View topic on PhilPapers for more information
Related categories

25 found
Order:
More results on PhilPapers
  1. Moral Worth Requires a Fundamental Concern for What Ultimately Matters.Douglas W. Portmore - manuscript
    An act that accords with duty has moral worth if and only if the agent’s reason for performing it is the same as what would have motivated a perfectly virtuous agent to perform it. On one of the two leading accounts of moral worth, an act that accords with duty has moral worth if and only if the agent’s reason for performing it is the fact that it’s obligatory. On the other, an act that accords with duty has moral worth (...)
    Remove from this list   Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark  
  2. On Progress: The Role of Race in Kant’s Philosophy of History.Elvira Basevich - forthcoming - In Proceedings of the 13th International Kant Congress ‘The Court of Reason’. Boston: Walter de Gruyter.
    Remove from this list   Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark  
  3. Moral Worth and Knowing How to Respond to Reasons.J. J. Cunningham - forthcoming - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research.
    It’s one thing to do the right thing. It’s another to be creditable for doing the right thing. Being creditable for doing the right thing requires that one does the right thing out of a morally laudable motive and that there is a non-accidental fit between those two elements. This paper argues that the two main views of morally creditable action – the Right Making Features View and the Rightness Itself View – fail to capture that non-accidentality constraint: the first (...)
    Remove from this list   Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   1 citation  
  4. Beyond Bad Beliefs.Nathan Robert Howard - forthcoming - Journal of Moral Philosophy.
    Philosophers have recently come to focus on explaining the phenomenon of ​bad beliefs,​ beliefs that are apparently true and well-evidenced but nevertheless objectionable. Despite this recent focus, a consensus is already forming around a particular explanation of these beliefs’ badness called ​moral encroachment​, according to which, roughly, the moral stakes engendered by bad beliefs make them particularly difficult to justify. This paper advances an alternative account not just of bad beliefs but of bad attitudes more generally according to which bad (...)
    Remove from this list   Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark  
  5. Moral Fetishism and a Third Desire for What’s Right.Nathan Robert Howard - forthcoming - Journal of Ethics and Social Philosophy.
    A major point of debate about morally good motives concerns an ambiguity in the truism that good and strong-willed people desire to do what‘s right. This debate is shaped by the assumption that ‘what‘s right‘ combines in only two ways with ‘desire‘, leading to distinct de dicto and de re readings of the truism. However, a third reading of such expressions is possible, first identified by Janet Fodor (1979/2014), which has gone wholly unacknowledged by philosophers in this debate. I identify (...)
    Remove from this list   Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark  
  6. The Goals of Moral Worth.Nathan Robert Howard - forthcoming - Oxford Studies in Metaethics.
    While it is tempting to suppose that an act has moral worth just when and because it is motivated by sufficient moral reasons, philosophers have, largely, come to doubt this analysis. Doubt is rooted in two claims. The first is that some facts can motivate a given act in multiple ways, not all of which are consistent with moral worth. The second is the orthodox view that normative reasons are facts. I defend the tempting analysis by proposing and defending a (...)
    Remove from this list   Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   2 citations  
  7. Creditworthiness and Matching Principles.Jonathan Way - forthcoming - In Mark Timmons (ed.), Oxford Studies in Normative Ethics, Vol 7. Oxford University Press.
    You are creditworthy for φ-ing only if φ-ing is the right thing to do. Famously though, further conditions are needed too – Kant’s shopkeeper did the right thing, but is not creditworthy for doing so. This case shows that creditworthiness requires that there be a certain kind of explanation of why you did the right thing. The reasons for which you act – your motivating reasons – must meet some further conditions. In this paper, I defend a new account of (...)
    Remove from this list   Download  
    Translate
     
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   6 citations  
  8. Admiration, Appreciation, and Aesthetic Worth.Daniel Whiting - forthcoming - Australasian Journal of Philosophy.
    What is aesthetic appreciation? In this paper, I approach this question in an indirection fashion. First, I introduce the Kantian notion of moral worthy action and an influential analysis of it. Next, I generalize that analysis from the moral to the aesthetic domain, and from actions to affects. Aesthetic appreciation, I suggest, consists in an aesthetically worthy affective response. After unpacking the proposal, I show that it has non-trivial implications while cohering with a number of existing insights concerning the nature (...)
    Remove from this list   Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark  
  9. One Desire Too Many.Nathan Robert Howard - 2021 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 102 (2):302-317.
    I defend the widely-held view that morally worthy action need not be motivated by a desire to promote rightness as such. Some have recently come to reject this view, arguing that desires for rightness as such are necessary for avoiding a certain kind of luck thought incompatible with morally worthy action. I show that those who defend desires for rightness as such on the basis of this argument misunderstand the relationship between moral worth and the kind of luck that their (...)
    Remove from this list   Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   2 citations  
  10. Moral Worth, Credit, and Non-Accidentality.Keshav Singh - 2020 - In Mark Timmons (ed.), Oxford Studies in Normative Ethics, Vol. 10. Oxford University Press.
    This paper defends an account of moral worth. Moral worth is a status that some, but not all, morally right actions have. Unlike with merely right actions, when an agent performs a morally worthy action, she is necessarily creditworthy for doing the right thing. First, I argue that two dominant views of moral worth have been unable to fully capture this necessary connection. On one view, an action is morally worthy if and only if its agent is motivated by the (...)
    Remove from this list   Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   1 citation  
  11. The Identity-Enactment Account of Associative Duties.Saba Bazargan-Forward - 2019 - Philosophical Studies 176 (9):2351-2370.
    Associative duties are agent-centered duties to give defeasible moral priority to our special ties. Our strongest associative duties are to close friends and family. According to reductionists, our associative duties are just special duties—i.e., duties arising from what I have done to others, or what others have done to me. These include duties to abide by promises and contracts, compensate our benefactors in ways expressing gratitude, and aid those whom we have made especially vulnerable to our conduct. I argue, though, (...)
    Remove from this list   Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   1 citation  
  12. Moral Offsetting.Thomas Foerster - 2019 - Philosophical Quarterly 69 (276):617-635.
    This paper explores the idea of moral offsetting: the idea that good actions can offset bad actions in a way roughly analogous to carbon offsetting. For example, a meat eater might try to offset their consumption of meat by donating to an animal welfare charity. In this paper, I clarify the idea of moral offsetting, consider whether the leading moral theories and theories of moral worth are consistent with the possibility of moral offsetting, and consider potential benefits of moral offsetting. (...)
    Remove from this list   Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   1 citation  
  13. Accepting Moral Luck.Robert J. Hartman - 2019 - In Ian M. Church & Robert J. Hartman (eds.), The Routledge Handbook of the Philosophy and Psychology of Luck. New York: Routledge.
    I argue that certain kinds of luck can partially determine an agent’s praiseworthiness and blameworthiness. To make this view clearer, consider some examples. Two identical agents drive recklessly around a curb, and one but not the other kills a pedestrian. Two identical corrupt judges would freely take a bribe if one were offered. Only one judge is offered a bribe, and so only one judge takes a bribe. Put in terms of these examples, I argue that the killer driver and (...)
    Remove from this list   Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   4 citations  
  14. Testimonial Worth.Andrew Peet - 2019 - Synthese 198 (3):2391-2411.
    This paper introduces and argues for the hypothesis that judgments of testimonial worth are central to our practice of normatively appraising speech. It is argued that judgments of testimonial worth are central both to the judgement that an agent has lied, and to the acceptance of testimony. The hypothesis that, in lying, an agent necessarily displays poor testimonial worth, is shown to resolve a new puzzle about lying, and the recalcitrant problem raised by the existence of bald faced lies, and (...)
    Remove from this list   Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark  
  15. From an Axiological Standpoint.Miles Tucker - 2019 - Ratio 32 (2):131-138.
    I maintain that intrinsic value is the fundamental concept of axiology. Many contemporary philosophers disagree; they say the proper object of value theory is final value. I examine three accounts of the nature of final value: the first claims that final value is non‐instrumental value; the second claims that final value is the value a thing has as an end; the third claims that final value is ultimate or non‐derivative value. In each case, I argue that the concept of final (...)
    Remove from this list   Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   2 citations  
  16. Sosa on Epistemic Value: A Kantian Obstacle.Matthew McGrath - 2018 - Synthese (12):5287-5300.
    In recent work, Sosa proposes a comprehensive account of epistemic value based on an axiology for attempts. According to this axiology, an attempt is better if it succeeds, better still if it is apt (i.e., succeeds through competence), and best if it is fully apt, (i.e., guided to aptness by apt beliefs that it would be apt). Beliefs are understood as attempts aiming at the truth. Thus, a belief is better if true, better still if apt, and best if fully (...)
    Remove from this list   Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark  
  17. Profound Intellectual Disability and the Bestowment View of Moral Status.Simo Vehmas & Benjamin Curtis - 2017 - Cambridge Quarterly of Healthcare Ethics 26 (3):505-516.
    This article engages with debates concerning the moral worth of human beings with profound intellectual and multiple disabilities (PIMDs). Some argue that those with such disabilities are morally less valuable than so-called normal human beings, whereas others argue that all human beings have equal moral value and so each group of humans ought to be treated with equal concern. We will argue in favor of a reconciliatory view that takes points from opposing camps in the debates about the moral worth (...)
    Remove from this list   Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark  
  18. Supererogation, Inside and Out: Toward an Adequate Scheme for Common Sense Morality.Paul McNamara - 2011 - In Mark Timmons (ed.), Oxford Studies in Normative Ethics, Volume I. Oxford University Press. pp. 202-235.
    The standard analysis of supererogation is that of optional actions that are praiseworthy to perform, but not blameworthy to skip. Widespread assumptions are that action beyond the call is at least necessarily equivalent to supererogation ("The Equivalence") and that forgoing certain agent-favoring prerogatives entails supererogation (“The Corollary”). I argue that the classical conception of supererogation is not reconcilable with the Equivalence or the Corollary, and that the classical analysis of supererogation is seriously defective. I sketch an enriched conceptual scheme, “Doing (...)
    Remove from this list   Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   13 citations  
  19. The Ethical Patiency of Cultural Heritage.R. F. J. Seddon - 2011 - Dissertation, Durham University
    Current treatments of cultural heritage as an object of moral concern (whether it be the heritage of mankind or of some particular group of people) have tended to treat it as a means to ensure human wellbeing: either as ‘cultural property’ or ‘cultural patrimony’, suggesting concomitant rights of possession and exclusion, or otherwise as something which, gaining its ethical significance from the roles it plays in people’s lives and the formation of their identities, is the beneficiary at most of indirect (...)
    Remove from this list   Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark  
  20. Wartość życia podmiotowego z perspektywy nauki.Andrzej Elżanowski - 2009 - Przeglad Filozoficzny - Nowa Seria 18 (3 (71)):81-96.
    In the evolution of the vertebrates and probably a few other animals (Metazoa), biological values have been translated (subjectivized) into affective experience that necessarily involves the consciousness of external objects/events (as different from one’s body), which is tantamount to the origins of subjectivity. Mammals, birds and other vertebrates are experiencing subjects even though their negative and positive experience greatly vary in scope. Some mammals are capable of vicarious experience and may act as empathic agents, and some of them, at least (...)
    Remove from this list   Download  
    Translate
     
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark  
  21. Addressing the 'Global Basic Structure' in the Ethics of International Health Research Involving Human Subjects.Janet Borgerson - 2005 - Journal of Philosophical Research 30 (9999):235-249.
    The context of international health research involving human subjects, and this should appear obvious, is the human community. As such, basic questions of how human beings should be treated by other human beings, particularly in situations of unequal power – e.g., in the form of control, choice, or opportunity – lay at the foundations of related ethical discourse when ethics are discussed at all. I trace a narrative that follows upon a recent revision process of international guidelines for biomedical research (...)
    Remove from this list   Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   1 citation  
  22. Achieving Moral Progress Despite Moral Regress.Ben Dixon - 2005 - Social Philosophy Today 21:157-172.
    Moral progress and some of the conditions under which groups can make it is the focus of this paper. More specifically, I address a problem arising from the use of pluralistic criteria for determining moral progress. Pluralistic criteria can allow for judgments that moral progress has taken place where there is causally related moral regression. Indeed, an otherwise well-argued pluralistic theory put forward by Michelle Moody-Adams allows for such conflicting judgments. I argue, however, that the way in which Moody-Adams handles (...)
    Remove from this list   Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark  
  23. (Inter) Subjective-Situated Moral Ought: Zahavi’s Reconstruction of Husserl’s Metaphysics of Intersubjectivity and its Ethical Implications.Mark Anthony Dacela - manuscript
    Remove from this list   Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark  
  24. Moral Worth and Our Ultimate Moral Concerns.Douglas W. Portmore - manuscript
    Some right acts have what philosophers call moral worth. A right act has moral worth if and only if its agent deserves credit for having acted rightly in this instance. And I argue that an agent deserves credit for having acted rightly if and only if her act issues from an appropriate set of concerns, where the appropriateness of these concerns is a function what her ultimate moral concerns should be. Two important upshots of the resulting account of moral worth (...)
    Remove from this list   Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark  
  25. DNA, Masterpieces, and Abortion: Shifting the Grounds of the Debate.Reed Richter - manuscript
    Writers, philosophers, and theologians have oft made the comparison between being a mature human being and a masterpiece work of art or design. Employing the analogy between the creation of artistic value and the creation of full-fledged human value, this paper stakes out a middle ground between pro-choice and pro-life by considering a more general account of value and the relationship between being a potential X and a mature implementation of X's potential. I argue that the value of a potential (...)
    Remove from this list   Download  
    Translate
     
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark