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  1. added 2020-03-24
    Indoctrination, Moral Instruction, and Nonrational Beliefs.Michael S. Merry - 2005 - Educational Theory 55 (4):399-420.
    The manner in which individuals hold various nonevidentiary beliefs is critical to making any evaluative claim regarding an individual's autonomy. In this essay, I argue that one may be both justified in holding nonrational beliefs of a nonevidentiary sort while also being capable of leading an autonomous life. I defend the idea that moral instruction, including that which concerns explicitly religious content, may justifiably constitute a set of commitments upon which rationality and autonomy are dependent. I situate this discussion against (...)
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  2. added 2020-03-23
    Uncovering the Moral Heuristics of Altruism: A Philosophical Scale.Julian Friedland, Kyle Emich & Benjamin Cole - 2020 - PLoS ONE 15 (3).
    Extant research suggests that individuals employ traditional moral heuristics to support their observed altruistic behavior; yet findings have largely been limited to inductive extrapolation and rely on relatively few traditional frames in so doing, namely, deontology in organizational behavior and virtue theory in law and economics. Given that these and competing moral frames such as utilitarianism can manifest as identical behavior, we develop a moral framing instrument—the Philosophical Moral-Framing Measure (PMFM)—to expand and distinguish traditional frames associated and disassociated with observed (...)
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  3. added 2020-03-20
    Moral Luck and Moral Performance.Hallvard Lillehammer - forthcoming - European Journal of Philosophy.
    The aims of this paper are fourfold. The first aim is to characterize two distinct forms of circumstantial moral luck and illustrate how they are implicitly recognized in pre-theoretical moral thought. The second aim is to identify a significant difference between the ways in which these two kinds of circumstantial luck are morally relevant. The third aim is to show how the acceptance of circumstantial moral luck relates to the acceptance of resultant moral luck. The fourth aim is to defuse (...)
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  4. added 2020-03-10
    Making Peace with Moral Imperfection.Camil Golub - 2019 - Journal of Ethics and Social Philosophy 16 (2).
    How can we rationally make peace with our past moral failings, while committing to avoid similar mistakes in the future? Is it because we cannot do anything about the past, while the future is still open? Or is it that regret for our past mistakes is psychologically harmful, and we need to forgive ourselves in order to be able to move on? Or is it because moral mistakes enable our moral growth? I argue that these and other answers do not (...)
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  5. added 2020-02-17
    Derivation of Morality From Prudence.Marcus Arvan - 2020 - In Neurofunctional Prudence and Morality: A Philosophical Theory. New York: Routledge. pp. 60-94.
    This chapter derives and refines a novel normative moral theory and descriptive theory of moral psychology--Rightness as Fairness--from the theory of prudence defended in Chapter 2. It briefly summarizes Chapter 2’s finding that prudent agents typically internalize ‘moral risk-aversion’. It then outlines how this prudential psychology leads prudent agents to want to know how to act in ways they will not regret in morally salient cases, as well as to regard moral actions as the only types of actions that satisfy (...)
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  6. added 2020-02-17
    Neurofunctional Prudence and Morality: A Philosophical Theory.Marcus Arvan - 2020 - New York, USA: Routledge.
    This book outlines a unified theory of prudence and morality that merges a wide variety of findings in behavioral neuroscience with philosophically sophisticated normative theorizing. Chapter 1 lays out the emerging behavioral neuroscience of prudence and morality. Chapter 2 then outlines a new theory of prudence as fairness to oneself across time. Chapter 3 then derives a revised version of my 2016 moral theory--Rightness as Fairness--from this theory of prudence, showing how the theory of prudence defends Rightness as Fairness against (...)
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  7. added 2020-02-17
    Wittgenstein and the Challenge of Global Ethics.Julian Friedland - 2011 - In Claus Dierksmeier, Michael Pirson, Wolfgang Amann, Heiko Spitzeck & Ernst von Kimakowitz (eds.), Humanistic Ethics in the Age of Globality. Palgrave-Macmillan. pp. 210-22.
    This paper describes Wittgenstein's pre-theoretical transcendentalist conception of ethics and the challenge it presents for the kind of global cosmopolitan perspective required of any multinational social responsibility strategy. It is argued that this challenge can be overcome through establishing a sense of solidarity with all stakeholders via a corporate social compact rooted in what Wittgenstein refers to as spontaneous agreement and sympathy. Contemporary examples of successful strategies are provided.
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  8. added 2020-02-16
    One Desire Too Many.Nathan Robert Howard - forthcoming - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research.
    I defend the widely-held view that morally worthy action need not be motivated by a desire to promote rightness as such. Some have recently come to reject this view, arguing that desires for rightness as such are necessary for avoiding a certain kind of luck thought incompatible with morally worthy action. I show that those who defend desires for rightness as such on the basis of this argument misunderstand the relationship between moral worth and the kind of luck that their (...)
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  9. added 2020-02-03
    Book Review: Clean Hands? Philosophical Lessons From Scrupulosity by Jesse S. Summers and Walter Sinnott-Armstrong. [REVIEW]Pei-Hua Huang - forthcoming - Journal of Applied Philosophy.
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  10. added 2020-02-01
    Surviving Homophobia: Overcoming Evil Environments.Claudia Card - 2018 - In Shlomit Harrosh & Roger Crisp (eds.), Moral Evil in Practical Ethics. New York, USA: Routledge. pp. 145-164.
    Thinking of the evils of homophobia and what is needed to survive them requires acknowledging a new category of evil besides the evils of individual deeds, social practices and social structures. That further category is evil social environments. Building on the work of Jeremy Waldron on the harm in hate speech, this chapter extends that account to certain hate crimes that, like the written word, send a lingering social message. The cases of four women survivors of homophobia are then examined (...)
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  11. added 2019-12-21
    Nietzsche Contra Sublimation.Eli I. Lichtenstein - forthcoming - Journal of the History of Philosophy.
    Many commentators have claimed that Nietzsche views the “sublimation” (Sublimierung) of drives as a positive achievement. Against this tradition, I argue that on the dominant if not universal Nietzschean use of Sublimierung and its cognates, sublimation is just a broad psychological analogue of the traditional (al)chemical process: the “vaporization” of drives into a finer or lighter state, figuratively if not literally. This can yield ennobling elevation, or purity in a positive sense—the intensified “sublimate” of an unrefined original sample. But it (...)
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  12. added 2019-12-16
    "Shining Lights, Even in Death": What Metal Gear Can Teach Us About Morality.Ryan Wasser - manuscript
    Morality has always been a pressing issue in video game scholarship, but became more contentious after “realistic” violence in games became possible. However, few studies concern themselves with how players experience moral dilemmas in games, choosing instead to focus on the way games affect postplay behavior. In my thesis I discuss the moral choices players encounter in the Metal Gear series of games; then, I analyze and compare the responses of players with and without martial career experiences. My argument is (...)
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  13. added 2019-10-27
    The Creeps as a Moral Emotion.Jeremy Fischer & Rachel Fredericks - forthcoming - Ergo: An Open Access Journal of Philosophy.
    Creepiness and the emotion of the creeps have been overlooked in the moral philosophy and moral psychology literatures. We argue that the creeps is a morally significant emotion in its own right, and not simply a type of fear, disgust, or anger (though it shares features with those emotions). Reflecting on cases, we defend a novel account of the creeps as felt in response to creepy people. According to our moral insensitivity account, the creeps is fitting just when its object (...)
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  14. added 2019-10-21
    Hypocrisy as Either Deception or Akrasia.Christopher Bartel - 2019 - Philosophical Forum 50 (2):269-281.
    The intuitive, folk concept of hypocrisy is not a unified moral category. While many theorists hold that all cases of hypocrisy involve some form of deception, I argue that this is not the case. Instead, I argue for a disjunctive account of hypocrisy whereby all cases of “hypocrisy” involve either the deceiving of others about the sincerity of an agent's beliefs or the lack of will to carry through with the demands of an agent's sincere beliefs. Thus, all cases of (...)
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  15. added 2019-10-16
    Moral Grandstanding in Public Discourse: Status-Seeking Motives as a Potential Explanatory Mechanism in Predicting Conflict.Joshua B. Grubbs, Brandon Warmke, Justin Tosi, A. Shanti James & W. Keith Campbell - 2019 - PLoS ONE 14 (10).
    Public discourse is often caustic and conflict-filled. This trend seems to be particularly evident when the content of such discourse is around moral issues (broadly defined) and when the discourse occurs on social media. Several explanatory mechanisms for such conflict have been explored in recent psychological and social-science literatures. The present work sought to examine a potentially novel explanatory mechanism defined in philosophical literature: Moral Grandstanding. According to philosophical accounts, Moral Grandstanding is the use of moral talk to seek social (...)
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  16. added 2019-10-10
    Blame as a Volitional Activity.Neal Tognazzini - manuscript
    Blame is fascinating yet elusive, and it is both of these things because it is so complex. It seems to have a cognitive aspect (the belief that someone has done wrong, perhaps), but it also seems to have an emotional aspect (resentment at being disrespected, perhaps). And then of course there is the outside-of-the-head aspect of blame, which manifests itself in rebukes and reprimands, accusations and distrust, cold shoulders and estrangement. Still, accounts of blame that identify it with beliefs or (...)
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  17. added 2019-10-10
    On Losing One's Moral Voice.Neal Tognazzini - manuscript
    Although it is widely accepted that hypocritical blamers lack the standing to blame others who have committed similar wrongs, an account of what it is that’s lost when someone loses their standing to blame remains elusive. When moral address is inappropriate because it is or would be hypocritical, what is the precise nature of the complaint that the blamed party is entitled to raise, and that so often gets voiced as “I don’t have to take that from you”? In this (...)
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  18. added 2019-10-04
    Silence & Salience: On Being Judgmental.Neal Tognazzini - forthcoming - In Sebastian Schmidt & Ernst Gerhard (eds.), The Ethics of Belief and Beyond: Understanding Mental Normativity. New York: Routledge.
    This chapter explores the concept of judgmentalism: what it is and why it’s morally problematic. After criticizing an account offered by Gary Watson, the paper argues for a broader understanding of what it is to be judgmental, encompassing not just the overall beliefs that we form about someone else, but also the very pattern of our thoughts about those with whom we are involved in interpersonal relationships. The thesis is that to care about someone is to be oriented toward them, (...)
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  19. added 2019-09-14
    More or Less Within My Power: Nature, Virtue, and the Modern Stoic.Christian Coseru - 2018 - Reason Papers 40 (2):8-18.
    Can the Stoic conception of what is within our power be adapted to fit our scientifically informed view of nature in general and of human nature in particular? This paper argues that it can, but not without a revision of the Stoic’s classical dichotomy of power principle, namely that some things are up to us, while others are beyond our control. Given the extent to which the Stoic way of life flows from a certain conception of what is real, a (...)
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  20. added 2019-09-09
    Forgiving While Resenting: Justifying Elective Forgiveness.Cristina Roadevin - 2018 - Ethical Perspectives 25 (2):257-284.
    Philosophers have proposed accounts of forgiveness in which the victim is warranted in forgiving only if the wrongdoer makes amends for the wrong done. According to such an account, forgiveness is made rational by the wrongdoer apologizing. But this account creates a puzzle because it seems to render cases of undeserved elective forgiveness (where there is no apology or repentance) unjustified. My aim in the present contribution is to argue that electively forgiving unrepentant wrongdoers can be justified if we accept (...)
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  21. added 2019-09-07
    The Limits Of Human Nature.Keith Horton - 1999 - Philosophical Quarterly 49 (197):452-470.
    It has become increasingly common recently to construe human natureas setting some pretty stringent limits to moral endeavour. Many consequentialists, in particular, take considerations concerning human nature to defeat certain demanding norms that would otherwise follow from their theory.One argument is that certain commitments ground psychological incapacitiesthat prevent us from doing what would maximize the good. Another is that we would be likely to suffer some kind of psychological demoralization if we tried to become significantly more selfless. I argue that (...)
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  22. added 2019-08-29
    Do We Love For Reasons?Yongming Han - forthcoming - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research.
    Do we love for reasons? It can seem as if we do, since most cases of non‐familial love seem *selective*: coming to love a non‐family‐member often begins with our being drawn to them for what they are like. I argue, however, that we can vindicate love's selectivity, even if we maintain that there are no reasons for love; indeed, that gives us a simpler, and hence better, explanation of love's selectivity. We don't, in short, come to love *for* reasons. That (...)
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  23. added 2019-08-15
    O Princípio de Reciprocidade: conceitos, exemplos, princípios e como evitá-lo.Emanuel Isaque Cordeiro da Silva - manuscript
    O PRINCÍPIO DE RECIPROCIDADE: CONCEITO, EXEMPLOS, PRINCÍPIOS E COMO EVITÁ-LO -/- THE RECIPROCITY PRINCIPLE: CONCEPT, EXAMPLES, PRINCIPLES AND HOW TO AVOID IT -/- Emanuel Isaque Cordeiro da Silva - CAP-UFPE/IFPE-BJ/UFRPE. eisaque335@gmail.com ou eics@discente.ifpe.edu.br WhatsApp: (82)98143-8399 -/- PREMISSA -/- Desde a infância, somos ensinados a sermos gratos e devolver os favores que eles nos fizeram. Nós temos essa regra tão internalizada que funciona em muitos casos automaticamente. O problema é que existem pessoas, empresas e associações que usam essa regra contra nós, (...)
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  24. added 2019-07-07
    Folk Moral Objectivism and its Measurement.Lieuwe Zijlstra - 2019 - Journal of Experimental Social Psychology 84.
    Experimental philosophers and psychologists investigate whether people perceive moral judgments to be objectively true or false. Existing research focuses on a single dimension of ‘perceived objectivity’. The present research examines whether multiple dimensions of folk moral objectivity underlie moral judgments. It also examines whether such dimensions relate to perceived objectivity, tolerance, and people’s behavioral intentions to punish norm-violators. Exploratory factor analysis on twenty ethical items revealed three different ways of perceiving moral truth (Independent Truth, Universal Truth, Divine Truth), which each (...)
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  25. added 2019-06-29
    Betraying Trust.Collin O'Neil - 2017 - In Paul Faulkner & Thomas W. Simpson (eds.), The Philosophy of Trust. Oxford, UK: Oxford University Press. pp. 70-89.
    Trust not only disposes us to feel betrayed, trust can be betrayed. Understanding what a betrayal of trust is requires understanding how trust can ground an obligation on the part of the trusted person to act specifically as trusted. This essay argues that, since trust cannot ground an appropriate obligation where there is no prior obligation, a betrayal of trust should instead be conceived as the violation of a trust-based obligation to respect an already existing obligation. Two forms of trust (...)
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  26. added 2019-06-11
    Faces of Irrationality in Euripides: On Medea's Irrationality.Daniel Simão Nascimento - 2018 - O Que Nos Faz Pensar 43 (27):237-272.
    In Nascimento (2015) I criticized the thesis defended in Irwin (1983) according to which two of the most famous characters in Euripides’ plays, Phaedra and Medea, could be said to exemplify akratic behavior and, in the case of Phaedra, even to explain it. In that article, I’ve pointed out several weakness in these thesis in order to justify my disagreement. I also suggested that, although there was no reason why we should stop looking for examples and explanations of akratic behavior (...)
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  27. added 2019-06-05
    Monkeys, Men, and Moral Responsibility: A Neo-Aristotelian Case for a Qualitative Distinction.Paul Carron - 2017 - Southwest Philosophy Review 33 (1):151-161.
    This essay is a Neo-Aristotelian critique of Frans de Waal’s evolutionary moral sentimentalism. For a sentimentalist, moral judgments are rooted in reactive attitudes such as empathy, and De Waal argues that higher primates have the capacity for empathy—they can read other agent’s minds and react appropriately. De Waal concludes that the building blocks of human morality—primarily empathy—are present in primate social behavior. I will engage de Waal from within the sentimentalist tradition itself broadly construed and the Aristotelian virtue tradition more (...)
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  28. added 2019-06-05
    Introduction: Justice and Disadvantages During Childhood: What Does the Capability Approach Have to Offer?Gottfried Schweiger, Gunter Graf & Mar Cabezas - 2016 - Ethical Perspectives 23 (1):73 - 99.
    Justice for children and during childhood and the particular political, social and moral status of children has long been a neglected issue in ethics, and in social and political philosophy. The application of general, adult-oriented theories of justice to children can be regarded as particularly problematic. Philosophers have only recently begun to explore what it means to consider children as equals, what goods are especially valuable to them, and what are the obligations of justice different agents have toward children. In (...)
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  29. added 2019-06-05
    Agreement as the Convergence of Will: A Consensualistic Approach to Negotiation.Arvanitis Alexios - 2015 - New Ideas in Psychology 37:24-32.
    Negotiation is often treated as an attempt to reconcile conflicting interests. Instead, I define negotiation as an attempt to produce a convergence of will. Based on a distinction initially made by Rawls (1955), I draw attention away from summary rules that are introduced during negotiation, including win-win interest prescriptions, and put the emphasis on the practice rules that are validated by the final agreement. The term convergence of will refers to the co-adoption of practice rules that define the interaction that (...)
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  30. added 2019-05-28
    Divine Forgiveness and Mercy in Evolutionary Perspective.Isaac Wiegman - 2017 - In Matthew Nelson Hill & Wm Curtis Holtzen (eds.), Connecting Faith and Science. Claremont: Claremont Press. pp. 189-220.
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  31. added 2019-05-27
    Which Emotional Behaviors Are Actions?Jean Moritz Müller & Hong Yu Wong - forthcoming - In Andrea Scarantino (ed.), Routledge Handbook of Emotion Theory. New York City, New York, USA:
    There is a wide range of things we do out of emotion. For example, we smile with pleasure, our voices drop when we are sad, we recoil in shock or jump for joy, we apologize to others out of remorse. It is uncontroversial that some of these behaviors are actions. Clearly, apologizing is an action if anything is. Things seem less clear in the case of other emotional behaviors. Intuitively, the drop in a sad person’s voice is something that happens (...)
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  32. added 2019-05-02
    Is Meat the New Tobacco? Regulating Food Demand in the Age of Climate Change.Lingxi Chenyang - 2019 - Environmental Law Reporter 49.
    Switching from a meat-heavy to a plant-based diet is one of the highest-impact lifestyle changes for climate mitigation and adaptation. Conventional demand-side energy policy has focused on increasing consumption of efficient machines and fuels. Regulating food demand has key advantages. First, food consumption is biologically constrained, thus switching to more efficient foods avoids unintended consequences of switching to more efficient machines, like higher overall energy consumption. Second, food consumption, like smoking, is primed for norm- shifting because it occurs in socially (...)
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  33. added 2019-04-27
    Measuring Moral Reasoning Using Moral Dilemmas: Evaluating Reliability, Validity, and Differential Item Functioning of the Behavioral Defining Issues Test (bDIT).Youn-Jeng Choi, Hyemin Han, Kelsie J. Dawson, Stephen J. Thoma & Andrea L. Glenn - 2019 - European Journal of Developmental Psychology 16 (5):622-631.
    We evaluated the reliability, validity, and differential item functioning (DIF) of a shorter version of the Defining Issues Test-1 (DIT-1), the behavioral DIT (bDIT), measuring the development of moral reasoning. 353 college students (81 males, 271 females, 1 not reported; age M = 18.64 years, SD = 1.20 years) who were taking introductory psychology classes at a public University in a suburb area in the Southern United States participated in the present study. First, we examined the reliability of the bDIT (...)
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  34. added 2019-04-11
    Love, Anger, and Racial Injustice.Myisha Cherry - 2019 - In Adrienne Martin (ed.), The Routledge Handbook of Love in Philosophy. New York: Routledge.
    Luminaries like Martin Luther King, Jr. urge that Black Americans love even those who hate them. This can look like a rejection of anger at racial injustice. We see this rejection, too, in the growing trend of characterizing social justice movements as radical hate groups, and people who get angry at injustice as bitter and unloving. Philosophers like Martha Nussbaum argue that anger is backward-looking, status focused, and retributive. Citing the life of the Prodigal Son, the victims of the Charleston (...)
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  35. added 2019-03-23
    Elizabeth Anscombe e la svolta normativa del 1958.Sergio Volodia Marcello Cremaschi - 2010 - In Juan Andrés Mercado (ed.), Elisabeth Anscombe e la psicologia morale. Roma, Italy: Armando. pp. 43-80.
    I discuss the three theses defended by Anscombe in 'Modern Moral Philosophy'. I argue that: a) her answer to the question "why should I be moral?" requires a solution of the problem of theodicy and ignores any attempts to save the moral point of view without recourse to divine retribution; b) her notion of divine law is an odd one, more neo-Augustinian than Biblical or Scholastic; c) her image of Kantian ethics and intuitionism is the impoverished image manufactured by consequentialist (...)
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  36. added 2019-03-15
    Anscombe on the Philosophy of Psychology as Propaedeutic to Ethics.Sergio Volodia Marcello Cremaschi - 2014 - In Matteo Galletti (ed.), La mente morale. Persone, ragioni, virtù. Rome, Italy: Edizioni di Storia e Letteratura. pp. 17-62.
    The chapter reconstructs and criticizes one of Anscombe's famous three these, namely the claim that a ‘philosophy of psychology’ is a preliminary task to the construction of any possible ethical theory, or that moral philosophy ‘should be laid aside at any rate until we have an adequate philosophy of psychology, in which we are conspicuously lacking’. The claim is that Anscombe’s idea of a philosophy of psychology cannot be simply identified with that of moral psychology with which we are familiar (...)
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  37. added 2019-03-07
    Practical Moore Sentences.Matthew Mandelkern - forthcoming - Noûs.
    I discuss what I call practical Moore sentences: sentences like ‘You must close your door, but I don’t know whether you will’, which combine an order together with an avowal of agnosticism about whether the order will be obeyed. I show that practical Moore sentences are generally infelicitous. But this infelicity is surprising: it seems like there should be nothing wrong with giving someone an order while acknowledging that you do not know whether it will obeyed. I suggest that this (...)
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  38. added 2019-03-01
    Gabriele Taylor, Deadly Vices. [REVIEW]Michelle Mason - 2008 - Mind 117 (467):742-744.
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  39. added 2019-02-27
    Confucius and the Superorganism.Hagop Sarkissian - 2018 - In Philip J. Ivanhoe, Owen Flanagan, Victoria Harrison, Hagop Sarkissian & Eric Schwitzgebel (eds.), The Oneness Hypothesis: Beyond the Boundary of Self. New York, NY, USA: pp. 305-320.
    In this paper, I describe a sense of oneness that, while having its roots in a tradition of thought far removed from our own, might nonetheless be of relevance to persons today. It is not a oneness with all of humanity, let alone with all the creatures under the sky or all the elements of the cosmos. Nevertheless, it is a sense of oneness that transcends one’s own person and connects one to a larger whole. I will be calling this (...)
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  40. added 2019-02-26
    Essays in Philosophical Moral Psychology.Antti Kauppinen - 2008 - Dissertation, University of Helsinki
    This 183-page introductory part of my dissertation is an overview of some key debates in philosophical moral psychology and its methodology.
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  41. added 2019-02-21
    Shame and Attributability.Andreas Brekke Carlsson - forthcoming - In David Shoemaker (ed.), Oxford Studies in Agency and Responsibility, vol. 6.
    Responsibility as accountability is normally taken to have stricter control conditions than responsibility as attributability. A common way to argue for this claim is to point to differences in the harmfulness of blame involved in these different kinds of responsibility. This paper argues that this explanation does not work once we shift our focus from other-directed blame to self-blame. To blame oneself in the accountability sense is to feel guilt and feeling guilty is to suffer. To blame oneself in the (...)
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  42. added 2019-02-21
    Blameworthiness as Deserved Guilt.Andreas Brekke Carlsson - 2017 - The Journal of Ethics 21 (1):89-115.
    It is often assumed that we are only blameworthy for that over which we have control. In recent years, however, several philosophers have argued that we can be blameworthy for occurrences that appear to be outside our control, such as attitudes, beliefs and omissions. This has prompted the question of why control should be a condition on blameworthiness. This paper aims at defending the control condition by developing a new conception of blameworthiness: To be blameworthy, I argue, is most fundamentally (...)
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  43. added 2019-01-01
    Resistance to Position Change, Motivated Reasoning, and Polarization.Matthew L. Stanley, Paul Henne, Brenda Yang & Felipe De Brigard - forthcoming - Political Behavior.
    People seem more divided than ever before over social and political issues, entrenched in their existing beliefs and unwilling to change them. Empirical research on mechanisms driving this resistance to belief change has focused on a limited set of well-known, charged, contentious issues and has not accounted for deliberation over reasons and arguments in belief formation prior to experimental sessions. With a large, heterogeneous sample (N = 3,001), we attempt to overcome these existing problems, and we investigate the causes and (...)
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  44. added 2018-12-17
    Remembering Moral and Immoral Actions in Constructing the Self.Matthew L. Stanley, Paul Henne & Felipe De Brigard - forthcoming - Memory and Cognition.
    Having positive moral traits is central to one’s sense of self, and people generally are motivated to maintain a positive view of the self in the present. But it remains unclear how people foster a positive, morally good view of the self in the present. We suggest that recollecting and reflecting on moral and immoral actions from the personal past jointly help to construct a morally good view of the current self in complementary ways. More specifically, across four studies we (...)
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  45. added 2018-09-06
    Personal Value, Biographical Identity, and Retrospective Attitudes.Camil Golub - 2019 - Australasian Journal of Philosophy 97 (1):72-85.
    We all could have had better lives, yet often do not wish that our lives had gone differently, especially when we contemplate alternatives that vastly diverge from our actual life course. What, if anything, accounts for such conservative retrospective attitudes? I argue that the right answer involves the significance of our personal attachments and our biographical identity. I also examine other options, such as the absence of self-to-self connections across possible worlds and a general conservatism about value.
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  46. added 2018-08-31
    Ideals and Idols: On the Nature and Appropriateness of Agential Admiration.Antti Kauppinen - forthcoming - In Alfred Archer & Andre Grahlé (eds.), The Moral Psychology of Admiration. Rowman and Littlefield.
    When we admire a person, we don’t just have a wow-response towards them, as we might towards a painting or a sunset. Rather, we construe them as realizing an ideal of the person in their lives to a conspicuous degree. To merit admiration, it is not enough simply to do something valuable or to possess desirable character traits. Rather, one’s achievements must manifest commitments and character traits that define a worthwhile ideal. Agential admiration, I argue, is a person-focused attitude like (...)
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  47. added 2018-08-15
    Being Realistic About Motivation.Charlie Kurth - 2019 - Philosophical Studies 176 (10):2751-2765.
    T.M. Scanlon’s ‘reasons fundamentalism’ is thought to face difficulties answering the normative question—that is, explaining why it’s irrational to not do what you judge yourself to have most reason to do (e.g., Dreier 2014a). I argue that this difficulty results from Scanlon’s failure to provide a theory of mind that can give substance to his account of normative judgment and its tie to motivation. A central aim of this paper is to address this deficiency. To do this, I draw on (...)
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  48. added 2018-07-29
    Vergiffenis in Elsschots Het Been: Boorman vs. Laarmans.Luc Bovens - 2008 - Algemeen Nederlands Tijdschrift voor Wijsbegeerte 100 (4).
    In the novel "Het Been" by the Flemish writer Willem Elsschot. In the novel, a businessman becomes obsessive over the fact that a victim of his unscrupulous business practices refuses to forgive him. This raises the following questions: Why does one find it upsetting when the victim of one's wrongdoing refuses to accept our apologies? Why does one find it upsetting when the victim is unwilling to grant us the forgiveness that we are asking for?
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  49. added 2018-07-26
    Immorality and Bu Daode, Unculturedness and Bu Wenming.Vilius Dranseika, Renatas Berniunas & Vytis Silius - forthcoming - Journal of Cultural Cognitive Science.
    In contemporary Western moral philosophy literature that discusses the Chinese ethical tradition, it is a commonplace practice to use the Chinese term daode 道德 as a technical translation of the English term moral. The present study provides some empirical evidence showing a discrepancy between the terms moral and daode. There is a much more pronounced difference between prototypically immoral and prototypically uncultured behaviors in English (USA) than between prototypically bu daode 不道德 and prototypically bu wenming 不文明 behaviors in Mandarin Chinese (...)
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  50. added 2018-07-25
    Grit.Sarah Paul & Jennifer Morton - 2018 - Ethics 129 (2):175-203.
    Many of our most important goals require months or even years of effort to achieve, and some never get achieved at all. As social psychologists have lately emphasized, success in pursuing such goals requires the capacity for perseverance, or "grit." Philosophers have had little to say about grit, however, insofar as it differs from more familiar notions of willpower or continence. This leaves us ill-equipped to assess the social and moral implications of promoting grit. We propose that grit has an (...)
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