 'Integrative Science' (Toqwa'tu'kl Kjijitaqnn, or 'bringing our knowledges together') degree programme at Cape Breton University. The goal was to combine Indigenous and scientific knowledges (...) in a way that protects and empowers Mi'kmaw rights and lifeways. (shrink)

Despite the United Nations Declaration of the Rights of Indigenous Peoples, assimilationist policies continue, whether official or effective. Such policies affect more than the right to group choice. The concern is whether indeed genocide or “only” ethnocide (or culturecide)—the elimination of a traditional culture—is at work. Discussions of the distinction between the two terms have been inconsistent enough that at least one commentator has declared that they cannot be used in analytical contexts. While these terms, I contend, have distinct senses, (...) yet in cases of governmental and other institutional assimilationist policy for indigenous peoples, such ethnocide effectively entails genocide. Insofar as any people’s cultural practices and beliefs are essential for life and health, individuals in groups value, if tacitly, their culture as highly as their language or any artifact: Thus, attempts to eradicate a culture through assimilation in fact eradicate individuals’ lives and health and so are effectively murderous. Acknowledgement by worldwide organizations that assimilationist ethnocide is effectively genocide should affect policy concerning indigenous peoples and thus has significance for international law. (shrink)

David Miller argues that national identity is indispensable for the successful functioning of a liberal democracy. National identity makes important contributions to liberal democratic institutions, including creating incentives for the fulfilment of civic duties, facilitating deliberative democracy, and consolidating representative democracy. Thus, a shared identity is indispensable for liberal democracy and grounds a good claim for self-determination. Because Miller’s arguments appeal to the instrumental values of a national culture, I call his argument ‘instrumental value’ arguments. In this paper, I examine (...) the instrumental value arguments and show that they fail to justify a group’s right to self-determination. (shrink)

It is crucial for indigenous people living in the Arctic to harvest animals by hunting in a traditional manner, as is the case with such peoples in other parts of the world. Given the nutritional, economic, and cultural importance of hunting for aboriginal people, it seems reasonable to say that they have the moral right to hunt animals. On the other hand, non-aboriginal people are occasionally prohibited from hunting a particular species of animal in many societies. The question then arises: (...) why can aboriginal people, unlike other citizens, have special hunting rights? If indigenous people are to have the right to hunt a particular species that other citizens are denied, then it presents a significant challenge to philosophers to explore the moral grounds that justify such a special right. This exploration is the subject of the current paper. (shrink)

My intention in this paper is to reframe the practice of veiling as an embodied practice of self-development and self- transformation. I argue that practices like these cannot be handled by the choice/chance distinction relied on by those who would restrict religious minority accommodations. Embodied self- transformation necessarily means a change in personal identity and this means the religious believer cannot know if they will need religious accommodation when they begin their journey of piety. Even some luck egalitarians would find (...) leaning exclusively on preference and choice to find who should be burdened with paying the full costs of certain choices in one’s life too morally harsh to be justifiable. I end by briefly illustrating an alternative way to think about religious accommodation that does not rely on the choice/chance distinction. (shrink)

El ensayo recontruye los diferentes conceptos de derechos humanos y de minorías. Centrándose luego sobre las minorías culturales, analiza las difíciles relaciones entre derechos humanos liberales y derechos culturales positivos.

Kymlicka has offered an influential luck egalitarian justification for a catalogue of polyethnic rights addressing cultural disadvantages of immigrant minorities. In response, Quong argues that while the items on the list are justified, in the light of the fact that the relevant disadvantages of immigrants result from their choice to immigrate, (i) these rights cannot be derived from luck egalitarianism and (ii) that this casts doubt on luck egalitarianism as a theory of cultural justice. As an alternative to Kymlicka’s argument, (...) Quong offers his own justification of polyethnic rights based on a Rawlsian ideal of fair equality of opportunity. I defend luck egalitarianism against Quong’s objection arguing that if choice ever matters, it matters in relation to cultural disadvantages too. Also, the Rawlsian ideal of fair equality of opportunity cannot justify the sort of polyethnic rights that Quong wants it to justify, once we set aside an unwarranted statist focus in Quong’s conception of fair equality of opportunity. Whatever the weaknesses of luck egalitarianism are, the inadequacy of the position in relation to accommodating cultural disadvantages of immigrants is not among them. (shrink)

L’article introduit au rôle de l’efficience dans la génération d’avantages ou de désavantages enregistrés par les minorités. L’objectif est de démontrer que l’efficience devrait jouer un rôle plus important dans le domaine de la justice ethnoculturelle. Pour ce faire, une brève présentation de la place du nombre dans la littérature sur le sujet est offerte, ce qui permet de saisir le fond de l’argument consistant à faire des déséquilibres numériques une source certaine des injustices subies par les minorités, notamment dans (...) une perspective inspirée par l’égalitarisme de la chance. De ce point de vue, l’asymétrie numérique peut toutefois constituer une source d’avantages pour ces groupes. Dès lors, une telle asymétrie, qui est l’un des constituants de la définition de la minorité, prend une autre dimension. Plus que cette asymétrie, il apparaît que c’est l’efficience (la manière dont les groupes gèrent cette asymétrie) qui détermine les conditions et succès matériels des membres d’un groupe donné. Après une discussion des minorités efficientes et dominantes, l’article se conclut par la mise en lumière de quelques pistes de recherche rendues visibles par l’efficience et qui sont pertinentes pour la théorie de la justice en contexte multiculturel. (shrink)

Stephen May (2011) holds that language rights have been insufficiently recognized, or just rejected as problematic, in human rights theory and practice. Defending the “human rights approach to language rights”, he claims that language rights should be accorded the status of fundamental human rights, recognized as such by states and international organizations. This article argues that the notion of language rights is far from clear. According to May, one key reason for rejecting the claim that language rights should be considered (...) as human rights is the widespread belief that language rights are collective rights. In order to address this kind of objection, the collective character attributed to language rights must be carefully assessed, distinguishing two different views of what a collective right is. (shrink)

This article starts by setting out the evaluative criteria provided by Will Kymlicka's liberal account of individual freedom and equality. Kymlicka's theory of cultural minority rights is then analysed using these criteria and found to be defective in two respects. First, his assignment of different rights to national and ethnic groups is shown to be inegalitarian with regard to generations after the first. Second, his recommendation of strong cultural protections is shown in some circumstances to undermine freedom and equality. Towards (...) the end of the article a policy of gradual and inclusive assimilation is described that may effectively promote the freedom and opportunities of members of cultural minorities. In conclusion, group-specific rights may, as Kymlicka says, be justified in liberal terms, but only where they differ in content from those he proposes. (shrink)

The question of why group-differentiated rights might be a requirement of justice has been a central focus of identity politics in recent decades. I attempt to bring some clarity to this discussion by proposing a typology to track the various ways in which individuals can be harmed or benefited as a consequence of their membership in social groups. It is the well-being of individuals that group-differentiated rights should be understood as protecting, and so clarity on the relationship between group membership (...) and well-being is vital. One of the problems with the way in which such justifications have often been formulated in the past has been that they inadvertently position the group as a handicap to be overcome, rather than a value to be protected. I seek to overcome this limitation by clearly specifying the circumstances under which group membership is a liability, and the circumstances under which it has value. While this distinction is important, in both cases there is a relevant interest at stake, and thus the groundwork can be laid for a defence of group-differentiated rights. (shrink)

The term ‘identity politics’ is used to refer to a wide range of political movements. In this paper, we look at the theoretical ideas underpinning two strongly, mutually opposed forms of identity politics, and identify some crucial differences between them. We critically compare the identitarian ideology of the New Right with feminist standpoint theory, focusing on two issues: relativism and essentialism. In carrying out this critical comparison we illuminate under-theorized aspects of both new right identitarianism and standpoint theory; demonstrate how (...) the two are distinct; reveal the depth and pervasiveness of the new right ideology’s flaws; and show what a coherent left-wing identity politics could look like. (shrink)

Hierarchy and inequality are deeply rooted in Indian tradition. They are found in practice in the form of unequal placement of caste and class groups in the civilizing system of Indian society. The notions of dharma (normative order), karma (personnel moral commitment) and jāti (caste) that constitute the basic principles of Indian culture, making the Indian cultural tradition a unique cultural tradition, are also the principles of hierarchy and social stratification. In this paper, an attempt has been made to present (...) a comprehensive and investigative view of different scholars concerning the deep-rooted traditional characteristics of caste in Indian society. (shrink)

The presence of hierarchy and inequality within Indian tradition is a prominent aspect that manifests through the unequal positioning of caste and class groups within the societal framework. This intricate connection is observed in the way dharma (normative order), karma (personal moral commitment), and jāti (caste) - the foundational tenets of Indian culture - simultaneously shape the distinctiveness of Indian cultural heritage and lay the groundwork for social hierarchy. This research paper delves into an extensive and exploratory assessment of diverse (...) scholarly perspectives aimed at illuminating the deeply entrenched traditional facets of caste within Indian society. (shrink)

This paper examines the complexity of the interconnection of varna and caste systems in Indian society. It reflects the complexities of the traditions of different caste groups and the system that regulates their relationship with each other. It will also reflect on the modes where they turn slightly flexible and become harshly rigid. The concept of community no longer exists. However, it is a stronger claim but is made while stressing the importance of the social Purushārtha Sādhana. Both terms (caste (...) and varna) are used interchangeably. However, a question regarding their meaning would need an entire book to be written. Both words are too ambiguous, especially for non-Indians or non-Hindus, though everyone, including Hindus and Indians, may find it challenging to distinguish between them. (shrink)

Amartya Sen argues that sectarian discord and violence are fueled by confusion about the nature of identity, including the pervasive tendency to see ourselves as members of singular social groups standing in opposition to other groups (e.g. Democrat vs. Republican, Muslim vs. Christian, etc.). Sen defends an alternative model of identity, according to which we all inevitably belong to a plurality of discrete identity groups (including ethnicities, classes, genders, races, religions, careers, hobbies, etc.) and are obligated to choose, in any (...) given context, which among our multiple affiliations to prioritize. While Sen’s model of discrete identity prioritization is a clear advance over single-factor accounts, it overlooks significant lessons about identity from over 150 years of scholarship by feminists of color. In ignoring the experiences of women of color, Sen’s model falsely assumes that identities are in-principle separable for the purposes of practical deliberation; and, in obligating individuals to make such identity-based “reasoned choices,” Sen’s model forces those with multiply marginalized identities to choose from a set of externally defined identity options, none of which sufficiently captures their experiences. (shrink)

Identity politics is commonly criticized as endangering democracy by undermining community, rational communication, and solidarity. Drawing on both radical democratic theory and standpoint theory, this article posits the opposite thesis: identity politics is pivotal for the democratization of democracy. Democratization through identity politics is achieved by disrupting hegemonic discourse and is, therefore, a matter of power, while such forms of power politics are reasonable when following minority standpoints generated through identity politics. The article develops this approach by connecting radical democratic (...) theories with standpoint theories and highlighting their commonalities and potential for mutual enhancement. Standpoint theory allows us to substantiate and reconcile two initially contradictory claims: particular minority standpoints are necessary to criticize the prevailing discursive and institutional orders, and these standpoints stem from intersubjective reason and embody ‘strong objectivity.’ This discussion presents a new perspective on the tension between particularity and universality, as well as the relationship between power and reason in democracy. Democratization is an oscillation between these polarities, and political theory should not aim to resolve this tension but to recognize and articulate it. Such recognition might involve elevating knowledge emerging from oppressed groups and exercising epistemic modesty when assessing specific forms of identity politics. (shrink)

El objetivo de esta entrevista realizada el 11 de julio de 2021 a Óscar Sarlo, miembro de la Academia Nacional de Letras de Uruguay, consistió en detectar y comentar en qué estado se encuentra la capacidad de los ciudadanos de América Latina con respecto a la introducción del Derecho en distintos ámbitos sociales. El resultado de esa inserción es fructífero al hacer referencia a la producción literaria; sin embargo, también se trata de un ejercicio deleznable, tal como lo sigue desarrollando (...) la televisión nacional e internacional. En ese sentido, este trabajo permitió dilucidar cómo un tipo de audiencia está comprendiendo erróneamente y tergiversando la actividad jurídica. Ese malestar cultural también estaría justificado por el desconocimiento de las verdaderas funciones de las mismas instituciones que se encargan de impartir leyes y normas comunitarias. (shrink)

One problem often associated with identity politics is “positional fundamentalism,” the equating of social positions with epistemic possibilities and political dispositions. The criticism is that identity politics is usually more about who says something than what is said. This goes hand in hand with perspective relativity, which no longer allows for a common, universal position and therefore also prevents emancipative politics. To respond to this critique of positional fundamentalism and perspective relativism, I develop a new account of identity politics as (...) inherently intersubjective and fundamental to democracy. This approach is necessary to address the philosophical problem at the heart of debates about identity politics: the tension between particularist power politics, on the one hand, and politics as a universalist appeal to reason, on the other. (shrink)

This study attempts to understand whether there were changes over time in Hegel’s opinions on the idea of recognition, which were the basis of Axel Honneth’s theory of recognition, and how later philosophers writing on recognition and intersubjectivity have comprehended Hegel’s intellectual heritage, together with their criticism of peculiar aspects of Hegel’s point of view. In this regard, in order to be able to understand Honneth’s theory of recognition, it is necessary to inquire into the relation between Honneth’s and Hegel’s (...) theories in a philosophical context. The current inquiry is both related to the aspects of how Honneth was affected by Hegel, and is also particularly focused on Hegel’s Jena period. The point of emphasis in this study is whether or not Hegel abandoned the theories of intersubjectivity and recognition after his Jena period. Therefore, the discussion focuses on Hegel’s Jena period and the aspects which distinguished this period from others. This study also critically examines the views respecting the abandonment of the recognition on the Phenomenology of Spirit and intersubjectivity after the Jena period, and suggests that recognition and intersubjectivity still retain their dominance on this work known also as Jena Phenomenology, dated as the end of the Jena period. -/- Keywords: Honneth, Hegel, Recognition, Intersubjectivity -/- Türkçe Özet Bu çalışma, Axel Honneth’in tanınma kuramına temel teşkil eden Hegel'in tanınma ve öznelerarasılık üzerine görüşlerinin zaman içinde değişip değişmediğini; tanınma üzerine yazan sonraki kuşak düşünürlerin Hegel’in düşünsel mirasını nasıl algıladıklarını ve görüşlerini hangi açılardan eleştirdiklerini anlamaya çalışmaktadır. Bu bakımdan, Honneth’in tanınma kuramını anlayabilmek için onun Hegel ile düşünsel bağlamda ilişkisinin sorgulanması gerektiğini ileri sürmektedir. Mevcut sorgulama, Honneth’in Hegel’den ne bağlamda ve ne şekilde etkilendiğiyle ilgili olmakla birlikte özellikle Hegel’in Jena dönemine odaklanmaktadır. Bu bağlamda, bu makalede, Hegel’in Jena dönemi sonrası felsefesinde öznelerarasılık ve tanınma kuramlarını terk edip etmediği üzerinde durulmaktadır. Bu sebeple ilk önce Hegel’in Jena dönemi ile bu dönemi farklı kılan yönler ele alınmaktadır. Bununla birlikte, Jena dönemi sonrasında, Tinin Fenomenolojisi’nde tanınma ve öznelerarasılığın terk edildiğine dair görüşlerin yeniden gözden geçirilmesi gerektiği; Hegel’in felsefesinde Jena döneminin bitişine tarihlenen ve Jena Fenomenolojisi olarak da bilinen bu eserde tanınma ve öznelerarasılığın halen gücünü koruduğu savunulmaktadır. -/- Anahtar Kelimeler: Honneth, Hegel, Tanınma, Öznelerarasılık. (shrink)

Contemporary globalization is largely shaped by the predominant position and strength of the United States, and the concept of globalization is cast upon the polity and social aspects of P.R. China after Reform and Opening. Globalization, though substantially varied in a modern scene, is not without historical and cultural roots. The future holds anew, whereas newly arisen pieces of knowledge and information shed new light on the past, the blood and violence of the political progress on the Chinese soil. This (...) paper digs into the interactive aspect of the Chinese civilization with Western Civilization, and an empirical understanding on the evolvement of the country / nation to the recent shaping, with implication of which might change the dynamic of the Asian area after the global power politics whereof after World War II. (shrink)

The Yogyakarta Principles for the application of human rights to sexual orientation and gender identity define gender identity as “each person’s deeply felt internal and individual experience of gender, which may or may not correspond with the sex assigned at birth, including the personal sense of the body and other expressions of gender, including dress, speech, and mannerisms.” This definition and its acknowledgment within human rights politics is a key step in the fight of trans people for legal protection. Our (...) aim is to analyze this definition both historically and systematically to find out how the Western liberal conception of rights fosters specific trans politics and limits the options for others. Specifically, we claim that political liberalism and the form of subjective rights that it brings about influence concepts of identity and political strategies. While we analyze the limits of the liberal framework, our aim is to think about how it is possible that even within this framework, non-normative bodies and queer identities can be acknowledged and supported through law. (shrink)

„Political Correctness“, „Identitätspolitik“ und „Cancel Culture“ werden heutzutage überwiegend als Waffen von Konservativen eingesetzt, um ihre Privilegien gegen emanzipative Neuregelungen zu verteidigen. Solche Neuregelungen als Einschränkung der Kunst- und Meinungsfreiheit zu kritisieren ist deshalb meist falsch. Tatsächlich tragen „Political Correctness“, „Identitätspolitik“ und „Cancel Culture“ zur inklusiveren Verwirklichung der Demokratie bei. Im Artikel zeige ich, dass es darauf ankommt, auf welcher Ebene politische Regulierungen der Kunst stattfinden: nicht-staatlich im allgemeinen Kunstbetrieb, para-staatlich im öffentlich-rechtlichen Rundfunk, oder staatlich. Nur wenn der Staat mit (...) zentralisierter rechtlicher, ökonomischer und symbolischer Macht in laufende Debatten eingreift, kann man von problematischer Cancel Culture sprechen - das ist fast nie der Fall. (shrink)

Vor wenigen Tagen hat das Hamburger Kabarett-Theater Schmidts Tivoli die Zusammenarbeit mit dem Komiker Kay Ray beendet, offenbar weil rassistische Witze in der Show einen zentralen Platz einnehmen. Kurz nach der Cancel-Affäre zwischen Lisa Eckhart und dem Hamburger Nochtspeicher sieht sich nun auch Ray als Opfer von „Cancel Culture“, die die Kunstfreiheit immer weiter einschränke. Um die Kunst und Kunstfreiheit geht es dabei aber eigentlich gar nicht. Sie ist nur der Austragungsort gesellschaftspolitischer Auseinandersetzungen um Sexismus, Rassismus und Transphobie. Dabei sind (...) Kunstfreiheit und Meinungsfreiheit zentrale Argumente – oder besser: Waffen – des konservativen politischen Projekts geworden, mit dem emanzipative Änderungen abgewehrt werden (s. auch Schubert, in: Leviathan, 48 (1), S. 29–51). Dieser machtpolitische Missbrauch muss klar von der grundrechtlichen Dimension unterschieden werden. Dafür ist zwischen drei Ebenen Kunstfreiheit zu differenzieren: im nichtstaatlichen, parastaatlichen und staatlichen Bereich. Die Neuregelungen von Diskurs, Kultur und Kunst durch „Politische Korrektheit“, „Cancel Culture“ oder „Identitätspolitik“ bedeuten nicht den Zerfall der Demokratie, sondern sind ein Schritt in Richtung ihrer vollständigeren Realisierung. (shrink)